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RYSZARD STEMPLOWSKI
Introduction
What is the actual condition of the state in Latin America? Each contributor to
this volume has been invited to answer this question by writing an interpreta-
tive essay from a specifically suggested angle: the origins of the state; govern-
ment and society; economic growth; society and economy; nation-building;
the indigenous population; political culture; international relations etc. It was
the contributors’ decision which particular states to focus on in order to best
illuminate the issues involved.
Our main focus in the volume is on outlining some of the processes con-
cerning the state now, two hundred years since the first declarations of inde-
pendence. Along the way, we tackle both theoretical and normative issues. All
the contributors to this volume share a long-cultivated multidisciplinary re-
search interest in Latin America but the volume also reflects our disagreement
on what we take the state to be as well as on the prevailing situation in Latin
America.
Each chapter reflects the views of its author all the way down to his choice
of British or American English. As a result all chapters reflect the authors’
views on the contemporary state of the State in Latin America, as well as – why
not say it – the authors’ identities.
The book is aimed primarily at academics and students of the humanities
and social sciences. The opening essay by Horst Pietschmann, “On the Ori-
gins of the Latin American States”, begins by examining the validity of
the notion of “Latin America”, an issue that each and every author in this book
had to face. Pietschmann delves deep into the core of the matter by pointing
out that the usage of the term in the traditional historiography was based upon
several premises: (1) The nineteenth-century concept of the nation and a vi-
sion of a common history treating “colonization” as a self-contained whole or
an analytical unit, followed by the common struggle for independence, thus
resulting in a parallel concept of the nation embedded in the sharing of the
revolutionary-liberal ideals of the independence period. (2) The rejection of
8 ON THE STATE OF LATIN AMERICAN STATES. APPROACHING THE  BICENTENARY
the colonial past linked up in the most simple way possible with the experience
of the “heroic” period of aspirations for independence, one confined to the
period of Carlos III since 1759, identifying it as the epoch of the allegedly first
manifestations of the opposition to the Spanish-Portuguese regime. Accepting
these premises meant forgetting the corporative – statist – ethnic traditions of
the colonial past which survived and continued for a long time after indepen-
dence. It also allowed the local elites to largely disregard the tensions and
conflicts between the ancient traditions and the new ideals of the revolutionary
period that grounded the new constitutions in Spanish America. It took numer-
ous constitutional amendments, from 1811 onwards, to introduce changes in
legislation to resolve some of these tensions and conflicts in public policies,
both with respect to external relations (e.g. in accepting the principle of uti
possidetis or interdict for the purpose of retaining possession of a territory,
granted to one who, at the time of contesting suit, was in possession of
a territory in order that he might be declared the legal possessor) and home
regulation (e.g. with regard to individual rights, private property, the state
monopoly of law-implementation). The establishment and delineation of inter-
national borders (as resulting from uti possidetis) were in general based upon
colonial antecedents, and had been achieved much earlier than the “coloniza-
tion” and “civilization” of the interior by the new states, the other way round
than in Europe. And so, within the old borders of the new “nations” it was still
possible to speak about the non-integrated population as “barbarians”, as the
ancient criteria of legally-fixed social differentiation became social-economic
criteria, with the antagonism between the city and the country built into the
system.
This state of affairs became increasingly challenged since the second half of
the nineteenth century both at home and from abroad. New concepts of ethnic
minorities (the science of anthropology), as well as environmental protection
concerning transnational areas (e.g. the rainforest), came from abroad and
gained gradual acceptance at home. At the same time internal colonization was
inducing migrations and other phenomena that were spreading across interna-
tional borders and creating tensions over the control of resources, etc. These
processes were in effect undermining the solidarity of Latin American states
while intensifying communication among them. Also, a re-ethnification of some
minorities was gradually emerging, which, in turn, led to attempts at redefining
the nation in terms of its own ancient traditions and/or re-adapting to the
‘national’ traditions of the past with the help of traditional concepts of the Left.
In the face of these tendencies, the big states of the region have intensified
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their efforts at modernization, spilling their presence over their international
borders (Brazil vis-à-vis some of its neighbouring countries, Mexico vis-à-vis
Central America).
Pietschmann makes it clear that this approach results from a reinterpreta-
tion of the Iberian colonial expansion. It focuses on the historic significance of
three centres of colonial control: Mexico (city), Lima and Bahia (the last centre
later relocating itself to Rio de Janeiro). The centres converted themselves into
sub-metropolises or sub-empires under a loose European supervision. Each of
them was a seat of the institutional power and maintained control over local
resources, and, in the case of Mexico and Lima, also over cultural activities
(universities, printing houses, secondary education). These colonial systems of
Central and Southern America, as existing at the end of the sixteenth century,
resemble, argues Pietschmann, the system of domination of the Roman Empire
of the late epoch with its various capitals and methods of extracting a surplus.
This kind of imperial system was characterised by contradictions and conflicts
among the centres, peripheries and the frontier zones, the phenomenon of
intermittent conflict and exchange displacing itself more and more towards the
interior. At the same time the indigenous peoples in Mexico and Peru, who in
the pre-colonial times were highly culturally and politically developed, quickly
redefined their identity along catholic-statist lines, thus obtaining a legal status
within the new system of domination.
At the beginning of the eighteenth century the European metropolises be-
gan to introduce mercantilism and this required a new system of direct territo-
rial governance. What we call now the “second conquest” by Spain and Portu-
gal was started by introducing privileged metropolitan companies and radical
fiscal and administrative reforms. In the process the sub-empire of Lima was
dismantled, and the Mexican one was considerably reduced in its competences.
In Brazil, a new centre emerged in the shape of Rio de Janeiro owing to the
gold discoveries in the South, and it is to this centre that even the Portuguese
Court moved from Europe (1818). More and more, the ancient legitimacy
established in the colonial type relationship between the Europeans and the
Americans appeared wrecked, and the political idiom in use on the two shores
of the Atlantic was becoming different. Conflicts emerged between those born
in Europe, and the Americans (where the division between the Conservatives
and the Liberals emerged as a new sign and premise of change). In the end
Napoleon Bonaparte destroyed what remained of monarchic legitimacy in Spanish
America thus inducing not just the independence of the already more or less
solidly formed state entities but also giving rise to even wider issues concerning
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the legitimacy of the (new) state and nation. Things were different in Brazil
since independence was granted by a monarchical executive act thus assuring
a long period of stability and internal expansion and creating some of the
conditions for establishing Brazil as a regional power.
Lawrence S. Graham writes about “Government and Society in the
Latin American States”, and provides an overview of consecutive govern-
ments together with his assessment of prevailing trends. We learn from his
essay that in order to understand the distinctiveness of the Latin American state
system in a global setting, one always needs to keep in mind that government
and society in Latin America are inseparably linked to two factors: (1) the
choices made by governing elites at the time of independence, as well as (2) the
institutional framework that evolved in the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies at differential rates throughout the region. The author takes Brazil and
the Southern Cone countries as the point of departure for his analysis. This is
because, as he argues, the further south one goes the easier it is to discern
these two significant factors: (1) the importance of the different decisions made
by governing elites in the regions where movements emerged to create inde-
pendent national states in Latin America, and (2) the different degrees to which
governing elites in these countries were able to consolidate both the state and
the nation on the basis of their relative autonomy from external interventions
and influence. The southern regions of the Western Hemisphere had to con-
tend much less with external actors, namely the European Powers and the
United States, as primary factors affecting nation-state formation. As one pro-
ceeds northward in South America and into the circum-Caribbean basin, the
role of external agents becomes more important in determining the outcomes
of nation-state formation. From this base, then, one is in a better position to
explain comparatively the diversity to be found among these states, all of which
have adopted presidential forms of rule rather than parliamentary options.
Graham examines seven country cases, beginning with Brazil as the largest
and the most unique Latin American state and ending with Uruguay, a very
small country, which has done the greatest amount of experimentation in cor-
recting for the weaknesses of presidential rule in consolidating its democratic
system. The other cases are introduced to call attention to a peculiar set of
properties of Latin American politics in the twentieth – twenty-first centuries: the
failure to incorporate effectively the masses into democratic rule and the out-
comes produced by populist politics (Argentina); the importance of democratic
values and the skillful use of national resources, both physical and human, by
governing elites and their diffusion into mass politics (Chile); the problem of
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incorporating indigenous peoples into national societies shaped by Western
concepts of democratic practices, the state and the nation (Peru); the reap-
pearance of populism in new forms and the breakdown of middle and upper-
class democracy (Venezuela); the consolidation of limited democracy in the
face of elite dissensus and enormous geographical disparities in a single coun-
try which makes consolidation of a mass-based democracy difficult (Colombia);
and the difficulties of consolidating both the state and nation and making demo-
cratic presidentialism work when a country borders a Great Power, such as the
United States, or falls within its sphere of influence (Mexico).
Colin M. Lewis writes about “The State and Economic Growth in
Latin America”. Reviewing the experience of the last century or so, he ad-
dresses several key issues. These include: the relationship between economic
growth and nation-state formation; the nature of connections between particu-
lar patterns of economic growth and state configurations; the ideology and
policies associated with specific periods of economic and social change. The
author explores these themes by addressing individual phases or cycles, and
seeks to challenge a number of conventional assumptions. Lewis argues that
state legitimacy has been determined by the provision of public goods, the
supply of which underpinned economic growth as well as political order. The
main findings of the paper are that since the late nineteenth century successive
state ‘models’ have sought to embed the market. In the latter part of the nine-
teenth and early twentieth century this was done through external economic
opening and pragmatic government intervention in domestic markets. Inser-
tion in the world economy during the first age of globalisation made the state
and partially formed the market. Between the 1910s and 1930s, state forma-
tions changed, driven as much by internal forces as external events. State struc-
tures, though often subject to profound challenges, proved to be fairly resil-
ient, partly due to a growth in the outreach of the state represented by an
increasing emphasis on the provision of social services as economic infrastruc-
ture. Public goods of various forms thereby became more widely available.
Although, after the 1940s, the state became ‘larger’ and governments virtu-
ally everywhere intervened in the economy, the argument here is that the em-
phasis remained that of embedding enterprise. The extent to which such efforts
succeeded in creating national capitalism, when states ‘retreated’ and econo-
mies ‘opened’ after the 1980s, remains a subject of sharp controversy. Yet the
ideologies and strategies associated with the neo-populist-business alliance re-
gimes of the 1990s and the market-friendly governments of the democratic left
of the early twenty-first century have, as their principal policy objective, the
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facilitation of market-capitalism. Hence Lewis maintains that from the oligar-
chic states of the late nineteenth century, to the post-Washington Consensus
regimes of the early twenty-first, an enduring feature of the political economy
of Latin America has been the quest to form and facilitate markets, a process
intrinsic to state legitimacy.
Patricio Valdivieso writes about “The State and the National Economy”.
He inclines towards the view that the present situation in Latin America may be
best seen as resulting from a combination of the following two factors: the
legacy of development that took place between independence and the 1970s
(hence the restricted autonomy, instability, poverty, inequalities, marginalization
and social exclusion) and neoliberal policies (which resulted in the opening of
markets, a strengthening of the private sector and a remaking of the relation
between the state and the national economy through deregulation). Owing to
the neoliberal spur, Latin America inserted itself more securely into the world
economy, but at a high social cost, and while preserving unfavourable condi-
tions of development. This situation, argues the author, needs to be overcome.
There is a broad consensus regarding how to do this among political actors,
governments, international organizations (the United Nations, specially ECLAC,
PNUD, and programmes such as the UN Millenium Development Goals, or
global governance as promoted by the World Bank, etc.) and the participants
of conferences such as UNCTAD, and scholars in general. At the same time,
different countries may face different priorities. Valdivieso zealously argues
that to improve the situation or overcome mistakes requires integrating the
economic and the social, and setting up as the key goals of policy making
human development and institutional stability. The main task of the state in
Latin America should be to stimulate economic growth under conditions of
globalization, and to develop a social and institutional order according to gen-
erally accepted principles of justice (commutative, legalistic, and distributive).
The author stimulates the debate on how to convert the stated goals into goals
achieved.
Tadeusz Paleczny writes on “The State and Nation-forming Processes
in Latin America”, against the background of what he calls a general theory
of social development in Latin America. Specifically, he examines the main theo-
retical models of nation-building processes with reference to their political,
economic, and cultural distinctiveness. The most important phases of develop-
ment in Latin American nation-building processes are listed and discussed.
Paleczny believes that successive historical periods, which he lists as the colo-
nial, postcolonial, republican, modernist and post modernist, ensured unique
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conditions for social integration and national assimilation; conditions that were
present only in the countries of Latin America. One section of his article fo-
cuses on the role and significance of civic ties and the state in the shaping of
the national consciousness of Latin American societies. Besides language, reli-
gion, and cultural heritage (all resulting from colonial and migratory tradition),
the state has been the most important factor in the growth of national integra-
tion. Nation-building processes in Latin America lead towards syncretism,
hybridisation, transcultural reality, and the emergence of a Latin American
civilisational area. The author provides a description of the Brazilian nation-
building processes, turning his attention to the roles played by religion, race,
and ethnicity in the context of a multicultural, pluralistic civil society. He con-
cludes that Brazil – much like Mexico – is a complex, multicultural civic society
with traits that are characteristic of both a nation and a civilisation.
Aleksander Posern-Zieliński writes about “The State and the Indig-
enous Peoples in Latin America”, and more specifically, countries with
a large share of indigenous (“Indian”) people (the Mesoamerican and Andean
regions). These relationships – between the state and the indigenous peoples –
are situated in specific economic, social, racial and cultural circumstances. In
turn these circumstances should be analysed from two perspectives: the
ethnopolicy of the state towards the indigenous citizens and the Indians’
ethnostrategy towards the state.
The relationships in question were from the very beginning antagonistic,
and they continue to be so perceived by the autochthonous population. The
contemporary state – shaped by the Creole, Mestizo, and immigrant elites
(from Europe and Asia) – has until recently ignored the actual needs of the
autochthonous population. It did not represent the interests of the indigenous
population, even though at times it would disguise this fact by calling to life
a variety of institutions formally charged with taking care of these peoples. In
fact, the attitude towards the indigenous people of both the dominant sections
of society and the apparatus of the state was (and still is) strongly permeated
with racial prejudice, a sense of cultural superiority, and civilisational and mis-
sionary paternalism, i.e. the ideas that have legitimised the social and economic
domination of the Creole-Mestizo sector over the indigenous groups. These
features categorically point to the postcolonial character of ethical and social
relations. They also explain, to some extent, the contemporary postulates of
the indigenous groups and individuals in defence of their rights and for the
improvement of their lives, all aimed at the liquidation of the continuing struc-
tures of endocolonialist domination visible in the economic (exploitation), so-
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cial (exclusion), civic (lack of subjectivity), and cultural (acculturation) realms.
These relationships between the state and indigenous peoples became increas-
ingly questioned thanks to the progress of democratisation. The newly estab-
lished indigenous organisations and their leaders, as well as “friends of Indians”
gathered in NGOs, formulated a position critical towards the earlier relations.
This is how the phenomenon of indigenous activism came to be. Its manifesta-
tion is a network of organisations from the local self-government level up to
national and international federations, ranging also from ethnic parties to the
indigenous peoples’ representatives in parliaments and governments. Posern-
Zieliński argues that the contemporary indigenous movement in Latin America
owes much to the economic development that triggered the modernisation of
the life of the indigenous population by breaking their former isolation. On the
grounds of these changes, the idea of ethnodevelopment (etnodesarrollo) took
shape. It highlights strongly the need for the advancement of the indigenous
population, while preserving their separate identity. A view was also becoming
widespread, outside of the indegenous population, that the state should also
serve the interests of the population in question, and do this by ensuring its
active participation as citizens. This is how a new idea of a pluralist state in the
ethnic sense began to take shape in Latin America. It is obvious that this new
model of the state should lay the foundations for a new type of national and
political community. It would incorporate the indigenous population – with full
rights – into the main current of the country’s life. The consequences of the
complex processes described by Posern-Zieliński are enormous, and the cur-
rent Bolivian experiment may turn out to be even more important than the
Cuban one.
In my own chapter on “States and Political Cultures in Latin America”,
I use some considerations on political culture as a method for throwing some
light on the state. Therefore I begin by defining the notion of the political
culture of a society in a given state and time as a set of widespread and rela-
tively stable and respected beliefs (a) related to the identity of the society as
a political nation that is the constitutionally defined sovereign, (b) expressed in
public discourse, and (c) referring to the state as the institutional correlate of
that identity, and especially to the constitutional system of policy-making. It
helps me to provide a concise review of the literature on the concept of political
culture, thus identifying various perspectives of looking at the state. I focus on
such aspects of the connection between the state and political culture as public
discourse, policy-making, democratisation, and collective (national) identity in
the state. The results are tentative at best. The lingering uncertainties about the
15RYSZARD STEMPLOWSKI • INTRODUCTION
state as such are not much weakened by the rather dispiriting vagueness of all
of the conceptualizations of political culture, and even more so by the variety,
scarcity and inconclusiveness of the actual empirical data and findings. The
connection between the state and political culture naturally exists, yet the re-
sults of seeking a specific cause-and-effect connection allow us to speak of no
more than a probability. This is all the more so since the dearth of studies by
Latin Americanists of the state and political culture combines here with a short-
age of such research in Latin America. On top of that, the parallelism between
thinking about “the cultural” and “the political” is manifested – on the one
hand – in the inconsistently controlled Eurocentrism of many works, which in
turn is accompanied on the other hand by the eagerness to accentuate the non-
European uniqueness and supposition that, if the European observer does not
understand something in Latin America, it is because this “something” carries
within itself ex definitione a deepness of meaning. Despite all of these prob-
lems, discussion of these ties helps us in thinking about the state – both as an
institution and as the specific type of organisation of a society, functioning
thanks to the systemic connection of norms (the building material for institu-
tions) with a population living in a natural environment within a specific terri-
tory, that is about the nation state. Yet before one will be able to say something
more revealing about a state from the point of view of political culture, ac-
counting both for continuity and social change, before one will actually be able
to clarify the issues and the questions about the state through the discussion of
political culture, there is a huge amount of research to be done.
Carlos Escudé writes in Spanish about the Iberoamerican civilization
and its international relations, rather than just the international relations
of the Latin American states. His essay starts with the premise that the main
actor in so-called inter-“national” relations is not the state, but what has been
dubbed the “state/society complex”. This concept reminds us that, rather than
the product of grand geopolitical objectives, foreign policy, in medium and
long-term, tends to be conditioned heavily by domestic economic, social and
cultural factors. Escudé’s position can be read as supporting the thesis that
policy-making is a domain in which foreign policy-making is whatever concerns
foreign subjects. That is, foreign policy-making is understood more broadly
than it often has been in the literature.
Rather than cataloguing events and treaties, Escudé’s chapter elucidates
the causes that explain the peculiar place occupied by Latin American countries
in the international relations of today´s world. He digs into the historical pro-
cesses that led to their emergence as nation-states, in order to find clues for the
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understanding of present-day phenomena. The author points to the peculiari-
ties which differentiate Latin America as a region from the rest of the world.
Among these are: (1) the unique commonality among this family of nations
which, in the case of the Spanish-speaking countries, ranks by far as the world’s
most extensive contiguous land mass sharing a single language; (2) the uniquely
low levels of massive violence, both at the interstate and intrastate levels, which
Iberian America has been blessed with during its two centuries of independent
life; (3) the inapplicability, in the region, of the bellicose model of state forma-
tion; (4) the notably weak states with which the region has been cursed, inca-
pable both of progressive taxation and of mass mobilization for war; (5) the
trend toward the capture of these weak states by crony bourgeoisies, both local
and foreign, generating the world’s greatest inequality of income, engendering
poverty, and making populism almost inevitable in most countries once elec-
toral democracy was consolidated, and 6) the trend toward the establishment
of zero-sum domestic political games, in which the politician that proposes
short-term sacrifices for long-term societal gains almost inevitably is the loser
in the competition for an impoverished and poorly-educated electorate.
In this context, the use of the Gramsci-inspired “state/society complex”
concept leads to unconventional formulations. The issue of narcotics in Mexico
or Colombia, for example, is not dealt with by Escudé so much as an issue of
law and order that impinges on state-to-state relations, but is treated instead as
a phenomenon involving conflicting stimuli: (a) the demand for narcotics, say,
in the United States; (b) the supply, say, in Mexico, which is largely generated
by foreign demand; (c) the American state that has declared a “war on drugs”,
but which emphasizes the repression of the supply side of the trade in order to
limit the quantum of violence at home; (d) the Mexican state that sometimes
cooperates as fully as it can with the American state, i.e. the United States, in
which case it engages in violent conflict with the segment of its own economy
that responds to the United States’ demand for narcotics, while it sometimes
drags its feet as much as it can (in which case it engages in a confrontation with
the American state). In other words, the international side of the Mexican
narcotics issue is not dealt with as a problem involving simply the two states,
but as one in which a segment of the (US) American and Mexican societies are
partners, while the relations between the two states fluctuate between conflict
and cooperation.
In conclusion to this introduction, I think that having read through the
book the reader will discover that the states in Latin America have evolved into
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organizations that are similar to the highly developed and democratic states in
Europe and North America. But the fact that they are similar – just similar – to
those states means that they are also explicitly different. Quite a lot of the
similarities and differences can be explained in terms of the prevailing global
system. A good deal of the issues can be understood in terms of the sociology
of government and/or of political culture. Furthermore, the deliberations on
the status of the descendants of the original population, and of the African
slaves, help to reveal nation-building as a societal process of identity construc-
tion. More difficult to understand is the feed-back between the state and the
collective identity as expressed by the nation as a social group which is politi-
cally organized. Here we have as many points of views as there are contribu-
tors to the volume. All in all, the state as an organization (including the notion
of the state as an institution or a set of rules) is developing. However, in most
countries of Latin America, the democratic state ruled by law, and universally
accepted and treated as a common good by the citizens, seems to be still
a constitutional ideal to be pursued, rather than an accomplished fact of life.
If we look at democracy in a wider context we can see that perhaps it is not
so much democratic procedures or the possibility of making choice as such that
is the most important object of the pretty much universal desire for democracy.
Rather, it is what the state delivers in terms of meeting the needs of its people
that matters first of all. Above a certain threshold of satisfaction people do not
risk a conflict for fear of losing what they already have. Below this threshold,
however, even a relatively minor reason may spark off a major confrontation
since people do not have much to loose. The exorbitant inequalities in Latin
America are a fertile ground for confrontation. But it is not clear how to change
this situation and to avoid a catastrophe; even eradicating the most extreme
poverty is difficult. If the degree of identification of the population, including
the power elite and the lowest classes, with the nation-state is high, it is easier
to harmonize conflicting interest in a peaceful way. How can such an identifica-
tion be increased without recourse to inventing a foreign foe, stimulating chau-
vinistic nationalism and the like? In other words, neither in the strictly material
sphere of life nor in the realm of political culture do we find simple and direct
incentives for a social compromise strong enough to prevail. And in the coun-
tries with a strong indigenous component, the ideal of mutual acceptance in
a bi-cultural society of equals is merely a concept, a design, even if a constitu-
tional one.
Nevertheless, had we dealt with the state in Latin America forty or even
thirty years ago, the tone would have been less encouraging. Democratization
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in Latin America has become a visible phenomenon and it bodes well. When
democracy in the Latin American states strikes deeper roots, as we may hope
one day it will, the next classical problem will have arisen: disillusionment with
democracy. May the Latin Americans face this problem as soon as possible.
One side-effect will be a better understanding of the dynamic relationship be-
tween the cultural and the political dimensions of a democratic society.
The approaching Bicentenary offers itself as one more reason to think about
the state in Latin America. That is why I was unable to resist the temptation
when Dr. Klemens Budzowski, Chancellor of the new and rapidly developing
Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow University, invited me to “write or edit for
us a book on Latin America”. Not everything is that bad in the realm of pub-
lishing in Latin American studies in these days of the Second World Depres-
sion, not even in publishing edited volumes.
Thanks are due to the people who were involved in publishing this first
book of this University Press in a foreign language. Director Tomasz Dalowski
of the Kraków Society for Education – AFM Publishing House worked
incessantly to see the project through. Piotr Krasnowolski has translated the
three essays from Polish, and waded through the texts in English as a copy-
editor, together with Benjamin Koschalka and Christopher Reeves, while the
essay by H. Pietschmann was translated from German in a record time by Piotr
Krasnowolski and Lesław Michalus. The Publishers’ external reviewer Profes-
sor Michał Chmara (The Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań) gave his com-
ments on the earlier version of the manuscript. Halina Baszak-Jaroń, Deputy
Editor-in-Chief at the Kraków Society for Education – AFM Publishing
House, oversaw the lay-out editing of the book.
Kraków, 25th May 2009 –
on the 200th Anniversary of the primer grito libertario de América
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HORST PIETSCHMANN
On the Origins
of the Latin American States
Writing about the state and the development of statehood at a time of general
crisis is in itself quite an extraordinary project for a historian. First, the notion
of the “crisis” is universally agreed upon by philosophers dealing with the
contemporary period, and carries a near-religious meaning (Sloterdijk 2009).
The subject range of the “state” and the “form of statehood” was, in this way,
almost monopolized by the constitutionalists and sociologists who devote them-
selves to it in, as a rule, the larger international organisations, like “think tanks”.
Academics who research politics, on the other hand, in most cases limit them-
selves to watching and commenting upon politics from a shorter perspective,
or from the perspective of examining the processes that took place in the re-
cent past. Besides these, in all the cases referring to non-Western states, this
subject range is also the field of research of various branches of anthropology.
Historical research concerning the state and statehood, the establishment and
development of the state – which was so important in earlier periods – has for
a variety of reasons lost significance in this subject area and now focuses on
specialist detailed research of various types: beginning with the history of
economy and society, through gender history, history of mentality, religion and
church, up to historical discourse, the symbolism of governing, everyday his-
tory, historical vividness and so forth.
It was only the historians’ rediscovery of historical geography in the last
decade, and dramatic historical events – like, for example, the 11th September
– that the interest in the history of powerful empires – from ancient times to
the present – increased. They are researched, or at times only begin to be
analysed along chronological lines, and frequently also in a comparative per-
spective in the context of oceanic regions, primarily the Mediterranean, the
Atlantic, and the Indian Ocean – if we account only for the various “trading
and maritime empires” – and currently also “financial or industrial empires”,
without even mentioning “economic imperialism” and other similar concepts.
24 ON THE STATE OF LATIN AMERICAN STATES. APPROACHING THE  BICENTENARY
Faced with the detailed historical research mentioned earlier, these newer at-
tempts at generalisation not only often fall into the trap of semi-knowledge and
the extreme trivialising of the problem, but also into the classical trap of the
traditional, one-way “history of the expansion” of writing – if not the compul-
sion to write – history from the “top down”, so as not to ground place on the
book market. Making generalisations on the basis of “history from below”
accounts for the extremely diverse results of the specialist research mentioned
above that has been classified in the last few decades. This, by its very nature,
is far more difficult and requires multiple intermediary steps which are based
on short-range generalisations, primarily because the set of tools inherited
from previous periods – and which are typical for purposes of conceptualisation
– that are used for this kind of research has become questionable for a variety
of reasons. This to a great extent characterises the subject of the development
of statehood in Latin America, which shall be demonstrated in the examples
below.
On this basis, the case of “Latin America” comes to the fore primarily
because that part of the continent had been – until the 1970s – considered to
a large extent to be European, or at least being strongly under the influence of
Europe. The Portuguese and the Spanish languages – complemented by smaller
enclaves of French – that were defined from Paris (as the intellectual capital) as
"The Latin" had exerted (better: excersised) a powerful influence, and even
awarded the region with its all-encompassing name. Catholicism and Roman
Law were part of the process. These were considered to be important common
features of the subcontinent that were disseminated by the colonialism of the
mother countries. They were already based on a truncated explanation of
history, and for that reason they were relativised or were questioned both by
the specific contemporary processes of development and by new historical
myths.
Originating in the nineteenth century, these characteristics of “Latin America”
were questioned especially as a result of the development of the situation after
the second world war and also by the increased intensity of the historical and
ethno-historical research, and also the role of historical myths that developed
immediately afterwards. One should only mention the “Big Brother” in the
North, together with the institutional framework of the OAS, the former colo-
nial powers – as poor but functioning members of the European Union offer-
ing political, cultural, and economic contacts – and occasionally symbolic al-
ternative events that accompanied the summits of the G8 Group, which served
to strengthen to a large extent the coherence of this group of states, and which
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is in various ways prompted by the media. With reference to the fundamental
parameters of the national economies, members of this group differ, however,
to such a large degree that within the geographic framework of the subconti-
nent, not only extreme differences are present between individual states in the
region, but also – even in their mutual relations – there are suitably varied
interests, which are hardly covered by the rhetorical appeals and symbolic
policymaking. These differences are also apparent even within the continent’s
states, particularly the largest ones. It is enough to mention here the continent’s
major power, Brazil, opening not only the interior of the country together with
its natural resources – and in so doing, defying global opinion – or the debates
about the rainforests of Amazonia and their importance for the world’s cli-
mate. Yet at the same time, this continental power disseminates its culture and
language far beyond its borders, to all the neighbouring countries, and tries to
ensure its access and use of the neighbouring countries’ resources.
The historian is fascinated at the same time by the phenomenon of the
“simultaneity of the unsimultaneous” in Brazil, which internationally shows the
face of its most modern coastal cities, yet is a country that beyond them con-
sists of – to quite a different degree – areas of varied historical development
within the regions, which when compared to Europe can be described by fea-
tures ranging from the time of the great migrations of peoples through the
various phases of the Middle Ages and the later centuries up to the nineteenth
century. This phenomenon may be observed in less developed forms, in other
states of the region. It is present even in relatively small states, like, for ex-
ample, Guatemala; it always has a specific historical shape, and there is always
an antithetical relationship between the city and country, and the rural ethnic
and cultural components. This phenomenon to a great extent takes root in the
fact that soon after regaining independence, and at least since the end of the
nineteenth century, the majority of the states in the region had reasonably well-
defined state borders that were constructed along the lines of relations from
the colonial era and the uti possidetis principle. At the same time, however, the
areas of the states defined by such borders had not been entirely taken over,
and internal colonisation had not fully taken place, the conditions in the interior
becoming a significant explanation of the twentieth century guerrilla tradition
in Latin America thus adding to the heritage of the “little war” – of medieval
origin – in Spain and Portugal. Even though this may not be sufficiently per-
ceived in the historical and political perspective, it is an important difference in
comparison to the processes in Europe, where the definition of borders always
followed the processes of colonisation, even when the controversial factors
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that underpinned the implementation of these processes led to stable clearly-
defined boarders only as a result of military conflict. It should not be forgotten
that the development of the territorial state with permanent borders is quite
a recent historical phenomenon, which in Europe continued to cause a variety
of conflicts even into the twentieth century, and that it was only relatively
recently that these were ended by concluding international treaties.
The process of establishing state borders, which, as already has been men-
tioned, was completed in Latin America – with a few exceptions – much earlier
on the basis of the continent’s colonial past, and was supported with the appli-
cation of the uti possidetis rule. The importance of this process is visible, for
example, in Mexico, in the fact that the loss of “over half of the state territory”
in the war against the United States in 1846–1848, is to this day viewed as
a national trauma. What this means is the loss of an area that, even though
large, was poorly populated and fell to Mexico as a result of the process of
northwards expansion conducted under the Spanish banner which were ac-
companied by autonomous territorial division. The Reconquista of these lands,
which began with the migration processes from Mexico and Central America –
a region, which in colonial times was also partially controlled by Mexico –
brought about processes of Hispanisation in the United States as early as the
beginning of the twentieth century, which through electoral and other pro-
cesses influences the entire state policy even more. The importance of staking
out the borders towards the neighbouring countries also brings up quite natu-
rally the question of the extent to which the phenomenon of defining the bor-
ders had an impact on the national discourse in the individual states. There are
plenty of arguments suggesting that the central events of the “Iberian seizure”
and independence from the European colonial powers are viewed in the region
from the perspective of historical solidarity, and also from a superior point of
view: namely, of the stabilisation of the state system; they were all without
exception conquered by Spain and Portugal and allied natives (Matthew, Oudijk
2007) and all gained their independence from the colonial powers. The spe-
cific differences of the individual colonial administrative entities along which
these processes were conducted have, however, not been considered for a long
time. “The History of Latin America” as a discipline of university research and
science did not appear in the region until after the second world war; it emerged
together with the aggravating economic rivalry between the USA and Europe.
The political role of this somewhat schematic historical vision in the coun-
tries of Latin America acquired importance in the context of the 500th anni-
versary of the voyage of Columbus in 1992. The Mexican national commis-
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sion dealing with the preparations for the jubilee worked within the framework
of the OAS, falling back upon inter-American consultations, a document that,
briefly speaking, put forth a claim that the native American cultures played an
extremely active historical role during the European expansion, and that for
this reason the quite widespread notion of the “discovery and conquest of
America” – its early Spanish nationalist connotations have been proved mean-
while – should be rejected as being Eurocentric and replaced with the notion of
encuentro de culturas. The OAS commission approved the resolution and in-
troduced this notion immediately into its texts, making sure that this notion
became widely held in individual countries. The radical left rejected it deci-
sively, believing it to be euphemistic, and discrediting the sacrifices made by the
indigenous population, and consequently its propaganda seized on the fact
that persons less familiar with the intricacies of the Spanish language would not
be able to discern philologically the double meaning of the central notion. This
is contained in the word encuentro, which in the Spanish language means both
“a joyful meeting of old friends” – this is the denotation that dominates today
– and “a military conflict”, a “skirmish, fray”, a violent encounter of adversar-
ies who are not at war with each other. To verify this, one should reach for the
Dictionary of the Spanish Language, published by the Spanish Real Academia
de la Lengua, which – Ibero-Americans still accept this – to this day remains
the central point of reference in the Spanish language. To ensure that this
language monopoly (not devoid of significance after all) continues in the suc-
cessive updates of the Dictionary, the Academia consults to an ever greater
degree with philologists from all the relevant countries of Latin America. While
the historical solidarity of the states of Latin America was still clearly evident
during the Jubilee of 1992, and particularly in the 1980s (the role that the
process of democratisation played, which began in the region in 1985, re-
quires further research), such a situation did not take place in relation to the
approaching jubilees of the acquisition of independence by the states of Latin
America. Organised in 2008 in Mexico, the consultative meeting of the par-
ticipating Ibero-American states was unable to work out a joint position, for
which reason the establishment of an appropriate joint commission was re-
jected. On the other hand, all the interested parties clearly accepted the invita-
tion of the King of Spain to the meeting commemorating this occasion, as one
can learn from numerous websites concerning the Bicentenario (e.g. www.
grupobicentenario.org, and successive links to other websites).
Over time, several processes interpenetrated with one another: these in-
cluded the powerful criticism of all types of colonisation, and the increasing
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importance and revindications of ethnic minorities that had been occurring
since the 1960s, promoted by the United Nations, churches, anthropologists,
and the democratic parties in the developed countries, so that during the last
five decades the processes of increasing ethnic awareness and the ethnicisation
of the assimilated parts of the population at a slightly lower social level took
place. They increasingly led to changes in the cultural self-awareness of entire
states, or at least helped politically to introduce such changes in their identity,
even in those states that from outside seemed to be culturally homogenous.
Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela can be identified as states in which these pro-
cesses are already highly advanced. One can consider the general acceptance
of the statement that the Bolivian president, Evo Morales, is the first Latin
American president who is of fully indigenous origin a historical fallacy, as the
example of President Benito Juárez, who enjoys a great deal of respect in
Mexico, attests. He was of indigenous origin, which he, however did not make
a show of, and presented himself – as a sop to liberalism – as the president of
all Mexicans. Similar processes are taking place in today’s Mexico, especially if
we notice that in the eastern part of the Mexico City megalopolis, entire dis-
tricts of the city today mainly use the Nahuatl language, and that every year on
the days of the solstices tens of thousands of Mexicans and foreign tourists
climb the pre-Columbian pyramids to draw the energy of the sun and/or space.
Even the powerful drug cartels, which are dominant in rural areas, and against
whom the current president of the country has formally declared war, seem to
make reference to the pre-Columbian rituals of human sacrifice.
The processes mentioned above have led to numerous – partially hidden
and partially open – internal and at times even transborder conflicts in many
countries of the region, that were stirred up – frequently in a conscious, and
partially unconscious manner – by foreign guests, “ethnographers”, churches,
and even organisations supporting development with civic–romantic and/or
ecological goals. From the point of view of the numerous governments in Latin
America, even those that are democratically elected, they represent a threat to
the domestic policy of the integration of such ethnically conscious minorities.
Even with national culture and social orders, however they be defined, these
new ideas, implanted, mostly from outside, mainly in those countries that have
lively, indigenous traditions and which frequently refer to false or simplified
explanations of their history, led individual states to suffer from the pressure of
having to deal intensely with their own history, while new ideas questioned the
older, simplified historic rationalisations of the “nation”, “identity”, and a vari-
ety of their symbolic stylisations.
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It is not for nothing that we may look at this from the perspective of the
1970s, when the intense process of the institutionalisation of history was tak-
ing place, at least in the major countries of Latin America: new research centres
were developed, archives were rediscovered, dusted off and organised, if not
digitalised; museums were modernised and reorganised, educational and di-
dactic activities acquired government support often in the face of violent de-
bates on meanings, values, and goals. History and historical policy, which ac-
quired major internal political significance, were strongly present in the media,
and involved parliaments. It should be emphasised here that it was primarily the
two largest states of Latin America, Brazil and Mexico, which simultaneously
very intensively and efficiently modernised their research and educational insti-
tutions (and still do) in the area of the natural sciences.
In the meantime, these processes acquired a far more general significance
both in the areas of external and internal policy. In terms of their external
dimensions, they extend to the mutual relations between the presidents of South
America who define themselves as “left-wing”. It is enough to mention, for
example, the conflict concerning the management of energy resources in the
eastern lowlands of Bolivia, and the fact that it is rooted in culture, essentially
reflecting the former opposition between the highlands and the lowlands. The
question of energy has acquired in the meantime a global significance; the
government of Bolivia has therefore managed to work out a position of solidar-
ity with two other producers of energy – Ecuador and Venezuela – on the
grounds of their developing new identity. All the three states show a tendency
towards political solidarity, calling upon self-evidently incompatible historical
traditions. In Bolivia and Ecuador these are the indigenous traditions which do
not greatly strengthen the broader solidarity. There is a slightly older example
of indigenisation than that of the early twentieth century, as both the countries
were captured and integrated by force in pre-Columbian times by the Incas
coming from Peru and speaking a different language. Even the period of Span-
ish colonisation resulted in major problems that were related to administrative
superiority and subordination, and – in the postcolonial period – led to military
conflict. This, in effect, had Bolivia cut off from the Pacific, which is an ob-
stacle for the left-wing president of Chile when it comes to strengthening the
solidarity of other countries ruled by the left. In Venezuela, in turn, the lack of
major pre-Columbian traditions, and the large share of Afro-Americans in the
population, the historically falsified liberator, Simón Bolívar, had to become the
scapegoat for the justification of such a tradition in Bolivarismo promoted by
President Chávez. With all the recognition for the historical role of Bolívar, one
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cannot avoid arguing that, as an owner of slaves, he does not actually stand out
as a pioneer when it comes to the liberation of black slaves. Moreover, he
himself brought about the political instrumentalisation of old antagonisms to-
wards today’s Colombia, and intervened in a strongly unilateral manner in the
independence process in Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. Thus the three stand united
in the face of an anonymous, distant, and – for the critics of globalisation –
obvious enemies, including the USA, and the multinational concerns of the
power industry. It is so even though all three countries cannot – due to the lack
of appropriate technological resources – make use of and sell their energy
resources. When examining, however, which companies are active in the east of
Bolivia, one very quickly realises that Petrobras, the national petrochemical
company of Brazil, is the largest investor when it comes to the exploitation of
natural gas resources on the eastern lowland of Bolivia. Yet, Lula, the president
of Brazil with his left-wing sympathies, does not place in the dock three other
countries which are disponents of energy resources; and the similarly leftist
presidents of Uruguay, Paraguay, and Argentina are extremely reserved when
it comes to dealing with their great neighbours. This example sufficiently ex-
plains that, in comparison to the 1960s and 1970s, the joint policy and rivalry
in Latin America acquired far greater importance, taking the place of the gen-
eral models of dependency and heteronomy of the region which were devel-
oped and promoted in the past by CEPAL/ECLA, i.e. the UN Economic Com-
mission for Latin America and the Caribbean. The processes of internal
colonisation leads also to more powerful tensions in the internal relations within
this group of states, which was exacerbated also by the debates – originating
from outside – about the policy of climate protection, resource consumption,
individual shares of the continental shelf, protection of environmental resources,
etc., as they drew the region into the realm of the more general problems of
globalisation.
All these bring to mind former historical debates on the processes of Euro-
pean expansion in early modern times. It seems that what now becomes lively
again are the discussions – continuing since the 1950s – about the form of the
Iberian occupation, the treatment and cultural alienation of individual groups
of the indigenous population by the missionaries, the political and administra-
tive organisation of the colonial period, the “environmental imperialism” of
Europe, etc. The question about the potential existence of a common identity
of the region in the face of the mentioned conflicts, that cannot be attributed to
external perpetrators as directly as the “discovery and capture” and “struggle
for independence” immediately after the second world war is asked in an en-
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tirely new light. The internal conflicts within individual states and between
them came too strongly to the fore. When faced with doubts concerning the
inherited notion of “Latin America” and its content, an additional question
about alternatives crops up. Towards the end of the twentieth century, histori-
cal research tried to overcome this dilemma by placing it, to an even greater
extent, into a broader Atlantic context (Bailyn 2005). Historians speak about
“Atlantic history”, perceiving it as an initial step in the latest globalisation schemes.
Besides these, there are attempts to revive the classical concept of the Western
Hemisphere, which started to loose its importance as a consequence of the
conflicts between the North and the South since the 1960s. (Fernández-
Armesto 2003). Additionally, we discover the renaissance of the classical no-
tion of empire, especially for the early modern period, most often in connec-
tion to the Atlantic (Elliott 2006). Thus the North – South concepts and East
– West perspectives compete as they used to for the assignment or appropria-
tion of what we classically define as “Latin America”. All these concepts are
loaded with the dilemma mentioned in the introduction of being between his-
torical specialist research and a generalisation that frequently falls back onto
semi-knowledge. This is especially true about the highly suggestive attempt at
the interpretation of the history of mankind since the last ice age, undertaken
by an outsider paleobiologist, Jared Diamond (Diamond 1997). The research,
which examines the questions of historic development in a broader extent and
in a systematic manner, often respect the rules of “political correctness”, espe-
cially in a form that is binding in the ethnographic sciences. Emphasising the
use and/or development of resources, with consideration of the technological
and geographical conditions – their presence on the interconnection or mutu-
ally permeating climatic zones – the author undertakes a global analysis of
former civilisations. For that reason, the German translation of the work, which
has already been published six times, received a changed title: Arm und Reich.
Die Schicksale menschlicher Gesellschaften, meaning literally “The poor and
the rich. Histories of human communities”. In general terms, this work goes
beyond the area of traditional, moralising observations of long-term historical
processes, and provides a rationally transparent system of categories that can
also be used for a concise outlook on the history of Latin America. Looking at
the subject of the state and state development, one can in this way follow how
that process was taking place over the last 500 years, accounting for the latest
research and emphasising the significant developmental changes in time and
space. Although, for those doing research on the pre-Columbian times, knowl-
edge of both empires – the Incas in the Andes and the Aztecs in Mesoamerica
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– is no longer a novelty, ethnographic research has greatly expanded our knowl-
edge about their state of being and their antecedents. Parallel to this, these
disciplines of science have helped us to realise that also in other areas of Cen-
tral and Southern America, present in different periods, were historical, indig-
enous peoples with more or less developed cultures, who, however, in terms of
their state of development, had developed quite different forms of organisation,
ranging from city-states via larger ethnic alliances to small nomad communities
accustomed to warfare, as diamond points out. As an aside, these his catego-
ries draw upon many aspects of the classification devised by a Spanish Jesuit,
José de Acosta (“Historia Natural y Moral de las Indias“) from the sixteenth
century, who in this way wanted to justify the different ways that the Christian
missions conducted themselves. At the same time, Acosta was the first to ex-
plain the origin of the indigenous inhabitants of America, who came here from
Asia through the Bering Straight. The number of state-forming high cultures is
agreed to include the Aztecs and the Incas, and – with certain reservations –
also the Mayas with their city-states. The two areas, however, differ as the
Aztecs and Mayas belonged to Mesoamerica, and were the only cultures of
America that developed writing, and whose writings have been successfully
deciphered. Moreover, all the three cultures had a highly developed system of
numbers and calendars closely connected to religious notions and governmen-
tal practices.
The document concerning the understanding of “encuentro de culturas“
was introduced into the dispute by Mexico in 1985, and being the subject of
a violent argument at that time proved, however indirectly, a dramatic mistake
in the historiography of the history of colonialism. It did not sufficiently ac-
knowledge the conditions of the indigenous cultures, and instead depicted his-
tory according to the chronological progress of the European seizure of the
continent. Everything began with Columbus, the events in Haiti / La Española
were examined, Europeans were followed to Cuba, to the Panama isthmus, and
then to Mexico, Peru, etc. The research of economic, religious, social, and
institutional development followed in the same vein. In the face of circum-
stances, the focus was mostly on the documents kept in Portugal and Spain, as
American archives were harder to access. This was coupled with unacceptable
generalisations, such as that with the capture of Tenochtitlán in August 1521,
the Aztec state collapsed and Mexico was captured, or that the same thing
happened to the Inca state in the Andes in 1532–1534, and so forth. Mat-
thew Restall names seven such myths concerning the period of the Spanish
conquest. Their number also includes a range of other mistaken opinions and
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conclusions that, although they have not acquired the status of myth, lead to
this very false interpretation of those processes, and the conclusions that were
drawn from them (Restall 2003).
One should, however, mention first that almost from the beginning, Span-
ish and Portuguese colonisation differed from one another greatly. Already in
1502, Queen Isabella stated that the ‘trade colonisation’ that Columbus had
initially planned should be replaced by the model of ‘settler colonisation’ in the
tradition of the Spanish Reconquista, whose characteristic feature was the found-
ing of cities. That model was later reinforced by Charles V to suit his imperial
concept of the universal monarchy. When Portugal began the colonisation of
Brazil – which initially was not greatly esteemed and was considered to be the
supplier of dye-wood – due to the foreign and especially French threat in
1532, it fell back on the model that was already being applied while settling the
islands in the Atlantic. Its base was the endowment of estates to colonising
entrepreneurs hailing from the feudal tradition, who were to organise the settle-
ment and economic exploitation of the land they had been awarded, ensuring
the superior functions at the same time. Apart from the acquisition of wood to
dye textiles, that model turned out to be barely effective in Brazil, due to the
failure to mobilise sufficient numbers of Portuguese settlers. The indigenous
population, inhabiting the coastal areas, could be used only as a workforce,
and only to a very limited degree due to their cultural traditions. The economic
activity that turned out to be the only one that promised success as the eco-
nomic base was to produce sugar, as wood was quickly losing its commercial
standing. This is why African slaves were imported in ever greater numbers,
because through the use of them large-scale sugar production could be
organised. This led to a situation where – apart from a few cities – the central
place of sugar production – the engenho – together with its ethnically mixed
population became the core of Portuguese settlements. The embryonic admin-
istrative organisation established since the mid-sixteenth century was limited to
a great extent to the coastal areas until the large-scale expeditions into the
centre of the continent – which were sent to seek precious metals and to
acquire slaves – brought about the slow shift of settlement-frontier into the
mainland in the seventeenth century. They led to extensive cattle breeding and
the slow settlement and establishment of new towns. This quickly resulted in
conflicts with the Jesuit Order, who were running missions among the indig-
enous and black population, and who tried to defend them against the
Bandeirantes. The poor civil and church organisation very quickly led to the
establishment of mixed, Christian–African–Indian cults, whose followers tried
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frequently to liberate themselves from the Portuguese colonial system by es-
caping into the hinterland and developing autonomous settlement centres. This
situation was to change only in the eighteenth century as a result of the discov-
ery of rich gold deposits in the hinterland, when the state system was expanded
beyond the coastal towns and gained more authority. Yet the decisive differ-
ence, when compared to Spain, lay in the fact that no universities were estab-
lished in Brazil, and – with the exception of the Jesuit Order – printing presses
were introduced very late, only in the eighteenth century. As even the mem-
bers of the elites had to travel for university studies to Coimbra in Portugal,
Brazil for a long time lacked a cultural life comparable to that which was present
in the metropolises of colonial Spanish-America.
To expand further, the way the state organisation of colonial Spanish-America
was presented should be counted among the mistaken judgements listed above.
As a rule, it begins with the presentation of the titles and offices of Columbus,
progresses to the colonisation guidelines for the Caribbean issued in 1502,
and lays an emphasis on the establishment of Audiencia, being the Royal Ap-
pellate court at Santo Domingo in 1511, and develops further. It does not
note, however, that the year 1514 already marked the disappearance of the
indigenous inhabitants of Haiti, that only after 1512, some Spanish settlers
moved from Haiti to the Panama isthmus, and that – after the conquest of
Mexico – a large share of Spaniards who settled in the Caribbean moved to the
continent. What they left behind them were cities without residents and institu-
tions, and regents without subjects. The establishment of the state organisation
of colonial Spanish-America actually took place on the bases of the two high
cultures, together with the use of their resources and with the decisive support
of the indigenous elites and specialists. Moreover, after the establishment of an
administration controlled by Spain, both viceroy metropolises of Spanish-America,
namely the cities of Mexico and Lima, took over the management of further
expansion around 1590. Taking Mexico as an example, one can present the
following chronological order when depicting the process of capturing the
lands of today’s Mexico:
1. 1521: the capture of Tenochtitlán;
2. by c. 1530: the capture of all the areas of the former Aztec state and the
annexation of the Tarascan (P’urhépecha) State within today’s state of
Michoacán;
3. by c. 1580: the gradual conquest of today’s states of Jalisco, Zacatecas,
Durango and San Luis Potosí or parts of them, and some of the land occu-
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pied by the Mayas: Campeche, the shores of the Yucatan peninsula, and
central Chiapas;
4. by 1600: the capture of the central areas of northern Mexico with Nuevo
León, beyond today’s US border, into New Mexico;
5. in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: the colonisation of parts of
today’s states of Sinaloa, Sonora and Baja California, the eastern mountain
regions of Querétaro and San Luis Potosí, Tamaulipas, and the area of
today’s Texas (USA);
6. in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: the colonisation of the north-
ern borderland with the USA, unless they had been captured earlier;
7. in the twentieth century: colonisation of Quintana Roo and the tropical
lowland regions of Chiapas.
In most of these phases, indigenous troops played a decisive role. In 1521,
less than 2000 Spaniards and over 150,000 indigenous warriors laid siege to
approximately 300,000 defenders of the Aztec capital, who were weakened
from the lack of water and a smallpox epidemic. In all the later expeditions,
auxiliary troops from the former Aztec state also participated, which after the
successful missions were frequently settled in the newly established cities in the
captured areas as occupational forces, receiving special privileges. In many of
these cities, far beyond the former Aztec state, these traditions are cherished
to this day, which can be seen today in the names of numerous urban districts.
The penetration of these areas by the state was a top-down process con-
ducted through the viceroys who appeared in 1536, whose rule, although in
fact regulated by the standards and acts issued in Spain, had to be exercised
locally through the gradually developing interaction with local elites. Assuming
the office of the Viceroy in 1536, Mendoza succeeded during his term to
establish his administrative authority only within the area of the valley of Mexico
City. His successor, Velasco, who stayed in office until 1565, governed in fact
three areas – the valleys of Mexico, Toluca and Puebla – relying generally on
indigenous experts in writing, who worked with both the local ideograms, and
the Spanish language. In a general form, the Spanish reign was recognised
within a far larger area through the payment of tributes, yet these were the
areas where the government was exercised by the Christianised members of
indigenous elites. In those areas, missionaries from mendicant orders spread
Christianity, recorded indigenous languages, and brought up the sons and daugh-
ters of the indigenous nobility in the schools that they ran. This was possible as
a result of the recognition of the indigenous nobility and their privileges, which
36 ON THE STATE OF LATIN AMERICAN STATES. APPROACHING THE  BICENTENARY
made them equal to the Spanish Hidalgos; they had the right to use weapons,
ride horses, and to collect further tributes. In parallel to that, Spanish cities
were founded, and indigenous ones received Spanish charters and privileges of
self-government. Besides these, the indigenous communes were integrated into
ordered villages and subjected to the municipal laws taken from the Spanish
tradition that guaranteed them self-government and a simple judiciary in the
hands of selected authorities, under the control of the Spanish district officer.
This was all based on written sources in individual native languages. In parallel
to the above, churches were built mostly with the support of indigenous expert
forces, and their decoration was the work of indigenous artists and painters
who worked to European standards, while the mendicant orders were at the
same time developing church organisation and would, for example, work on
the Indian festivities calendars, replacing them with Christian content. It is
important here to see that this process had taken place in Mexico before the
end of the Council of Trident, as the Christianity of the Renaissance was theo-
logically more open and varied.
Achieved around 1560, this persistent administrative organisation was far
more similar to the ancient methods of colonisation of the Roman Empire than
the practices of modern colonialism. In 1560, Mexico already had its univer-
sity, numerous colleges of secondary education open to Indians, and plenty of
printing presses. There was already, by that time, an independent cultural life
to speak of, in which the indigenous elites participated in various ways. To an
ever greater extent they reinterpreted their own history and culture in the
Christian way. This process was reinforced in successive periods, by the Marian
revelations and other supernatural occurrences. The Mexican Virgin of Guada-
lupe meanwhile became by papal appointment the religious protector of the
entire continent. Although numerous internal political and church conflicts
occurred, these were nonetheless resolved peacefully. Three provincial church
councils standardised the religious manner of treating the indigenous popula-
tion before the lay clergy began to remove the mendicant orders from their
dominant positions in the church organisation around 1570. That process ran
parallel to the progressive Hispanisation of the administration and the imple-
mentation of the state patronage of the church. Besides the indigenous nobility,
nobility of European origin also formed, yet court decisions remained, with
rare exceptions, under the control of royal institutions. Simplifying, one could
say that only Indian nobility maintained some feudal rights over Indian sub-
jects, meanwhile the European elites took over large land holdings without
jurisdiction and with a limited supply of labour.
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A similar process took place in Peru, yet due to conflicts among the con-
querors it was delayed until around 1570, and the resulting differences –
compared to Mexico – were great. The fact that the newly established coastal
city of Lima was elevated to the status of capital, and not the indigenous capital
of Cusco, marked an important difference when compared to Mexico. The
construction of the capital of Mexico on the ruins of the Aztec capital of
Tenochtitlánin in the centre of the country was an obvious difference – whose
historical significance is underestimated – when compared to Peru. Today, it is
assumed that it was an important factor in explaining the far greater degree of
biological and cultural Mesticization in Mexico. Because the Council of Trident
had finished in the meantime, the Christianisation of Peru was conducted along
stricter theological assumptions, and under the ever growing influence of the
Jesuit Order. In Peru, the viceroy’s court prerogatives for disputes among the
indigenous population did not receive such strong institutional foundations as
in Mexico. Independent from the comparable privileges of the indigenous no-
bility, no indigenous cities originated here, unlike in Mexico, even though the
indigenous population received a similar municipal constitution as was the case
in Mexico. In both cases, the discovery and control of rich deposits of precious
metals was the decisive factor for the development and quickly growing impe-
rial significance of Lima and Mexico.
This was further reinforced by the fact that since Philip II, the state on
which “the sun never set” was managed in an increasingly decentralised man-
ner, to which a new quality of the Spanish empire, the “monarchy of courts”,
strove for. The regions’ viceroys or governors of royal or aristocratic blood
established by the King in Aragon, Barcelona, Valencia, Palermo, Naples, Milan,
Brussels, Besançon, and the authorities in Mexico and Lima enjoyed a high
level of autonomy and presided over the highest judicial authorities, which
disposed of the royal seal and could issue documents in the name of the King.
The symbolical ceremonies acted as a substitute for the presence of the king
among his various subjects. Even the fleets, sailing every year together with
military protection between the American metropolises and the motherland,
transporting people, messages, goods for trading that were of an economic
and cultural nature from all the European countries, were a form of the visible
presence of the royal authority. As a result of this tradition, the cities of Mexico
and Lima became populous metropolises with an imperial significance, control-
ling faraway administrative areas directly and indirectly, and managing the sys-
tem of subordinate centres which were of lesser importance. Only the territo-
rial rule of the two viceroys was appropriately divided by law: the Panama
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isthmus was subordinate to Lima and provided the border between the zones of
influence of the two royal representatives. In the days of Philip II, there were
plans made in the court of Spain to transfer the central Indian Council to
Panama, but this did not happen, for reasons that remain unknown. The city of
Mexico controlled the Caribbean and the Spanish dominions in North America,
as well as the Philippines, together with individual sea connections. Lima con-
trolled the Panama isthmus and the whole of Spanish South America, slowly
entering in conflict with Portuguese claims. The role of both the capitals as
centres of Spanish sub-empires becomes clear only when they are compared to
the centres of other regions that later became capitals of Independent States.
To the extent that Santo Domingo and Guatemala or Puebla and Guadalajara in
Mexico were – in their architecture and institutions – near copies of the Mexi-
can metropolis, the same was no longer true of, for example, Caracas, Havana,
Manila, and other cities of the northern part of Spanish America. The printing
presses and the institutions of higher education only had been introduced much
later. A similar situation pertained to the Spanish South America, where Quito,
Cusco, Charcas, and Potosí were allowed to acknowledge the importance of
Lima, which was, however, not then true of Asunción, Buenos Aires, Santiago
de Chile, and other cities whose development took place only in the eighteenth
century. Despite the greatly increased attacks of pirates, corsairs, and fleets of
competing European naval powers in the seventeenth century, the Spanish
reign in America was not seriously threatened, and required no more than the
stationing of troops to prevent external attacks in a few reinforced spots on the
coast. Disregarding local rebellions, which could be subdued with the forces of
the militia, the Spanish rule also remained unthreatened in the hinterland. It
was only at the end of the seventeenth century, when – due to the problems of
the succession of the throne after the death of the childless and sick King
Charles II – that these relations were to be changed radically.
Together with the change of the dynasty from the Habsburgs to the Bour-
bons in 1700, sanctioned after the Spanish war of succession and the peace of
Utrecht and Rastatt in 1714, the eighteenth century is defined in historiogra-
phy by the notion of “the epoch of Bourbon reforms”. Due to the limited
power of expression, this notion is complemented with modifiers from the most
varied European definitions of the period including “absolutism” or “despo-
tism”, “reason”, “Enlightenment”, “modernisation”, “nation”, etc – depending
on the approach of the individual schools of historiography or the ideological
positions of individual authors. What was more or less directly emphasised was
the relativised French example of such a policy. Individual references to Italy,
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England, and states that belonged to the Holy Roman Empire of the German
nation have begun to appear only recently, in order to emphasise the difference
in the response to this policy also within Spain. Other broader and newer
attempts at interpretation place Spain in the context of an Atlantic history that
has a West European – American character, while the German speaking histo-
riographers emphasise the further slowing down of development between north-
ern and southern Europe which was visible from the seventeenth/eighteenth
centuries onwards. The historiography that deals with Spanish-America inter-
preted this period more or less clearly as “the beginnings of the history of the
independence of Latin America” or as “the end of the Spanish empire” in the
context of the Napoleonic period. The researchers only very recently reached
beyond the period of Charles III, and even later for reasons extended further
back to the times of Philip V.
While initially the processes of the historical development of institutions and
constitutions in that century was the domain of not only legal historians, fol-
lowing different methodological and theoretical innovations of the last two
decades, these questions, moved to a second plane or were no more than the
subject of discussion in the history of law and were pushed to the margins due
to their legal positivism. Thus for a long time, the significant changes in the
states of the crown of Aragon after the conclusion of the Spanish war of suc-
cession were interpreted as a penalty for the uprising against Philip V, and the
actions as a tendency towards centralisation that was inspired by France. After
the second world war, the Spanish historiography of the Franco era referred to
the times of Charles III as “enlightened despotism” and “bourgeoisie revolu-
tion”. Early in the 1970s, in his already classical study of Mexican silver min-
ing, an English historian, David Brading, postulated a “Revolution in govern-
ment” referring to the changes in the mother country at least in reference to
the late colonial Mexico. Somewhat later, this author was trying to prove con-
nections with attempts at reformation in the seventeenth century under the
reign of the Habsburgs, and explain reforms in a manner more complex than
just the top-to-bottom attempt at modernisation and rationalisation of the rule
and government. The history of law later took over the notion of a “complex
monarchy” and tried to explain reforms as a unification within the framework
of Castile Law. What came to the fore in the general historiography was the
unclear notion of empire, into which a variety of reformative actions were
forced, in an attempt at modernisation or efforts serving to make safe the rule
over America. Recently, a biased explanation has been given for the repeated
expansion of influence over Italy under Philip V, which views this more as
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a restoration of the area that fell under his reign, similar to that of the preced-
ing dynasty, rather than a purely dynastic tendency to provide children from
the second marriage of Philip V with Elisabeth of Parma. Speaking of Spanish-
America, there were even voices referring to the “second conquest” (König
2006) of the overseas territories that had gained autonomy in the context of
the previous political regime of the country.
This brief article acknowledges not only the changed interpretations of his-
torical processes, but emphasises that such interpretations depend very strongly
on the earlier evaluations of the period that preceded the Habsburg reign, and
the role and significance of Spanish-America in the context of Bourbon
policymaking. In both areas, in the last 15 years there have appeared very
significant, new premises in research as a result of the opening of new and
abundant sources thanks to the nearing of the two-hundredth anniversaries of
the independence of the Latin American states, the 400th anniversary of the
death of Philip II, and the 500th anniversary of the death of Charles V. In all
these cases, we deal with huge state investments into appropriate research and
major exhibitions; the Spanish government even established a permanent insti-
tution known as Sociedad Estatal de los Centenarios de.... The commemora-
tion of the years that Philip II and Charles V gave birth, as well as, among
others, to the concept of the Spanish monarchy as “the monarchy of courts”, in
whose name, Philip II awarded a certain degree of autonomy to the individual
parts of the territories he reigned over. Indirectly, this thesis was confirmed
independently of the Spanish historiography by the research that focuses on
Spanish-America, which worked out the dominant position of both the viceroy
metropolises, Lima and Mexico, a characteristic for which there was already an
example of their special role in the independence process after the year 1808,
which nevertheless could be explained only through large-scale research of the
interconnections present in the various areas.
These results revived the discussion about the character of the Monarchia
Hispanica: whether it was an empire or not. After the works by Anthony Pagden,
James Muldoon and others, this question has seemed since the 1990s, to some
degree at least, to have been answered. There are, however, symptoms to be
found under the reign of Philip II: the assumption of the imperial title was
actually considered for a time, and some time later the court entertained impe-
rial symbolism, even though it was never echoed in the official titles used by the
then monarch, acts, and treaty policy. An interesting question that is related to
this – at least with regard to the overseas territories – is that for some time, the
notion of “province” came to the fore also in reference to the metropolitan
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regions that defined themselves as Reinos, i.e. kingdoms, and were also de-
scribed in this way by the Crown. Besides them, for example, in New Spain
from the seventeenth century, the Creole elites cherished the notion of the
Mexican empire – Imperio mexicano – even in official ceremonies, like, for
example, the reception of the new viceroy. The history of law did not actually
consider that too seriously, which may, however, be connected to the rather
unsatisfactory explanation of the problem that has remained open since the
reign of Philip II, who was very much engaged in codifying the law in his
Spanish kingdoms. In Castile, he introduced a collection (and system) of laws
entitled Recopilación de las Leyes de Castilla, for the Castilian legal order; in
Aragon it was Fori Aragonum, which was – appropriately for the language used
locally for legal purposes – the Latin counterpart of the Castilian Recopilación.
A similar collection was also ordered for overseas territories. It had been com-
pleted by the end of the reign of Philip and published anonymously in 1596,
though not publicised. The work was renewed in the seventeenth century, and
thus the Recopilación de las Indias had been completed by 1638, yet it neither
came into effect nor was published. Does such a doubtful status of these texts
correspond to the problem of the status of overseas territories?
In 1680, Charles II finally put the Recopilación de Leyes de los Reynos de
las Indias... into practice, which was distributed in Ibero-America a year later.
For the historian, the very title of the work proves that it was different from the
two previous ones, as here the Spanish-American territories of the Crown are
defined as Reinos – kingdoms, just like in the collection of laws, which were
defined as Leyes, comparable to those that had already been introduced by
King Philip II in Castile. In this collection of fundamental laws – in the tradition
of Roman law, the leges had greater importance than the individual royal in-
structions in whatever form they took – the character of the kingdoms was
recognised for the first time by codified laws, and the territories in America, at
least those that enjoyed such a status, were placed on an equal footing to the
Spanish kingdoms. In the history of law, which in its scope never dealt with the
problem of the Empire, it was asked why this collection of laws was, indepen-
dently of its predecessors, published so late and at the time when Charles II was
considered weak and in poor health. There is much to suggest that there were
serious political reasons that triggered these actions, e.g. the first secret plans
to divide the Spanish monarchy between Paris and Vienna negotiated around
that time, which – though secret – must have been known in Madrid.
Madrid considered maintaining Spanish-American dominions a priority also
because – even in the case of a dynastic change in Europe – Spain could still
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play a certain political role. Besides, the abundance of precious metals ensured
that European powers were greatly interested in these territories. For that rea-
son, everything had to be done so as to maintain the connection between
Spanish-America and the mother country, even running into the danger of
encumbering the successor of Charles II with difficult political baggage con-
nected to the status of the overseas dominions. Following the Habsburg tradi-
tion of reigning, the collection of laws was based on the principle of the legally
established state, i.e. the reign over a hierarchy of vassals who define by their
properties the territory under the sovereignty of the monarch (Personenverbands-
staat). In accordance with the above, authority was exercised over vassals or
corporations who lived or existed in a given territory by settling or being estab-
lished there and through ownership of land. What had to be defined earlier,
were only the borders with France, or treaty regulations of dominion over
individual islands in America. The Bourbon dynasty was to change that hierar-
chy in so far as they strove to reign over a territory inhabited by vassals of
varied ethnic and legal statuses. This concept of reign was at the same time
inseparably connected to the mercantilism that hailed from Colbert, and was
even a previous condition for mercantilist economic policy and at the same time
an important step towards a modern nation state.
As early as the war of succession – and to a greater extent after its conclu-
sion with the peace treaties of 1714/1715 – Philip V undertook far-reaching
means to change drastically the constitutional order of Spain. Already during
the war, intendencias (departments) known as provinces, with assigned regional
jurisdiction, were introduced in the theatres of operation or where troops were
stationed; this activity quickly spread across the whole of Spain with the excep-
tion of Navarra and the Basque provinces. After the conclusion of the treaty,
significant changes took place also at the highest reaches of the monarchy.
Together with the so-called Decretos de Nueva Planta, the kingdoms of the
crown of Aragon, were made equal, i.e. their traditional administrative order
was made null and void and subjected to the administrative law of Castile. The
viceroys who had at the time governed in Saragossa, Barcelona, and Valencia
were recalled and replaced by general captains and governors i.e. officers of
military character who started what was called the militarisation of the entire
monarchy. With the lowering of the rank of the regions, the departments of the
Castilian tax system were introduced, and tax borders between the individual
parts of what was now designed to be “Spain” were removed. The capitals of
the three parts received their place and right to vote in the Castilian Cortes:
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these gatherings, however, were summoned only when the order of succession
to the throne was changed by the Crown.
In parallel to the above, the Crown reorganised in 1715 the central admin-
istration of the monarchy by the establishment of Secretarías de Estado y del
Despacho Universal de... (followed by the name of the scope of activity), the
predecessor of the contemporary ministries. Their number changed, yet soon
the secretariat that dealt with foreign relations was developed under the name
of Primera Secretaría de Estado and fulfilled the executive functions of the
Prime Minister of the government; there were also the secretary of justice, for
matters of finance and war, and the marine, joint with American affairs. These
secretariats, soon furnished with different departments, arranged matters di-
rectly with the King, while the former authority of the Council of the Indies was
limited ever more to the function of an advisory body and the highest judicial
authority. An important element of these actions was primarily the fact that,
with their initiation, not only the old authority of the council, when it came to
the manner in which it focussed on individual cases, was gradually limited and
its importance was being lost, but also that the examination and decision-mak-
ing in matters other than court procedures were being conducted through
these ministries. Executive authority lay with the King and was delegated to the
subordinate official units on the order of the King (real órden). Thus the old
sacred function of the king as the supreme judge who exercised government by
deciding what was just in every single affair brought before him, became par-
tially bureaucratic and tended to be more normative. By this process the king
lost much of his sacred character especially among the faraway vassals. The
former casuistic procedures where increasingly replaced by government through
normative general ordinances. Parallel to the above, the Crown tried to intro-
duce gradually administrative routines. Within the Habsburg system, every
person or institution – at least theoretically – had the right to turn directly to
the king – even if they had to wait a decade for an answer; now such cases
were directed either through the regular court procedures, or the decision was
made after appropriate information had been gathered directly within the ad-
ministrative hierarchy. In the same manner, the distance to the monarchy,
when it came to being a source of law, was increasing. Together with the
geographic distance of the person making the complaint, the path of appeals
was lengthening. For politically conscious institutions and individuals in over-
seas countries, the subordination of American territories to the Ministry of
the Navy could be considered to be degrading in terms of their relationship to
the mother country.
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The actions towards the former kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon soon
turned out – on the basis of successive steps – to anticipate the new perspec-
tive on policymaking that was conducted by the new dynasty, which served the
new administrative and much more centralised structure of the Spanish monar-
chy. These activities were soon followed by complementary reforms, such as
the state administration taking over the entire financial administration and tax
collection, and their subjugation to the new provincial and military intendant,
who were embarking on the construction of a system of provincial militia based
on the drafting and recruitment of men that did not belong to the gentry in
order to build military reserves. As well as the reorganisation of the Spanish
navy and related to that, the registration of men in coastal areas in order to
allow them to be drafted if war broke out has to be seen as a step towards
territorialisation. Since these measures preceded the reforms in America, Ameri-
cans could start preventive measures based on the fundamental laws of the
Recopilación of 1680 that remained valid, as the new dynasty did not dare to
abolish it entirely. Conflicts of legitimacy thus were unavoidable.
The reforms in the army and navy were accompanied also by the policy of
recruiting sons of the nobility to serve as officers, and through the discipline
and uniformity of the army – subordinating its members to the military courts,
and the establishment of professional training centres – introduced incentives
for becoming officers who would serve in the Army and Navy. The graduates
of secondary and higher officer schools were entrusted to an ever greater
degree with various governmental functions in Spain and in America, so that
throughout the eighteenth century, not only the militarisation of the adminis-
tration but also of public life was commented upon. Soon after his accession to
the throne, King Charles III ordered that throughout the kingdom mourning be
observed early in November for all the military personnel who had died in the
wars for Spain. Many of the sermons preached on this occasion were later
printed. In parallel to that the “Orden de Carlos III” was established; it was an
order for civilian merit that was awarded to, apart from the military who had
distinguished themselves in public life, lawyers, scientists, merchants, and the
clergy – in other words, to all the subjects whose involvement in different fields
of life was outstanding.
Soon after he had inherited the throne, and still during the war of succes-
sion, Philip V opened a new front along with his government, by entering into
a conflict with the Roman Curia and the high clergy of Spain. In 1707, the
King summoned the clergy in the territories he controlled and demanded that
they pay subsidies. They rejected that claim, arguing that a concession from
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the Pope was required. Not eager to become entangled in the war for the
throne, Pope Clement XI confirmed the position of the Spanish clergy. Against
the Council of Louis XIV, Philip escalated the conflict by nominating Melchor
Rafael de Macanaz for the office of Juez de Confiscaciones – which was re-
sponsible for collecting subsidies and was created ad hoc in Valencia. In De-
cember of the same year, he published the decree requesting that the clergy
declare their belongings. Later on in the conflict, in 1709, King Philip V broke
relations with the papacy and closed the office of the Nuncio in Madrid. Pre-
paring for the negotiations in Paris, which the Pope and Louis XIV were striv-
ing for, in 1713, Philip ordered Macanaz, who already possessed the position
of the Royal Attorney of the Castilian Council, to prepare a report on the use
of the influence of the Curia in Spain. In the report, Macanaz charged Rome
with such basic abuses as: the accumulation of church estates; too many mon-
asteries, church institutions and clergy; the immunity of church institutions; the
excessive outflow of church funds to Rome, etc, which in the later periods of
the eighteenth century was to become increasingly significant. At the same
time, the report noted that the Spanish felt equally exploited by Rome as the
Indios in America were by the local elites. In this way, the idea that the Indios
were exploited by American Spaniards, which had appeared at least sublimi-
nally for an entire century among the Spanish, now for the first time made its
way into official texts; this time in connection with the notion that the Spanish
themselves were being exploited. It found a reflection in the anti-Creole policy
of the Crown towards America, and was independent of the conflict with Rome;
the heads of the Spanish state maintained a lack of trust towards church institu-
tions and the clergy. In wider public opinion, an attitude of hostility towards
France and the French was beginning to harden. Visible in the Spain of the
early eighteenth century was a deep, internal rift: this was between the dynasty
closely linked to France and the political elites who supported it, and the popu-
lation whose attitude was becoming increasingly anti-French, which in many
ways presaged the situation after 1808.
The year 1717 finally saw another depolarisation between Philip V and the
Curia, and the restoration of diplomatic relations on the basis of the status quo
ante. Macanaz was removed from his office and imprisoned. The context for
this new attitude was the marriage of Philip V to Elisabeth of Parma, which
soon brought Italian policy to the fore, and the confrontation with the church
and Pope was replaced by the wish to regain the Crown’s influence in Italy. The
sons of Philip and Elisabeth of Parma were the dynastic vehicle to reach that
objective. This situation later facilitated the eldest son of the couple, Charles,
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becoming the King of Naples (after 1730), and helped his elder brother, King
Ferdinand VI, resolve the open problems in the relations between the State and
Church via the Concordat with the Apostolic See in 1753.
Although it was already evident in 1717 that the Crown was beginning the
expansion of reforming activities in America and enforced the abolition of pur-
chasing offices, a new interim viceroyship was established in New Granada,
today’s Colombia. Already, however, in 1721, the reforming policy ceased to
be extended onto America, only to undertake it anew, in a more decisive man-
ner, at the end of the reign of Philip V; that is, from c. 1740. Despite the
marriage to Elisabeth of Parma and conflict with the Curia, the eastern flank of
the monarchy was strengthened for other political reasons, namely the recap-
turing of the Balearic Islands and the annexation of Gibraltar by the English,
and combining this with accommodating elites of Catalonia and Valencia and
even Aragon, interested predominantly in the western areas of the Mediterra-
nean. After the defeat in the war of succession, and as a result devoid of their
due privileges, and with the policy of suppression of the Catalan language in
administration, the elites of these kingdoms had to resign themselves to the
new dynasty as quickly as possible, considering themselves defeated. Besides
these factors, there was a need for a policy of balancing these actions in the
remaining part of Spain, as the reforms and the conflict with the Roman Curia
and clergy, as well as domination by foreigners – initially, the French and later,
Italians and Spaniards from the North – in policy-making led to problems when
it came to the acceptance of other parts of the state.
Besides the intensive policy-making in the western area of the Mediterra-
nean, which was used to strengthen the European policy, since 1720s, the
policy concerning the Atlantic fleet continued to acquire increasing impor-
tance. The inflexible system of both the fleets moving every year between Spain
and America was loosened, and the marginal provinces, like Buenos Aires,
Venezuela, and Cuba, were gradually awarded the development of direct mari-
time connections to the mother country. This was to prevent the increasingly
active smuggling on the one hand, but also at the same time was intended to
weaken the direct or indirect control of the two American metropolises. Since
the 1730s, there had been a policy of establishing privileged companies that
had a monopoly on trade that – from the headquarters in Spain – controlled
trade and goods exchanged with various marginal provinces, especially in the
Caribbean. For a long time, research overlooked the fact that these companies
were the expression of not only a mercantilist trade policy favourable for the
mother country, but also that at the same time they were also used to break –
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besides the foreign trafficking – the economic control, and connected to it,
also the political control of these areas by the viceroy metropolises. These
companies were a significant part of the already mentioned “second conquest”,
after which – in a few years or decades – the companies were dissolved and
financial and military intendants directly subordinated to the metropolis were
introduced. Such a policy meant the gradual limitation of the scope of author-
ity and competence of the viceroys both in Lima and Mexico.
The situation that – independent from the liquidation of the offices of the
viceroys in Aragon – the Crown continued to nominate viceroys in America
has not been sufficiently examined. It could be, on the one hand, an expression
of the indirect recognition of the legal situation that developed as a result of the
Recopilación de las leyes de Indias, yet on the other – it can be explained by the
awareness of the threats of the vast changes in legal relations in America.
Already the first viceroy nominated by Philip V in Mexico, the Count of
Alburquerque, opposed the actions of the Crown. It was so as the viceroys sent
to America were confronted in their capitals with a complex and influential
structure of interests and not with a colonial community. Ten years earlier,
under the last of the Habsburg dynasty, the crowd – incited by the elitist inter-
est groups stormed the royal palace. Besides that, viceroys that came from
aristocracy pursued their own, most often material interests, at the same time
caring for their image as the royal alter ego, which they needed in order to
perform their tasks. Due to the politics of the Crown aiming to limit the influ-
ence of both the Viceroy capitals, many post holders resorted to defence strat-
egies towards the policy of the Crown, which, among other things, included
the tactics of using the strategy of bureaucratisation and centralisation of the
Crown to develop an administrative apparatus in the viceroy capitals that was
under their own control. For that reason in both the capitals – Lima and Mexico
– throughout the eighteenth century there continually developed a concentra-
tion of administrative bodies that were formally subordinated to the viceroys,
yet in fact claiming their share of the execution of power. The attitudes of the
viceroy court developed in communities parallel to the court in Madrid, where
conflicts were often resolved by symbolic politics.
In 1746, the new viceroy arrived in Mexico, in the person of the First
Count von Revillagigedo. He came from a family that had served in the military
under the new dynasty. He sent an order – órden – to the city council –
Cabildo – in a matter of wholly secondary importance. The council was infuri-
ated with the manner of the Viceroy’s conduct and decided to send two of its
members to the Viceroy to explain that, following the tradition, viceroys –
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being representatives of the community – do not give written orders to city
councils but send a note – billete – in a manner similar to sending their wishes
to the Archbishop as a request and instruction – ruego y encargo. Looking at
the frontispiece of the Gaceta de México, published monthly, from the mid-
1720s under licence from the viceroy and archbishop, we discover that nearly
every edition of the gazette was published with a graphic symbol and textual
explanations of the culture of the Aztec country. The periodical was also quite
naturally sent to Madrid; therefore, the attitude of the Creole elites was very
well-known in the capital of the Monarchy. The mentioned Viceroys also began
the first profound reforms in New Spain at a time when the Crown undertook
the first “frontal attack” towards Lima, and in 1748 established definitively the
new Viceroyship of New Granada with the capital in Bogota, whose territory
had previously mainly fallen under the jurisdiction of Lima. At the same time,
the trade in posts was also done away with – an action pertaining primarily to
the offices of the district, where offices were purchased frequently by the mem-
bers of the merchant elite, to protect themselves against the reluctant alien
command, and also to control – through a certain outwork system – trade and
production. When at the same time, the Crown ordered that restrictions be
placed on the trade in goods by the district’s officers, Viceroy Revillagigedo
ordered spacious files with data on the trade to be submitted to individual
jurisdictions. When the time to inform Madrid about that action came, the files
disappeared; such a situation continued for many years, as long as the danger
existed. The files were later returned under the seal of the secret of confession.
Although in fact these restrictions began in Peru, it turned out to be largely
useless. When in 1749 Madrid asked the Viceroy Revillagigedo whether he
would recommend the introduction of the system of intendants in New Spain,
he argued them earnestly against such a solution, as different circumstances
required a different system of government. Nevertheless, in the following years,
he successfully took over the collection of indirect taxation for the state admin-
istration, which formerly had been in different hands, and which contributed to
the establishment of numerous positions in the administration and reinforced
the political standing of the capital of Mexico in relation to Madrid.
The growing political role of viceroyal capitals was, on the other hand,
widening the differences between the provinces that they ruled, as these were
becoming increasingly more dependent. It so happened that the envoys to the
Viceroy of the cities lying in the hinterland were accompanied in audiences by
two members of the municipal council of México. The Council of the capital
city made use of this right on the grounds of having been elevated to the rank
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of “the first city of New Spain”, which had already been expressed by Charles V.
Looking back, the independence movements validated the opposition of the
viceroyal metropolises to their nearer and further environment, be they the
more distant internal provinces, in Northern New Spain, or the Ibero-Ameri-
can border provinces as Venezuela and Buenos Aires, where the independence
movements appeared. In 1808, after the abdication of Charles V and his son
Ferdinand VII, which Napoleon had demanded, animated movements of the
junta character could be observed in the Ibero-American metropolises. These
movements wanted to ensure for themselves swift legitimisation, and found
numerous other ways of expressing opposition towards the Spanish metropolis,
as only they – as a result of the fact that they transmitted the collected taxes –
held the means to apply pressure, even against the will of the viceroys.
Much like in the mother country, where as a result of the political reforms,
the differences between the court and its environment were aggravated, in
Ibero-America, the rift between the metropolises of the viceroys and the prov-
inces that were subordinate to them was deepening. This required the involve-
ment of high-ranking and politically experienced royal representatives who were
able to govern the distant territories in a peaceful manner and eliminate ob-
stacles, which might have been the reason why the judicious followers of Vice-
roy Revillagigedo warned against the introduction of the system of intendants,
as American territories could be governed politically and not through the bu-
reaucracy of administration operating in a more executive manner. In Spain
itself, resistance was also developing against the policy of reforms on behalf of
local nobility and on the part of the clergy. This was true, even among the
lawyers that came from the elitist university Colegios Mayores who often played
the dominant role both in the councils of the central authorities and the higher
courts – Audiencias y Chancillerías, on both sides of the Atlantic and were
often educated by the Jesuits, who dominated the system of education. The
lawyer elites were mostly biased against the more executive attitudes in the
governance practised by the new dynasty, and they frequently improved the
success of complaints against the practices of the government, calling upon the
ancient legal tradition. Governmental positions, besides the new military type,
were increasingly held by the legal newcomers who graduated from the same
universities, but not as members of the elitist colleges. Similarly, among the
clergy there was a marked division into the more traditional fraction, and the
progressive regalists, which was frequently defined as being the Jansenist cur-
rent. For a long time, attempts were made to use in the description of these
factions the division line of the Enlightenment, yet this interpretation does not
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stand up to criticism, as for example, the Jesuit order in puncto of natural
philosophy assumed a decidedly modern and progressive attitude, even though
it defended the idea of representation in its traditional form and regional ten-
dencies towards autonomy. Nevertheless, the Enlightenment in Spain was
a spiritual movement supported by a part of the clergy, which began to spread
towards the end of the 1730s, and was promoted by a Benedictine monk,
Benito Feijóo. That movement did not become of critical significance until the
mid-eighteenth century. The beginning of the political reforms of the Bour-
bons, and their political vision of their reign’s territorialisation were, however,
connected far more strongly to the rationalism of the late seventeenth century
and mercantilism in Colbert’s style.
This tendency is also visible in the political discourses of the first half of the
century, which was marked by a mercantilism that focussed the Atlantic trade
and relations with the overseas territories. Published in 1724 was the book on
the theory and practice of the Spanish trade by a clerk Gerónimo de Uztáriz,
which was succeeded in the first half of the century by numerous other works
on the subject: some printed and some not. In late 1730s and early 1740s,
these authors pointed to a colonial complementarity between Spain and Ibero-
America; they were joined by the minister of finance, war and the navy, José del
Campillo y Cossío. He believed that Spain should develop industry and pro-
duction plants fed from Ibero-America with the necessary raw materials, in
order to later receive the finished products from the mother country. Following
these Spanish discourses, the American territories were openly defined as Colonias
in the modern understanding. It remains unknown to what level these publica-
tions were controlled by the Crown in order to protect its policy of industrialisation
and the establishment of production plants, yet such an option remains quite
probable. Together with the establishment of academies and new educational
institutions, the press was used by the reformers who controlled these institu-
tions to promote their policies to an ever greater degree. It must be stated here
that this new language was not welcome in the overseas territories: more or
less covert messages can be found in the journalism of the Ibero-American
metropolises.
Ferdinand VI, the successor of Philip V, initially continued the reform policy.
The minister of war and finance, the Marquis Ensenada, who supported a close
relationship with France, conducted his broad project of introducing the
contribución única, which was a sort of uniform income tax, on the grounds of
defining all the subjects’ individual property situation. To achieve that, spacious
cadastre counts were conducted. The project failed, however, when King
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Ferdinand, when faced with the seven years war, opted for a consistent policy
of neutrality; he recalled Ensenada and had him imprisoned. After the mental
illness of Ferdinand, the reign of the childless monarch ended in 1759 without
further crucial reforms. In the same year, he was succeeded to the throne by
Charles III, his stepbrother, who had already reigned for many years in Naples.
His involvement on the French side in the seven years war led to the defeat of
Spain. The loss of Cuba, the Philippines, and other territories was painful, even
though in the peace of Paris, Cuba and the Philippines were given back by
England, and the loss of Florida was partially compensated by the purchase of
Louisiana. These failures at the beginning of his reign induced Charles to em-
bark energetically on a reform policy. The ambitious programme of modernising
the capital – Madrid – and expanding the reform activities over the Viceroyalty
of New Spain was met with the resistance of the colonies and provoked a popular
uprising in Madrid in 1766, which forced the king to flee from his capital.
Viva el Rey, muera el mal gobierno – long live the king, death to bad gov-
ernments – was the battle cry of the rabble-rousers, as was often the case
during times of rebellions and uprisings in the Spanish monarchy on both sides
of the Atlantic. The riots, however, did not limit themselves to the capital, yet in
the provinces they could be quickly subdued. Once the negotiations had ended,
order in Madrid was successfully restored at the price of the reorganisation of
the Cabinet. After the appropriate examination of cases, the council of the
state discussed the necessary consequences in secret sessions. It was decided
that the institution that stood behind the riots was the Jesuit Order, and its
banishment was decided upon – much like in Portugal ten years earlier – from
all the territories of the monarchy. During the action – which was kept secret
and organised by the general command – they were simultaneously jettisoned
from the European and American territories in 1767. Members of the order
were deported to the Church State and for the rest of their lives were to receive
modest pensions. In America, especially in the New Spain, the exiling of the
Jesuits, so deeply rooted in the society, resulted in unrest among the indigenous
population in the flatlands, yet these were successfully contained. The expro-
priation of the order’s opulent possessions and the sales that resulted from
them to interested parties in the regions, and the transfer of the cultural goods
to other local institutions of education, helped somewhat to dampen the dissat-
isfaction with the original action. The reforming activities conducted at the
same time with regard to the administration and in the church of New Spain
aggravated the existing antagonisms. In 1772, the city council of Mexico sent
a long letter to King Charles III, in which it claimed – in the spirit of the
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terminology of the Recopilación of 1680 – self-government (Reino) and the
resulting right for the government to be conducted by a person coming from
New Spain, and limiting relations with Spain to the maintenance of fraternal
relations, while demanding at the same time a separate subordination solely to
the King. This without doubt was a reaction to the Crown’s policy of appoint-
ing European Spaniards to significant posts in the administration. Two years
later, mine owners expressed their claims even more clearly, demanding the
establishment of a privileged organisation. In a long text, they pointed to the
fact that New Spain could not cope with paying for imports from the mother
country without mining and its revenues, otherwise they could see no other
option but to develop swiftly their own system of manufacturing industry. It
was a barely hidden threat towards the European colonial power that also indi-
cated a change in relations. The Crown reacted immediately and acceded to
their demands.
At the same time, the council of state finally approved an extensive political
programme in 1766. It envisaged undertaking all the possible steps that would
integrate America and Spain into a uniform national state, Cuerpo unido de
Nación. To involve people more strongly in the reform programmes, the Crown
promoted the establishment of local or regional patriotic societies – Sociedades
Económicas de Amigos del País. They were to care “on the spot” for the im-
provement of the economy, the protection of the poor, improved education,
and similar supporting actions, and – through their joint reading and discus-
sion of contemporary literature – develop and carry out appropriate projects.
To increase the efficiency of the fossilised structures in city councils on both
sides of the Atlantic, the introduction of honorary councillors and annual elec-
tions of procurador síndico del común – a legal representative of the public
good – was ordered. This policy was extremely efficient in Spain. Appropriate
societies sprouted up everywhere, and began their work, even though some
were successful only for a few years. Others, as for example the Sociedad
Vascongada of the Basque provinces, exist even to this day. That particular
society managed to acquire numerous members also in America. Only in New
Spain, was the organisation joined by more than 500 representatives of the
economic elite of Basque origin. In other parts of America, the response was
much poorer, possibly because in the years following 1776 which marked the
outbreak of the American war of independence, the Crown clearly refrained
from establishing such societies. Moreover, the national rhetoric enjoyed greater
popularity in Spain. The arrival of the notion of “la nación española“ which was
present as early as the 1780s in many documents – years before the French
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Revolution – became a popular slogan in the absolutely modern understand-
ing. Similarly, the municipal reforms seemed to be successful, gradually helping
to drive away the elites from the city councils on both sides of the Atlantic, and
to have them at least partially replaced with new groupings. From around 1780,
there was serious anxiety in Madrid about the development of the situation in
America, and independence tendencies were feared. The question of which
social groups should dominate politics to prevent that would increasingly come
to the fore thereafter. After the French Revolution and the assumption to the
throne of King Charles IV, the ruling house discredited itself, therefore, it was
only the Crown – a symbol that had been quoted for centuries but which did
not exist materially – that connected the various parts of the kingdom.
Attempts were made to characterise the constitutional development of the
Spanish monarchy with the aid of numerous general notions, prominent among
which were all the possible variants of absolutism and/or despotism, the Bour-
bon reformism, the Enlightenment, etc. Yet as was stated earlier, the research
on the eighteenth century in the post-Franco period drew primarily from the
countless sources that that policy produced regarding the administration, army,
finance, navy, production, etc. The contents of source materials available made
the reform policy perceived as highly impressive, and even effective. Yet the old
structures that were hidden below it which concerned justice, senioral and
church rule, influence and possession manifested themselves only much later,
primarily when the many aspects of the first desamortisation – as the Spanish
language Idefines secularisation – at the end of the eighteenth century under
Charles IV (which, after all, suited the nation’s value system) were more pre-
cisely researched. The dynasty administratively reorganised, if not modernised,
the monarchy. This took place, however, not without the participation of the
estates, and was dictated from the top, and for that reason was located on the
edge of the inherited legal justification. This is why, after the exile of Jesuits, the
dynasty encountered problems with legitimisation that were far stronger in
America than in Spain itself. As early as the 1770s, the need for a new legal
code for this very reason emerged also on behalf of the ruled. Charles III had
appropriated the works that had been initiated. They lasted for nearly three
decades. When the Novísima Recopilación was finally published in 1804, it
turned out to be of such little interest, that even the latest literature concerning
Spanish constitutional history during the Napoleonic period either does not
mention it or refers to it only while listing sources and literature.
Looking at the political relations in Ibero-America on the eve of indepen-
dence, we see a highly varied picture. Four Viceroyalties originated from the
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formerly dominant two – with capitals in Lima and Mexico. The new ones –
New Granada with the capital in Bogota, and Río de la Plata with the capital in
Buenos Aires differed radically from the two old ones in terms of population,
cultural and political organisation, and economic potential. Mexico, which ter-
ritorially was politically reduced to more or less to today’s Mexico and the
northern lands that were seized by the US in the nineteenth century, possessed
approximately 200 Spanish cities, highly differentiated in their size and impor-
tance. They were governed by municipal councils composed of city council-
lors, who owned their positions, and a certain number of additional, annually
elected honorary councillors, subordinate to the intendants of 11 or 12
intendencias (departments) or their delegates nominated from among the local
inhabitants. Together with the intendant or delegate presiding over the council,
the Alcaldes were elected every year by the members of the council and held
executive and the judicial power at the first instance and regulated other mu-
nicipal matters. The cities were strictly controlled by one of the powers operat-
ing in the capital. Besides these, there were around a dozen indigenous cities
under the control of a Spanish officer of the appropriate intendant of the
province. Independent of the population mix of those cities, aldermen of the
councils were always recruited here from the indigenous elite. Besides these,
there were approximately 4000 Indio-Municipalities that were also subject to
the intendants or the delegates, whose council members and persons holding
offices were nevertheless elected annually in direct elections from among all the
adult males. These elections did not meet today’s customs, as they were held in
the form of a gathering of all the males, who in a specific “dispute” decided
who should take a given post. Thus, a traditional type of direct democracy was
in operation here, which could be observed still in nineteenth century military
pronunciamientos, when military chiefs wrote down their objectives and made
the draft circulate among the villages in order to have them discussed, ex-
panded or amended by the plenary assembly of adults male citizens, who were
supposed to back – and finance – the uprising. The intendants and military
governors of the fortified cities were subordinate to the Viceroy and his strongly
developed central bureaucracy in the matters of finance and government, but
in judicial matters answered to both the central courts of appeal in the cities of
Mexico and Guadalajara. Besides these, there were two corporate organisations
of merchants and mining entrepreneurs with their own judiciary, who enjoyed
a high social status. Universities operated in the cities of Mexico and Guadalajara.
Dioceses in Yucatan, Oaxaca, Puebla, Valladolid de Michoacán, Guadalajara,
and Durango were subordinate to the Archbishop of the City of Mexico. Acapulco
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and Veracruz were the two central ports through which nearly all maritime
traffic was passed. Like earlier, besides the payments that were transferred to
the metropolis, Mexico had to pay high annual subsidies for the benefit of,
among others, Puerto Rico, Santo Domingo, Florida, Cuba, and Venezuela,
which – under the influence of the policy of Madrid – increasingly refrained
from buying the necessary goods in Mexico. This contributed to the alienation
towards the mother country.
Of all its zones of influence, Peru kept only Chile, which was subjected to
the viceroy in Lima. Its internal organisation was comparable to that of Mexico,
yet it had a far smaller number of Spanish cities and self-governing Indio-
communes. Moreover, the oppositions between Lima and the plateau around
Cusco intensified. The uprising by the cacique Túpac Amaru in 1780, cover-
ing a large share of the plateau, was smothered only with difficulty, and with
the support of other highland caciques.
Ecuador with its capital in Quito was subjected to New Granada. Venezu-
ela, which used to belong to it earlier, became liberated from under Colombian
control and constituted itself as an autonomous province. The territory was
decidedly sparsely populated, held only a small number of Indio-communes
and Spanish cities, and was inhabited much like Venezuela primarily by free
people living in coastal regions of black African origin, and black slaves, that is
groups without political rights. Due to the uprising of the indigenous American
people of 1780 against the taxation and politics of reforms introduced by the
Crown, New Granada, poorly integrated politically and communicatively, man-
aged to prevent the introduction of the system of intendants. In today’s Ecua-
dor, clearly visible are the differences between the plateau with its indigenous
features and capital in Quito, and the areas of plantations with Guayaquil in-
habited by African Blacks. While, besides a few Spanish cities, there were plenty
of Indo-communes of municipal character in the plateau, the coastal city of
Guayaquil dominated the surrounding settlements and areas of plantations. In
Venezuela, people in municipal organisations, much like the economically domi-
nant plantations, were also concentrated in the coastal zones while the base
remained an open frontier region, administratively and religiously unorganised.
The Río de la Plata Viceroyalty was also poorly integrated. The quickly
growing port and capital city of Buenos Aires was joined by the Pampa: its
base, though inhabited, yet poorly organised politically; while nearly the entire
south of today’s Argentina was the borderland with nomadic Indian tribes inte-
grated neither politically nor culturally. There were a few Spanish cities of local
central functions in the Argentinean Mesopotamia, yet they were sparsely popu-
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lated by people who were only superficially organised, and hailing from the
disbanded Jesuit organisations (after the exile of the Jesuits in 1767–1768).
The subordinate province of Paraguay was nearly entirely autonomous and
economically dependent on Maté exports controlled by Buenos Aires.
Montevideo, which developed only in the eighteenth century as a bulwark
against the Portuguese invasion of Río de la Plata and depended on grants from
Buenos Aires, at the same time drawing profits form its port, situated far more
favourably than the one in Buenos Aires. It was only far to the west of the
viceroyalty, that the provinces established earlier were situated; their number
included Mendoza, belonging to Chile, and Córdoba with its ancient university
– established once as Peru, and now subjected to the viceroy in Buenos Aires,
Tucumán, and others that were fully dependent economically on the Upper
Peru (today’s Bolivia), which belonged als to Buenos Aires. These highland
regions with rich silver mines and relatively dense population focusing partially
in few Spanish cities, yet mostly in the indigenous municipalities, were the
economic centre of the Viceroyalty, which – much like the cities of Cordoba
and Tucumán – rejected subordination to Buenos Aires. The very composition
of the two new viceroyalties permits the statement that their foundation was the
result of the Bourbon policy of regaining control over Ibero-America, which
additionally aggravated the already existing Ibero-American conflicts. This is
why it is not surprising that the independence movement in many aspects em-
braced the results of former antagonisms leading to the fact that – depending
on the development and the status quo – not only was the question “whether
or not to stay with Spain” asked, but also political projects – reaching from an
empire via monarchy up to a centralist or federative republic – were born.
The whole Caribbean region provided an entirely different picture, irre-
spective of whether it was controlled by Spain or by other foreign powers. The
Spanish Caribbean was for a long time controlled more indirectly than directly
from Mexico. Until the end of the seventeenth century it was a poorly devel-
oped region, whose quick development began only after the formal recognition
of the foreign holdings by Spain around 1660. Since that time, the foreign
powers took decisive action against the pirates and corsairs, who had previ-
ously been supported directly or indirectly, and provided an important factor in
colonial competition. The Caribbean was first included into the European inter-
national legal system, which had not taken place earlier due to the Spanish mo-
nopolist claims. This was still based on the papal bulls of 1493 and the result-
ant Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494 between Portugal and Castile, in line with
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which Spain refrained from drawing America into its European treaty policy
until the end of the Thirty Years’ War. It often remains unnoticed that it was
only around 1660 that European treaty law was gradually expanded into America
(Kahle 1993). In the eighteenth century, faced with the economic importance
of American deposits of precious metals under Spanish control, peace treaties
concluded by European powers after major pan-European military conflicts
would first decide about colonial interests and only thereafter deal with regula-
tions of internal European matters. As Hans-Otto Kleinmann correctly remarked,
Europe at that time became more “Western” or “Atlantic” (Kleinmann 2001).
The consequences of that process for Latin America, however, still remain
scarcely examined. Nevertheless, they formed the potential background for the
statement that the international recognition and protection of external borders
was the central political matter of the states gaining independence in Latin
America, as was mentioned at the beginning. This was so as the European
military conflicts began to spread quickly on to America, and primarily onto
the Caribbean. From Spain, this required intensification of military efforts also
in America, which in turn had its reflection in the reform effort leading to the
increased revenue of the Treasury. As the old Spanish colonial metropolises –
on the one hand for geographic reasons, on the other also as producers of
precious metals that were so eagerly sought – felt less threatened by war, the
interests of Spain and Ibero-America were becoming increasingly divergent.
Due to the quick growth of the transatlantic slave trade and the rapidly
increasing significance of the plantation economy (sugar, tobacco, cocoa), this
area quickly became internationalised. The English (Jamaica, Guyana, some of
the Lesser Antilles, Central America), the French (the western half of Haiti,
Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique), the Dutch (Guyana, Curaçao, Lesser
Antilles), Danes (St. Thomas, Lesser Antilles), and through Denmark also north-
ern Germans (the Hamburg suburb of Altona belonged, much like Schleswig-
Holstein, to Denmark), and even Swedes (St. Barthélemy) had their dominions
in the region, and their ships ever more often travelled to the Caribbean as if in
“the gold rush”. Even small islands were becoming entrepôts for slave trade
and major smuggling to Spanish America. What was mistakenly defined as “the
Atlantic triangular trade” – as, in fact there were far more complex trade
networks and roads – was conducted besides European powers listed above
even by Portuguese ships; there was also the trade of the Anglo-American
colonies with the Caribbean, which – on the way through Mexico – allowed
the shortest connections to Asia. It was only the construction of the Suez
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Canal that contributed to the region losing its importance in communication
with Asia. After Philip V introduced his sons from the second marriage to
Parma/Piacenza and Naples in 1730, which – due to the attitude to the Roman
Curia – could be of significance to the major Italian interests of Spain, the king
focused more strongly on American problems. As has been mentioned, the
Caribbean holdings of Spain were – thanks to the aid of privileged trading
companies – more strongly connected with the mother country, and their de-
velopment was based on the import of African slaves. Spain was seeking a way
into the lucrative plantation economy. At the same time, Buenos Aires tried to
sustain itself with an increased import of slaves. Even though the African slaves
reached Spanish America through foreign intermediaries (as Spain had no di-
rect access to the African coast as a result of the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494),
even in the days of Spanish Habsburgs, they were not a quantitatively signifi-
cant population in the old metropolises. Nevertheless, on the little developed
borders of the Spanish colonial empire a dynamic “Black Spanish America”
developed economically (Meissner, Mücke, Weber 2008). Especially Cuba, Ven-
ezuela, Puerto Rico, and Buenos Aires were gaining from this development
directed against the old colonial metropolises, which for that reason articulated
more strongly their own political interests, partially against the old colonial
dependencies and also – increasingly strongly – against the mother country.
When the slaves rebelled in the French Haiti and massacred the white planters
in 1803, and the news of that spread quickly through a variety of means,
printed word included, in Spanish America, the results were long-lasting. Even
though a biased assumption is made for the Spanish area namely that slavery in
this area was less rigorous, and the opportunity slaves had there to become
liberated was greater than anywhere else, the event increased the distrust be-
tween the ethnic elements of the population.
We should mention, finally, the further consequences of the Bourbon policy
of reforms for Latin America, which must be defined as purely Spanish. Soon
after the end of the Spanish war of succession, by reforming central adminis-
tration, Philip V strengthened fiscal and military administration, and general
governmental tasks by the inherited procedures of conduct based on the Ro-
man law, which was focused on examination of individual cases by legally trained
officers, and organised these along the procedures based on execution and
authority. Governmental posts were increasingly often manned by military trained
personnel according to the new principles, whose actions were result-oriented
and whose training encompassed the new technical and empirical knowledge.
As far as the high military rank in the earlier days was rather a mark of nobility,
59HORST PIETSCHMANN • ON THE ORIGINS
now a successful military career became a condition for ennoblement. The new
military organisation introduced by the Bourbons ensured – besides ornate
uniforms – military careers through provincial militias also to reserve officers
working in civil areas, and protection through special military courts. This led
ever more strongly to the militarisation of administration and further fields of
public life, which in the second half of the century permeated also to America.
The old elites were defiant due to their different perception of government,
which helped, however, its gradual marginalisation in administration and the
army. Prospects of such careers opened for Americans in Spain. Despite nu-
merous examples of such transcontinental carriers in both directions, this phe-
nomenon has not yet been sufficiently studied. As the traditional scheme of
opposition between Creoles and European Spaniards was at the same time
questioned, no conclusions of general nature may be made here.
Traditionally dominant in the administration during the Habsburg period,
the lawyers who captured the central authorities in the councils of the me-
tropolises gradually lost influence over the course of the eighteenth century
and were pushed back to the margins that encompassed the judiciary and court
administration. The new sites of education that were connected to the new
practical and empirical sciences were for a long time limited only to the mother
country, and had not appeared in Spanish America until the last decades of the
eighteenth century. For that reason, special opportunities to acquire education
– especially after the Jesuits were exiled – appeared for the youth aspiring to
become clergy, and the future lawyers and the physicians who were tradition-
ally educated in the universities of Ibero-America; yet employment opportuni-
ties were limited. Similarly, the professions of a clerk or a notary – available
without university education – were strongly reduced in the new administrative
order. This development may be perceived as the primary cause of the situation
in which the Spanish American claim to reserve the public offices and posts in
administration only for people born in America was becoming stronger. The
sons of rich parents increasingly chose to travel for a few years to Europe in
order to acquire an education, where they embarked on a variety of careers,
like, for example, Francisco de Miranda from Venezuela, who first served first
in the Spanish army, then in the French revolutionary army and who would
later fight for Venezuelan independence, but who would eventually be de-
feated. Simón Bolívar, a son of rich planters, who after Miranda would also
fight for independence, had his Grand Tour of Europe in order to acquire
knowledge and experience. There are plenty of other examples of this kind. On
the other hand, it is also important to note the cases of innumerable represen-
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tatives of lower clergy and lawyers who did not succeed, and who for that
reason became increasingly disgruntled. Against this background, it is of little
wonder that the number of harbingers of independence, and the fathers of the
Latin-American constitution drafts, included lawyers and clergy from that so-
cial stratum that – besides officers of the militia who acquired military experi-
ence and developed leadership skills during the battles – had a decisive influ-
ence on the course of events.
Somewhat different were relations in Brazil, where the entire Portuguese
court was transported as early as 1808 by the English fleet. Besides the Royal
family, approx. 16,000 Portuguese connected to the court reached the capital
of Rio de Janeiro. Internal developments in Brazil had been delayed when
compared to Spanish America, and occurred from around 1710, when rich
deposits of gold were discovered in the interior of the country and they began
to be exploited. This process was a new opportunity for many people from the
cities situated close to the shore, which helped to alleviate social tensions. As
the press arrived quite late in Brazil, and there was no university education,
cultural life was rather weaker, and there was no excess of graduates seeking
employment. Moreover, only small movements and caucuses turned up in Bra-
zil during the period of revolution, and struggled to achieve any changes in
political relations. The arrival of a huge group of Portuguese, with their anti-
French and anti-Napoleonic attitude, who were the source of the educated elite
in the country, also prevented movements comparable to those that emerged in
Spanish America in the last decade of the eighteenth century. Independence
and the establishment of the Brazilian empire took place only as a result of the
decisions taken within the Royal family, long after the conclusion of the Con-
gress of Vienna, in the period of the restoration, when the general assembly in
the mother country demanded the restoration of the status quo ante and threat-
ened to remove the King if he did not return to Lisbon. At the time, the Brazil-
ian elite applied pressure on the new Emperor Pedro I to devise a constitution,
or at least prevent authoritarian rule.
Independent of the events of 1808 that presaged the future developments
mentioned above, Spanish America was entirely surprised by developments in
Europe. The abdication of Charles IV and his son Ferdinand VII, which Napo-
leon had forced, and the later appointment of Joseph Bonaparte as King of
Spain, whose entry into Spain at the head of the French troops and the radical
change in the form of government through the constitution of Bayonne in
Spain produced a problem of legitimacy. Similarly, popular uprisings that broke
out everywhere, and the establishment of the Juntas who took power in the
61HORST PIETSCHMANN • ON THE ORIGINS
name of Ferdinand VII to begin the struggle against the hated French, led to a
situation in which news that required the authorities to react reached the Ibero-
American capitals literally every month. Together with the imprisonment and
the abdication of the kings, being the source of legitimisation, legitimisation
was exhausted, whatever the assessment of the processes preceding them. The
messengers of the new King Joseph and a variety of Juntas were received – sent
one after another – and demanded obedience and subordination, not least
because of their interest in the rich financial resources of Spanish America.
With the abdication of the kings, did the viceroys and officers nominated by
Charles IV also lose their legitimacy? Should people take their future into their
hands, which – on the grounds of binding law – seemed fully justified? As the
scandals that surrounded the family of Charles IV discredited him completely,
one could quickly agree to recognise Ferdinand VII did the Spanish regency. As
far, however, as the question of whether an independent administrative unit
could take over the regency in the name of Ferdinand – and if so, in what form
– or whether it would become subordinated to the Spanish Junta, opinions
were divided, with those interest groups who were the best organised and who
operated in the most decisive manner coming to the fore. With the consent of
the highest court, the Audiencia, and a group of rich Euro-Spanish, a putsch
broke out in the City of Mexico, where the governing viceroy wanted to estab-
lish a Junta whose rule would cover the entire country. Other places were
subordinated to the Junta Central, which was quickly formed in the mother
country, while other territories established their own juntas. Compared to the
example of the USA, which in this period had gained independence, and the
individual plots of Euro Spaniards suspected of independence tendencies, who
– most often thanks to the policy of the Bourbon kings – obtained important
posts in America, one can interpret the penchant for establishing juntas as
being the first step towards independence. The quick succession of events in-
tensified the political climate and rendered a matter-of-fact assessment impos-
sible. When the Spanish Junta Central announced the election of a parliamen-
tary assembly which would have representatives of all the parts of the empire,
the move resulted in first declarations of independence in some areas of Span-
ish America, and in other places led to a temporary calming of the situation.
The Cortes de Cádiz, prepared by the general assembly under the protection
of English troops, otherwise occupied by the French, and elaborated the Con-
stitution of Cádiz of 1812 that operated only in the two old viceroyalties, and
even then only for a short time, as King Ferdinand VII rendered it null and void
immediately on his return to Spain in 1814, returning to absolute government.
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Even at the time, the text of this constitution was greeted with a great interest
in Europe and America; and has since then stimulated a great deal of discus-
sion, also in relation to its significance for Germany (Wohlfeil 1965; Timmermann
2007). In the face of the jubilees of 200th anniversaries of the independence
of Spanish America, the text of the constitution is discussed in Spain and in the
Latin American states, where it was the binding document. Those countries of
South America that were the first to announce independence, object to today’s
rather biased attempts to instrumentalise the understanding of Spanish – Ameri-
can similarities. Nevertheless, to understand its great significance, it seems
proper to provide at least a general sketch of the processes during the period of
1808–1825, i.e. until independence was achieved.
According to dependency theory, independence has been perceived since
the 1960s as a revolutionary liberation movement from colonial exploitation
and subjugation. David Brading described the process of modernisation, which
had earlier taken place in Spain itself, in terms of “Revolution in Government“
as the central reason behind the events that followed 1808 (Brading 1972). In
2006, Hans-Joachim König described the same process with an almost un-
changed chronology as “the second conquest” of Ibero-America (König 2006);
before that the Mexican historian Luis Jáuregui called the very same process
“modernisation”, at the same time characterising, however, the Viceroy’s gov-
ernment of that period as weak (Jáuregui 2004). The first example suggests
that the reaction to such a “revolution” has been somewhat conservative (Mücke
2008). The “second conquest” raises the suspicion that the colonial status was
not that strong, as the Empire’s own colonies had to be captured a second
time, while the description provided by Luis Jáuregui allows for the conclusion
that the autonomy of colonial Mexico, and even the government of the Viceroy
in the capacity of a representative of the Crown, was not only to a large extent
weak, but did not even have a central role in the processes that were taking
place. What fits the last opinion are also the statements of Mexican historians,
like, for example, “la conquista la hicieron los indios y la independencia los
españoles“, which, when they were delivered, encountered no opposition dur-
ing a seminar on independence at El Colegio de México in November 2007.
Although it is a fact that these cases refer mostly to Mexico, similar tendencies
can also be observed with regard to other countries of Spanish America. It is
interesting that this concerns mostly the states that possessed metropolitan
functions before gaining independence.
Analysing more precisely the way the historiography developed, one can
distinguish a few central parameters in the historiography of the Spanish world
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that for a long time, up until today, differed partially on some important matters
from the European discourses. These include primarily:
1. The notion of “constitution” was and is applied solely to the constitutional
orders that the individual fathers of constitution referred to as Constitución,
which is legitimised through a type of representative consent. For that rea-
son, the first constitution of the Spanish world was the constitution of
Bayonne, which Napoleon ordered and which allowed his brother Joseph to
be appointed the King of Spain. In many respects, it was reminiscent of the
constitution that had been established by Napoleon for the kingdom of
Westphalia, where the French emperor placed his younger brother Jérôme
in the position of King; yet both constitutions play a rather insignificant role
in the historiography of Spain and Germany. While the German constitu-
tional history focuses more on the phenomena of earlier periods, while also
examining the revolutionary period of 1776–1848 defined more or less
appropriately as Sattelzeit; this did not happen in the Iberian world. Even
the Novísima Recopilación de las Leyes de España from 1804 does not play
any role in the literature on constitutional history, independent of its char-
acter as the fundamental law. Beginning with the fact that the constitution
of Bayonne was actually the first, although widely disliked, constitution for
the Spanish world, outside this cultural realm there is hardly anyone eager
to claim in earnest that e.g. there was no constitutional order before Napo-
leon in the German states, and one should also bear in mind that England
does not have a written constitution to this day. One should note that the
Spanish colonial kingdoms had – much like the mother country – a legal
order regulated by the fundamental statute of the supremacy of the consti-
tution, and that the fathers of all the Spanish and Latin American constitu-
tional orders of the period following the attainment of independence natu-
rally knew them, as they were educated in them. This concerns only Span-
ish America, and not Brazil or the USA, whose colonial territories claimed
a variety of royal or other charters that had no common legal basis of the
status of fundamental law. Speaking of Spanish America, one should also
account for the fact that, due to the lack of codification adjusted to the new
constitutional orders following the independence, courts had to pass sen-
tences along the lines of colonial legal norms until very late nineteenth
century. The reasons for not accounting for the colonial history of law in
the newer constitutional histories are complex. Significant grounds for the
view claiming that the history of constitution – at least in Latin America –
began in 1808, leads to the second central group of problems, namely:
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2. The colonial status of Ibero-America. Even at the beginning of the 1950s,
an Argentinian historian of law, Ricardo Levene, published – citing colonial
legal orders – a work entitled “Las Indias no eran colonias”. This resulted in
violent opposition against the European historiography of Latin America
which was emerging at that time, which referring to the Conquista and the
Charter of the United Nations insisted on using the term “colony” in its
modern definition. Since then the modern notion of colonies has been ap-
plied to Ibero-America without differentiation, at least until the period of
the independence movements, and to some degree even much more after,
qualifying the new states as only formally independent. Yet, in reference to
many parallel phenomena between Portugal and Spain on the one hand,
and the Ibero-America of the eighteenth century on the other, the question
arises whether that colonial status did not change from the sixteenth to the
end of the eighteenth century, and was it not at the least perceived differ-
ently in Ibero-America. The colonial legal order did not give any opportu-
nity to many representatives that came from the elites to feel “colonialised”,
to use this modern, tautological notion. After all, Ibero-America exerted
control over the deposits of precious metals coveted by everyone. Another
factor that plays a role here is that a certain “Latin American solidarity”
made it difficult for the historiography of those countries to admit that
Spanish overseas territories were strongly hierarchical. In contrast to the
old colonial metropolises, like Lima and Mexico, were in the peripheral
areas, whose elites felt partially more colonialised by these centres than by
Spain itself. For that reason, the independence movements were born in
those very territories; it is enough to mention Venezuela, Buenos Aires,
and Paraguay. This thought leads to another specific feature of the histori-
ography of the history of Latin American law and constitutions, in compari-
son to Europe, namely:
3. The temporal perspective of the depth of the historical sciences in the re-
search of far-going transformations resulting from the American War of
Independence and the French revolution, briefly speaking – the research
for the reasons behind the period of revolutions from 1776 to 1848.
While what is treated as the very genesis of those changes in Europe is –
more or less concisely – the entire eighteenth century, and in certain peri-
ods an even deeper history is achieved: the late seventeenth century with its
rationalism, European system of powers, absolutism, and state develop-
ment, in the context of the Iberian states and their overseas territories, the
research has been limited to a great extent to the times following 1740 in
65HORST PIETSCHMANN • ON THE ORIGINS
Portugal (the Minister Pombal) and 1759 in Spain (the assumption of the
throne by Charles III, participation in the Seven Years War). The reasons for
this emphasis on this relatively short time period can possibly be found in
the fact that at least since the eighteenth century the European South was
perceived as lagging behind northern Europe, and was, moreover, suffering
from stagnation: a view that was even shared by numerous Iberian men of
that period, while the overseas territories were perceived as dependent colo-
nies, even less developed than the mother countries. For that reason, the
research was limited to the periods that had visible tendencies for reform
and modernisation, even though in Europe Ibero-America was again re-
ceived – since the time of Rousseau, and also partially even in the period of
Renaissance humanism and Romanticism – as more akin to nature and less
burdened by deleterious civilisation influences, as Antonello Gerbi proves
in his old monumental works “La natura delle Indie Nove” and “La disputa
del Nuevo Mundo” (Gerbi 1982). What results from this is another signifi-
cant difference in the historiographical treatment of Ibero-America early in
the nineteenth century, both in relation to Europe and the USA, namely:
4. geography. It is known that it did not play a major role in historical re-
search, primarily because it had been abused by the Nazi machine, not only
in the German historiography of the latter half of the twentieth century.
Since the mid-1980s, French historians following Fernand Braudel (Braudel
1966) and American ones put again in their research more emphasis on
geography, which resulted in a new interest and new definition of historical
areas, as for example, the concept of Atlantic history from the mid-1980s
which subordinated all the adjacent seas and the continental river systems
emptying into the Atlantic to the Atlantic area; instead of the classical per-
spective of metropolises – colonies, it focused on the spatial interactions of
lands bordering this area. The role of the colonial powers goes to a further
plane, and was reduced to the potential influence on the system and the
benefits drawn from those, while colonial territories were indirectly awarded
a historically more independent and active role. Whilst this premise focuses
primarily on the economic and financial aspects, to an ever greater extent,
it also accounts for the questions of migration, cultural development, and
even the independent “colonial” internal policy. What results from this, for
Spain and Portugal in the historiography of the period and at the threshold
of independence, is a change of perspective that threats the mother coun-
tries more as an addition to the colonies, and later as political actors of the
past.
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With reference to the above generally drawn outline of development, the
theses stated below may be formed and their significance for the central subject
of the constitution briefly explained.
1st Thesis:
In opposition to Portuguese Brazil, in 1680 colonial Spanish America ac-
quired with the Recopilación de las Leyes de Indias the basic legal order that
corresponded to the categories of European constitutional history of that time,
which bestowed equality in the legal sphere to the overseas states, as kingdoms
– but not to the provinces that were subordinate to them – with the kingdoms,
being parts of Spain. Even though this order was imposed from above, the laws
nonetheless included and took as their source the practice of government pre-
ceding the process of law, and “listened” individually to the interested parties.
In their attempts to make Spain a territorially uniform modern state, the Bour-
bon dynasty continued to dismantle gradually that order from 1700 onwards,
unwittingly distorting in this way the legal order recognised in America as
being the most legitimate. This was achieved through transition to a new prac-
tice of government, in which it was not the process of law but the directives
issued from the top down, which is corroborated by the way that the modern
ministries that were established in 1714 operated. At the same time, the colo-
nial discourse was beginning to develop in Spain, comprising mercantilist rep-
resentations, which resulted in ever greater disparities between the mother
country and the colonies. Together with the claim to subject the overseas ter-
ritories to the Spanish Regency, which resulted in the peoples’ movements that
developed after 1808, the legitimisation of the Spanish power based on the
Recopilación was definitely nullified, as Spanish Americans states felt them-
selves to have equal rights.
2nd Thesis:
Having roots that went back to 1680 and the times of Philip II, the
Recopilación consolidated the legal relations that were developing in Spanish
America, which could be viewed as a feudatory state of estates and corpora-
tions, due to which the authority (reign), was executed primarily over people,
and only secondarily over the territory they inhabited and owned. Briefly speaking,
that was a system based on feudalism, similar in many aspects to pre-Colom-
bian relations, divided into the same hierarchy as Castile into kingdoms (Reinos)
and provinces (Provincias) that were dependent upon them. Its result was that
the elites, at least those who defined themselves as Spanish, did not feel in any
way subordinate to Castile or Spain, but only to the King. In this legal order, the
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decisive fact was that the Reinos were composed of two parts, the (repúblicas)
of the Indios and the Spaniards, neither of them giving any consideration to
those persons of Black African origin. In both, municipalities operated as rep-
resentatives of the common people in an order based on different social strata.
In both, the nobility was privileged, while the clergy was counted as being
among the Spanish parts. The senoríos (Grundherrschaft) in Spanish hands
were very few (for the inheritors of Columbus, the domains of Cortés and
Moctezuma, the last being in the hands of the Spanish nobility), yet they were
numerous in the parts that belonged to the indigenous cazicazgos, where apart
from the indigenous municipalities, they were acquiring the character of mano-
rial estates as many of the large Spanish landholdings may be classified. In the
distant provincias in Spanish America, there was no such division as there the
Indios classified as barbarians and were assigned to reservations or reducciones,
or relations with them might be regulated in the form of treaties. It is enough to
mention, even in this context, the “Indian parliament”, established by José de
San Martín (who also described it in vivid detail) in Mendoza, before he crossed
the Andes.
3rd Thesis:
From the point of view of constitutional law, the policy-making of the Bour-
bon dynasty was the same in Spain and later also in the American territories,
yet the Bourbons connected it to various political discourses. Just like with the
end of the war of succession, the kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon lost their
legal order and were incorporated as provinces into what was at least formerly
uniform Spain, the dynasty attempted to do the same gradually from the 1730s
in Ibero-America, even though using somewhat different means. The reason
behind that was the change in the concept of governance. The place of the
chain of government down the pyramid of the vassals with its corporate struc-
ture which defined the given territory through their area of inhabitation based
on liege law represented by the Habsburgs, was taken over by the concept of
reign over the territory and – in the second order – over the people of any
rank who inhabited it. Due to that concept, attempts were made in Spanish
America to limit the authority of the old metropolises by establishing new
viceroyalties (primarily in the area of the viceroyalty of Peru) and trading com-
panies in the regions subordinate to Mexico (Venezuela, Cuba, Philippines, and
others) and which were directed from Madrid. This process was justly defined
by König as “the second conquest”. At the same time, the breaking of the
direct recourse (abolition of the direct path of appeal) of overseas vassals to the
Crown – and the weakening of the old overseas bureaucracy that was related
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to this – by the development or a formalised structure of administrative hierar-
chy (ministries, governorships, departments, etc), through which everything
was to be directed to the centre, the overseas hierarchies were dispensed with
and the focus shifted to the centre in Madrid. At the same time, as has been
mentioned, there was a particular militarisation of administration and society
through the system of provincial militias and the new officer elite. These ac-
tions encroached on numerous interests and the constitutional order (that had
been in force) since 1680, yet in the metropolises they triggered defence mecha-
nisms against the politics of the Crown. For example, the Spanish kings were
defined in official, printed texts as “emperors of the Indians”. After the exile of
the Jesuits in 1767, which was considered in America as planned and unlawful,
the crisis of legitimisation was aggravated. The Crown tried to cope with it
through a new discourse, postulating the establishment of “cuerpo unido de
nación” from Euro- and Amero-Spaniards. The central representative organs,
like, for example, the City Council of Mexico, claimed in turn the continuation
of autonomy guaranteed by the Recopilación, yet indirectly they assumed
a privileged position within the American structure of the state. Similarly, since
the 1770s, the old centres in Spanish America codified their own legal acts
through their appellate courts, and issued them in print, while the Crown or-
dered the codification of a part of the law (mining law, trade, slaves, etc) order-
ing at the same time the development of a new legal code of the Novísima
Recopilación de Leyes de España of 1804, mentioned above. Because of the
historiographical lacunae mentioned in the introduction, it is not clear to this
day to what extent these attempts at codification on both sides of the Atlantic
were complementary or were secretly antagonistic actions. Premises for both
the assumptions exist.
4th Thesis:
The outbreak of the American War of Independence in 1776, and later the
French revolution aggravated these problems, because they pointed out politi-
cal alternatives in the solution of the crisis of legitimisation. No later than
1780, we also find documents by Spanish governmental officers denouncing
the threat that independence movements also posed in Ibero-America, and
promoted them as an opportunity to solve the question of elevating viceroyships
to the rank of independent kingdoms in the hands of the princes of the ruling
dynasty. At the same time, the King of Spain would take over the imperial title
and play the role of the “Suzerain” towards Spanish America. In the 1790s
there was an on-going discussion about this project in Spain in the form of
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secret consultation. Yet in 1780 with disturbances breaking out in Peru and
today’s Colombia, in the context of the crisis of legitimacy confirmed by the
slogan “Viva el Rey, muera el mal gobierno”. The old order, considered legiti-
mate at least by the broad elites, was nevertheless demolished when the re-
gency council was formed in Spain after the events of 1808, as a result of the
popular uprising against the new king, Joseph I (appointed by Napoleon) and
declared subordination to “Ferdinand VII, who was unable to execute author-
ity” and claimed own authority, which de jure meant subordination to Spain but
no longer to the king. The year 1808 meant the breakdown of the laboriously
balanced, old legitimisation based on the one hand on Recopilación, and on the
other hand on the Bourbon modernisation policy. In accordance with the old
law, referring to constitutional mediaeval legislation, after the abdication of the
King, the mandate of the officers he nominated ended, and the representatives
of the people (that is, the cities), were envisaged as now organising the execu-
tion of power in the name of the King, and to guarantee order in the state.
Following the order which the Bourbons aspired to, the execution of authority
in the name of the king was to be placed in the hands of the Regency that was
to be established in Spain, to whom the overseas authorities subordinated them-
selves until another decision, considering a further course of action was made
by the Regency. This process, which was in the tradition of absolutism, divided
the public not only in Spanish America, but also in Spain itself, where, as
a result of dissatisfaction towards the old dynasty, even some organisations of
the central government supported the new ruler, Joseph Bonaparte.
The conclusion that should be drawn from the above is that the crisis of
legitimacy of the Spanish reign in America, which was slowly aggravated in the
eighteenth century, led in 1808 to the fundamental breakdown of the order
based on constitutional legitimacy, as the new order that was introduced gradu-
ally by the Bourbons under the principle of absolutism and which was still
imperfect did not offer legal options for a solution that would provide for equal
rank. Faced with the vacuum of legitimacy, the broad consensus now offered
plenty of political exit strategies in the light of the current circumstances. Only
now could one consider, and even try out, political alternatives in a more or
less open manner, depending on the relations that were predominant in indi-
vidual regions. What resulted from this was the right to base political solutions,
be it on the legal order that was inherited from the Habsburg period or on
different political models from the recent past, as Republican solutions in the
USA or the model of empire that had been produced by the French Revolution
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and Napoleon, or constitutional monarchy. That was offered from 1812 by the
liberal constitution from Cádiz, on which, after all, the first American repre-
sentatives who had been elected cooperated for the first time. It turned out
then that independence movements began to be successful wherever the old
order – which was far away from the old metropolises – had a far weaker
rooting and institutional cohesion, and where circumstances – like, for ex-
ample, close external contacts that reached across the ocean – had a beneficial
influence. This was the case in Venezuela, and Buenos Aires, while the upris-
ings of Father Hidalgo and his successors in the depths of Mexico, could be
very quickly contained by professional troops, capital elites and institutions.
The hierarchical order of the Spanish colonial empire often led to that kind of
the independence strife degenerated into civil wars. Some independence decla-
rations, as for example the one in Paraguay, were primarily directed against the
dominant colonial metropolis, instead of the distant mother country. It was not
for nothing that both Bolívar in Venezuela and San Martín in Argentina under-
stood that without the exclusion of the old, royalist metropolis in Lima, one
would not be able to maintain lasting independence even in their home coun-
tries; this forced them to undertake the risky crossing of the Andes, which
resulted in major losses. Lima was liberated, but Peru preserved the centralist
system. Mexico was liberated in the transitory phase by the Empire of Augustín
de Iturbide, yet in the first federalist constitution of the state of 1824 the City
of Mexico was heavily punished as the largest city of the country. It was admin-
istered by a governor appointed by the president and did not have its own
representational organ until the early 1990s. Cuba in turn liberated from ties
with Mexico only in the eighteenth century, at first preferred weak Spanish
authority to independence, when it viewed the events that led to the gaining of
independence by Haiti.
All the new Ibero-American states declared themselves to be republics, yet
on closer inspection, it became obvious that the first constitutions of all the
new republics followed in their central point the Constitution of Cádiz of 1812;
that is, the text of the constitution for a constitutional monarchy. The unifying
element in each case was the “nation” on which that concept was based. This
took place according to the following order: the definition of the nation, defini-
tion of those who belong or do not belong to it, definition of Catholicism as the
only recognised religion – a statement that could not be avoided due to the
position of the church and its role as the loan provider – then duties towards
the nation, and somewhat further also the listing of a few individual rights. The
individual catalogue of fundamental rights, similar to the catalogue in the first
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republican constitution of France, is found – curiously enough – only at the
end of the constitution of the Brazilian empire, which, however, is legitimised
in its introduction with the Grace of God. The Spanish American fathers of the
constitutions knew only too well that the national concept in each of the newly
established states did not correspond to the reality for many reasons, yet in all
the instances it described a futuristic project, to which one could agree, not
least for its potential of maintaining power, and which needed at the same time
historic legitimisation, which explains the many references to the pre-Colom-
bian past that sometimes seem absurd. Besides that, the lawyers at least among
the fathers of the constitution had to know that in the daily judicial practice one
would still have to rely on colonial legislation for a long time to come. Follow-
ing the Constitution of Cádiz, a basic division of powers was envisaged, yet the
judiciary as the third power was strongly handicapped. Nor was there any
justification provided for the rulings of the court. If this was a federalist consti-
tution that was agreed, the more complex questions would be passed into the
constitutional legislation of the new federal states, and in the case of passing
a centralist constitution, the problem-solving questions would be moved to the
later acts given by the parliament. What all these constitutions actually sought
was only the regulation of the question of the manner of how the state was to
be constituted and how sovereignty should be distributed internally. A decisive
role here was played by the size and richness of the city; namely, whether or
not it would succeed in becoming the capital of a federal state; and in a state
with a centralist system, at least the capital of a “department”. Despite numer-
ous borrowings from the constitution of the USA, there was, however, no
consent to the solution that was implemented in North America, due to which
Washington – at that time devoid of any significance – became the capital and
the seat of the institutions of central government. In Spanish America, each
city that to varying degrees had any importance thanks to its colonial past,
claimed capital functions, at least in one of the federal states. As the federal
government in a way embodied the nation and was perceived as a somewhat
general binding element, there was no possibility of jettisoning it in its entirety.
Sovereignty related to the above required a visible municipal symbol of power,
although later there was joint action to limit its political and legal aspects. In
individual countries this process was so varied and problematic that a new
factor had to be taken into consideration: the inheritance of Bourbon politics,
namely the more or less strong, legally privileged role of the armies, whose
commands reserved the right, derived from the Bourbon tradition, to be some-
thing akin to the “nation’s school and guarantor”. Yet as a symbol of opposition
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against the Spanish colonial regime, any direct taxation was deemed to be
socially discriminating and was swiftly dispensed with; a move that deprived the
state, and especially the army, of an important source of finance. Against this
background, the texts of the constitutions were in later periods adjusted to
reflect political changes, without the introduction of specific changes towards
the nation in ill fortune – stylised to the “sacred cow” – and the general way of
operation of the state.
With the process thus outlined, the claim has to be made that the nation as
a futuristic project was characteristic of all the constitutions of independent
states, yet their development differed from the very beginning in terms of such
central functions of the state as centralism and federalism, parliamentarianism,
the judiciary, sovereignty, financial system, etc. The frequent changes of con-
stitution in later times and highly differentiated periods of elaboration of ad-
equate legal codifications, frequently making reference to non-Spanish legal
traditions, aggravated these differences. This was also the case because the
progressing internal colonisation, approach to the church and its landed prop-
erties and income from testamentary legacies, economic development, and highly
dissimilar internal relations posed new challenges for the states. Although in
fact, in all the countries of Spanish-America the legal substratum and corpo-
rate legal figures and traditions took root in the Spanish tradition, with time
legal and political changes produced a highly differentiated order in individual
states. Even though the differences between Brazil and Spanish-America were
present much earlier, the situation developing after independence also led Span-
ish-American states in various directions. While the liberal governments of the
nineteenth century initially tried to continue the Bourbon policy of reforms
quite persistently, conservative regimes chose an entirely different political di-
rection. Of exemplary significance here is the frustration of Bolívar in his late
life, resulting from the development of events, as well as the voluntary, long-
term emigration of José de San Martín to France – these were two of the most
important strategic protagonists of the independence process, responsible for
its success.
Tracing the problem shared by the new Latin American states related to the
taking control and organisation of regions situated in the distant corners of the
country and imposing state monopoly in exercising power, one encounters
similar or comparable consequences in specific areas of statehood, for example
the financial system. What showed here for instance in Argentina were long-
term problems, related among other things to the implementation of state con-
trol of the monetary, financial, and tax policies, as the north-western provinces
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colonised by Peru remained dependent on Bolivian mining for a long period
after gaining independence, and the Bolivian currency was in use in their terri-
tory, despite of their inclusion in 1776 into the new viceroyalty of Rio de la
Plata. It was only in the last three decades of the nineteenth century that the
central government managed to bind these territories more strongly in finan-
cial terms to the seat of central government in Buenos Aires, even though to
this day they enjoy a certain autonomy in this scope. These problems look
different in such states as Mexico, where the control of resources by individual
federal states was much more significant for the financial system from the out-
set, while the central state had to limit itself to import and export duties, and
quickly found itself in financial dire straits. It was only towards the end of the
nineteenth century that this situation underwent a change. Independent of the
federal system of Mexico, the financial situation of individual federal states is
still today extremely unequal, thanks to which the central state may use it as
a mechanism for policy-making. The area of financial systems has not been
examined in detail in many other states of Latin America, even though state
constitutions of numerous countries follow highly divergent assumptions in this
scope. From the point of view of the history of constitutions, we should note
that this question in the constitutions of the individual federal states within
a central state i.e. the constitutions of the subjects of the federation has hardly
been researched in the historical aspect. For example, the terms describing the
subdivisions of individual federal states in Mexico were very diverse as late as
the nineteenth century. Similarly, the elections statutes defined for individual
states depending on density of population provided a very misleading picture
for a long time, since for example winning 1000 votes was sufficient to win
a seat in the national parliament for one state, while in another, their number
had to be five or ten times as high. It turned out that territorial divisions origi-
nating in colonial times no longer corresponded to later developments, yet for
political reasons of national unity, changes were shunned. Similarly, constitu-
tions of individual parts of states seem to operate differently in states with
a large concentration of settlements from pre-Colombian times than in states
without such a tradition, a difference which produced different forms of exer-
cising the right to vote. We should note here that colonial legislation not only
awarded indigenous municipalities with considerable autonomy, but also that
those communes – unlike Spanish cities – enjoyed a powerful system of repre-
sentation throughout the entire colonial period, according to which elections
to municipal authorities were held every year, which after gaining indepen-
dence led to conflicts between the traditional and the modern system of elec-
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tions. It is here that the tradition of the communal (municipal) resistance against
the decisions of the central state took root: it is present even in the most recent
history, as demonstrated by the violent rejection of the new central airport for
Mexico City by Mexico’s Atenco municipality, which resulted in the federal
government abandoning the project.
One should also mention here the different results of the latest historical
studies concerning the history of the nineteenth century and conducted under
the aegis of methodologically renewed political history. Besides the surprisingly
high importance of election processes in the nineteenth century, we should
point out that the creation of political parties in the second half of the nine-
teenth century proves significant similarities to comparable processes in Eu-
rope. Thus, parties showing far-going continuation and parallelism to Europe
can be found, even though they moved away from the European patterns dur-
ing further development. The development and role of the public space, much
like that of the beginnings of social organisation in the scope of establishing
associations and representation of interests, were examined in greater detail by
the school of François-Xavier Guerra, a prematurely deceased French aca-
demic who persistently applied the theoretical assumptions of Habermas. As
a part of far-reaching historical research, based on the unveiling of new sources
considering the problems of the nineteenth century, many generalisations and
generalising typologies of Latin American histories and political systems were
revised or at the least strongly relativised. One cannot fail to refer here to the
great amount of recent and latest research on the complex of “nation build-
ing”, as this has become practically its own field of research on Latin American
history. Parliamentarianism and elections also comprise a new, separate area in
which new, astonishing discoveries are made in different countries. This also
concerns the classical topos of caciques and caudillos, which are today inter-
preted as factors of national cohesion. Currently, even the topos of Latin America
as a region characterised by specific structural social inequalities – from the
time of European invasion to this day – is questioned for lack of historical
evidence. Latin American intellectuals claimed even that for Europeans the
region plays the role of a “negative utopia” (Villoro 1999).
In the last decades, many new discoveries have been made on the grounds
of new source materials, after historiography in Latin America and concerning
Latin America adjusted its scope of interest and methods to appropriate inter-
ests or historiography in Anglo-America and Europe. The old ideological di-
vides were to a great extent eliminated, and replaced by methodological and
theoretical schools and international historiographic networks, describing pre-
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dominantly post-modern and postcolonial questions, and dealing with histori-
cal, social and historical, structural and historical, and other forms of dis-
course, while the classical subjects for example the history of international
relations, the history of constitutions, and others rather lead their own lives on
the margins of the discipline. What is still lacking, as has been mentioned pre-
viously, is comparative research. This results from shortages in content, expert
and language knowledge encompassing the entire continent. Studies of global,
Atlantic, or continental importance – rather scattered and skimming only the
surface of the problem – are helpful only in reference to specific problems and
in a highly limited way. Facing the problem of the diversified development of
Latin American states, after gaining independence, outlined in the introduc-
tion, there appears on the other hand a visible trend in line with which the
history of Latin America does not differ so significantly from the histories of
Europe and Anglo-America, as was postulated in the 1960s and 1970s. In the
meantime, the old models of the centre and the periphery, on the one hand,
diversified to such a degree that they can no longer be used for the region as
a whole in comparison to state organisation in other parts of the world. On the
other hand the centre – periphery – model became a problem more within
individual states or within the entire region (Scheuzger, Fleer 2009). Earlier,
corruption was considered a specifically Latin American phenomenon, and to-
day it is dealt with both in Europe and in the United States. Everyone is talking
about the international financial crisis, with which Brazil seems to have no
problems.
Speaking of state development in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
one can use the historical experience of the colonial period and process of
gaining independence, and of the differences concerning on the one hand
Brazil, and on the other – Spanish-American – states, to conclude that since
gaining independence, Spanish-America did not suffer from a deficit of de-
mocracy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but rather from the deficit
of inwardly directed state legitimisation. Establishing the state on the basis of
a national model by bringing together competing cities of a corporate type and
– to a lesser or greater degree – directly controlling the territories surrounding
them with highly differentiated structures and settlement, proved to be compli-
cated in developing the model of legitimisation of the nation based on historical
foundation and adjusted to cultural, social, and economic conditions. Obstacles
were on the one hand the old colonial past – negatively perceived and inca-
pable of consensus because of the immanent hierarchy and rivalry, and on the
other, breaking away from monarchist legitimisation. This necessitated reach-
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ing for different, alien standards – in most cases they were European – which
sooner or later lost their acceptance due to the development of the processes
of internal colonisation, communication and development, together with the
integration of new groups in society that accompanied those. In Brazil, on the
other hand, the passage to statehood took place thanks to the maintenance of
the domestic legitimisation. Not entirely without problems, but also thanks to
the fact that the imperial regime provided the country with such a long period
of adjustment to changed conditions, that the process of internal colonisation
and consolidation of the state and the nation were allowed to develop simulta-
neously for a long time (Haußer 2009). Thus even the problem of new defini-
tions of national identity and policy could be solved more easily than in Span-
ish-America, by a variety of cultural and ethnic means.
Did the states of Latin America for that reason become ordinary members
of the international community of states ever more strongly connected with
one another due to globalisation? A prospective attempt, serving the develop-
ment of appropriate forms of cooperation in the region, undertaken in vain as
soon as 1826 by Simón Bolívar at the Congress of Panama, brought in its day
general respect and declarations of intent that were to lead to peaceful conflict-
solving, yet it also brought about the increasingly various forms of develop-
ment of these states, which could not be prevented, either by the application of
different systems of pan-American cooperation, or by the OAS/OEA estab-
lished later. Brazil exploited this development, acquiring to an ever greater
degree the character of a power with borders with all the states of South America
except Chile, and already at the time influencing the neighbouring countries in
many ways. Thus, to an ever greater degree, geography and the use of avail-
able resources enforced a more powerful cooperation, whose conditions were
influenced increasingly by Brazil, as a hegemon state. In opposition to these,
the development of the distant Caribbean is far more complex not only due to
the differences between Cuba and the United States, but also to the definition
of borders concerning the rights to exploit the seabed – which are still the
question of handling maps – not to mention the role of the modernised and
developed Panama Canal. Here – sooner or later yet definitely – OAS will play
a role more important than other, superior political talks forums at a global
level. Migration problems and the policy of the fight against drugs and drug-
related guerrillas – in the nineteenth century assigned rather to the realm of
folklore, under the influence of colonisation processes – are among further
problems on the north-south line, already threatening the destabilisation of
states in the region; problems whose solution may only be brought closer through
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joint negotiations with the new US administration. The fast pace of growth of
the Latin American population in the USA, a population which plays a signifi-
cant role in many fields, for example in the army, allows the assumption that in
the medium-range perspective, the enlivening of the “Western Hemisphere
Idea” seems probable, as only in this way can at least the radicalisation of the
process of re-ethnicisation be prevented.
Translated from German by Lesław Michalus and Piotr Krasnowolski
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Government and Society
in the Latin American States
Government and society in Latin America are inseparably linked to the choices
made by governing elites at the time of independence and the institutional
framework, which evolved in the nineteenth and early twentieth century at
differential rates throughout the region. The national states that emerged are
today a hybrid of nation-state constructs derived from Western European gov-
ernmental experience and ideas linked to U.S. constitutionalism and
presidentialism. However, rather than survey these developments from a North-
South perspective, it is best to begin with South America, especially Brazil and
the Southern Cone countries of Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Paraguay. This
is because it is easier to understand the importance of the European anteced-
ents of the Latin American state system and the context within which politics
and society have evolved, without dealing first with U.S. hegemony in the areas
closest and adjacent to the United States. From this base, we will then proceed
northward, in order to understand the dynamics of politics and society in this
region and the wide range of governmental experience and outcomes in re-
sponding to political and economic issues, over the roughly 200 years span-
ning independence and the consolidation of a unique group of national states
in the contemporary world.
South America
First, most importantly, and least well understood is the difference between
Portuguese and Spanish America. Much more common is to speak of the Latin
American region within the context of 20 national states with a very similar
past and present in the evolution of their governments and national societies.
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Why this shift in emphasis? If we turn the map upside down, we have a very
different visual image of the region. From this perspective what stands out is
the size and diversity of South America. This is a distinct world from the na-
tional states which took formation to the north in the mid-nineteenth century.
There, issues of state and nation were resolved well before viable national
states emerged in Mexico (actually a part of North America, in its physical,
human, and political geography), Central America (the land bridge tying to-
gether North and South America), and the Caribbean (with its extension into
northeastern South America – an area largely separate from the rest of the
Continent, historically and presently).
A key factor in the evolution of this state system is the fact that, once these
countries achieved independence, governing elites in South America were rela-
tively isolated from external world events and able to focus on their own inter-
nal development, without frequent intervention of external powers. As a con-
sequence, by the end of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the
twentieth, issues related to the definition of state and nation had already been
decided largely within the framework of Western European constructs trans-
ferred to the Americas, into which U.S. ideas linked to constitutionalism and
presidentialism were incorporated.
How this institutional framework for governance evolved differentially can
best be captured by contrasting the experience of Brazil and the Southern
Cone countries with the rest of Latin America – Mexico, Central America, and
the Caribbean. Whereas the former were far removed from events in Western
Europe and freer from direct intervention of foreign powers in domestic af-
fairs, the latter were much more exposed to direct external intervention from
independence onward. If in the nineteenth century Great Britain was hege-
monic in the circum-Caribbean (Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, and
northeastern South America), in the twentieth it was the United States which
assumed that role. Furthermore, it is in that region that continuing ties of the
smaller island dependencies, Puerto Rico, and French Guiana with external
powers have endured until today.
Seen from this perspective, centered in South America, what stands out is
the difference between Spanish and Portuguese America: the fragmentation of
the Spanish Empire in the Americas at independence versus the cohesiveness of
the new world the Portuguese created in the Americas. Despite the fact that
Portugal was a weak European colonial power and without the resources which
permitted Spain to control its American dominions much more effectively, Bra-
81LAWRENCE S. GRAHAM • GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY
zil embarked on a very different path at independence in 1822 from the rest of
the continent. Whereas Spanish America fragmented along lines roughly con-
tiguous with the administrative divisions present in the Spanish Empire in the
Americas at the end of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Brazil
evolved in the direction of sustained union and consolidation of a framework
for governance that allowed it to maintain its regional diversity without ruptur-
ing the unity of what is today the largest independent state in Latin America. In
the twenty-first century Brazil appears to be destined to become as hegemonic
(without wishing to be so) in South America as the United States has been in
North America since the 1890s. As a consequence of this trajectory focused
on consolidating its own national state, Brazil today is the 5th largest country
in the world in geographic area (one which is actually larger than the conti-
nental United States, if its non-contiguous appendages in Alaska, Hawaii,
and Puerto Rico are excluded); it has the 4th largest population, the 9th larg-
est economy; and, next to the United States, it has the largest internal market
in the Americas.
In explaining why this occurred, there are two different factors: cultural
identity and the choices made by governing elites. Overriding the distinctive
character of each of the regional entities scattered along its Atlantic coast,
defined first as provinces and later as states, is a cultural cohesiveness that has
precluded the division of Portuguese dominions in South America into a series
of independent republics, matching Spanish American experience. The forging
of this distinctive cultural identity, which is the basis of Brazilian nationalism,
has received much attention by Brazilian scholars, viz. Manuel Dieguês Júnior,
as well as the U.S. anthropologist Charles Wagley and is usually referred to as
Luso-Brazilian. This cultural identity, based on the commonality of the Por-
tuguese language and its acceptance as the medium for communication
throughout its national territory, however, needs to be tied more clearly to the
legitimacy of the Portuguese monarchy in the Americas in the early nineteenth
century. This institutional factor stands in marked contrast to the legitimacy
vacuum which evolved in Spanish America at independence and the formation
of a distinct group of successor nation-states.
The most important institutional factor shaping Brazil’s formation as a na-
tional state is a consequence of the decision of the Portuguese Monarchy to
move the entire Court from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro in 1808, with the assis-
tance of the British navy, rather than submit to French rule under Napoleon, as
was the case in Spain. From 1808 to 1822, Rio became the center of the
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Portuguese Empire. Once Napoleon’s hegemony on the Continent was broken
by the British, the pressures on the Monarchy to return to Lisbon were enor-
mous. Faced with the dilemma of what to do and the reality that a dual monar-
chy linking Brazil and Portugal was unsustainable, the reigning monarch, Dom
João VI, left his son as regent in Brazil. Subsequently, Dom Pedro joined forces
with the landed elite in Brazil to declare their independence on September 7,
1822. The outcome of this was the only viable constitutional monarchy in the
Americas, one in which he as Dom Pedro I and, more importantly, his son Dom
Pedro II governed Brazil until 1889.
When the monarchy was overthrown by a military coup in 1889, what
emerged in the aftermath was a presidential federal republic. Consolidated
under the Constitution of 1891, this document drew upon U.S. constitutional
experience, but more importantly it established the basis for what has been
a functioning three-tiered federal system ever since, in which as much au-
tonomy has been granted to the major municipalities as it was to the states. The
impact of this governing experience, extending across the nineteenth century
into the first two decades of the twentieth, was the construction of a federal
state in which local interests were guaranteed sufficient autonomy to ensure
their remaining within the union. Thus, what began at the outset as a weak set
of national institutions, executive and parliamentary/congressional, evolved in
time into a more coherent national government. In this regard, the formative
period for modern Brazil were the years1930 to1945, during which Getúlio
Vargas dominated national politics and power shifted from subnational units of
governance to a stronger central government under his leadership. Today, two
hundred years later, as a consequence of this convergence of more cohesive
cultural and governing forces, more people speak Portuguese and identify them-
selves as citizens of Brazil than speak Spanish in all the other South American
states combined – Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Peru, Bolivia, Ecua-
dor, Colombia, and Venezuela.
The Regionalization of Latin America
In continuing with this trajectory, setting aside Brazil for now, and in moving
from south to north, it is helpful to identify 6 different regions and groupings
of states and national societies, each with a different set of governing experi-
ences. There are three in South America (the Southern Cone countries – Ar-
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gentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay; the Andean region – Peru, Bolivia, Ecua-
dor; the Northern Tier republics – Colombia, Venezuela) and three in the
circum-Caribbean (Mexico; Central America – Guatemala, El Salvador, Hon-
duras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama; and the Caribbean – Cuba, the Do-
minican Republic, and Haiti).
Southern Cone South America
This area is the most embedded in the construction of national states in which
issues related to the definition of state and nation were resolved the earliest and
governing elites sought more frequently to replicate a European state system.
While European points of reference are most visible in the urban spaces occu-
pied by Buenos Aires, Santiago, and Montevideo, a distinct cultural milieu also
emerged in the countryside, one which while very different from European
experience produced strong national identities. This is reflected in how the
Spanish language has come to be spoken in each of the four countries and how
the indigenous population was either assimilated or decimated. While massive
European immigration from the 1890s onward overwhelmed rural society in
Argentina and Uruguay, and to a lesser extent in Chile, Paraguay retained its
rural focus. The consequence of this has been a unique bilingual society, one
where both Guaraní and Spanish are spoken. But here there is as strong and
distinct national identity as has been the case in Argentina and Uruguay, coun-
tries where European immigration totally transformed both state and nation.
From the 1890s into the 1950s Argentina was hegemonic in South America.
The most dynamic, the most prosperous, the most creative in building a new
society in the Americas derivative from European experience, Argentina seemed
destined to emerge in those years on the world scene as the most successful
instance in Latin America of the ability to transform state and society through
massive European immigration and the maximization of a country’s resources
in land and agriculture that, once commercialized, laid the foundation for
a productive national economy. To this day, Buenos Aires remains one of the
great urban centers in Latin America. But Argentina’s comparatively earlier
development, despite its successful economic take-off, became a source of enor-
mous political problems later in building a New Argentina, when this massive
immigration, most of which came from Italy, was assimilated into the Argentine
ethos. Once mobilized, what emerged was a citizenry that wanted its share of
the political power and economic resources held by a conservative, Hispanic
ruling elite. This rupture in politics led to political and economic upheavals in
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the 1930s and frequent military intervention in government, the outcome of
which was the presidency of Juan Perón, 1946–1955. This era of mass mobi-
lization under populism constituted both the highpoint in Argentina’s power
and influence throughout South America and its collapse. Once the country’s
economic resources were exhausted and the rupture in Argentine politics be-
tween the Old and the New Argentina had created an unbridgeable chasm,
bitter recriminations dominated national politics over the next 35 years (1955–
1989), until finally in 1989, the military exhausted its power and a democratic
transition began which has at long last produced the possibility of sustained
democratic rule.
Chile, in contrast, departed on a very different path in its national develop-
ment on West Coast South America. Even more isolated from European cen-
ters of power, Chile’s governing elites were able to consolidate a small national
state along the backbone of the Andes, extending over 2,000 miles from south
to north, along the Pacific Coast. Like Argentina, the model followed was Eu-
ropean, both in terms of building state and nation through the assimilation of
European immigrants into a new world setting, but without the massive influx
of people that characterized early twentieth-century Argentina and its ruptures
in politics. The consequence was a longer, uninterrupted process of state and
nation building, with greater cohesiveness among its governing elites and more
accommodation of new groups, permitting them to enter national politics more
easily as the political basis for participation expanded, but with the understand-
ing that they would not set aside the previous rulers. What makes the develop-
ment of Chile’s national state so different from the rest of the Continent was
skilled use of its resources, physical and human, to achieve a relatively prosper-
ous and viable society. In this case, the country’s leaders not only had a clear-
cut idea of how they intended to govern, through civilian institutions based
initially on limited participation, but also later on were open to participation in
politics and governance by new groups, as they entered a political arena which
became more and more democratic over time, through the construction of
a parliamentary republic under presidential leadership. Coupled with relatively
successful internal economic and political development, without major govern-
mental ruptures until the 1970s, was awareness of the need to develop an
external capability which would make it possible for Chile to sustain its hege-
mony over West Coast South America, as other national states evolved in their
area of the world – Argentina to the east, Peru and Bolivia to the north.
From 1860 to 1905 Chile was hegemonic throughout West Coast South
America. As Chile pushed northward, into the Atacama Desert where nitrates
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were to be found, it came into conflict first with Bolivia, whose access to the
sea was through Antofagasta, and then with Peru, whose southern two prov-
inces contained more of the nitrates it sought. The outcome of this three-way
competition for territorial control was the War of the Pacific, 1879–1883, in
which Chile was the victor. As a small state, with a more homogenous popula-
tion, leadership which was better educated and more skilled, a greater military
capability – the core of which was a navy that could more easily deploy its ships
up and down the Pacific Coast, Chile won the crucial engagements on sea and
land. Neither Peru nor Bolivia, with their unincorporated Indian masses in the
Andean highlands for whom neither state nor nation were meaningful con-
structs, could match Chilean military power. The outcome was that Chile as the
victor annexed both land providing Bolivia with access to the sea through
Antofagasta and Peru’s southern two provinces. While mediation, through the
offices of the United States, eventually settled the conflict, to this day both
Bolivia and Peru have unsatisfied irredentist claims on their lost territories, for
without access to the Pacific Bolivia remains a landlocked highland nation and
Peru has never fully accepted the incorporation of its southern provinces into
Chilean territory.
The Andean Countries
The War of the Pacific highlights the contrasts between Southern Cone and
Andean South America. During the colonial era, Lima was the hub of Spain’s
empire in South America, as a vice-regal capital which suddenly lost its rel-
evance with the collapse of Spain’s presence continentally throughout the
Americas. For the first several decades after independence, Peruvian elites sus-
tained the hope of reestablishing at least the union of adjacent coastal and
Andean regions, with Lima as the capital. But both Chile’s interest in seeing
two smaller nations emerge to its north and centrifugal regional forces in Peru’s
northern coast and inland in the Andean highlands, where communication
north- south faced formidable obstacles, made movement toward three sepa-
rate states – Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia – irreversible.
Herein is centered the origin of two small states in South America, as buff-
ers in the new South American state system in the making. An independent
Uruguay (the República Oriental del Uruguay / the Eastern Republic of Uru-
guay) became a useful buffer between Brazil and Argentina, where control of
the eastern bank of the River Platte was seen as key to which would dominate
nineteenth-century East Coast South America. And, Ecuador fulfilled equally
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well the need for a buffer between Peru and Colombia on the West Coast.
There, despite serious internal divisions over who should govern and what to
do with its indigenous majority in the highlands, governing elites struggled to
define an Ecuadorian state in the space between what was generally recognized
as Peru’s northern tier and Colombia’s southern frontier. This was joined by
Chile’s interest in confirming the emergence of a smaller Peruvian state to its
north, at the end of the nineteenth century, and supporting Ecuador’s claim to
disputed Amazonian territory under Peruvian control in the twentieth.
The Northern Tier
The geopolitical position of Colombia and Venezuela, with one foot in South
America and the other in the Caribbean, has made the dynamics of their na-
tional development very different and delayed their consolidation, as each
struggled internally with competing regional elites. Once the Bolivarian ideal of
a unified Spanish South America collapsed, Simón Bolívar, the Liberator of
northern South America, hoped to keep alive his vision of a greater union after
independence in the creation of a Gran Colombia in 1819. But even that hope
soon ended, with the declaration of independence in Caracas in 1830, out of
which eventually came the formation of a Venezuelan state and nation in the
early twentieth century, as a country which also had to contend with aggressive
external actors.
Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean
The struggle to define new independent national states in the Caribbean basin
has followed a very different trajectory. Whereas the majority of the states
emerging in South America were relatively free from Great Power intervention
in the nineteenth century and remained isolated, for the most part, from the
extension of U.S. power into the Caribbean until 1945, none of these states
had the option of being able to focus attention on its own internal develop-
ment. Thus, whereas nationalism was confirmed in South America largely in
terms of competition among new states and nations in the making within the
same region, in the circum-Caribbean nationalism was defined largely in terms
of opposition to external influence, both that of the United States and the
European countries. This contrast can best be captured by looking at how
national heroes are defined in the two regions. For example, Arturo Pratt in
Chile, Miguel Grau in Peru, Francisco Solano Lopez in Paraguay are all hon-
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ored for how they defended the homeland against the actions of other South
American states. In contrast, Augusto César Sandino in Nicaragua is remem-
bered for his stand against the invasion of U.S. Marines in the 1920s. The
Heroic Children in Mexico – Los Niños Héroes de Chapultepec – are honored
for the sacrifice of their lives in resisting the invasion of French troops intended
to shore up the rule of the Hapsburg Prince Maximilian and his wife Carlotta.
And, to cite a more recent case, Fidel Castro was able to galvanize his control
over Cuba by mobilizing those who had remained in Cuba against the action of
the Yanquís and their Cuban counterparts in the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961.
Mexico and Central America
The century which extends from 1810 – the declaration of independence by
a parish priest in Dolores Hidalgo, Guanajuato, – to 1910 – when the up-
heaval against the dictator Porfirio Díaz evolved quickly into a full-fledge revo-
lution – marks an enormous struggle to build a viable national state in the face
of the loss of huge blocs of national territory. While 1821 commemorates the
independence of Mexico and the end to the wars for independence from Spain,
the succession of Central America from Mexico in 1822 initiated an extended
process of redefinition of national territory to the south, out of which emerged
a distinct group of very small, independent countries – Guatemala, Honduras,
El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. This process of defining a small, re-
gional system with its own dynamic was not completed until 1903 with Panama’s
independence from Colombia, which was encouraged by the U.S. in its push to
get a canal constructed across the isthmus, in another of its frequent interven-
tions in the Caribbean. To this fragmentation and redefinition of what portion
of North America would be consolidated under a Mexican national state must
be added the loss of Mexico’s northern territories. This occurred, first, through
the independence of Texas in 1836 and its admission as a state to the Union in
1845. A year later, as a consequence of Mexico’s determination to go to war
with U.S. over the loss of this territory to the North Americans, the Mexican-
American War of 1846–1848 resulted in an even greater loss of territory. The
outcome of that conflict was the invasion of Mexico by U.S. troops, its defeat
and the cession of the remainder of Mexico’s northern territories to the U.S.
under the Treaty of Hidalgo. When this process ended in 1848 Mexico had
lost to the United States not just Texas and eastern New Mexico but also Cali-
fornia, Nevada, Utah, portions of Colorado, Arizona, and Wyoming, and the
remainder of New Mexico – its whole northern tier.
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The Caribbean
This is the most heterogeneous region in Latin America. There three very
different small island republics complete the region we define today as Latin
America: Haiti and the Dominican Republic, on the island of Hispaniola, and
Cuba. Their independence dates reflect the complicated history of the island
republics: Haiti’s independence from France in 1804 as a consequence of
a successful slave revolt; the Dominican Republic’s independence in 1844
from Haiti, and Cuba’s independence from the United States in 1901, in the
aftermath of the Spanish-America War of 1898. But, whereas a new state
system with definable borders had taken shape in South America by the early
twentieth century, Puerto Rico’s retention as a U.S. territory under that island’s
Commonwealth arrangement signals the fluidity of relationships in the Carib-
bean. This is a region with 13 sovereign states, 2 overseas departments and 12
dependent territories, the majority of which are tied to the European Union.
Linguistically it is equally varied: Spanish speaking (Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the
Dominican Republic), Creole (Haiti), English in the former British islands and
the U.S. Virgin Islands; French in the French dependencies, and Dutch in areas
now independent, formerly affiliated with the Netherlands.
Puerto Rico is a case in point illustrating the fluidity of boundaries in this
region. Under current governing arrangement, the island is semi-autonomous,
but subject to U.S. jurisdiction and sovereignty, with its powers of self-gover-
nance being derivative from the authority delegated by the U.S. Congress
permitting Puerto Ricans, as U.S. citizens but who do not pay taxes to the
U.S., to form and maintain their own government. In this case, the society is
Latin American, but the government is a replica of U.S. constitutional arrange-
ments in the division of powers among the Executive, the Legislature and the
Courts. To this mix must be added numerous islands outside what is defined
today as Latin America. The most important are those identified with the Com-
monwealth Caribbean, in which the United Kingdom’s former colonies are
now self-governing under parliamentary rather than presidential rule – for
example, the Bahamas, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. Adding further di-
versity to this region are the French possessions, viz. Guadeloupe, Martinique,
and French Guiana which are considered to be part of Metropolitan France, as
well as those belonging originally to the Netherlands but now self-governing,
as is the case with Suriname and Curacao.
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State and Society in Latin America:
The Continuing Struggle for Democracy
Yet another reason for beginning with Brazil and the Southern Cone countries
in South America is to clarify that the difficulties in consolidating democratic
rule and in building and sustaining successful market economies are less
a function of a very different colonial past (when contrasted with Canada and
the United States), lack of experience in self-government, and economic un-
derdevelopment and more a consequence of the choices made by governing
elites at crucial junctures in their development of national states and how they
have made use of the resources available to them. From this perspective gov-
ernmentally, the most important issue in all these countries is how each has
responded to mass mobilization, when the basis for participation in politics
could no longer be restricted to a small ruling elite and citizens at large from all
sectors of society pressed for incorporation into the political process. As Rob-
ert Dahl has suggested in his book Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition,
there are two critical variables in making democracy work and key to under-
standing political outcomes in Latin America: liberalization (the freedom to
contest issues publicly) and inclusiveness (the range of participation). To illus-
trate this point, a series of 7 contrasting case studies will better serve our
purposes here, rather than generalizations about the region as a whole, since it
is the diversity of this experience with governance in each of these 20 countries
that provides greater insight into the dynamics within government and society
throughout Latin America. To these country-based discussions will be added
an eighth outlying case, Uruguay, a small state like those in Central America,
but with a political system of its own unique in Latin America.
Argentina
As already noted in the discussion of national state formation at independence,
pre-World War II Argentina reflected a rapid rise to prominence on the world
scene as Latin America’s most successful economy, with sustained economic
growth 1880–1914, based on its agricultural strengths in beef, wheat and
wool, followed by a major drive towards industrialization and the creation of
a more diversified economy, 1914–1940. Complementing early economic suc-
cess was progress in consolidating a national state, 1810–1853, marked by
the centralization of power under the Juan Manuel de Rosas dictatorship 1829–
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1853, followed by mobilization of large numbers of people in opposition to
Rosas. Out of this conflict emerged strong political leadership, within which
Juan Bautista Alberdi, Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, and Esteban Echeverría
stand out in their commitment to institutionalizing more democratic practices,
enshrined in the Constitution of 1853. To this base was later added the Sáenz
Peña Act of 1912 which removed property requirements for voting. As
a consequence of this enshrinement of universal male suffrage into law the
urban middle classes entered politics as a dominant force in the election of
1916.
Under the leadership of the Radical Party – a party patterned after the
Radical Party in France, voters drawn from newly enfranchised middle class
citizens, people with immigrant backgrounds, and their political representa-
tives largely replaced the Conservatives in government, the core of which was
a Hispanic elite identified with highly productive, large landed estates. Once in
power with an expanded political base and a limited democracy in place 1916–
1930, the Radicals failed to deliver on their promises to open up politics to all
new Argentine nationals. They proved to be far more interested in consolidat-
ing their power and status as a new power contender, rather than respond to
increasingly aggressive working class demands, for greater equity in pay and
rights, as those groups also pressed for incorporation into the country’s politi-
cal life. Political conflict, centered around the rise of the Socialist Party as
a major actor in Congress and its militant working class supporters, eventually
triggered reaction by the Conservatives who had been displaced from power in
1916.
Political discontent coupled with the economic impact of the Great Depres-
sion in 1929 on all sectors of Argentine society led Conservatives to success in
their appeal to the military to intervene to reestablish order. Out of this new
alliance came the formation of a military-Conservative governing coalition in
the 1930s; the fragmentation of the opposition, as manifested in the 37 par-
ties participating in 1935 congressional elections; and a succession of first two
generals, then two civilians as president. In 1943 this coalition broke down
and the military decided to pursue its own course of action, the consequence
of which was the fragmentation of the military, with a conservative wing favor-
ing sustaining civilian Conservative rule with military support and more radical
younger officers favoring the creation of a new mass movement empowering
the urban working classes.
In 1946 Col. Juan Perón took power and with his wife Evita forged a much
more radical populist government, reflecting the wishes of their urban working
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class base and their desire to penalize affluent Argentines identified with the
old order. This movement whose formal name remains the Partido Justicialista
(the Justice Party) more commonly bears the name of the Peróns. Initially suc-
cessful in mobilizing and enfranchising workers, by the early 1950s the Peróns
had exhausted public coffers in their reallocation of the nation’s wealth. As
their ruling coalition disintegrated and opposition to their populist regime grew,
conservative military officers finally responded to the protests of the opposi-
tion against the excesses of the regime and economic chaos, and intervened in
1955.
The peronista phenomenon, however, has had an impact on Latin American
politics transcending the Argentine case which warrants further discussion in
flagging a style of politics known as “populism,” one that has returned time and
time again in different parts of Latin America when economic, social, and po-
litical conditions have led to mass upheaval and the breakdown of established
political institutions. Populism in the Latin American world, as first defined by
the Peróns, has had four ingredients whose content has varied greatly accord-
ing to the national context and the epoch within which it has emerged: cha-
risma, mass movement, nationalism, and social justice. Political charisma in
populist politics refers to the attachment of large numbers of people to the
individual who becomes enshrined in the public memory for his or her identi-
fication with the masses and that person’s responsiveness to their needs and
aspirations. No one to this day has surpassed the imagery, style, and political
performance created by Evita Perón, one that has long outlived her demise.
Attached to the populist leader is a mass movement which transcends the divi-
sions and competing interests of working class and marginalized citizens who
perceive their social condition to be one of exclusion from the economic, so-
cial, and political benefits enjoyed by the privileged. Nationalism, the third
component, carries with it the identification of the masses with a common
political culture beyond the cleavages dividing society into competing groups
and interests, with mass aspirations for a better life transcending all that has
been defined as the source of their oppression. This phenomenon is closely
linked with a fourth characteristic: social justice, the desire for correction of the
economic inequities and the social ills affecting workers and the poor by taking
back control of the country in the name of the people, the pueblo.
From 1955 to1966, in an effort to transcend the chasm created by
peronismo, middle-class civilian politicians resumed their leadership, under the
Radical Party, with military support based on the agreement that the Peronistas
would be excluded from power. But, by 1966 the courting of disaffected
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Peronistas by more liberal members of the Radical Party not only produced
a split of the party into two factions, but also convinced the military that poli-
ticians seeking to build a more solid base from which to govern was tantamount
to collaboration with the enemy. From the military’s standpoint this necessi-
tated their taking power to root out all corrupt civilian party politicians.
A succession of three military governments followed, 1966–1973, which
ultimately failed. Convinced that there was no way to govern the country effec-
tively without reincorporating the Peronistas, General Alejandro Lanusse ne-
gotiated a agreement with the Peronistas that civilian government would be
reestablished, with the understanding that Juan Perón could return to Argen-
tina but would remain in the wings, only to discover that once in power, the
ruling Peronistas reversed their position and invited Perón to reassume the
presidency. Acquiescing to a presidential election in which Perón received
a mandate to take power in 1973, the result was a new political disaster. By
that point, Perón was too old to govern effectively and, with his death shortly
thereafter in 1974, politics returned to their old divisive patterns – the conse-
quence of which was the disastrous presidency of Peron’s second wife, Isabel
(1974–1976). At this point, the military split into opposed wings, one com-
mitted to constitutional rule and new accommodation with the civilians – this
was the group which had had the upper hand in seeking to work with civilian
politicians before – and the other favoring a more decisive and radical inter-
vention to clean up the system and set the country back on course.
The takeover of this latter group, the hardline military, with three Army
generals as presidents, 1976–1982 (Gen. Jorge Videla [1976–Mar.1981],
Gen. Roberto Viola [Mar.–Dec.1981] and Gen. Leopoldo Galtieri [Dec. 1981–
June 1982]), ended in the disastrous Falklands War, 1981–1982 – but not
before a dirty, internal war against their own people, in which thousands of
people identified with opposition to the new order simply disappeared. With
the military thoroughly discredited, and a fourth general in office to ease the
transition, Argentina returned to civilian rule, this time with a wider base in
terms of popular support and with greater consensus for the first time, that in
the face of having all the other options fail, a democratic solution was the least
worst alternative.
For the first time, since 1930, civilian rule under a democratic regime with
open competitive politics, returned to the forefront in 1984. In the election of
1984, the Radicals received majority support and took power under Raúl
Alfonsín. In subsequent elections, after the failure of the Radicals to deal effec-
tively with the country’s economic problems, the Peronistas reasserted them-
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selves as the majority party. As a consequence, a succession of Peronista lead-
ers as president has followed: Carlos Menem (1989–1999), Fernando de la
Rúa (1999–2001), Eduardo Duhalde (2002–2003), Néstor Kirchner (2003–
2007), and most recently his wife Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in 2007.
Brazil
Aside from the factors already discussed regarding the formation of modern
Brazil, when authoritarian and populist responses to mobilization politics in
Brazil are compared and contrasted with Argentina, what stands out is the
preeminence of a conciliatory political style – that is to say, the use of govern-
ing tactics of conciliation and reform as opposed to the confrontation and
radical change so prevalent in Argentina and elsewhere in Spanish-speaking
Latin America in responding to the mobilization and entry of new groups into
the political process. Complementing this political style is a key institutional
factor: the formation and evolution over time of a functional federal system of
government in Brazil, which permits multiple political arenas to develop at the
federal, state, and local level. While federalism has also been a part of govern-
ment in Argentina, de facto that system has functioned primarily within the
framework of a unitary state, within which the powers of the national govern-
ment in governance and finance override those of the provinces. The political
antecedents of Brazil’s present system of government are twofold: the creation
of a federal system in 1891 from above rather than below, characterized by
cycles of centralization and decentralization, and considerable internal vari-
ance in the autonomy of the individual states.
Just as Juan Perón has had a major role in shaping political outcomes in
modern Argentina, so too Getúlio Vargas has exercised a major role in the
formation of modern Brazil, first as an authoritarian leader (1937–1945) and
later as an elected president (1951–1954). Whereas mass mobilization in
Argentina is linked to the Peronista movement and the way the Peróns took
power in 1946, so too Vargas’ rule and how he responded to the imperatives
of economic and political modernization are very important in understanding
today’s Brazil.
What distinguishes the Brazilian case is that Vargas undertook economic
modernization and the creation of a strong national government in the 1930s
through the politics of expanding presidential power, until he was able to estab-
lish an authoritarian state known as the Estado Novo in 1937, one which drew
upon corporatist ideas and practices prevalent in Southern Europe. Accompa-
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nying this shift in the balance of power from the states to the federal govern-
ment was Vargas’ use of the tactics of cooptation through the establishment of
government-controlled unions, designed to anticipate worker demands linked
to pay and rights before an independent labor movement could get underway.
Prior to the 1930s Brazil experienced weak party development and widespread
use of clientelism, based on state and regional coalitions, under the country’s
Republican Party, which functioned as a confederation of state party organiza-
tions. After working within this framework in the years before the Depression
of 1929, Vargas undertook major reforms in the economy through the organi-
zation of state enterprises, and in government through extensive administrative
reform. Among the changes instituted were a new Ministry of Labor and the
establishment of an elaborate system of corporate relations establishing close
ties between government and state-centered unions, through industry-specific
social security arrangements.
What brought an end to Brazil’s New State era were external events: the
Allied victory ending World War II. With Brazilian troops returning from the
Italian campaign with the Americans, military leaders joined hands with Vargas’
democratic opposition, the National Democratic Union (UDN), to force Vargas
to resign. The outcome was a new democratic charter, the Constitution of
1946, and an interim president chosen from the constitutionalist military. But
in the election of 1950, the first open election in more than a generation,
Vargas reinvented himself and returned to office as a populist politician with
enormous mass appeal. For a brief moment Varguismo matched the mass mo-
bilization of the workers, the poor, and the lower middle classes characteristic
of Peronismo with its cult of the leader. However, Vargas was unable to convert
this popular enthusiasm for his election into a governing coalition which could
sustain him as president under the new constitution, with an independently
minded Congress. In 1954, shortly before his term ended, he committed sui-
cide, leaving a letter behind attributing to unnamed foreign interests the causes
of his failed presidency and appealing to his followers to keep alive his spirit.
In death, Vargas had far greater impact on Brazil’s new democracy than he
had in life. For, his legacy of populist politics lived on in the two parties he had
created in1945: the one, a coalition of conservative followers in the states who
had supported his New State (the PSD, the Social Democratic Party); the other,
a labor-oriented, lower middle class urban movement (the PTB, the Brazilian
Labor Party). The opposition UDN, however, weighed in heavily in the transi-
tion, in the selection of an agreed-upon interim civilian. But, in the 1955
presidential election, Juscelino Kubitschek galvanized the union Vargas had
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hoped to realize into a coalition linking the PSD with the PTB. His presidency,
1956–1960, was the most successful during this democratic interlude, for he
understood how to make the Vargas coalition work and to govern with Con-
gress. When the Kubitschek presidency ended in 1960, the UDN was able to
rally sufficient support to elect its own candidate, Jânio Quadros, as president.
But Quadros as an anti-party candidate with his own quixotic expectations
entered office attempting to bypass the new party system. Chaos soon ensued
with his attempts to govern without Congress and, when he resigned in August
1961, expecting a huge upsurge in populist support, he found himself out of
power. Crisis in Brazilian politics returned to the forefront, because immedi-
ately conservative PSD politicians and their allies in the UDN schemed in Con-
gress to keep João Goulart, Quadros’ PTB Vice President, from assuming of-
fice. Ultimately, maneuvering in Congress failed, an election was held the end
of 1961in which Goulart consolidated his new leadership with a solid electoral
mandate. As a left-oriented populist, he embarked on changes in national poli-
tics, designed to enfranchise more fully his labor and lower-class civilian sup-
porters and to subvert the military establishment by organizing support in the
Armed Forces from among younger non-commissioned officers. Mass demon-
strations proliferated; inflation, already severe, got out of hand; mobilization
of the rural poor in their demand for land upset established land owners in the
Northeast with a rhetoric increasingly pro-Cuban in content – all this com-
bined to convince the military that conservative civilian appeals to intervene
were essential to save the country from radical populism.
Taking power in a March 15, 1964 coup with enthusiastic civilian support
from the middle and upper classes, the military began to govern (with Gen.
Castello Branco as president), expecting to work with the civilian opposition to
Goulart to reform the system and return power to more responsible civilian
leaders, housed primarily in the UDN. But, one by one as the initial reforms
unraveled, the new regime with its committed military leadership embarked on
a policy of exterminating the excesses of populism embodied in the PTB. In the
process they became convinced that the whole party system had been cor-
rupted by populism and that a more radical solution was required: abolition of
the existing party system and the creation of a new government-controlled two
party system. At this point the military split into two camps: the constitutional-
ists and the hardline military, much along the same lines present in the Argen-
tine military in the aftermath of Juan Perón’s rule.
But once again, the established political style of conciliation, conflict avoid-
ance, compromise, and the desire to avoid the excesses of the reactions against
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Peronismo moved the country in the direction of avoiding open conflict and
outright repression. The label used to characterize this more conservative style
of politics became known as democratic formalism, the gutting of the content
of the 1946 Constitution without abolishing it. In 1967, faced with still un-
controllable inflation and insufficient political control to set the country on
a new course, the hardline military took over in a coup within the coup, amending
the Constitution so fundamentally that they altered its content. In so doing they
avoided the issue of writing a new constitution, and were able to continue to
emphasize their caretaker role in setting the nation on the right course. That
phase lasted a scant two years, 1967–1968. Taking advantage of the illness of
the acting president (Gen. Costa e Silva), a military-civilian coalition took over.
The agreement was that the military would name the president (in this case
Gen. Garrástazu Medici), while civilian economists and planners would guide
the country by assuming key ministerial posts, incorporating key representa-
tives of the business community, in economic reform designed to curtail infla-
tion and to get the economy back on a steady growth rate. This successful
strategy became know as the Brazilian miracle, with a growth rate of 10 per-
cent per year, 1968–1973. But it came to an abrupt end in 1974 with the
escalating costs of imported oil, which was essential to sustain Brazilian indus-
try; the return of inflation, and economic slowdown in what was state-centered
economic growth. The worsening economic situation coupled with growing
civilian unrest against military rule, with its hardline policies in dealing with pro-
testors, convinced the military of the need to gradually withdraw from politics.
From 1974 to 1984, under the leadership of two more moderate generals
(first, Ernesto Geisel, then João Baptista Figueiredo), the regime began to ne-
gotiate with the “responsible” opposition, those who would cooperate with the
government in negotiating an exit strategy. The Brazilian transition took a de-
cade as the two sides sparred back and forth on how to open up the system and
at the same time avoid recriminations against the military in power. Centrist
civilians played a key role in keeping the negotiations on track, but also the
inability of the Government to find a solution to the return of inflation and
economic slowdown made it impossible for it to renege. Agreement was finally
reached on who the civilian president would be (Tancredo Neves), in 1984,
and he was confirmed by an indirect election in Congress with a Vice President
identified with the regime in power (José Sarney). The tragedy was that candi-
date, Tancredo Neves, died on the eve of assuming power and the conserva-
tive, pro-regime vice president, José Sarney took over as president (1985–
1989).
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Brazil’s return to democratic rule was not an easy one, not only because of
the difficulties in negotiating an exit strategy for the military and its civilian
supporters, but also because of the intractability of the country’s economic
problems and spiraling inflation. On the political front, old-style populism re-
turned under the Fernando Collor de Mello presidency, 1990–1992. But
there was crucial difference in the 1990s from populism in the 1960s: an
independent press and media, in radio and television, with a strong investiga-
tory bent. Since petty and large-scale corruption was the fuel on which popu-
lism ran, when documentation of the President’s involvement in a huge scheme
of privileges and kickbacks became public knowledge, impeachment proceed-
ings were brought against him in Congress. Rather than undergo indictment
by the Senate, Collor de Mello resigned and his vice president took over.
At the point when inflation had reached its worst and the economic outlook
was the blackest, Acting President Itamar Franco asked a leading opposition
figure, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, to assume the role of Finance Minister. To
the surprise of everyone, Cardoso devised a recovery plan that worked. So
successful was this economic recovery that Cardoso became a candidate for
president, was elected to office (1995–1998), and was equally successful in
engineering not just continued economic reforms designed to dismantle a state-
dominated economy and install a market economy, but also in instigating gov-
ernmental reform. With these accomplishments behind him, he was reelected
for a second term of office (1999–2002). When Cardoso left office at the end
of 2002, Brazil had emerged from its long and painful economic and political
transition into sustained economic growth and sufficient governmental reforms
to insure the continuation of a market economy and sustained democratic rule.
The last phase of this economic and political transition and the consolida-
tion of Brazilian markets and democratic rule has been the election of the
leader of the new Brazilian Labor Party, the PT, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, not
just for one, but for two presidential terms (2003–2006, 2007–2010). Its
significance lies in the acceptance by the opposition of Lula’s victory not just in
one election but in a second one as well, making it possible for a leader of
a political party on the left to take power legitimately by winning at the ballot
box. In power, the fact that Lula has been able to hold two terms in succession,
as permitted by the Brazilian constitution, is a consequence also of his decision
not to reverse the commitment to a market economy, but rather to affirm mar-
kets as president of the republic and to move ahead with his left-centered
coalition in Congress to enact the social and educational policies his political
base demanded.
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Chile
In terms of political mobilization – how new groups and individuals are brought
into the political process as the base for political participation expands – what
is distinctive about Chile, when contrasted to Argentina and Brazil, is its long
and successful experience with the development of continuous party organiza-
tions and the formation of party governments across time. Earlier then either
Argentina or Brazil, one can identify the emergence of a distinct center, right,
and left in Chilean politics within an institutional framework that has sustained
an evolving and expanding democratic regime. Political historians in Chile ac-
count for this within the context first of an aristocratic republic, 1829–1861,
in which voting was restricted to those owning property; a liberal republic,
1861–1891, in which property restrictions were abolished and middle class
voters were added to the electoral roles; and the parliamentary republic, in
which Congress became the dominant institution and where by 1920 all sig-
nificant social sectors had been incorporated into a multiparty framework. More
importantly, all the major parties had two primary characteristics, matching
party development in Europe: the ability to develop and sustain party organiza-
tions across time and to provide cohesive party leadership in which individuals
could be rotated through party organizations, without becoming identified
with a single dominant personality.
Why then the breakdown of Chilean democracy in 1970? Despite the open-
ness of the political system in Chile (liberalization) and the incorporation of
a wide variety of groups spanning the political spectrum from left to right
(inclusiveness), there was one unwritten rule: the political left could obtain
majorities in elections and in Congress, as long as coalition politics would not
produce a presidential leader from the left who could control the presidency.
For many years, the practice of determining who would be elected to public
office in the Congress and the presidency depended on pluralities rather than
majorities, where multi-member congressional districts allowed greater flexibil-
ity in representing a variety of viewpoints, as opposed to single member dis-
tricts in which there could be but one victor. For years, the election of a presi-
dent from the left was simply not viable given the broad-based coalitions in the
center and on the right, which precluded sufficient votes to elect a left can-
didate. The other factor, from the mid-1960s onward, was the increasing
polarization of politics in Chile, the introduction of marked ideological differ-
ences, and the difficulty in building legislative coalitions transcending ideologi-
cal differences, 1965 to 1973. Here, the politics of the cold war combined
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with the rise of Fidel Castro to power in Cuba and the exporting of the Cuban
Revolution as a model for reform and revolution throughout Latin America had
a major role to play. The priorities in economic and social reform increasingly
became issues related to the internationalization of the conflict over priorities
in economic and social reform. As the polarization between the right and the
left increased, the center in politics became less and less relevant in Chilean
politics. The crisis peaked in the years 1970–1973, the outcome of which was
military intervention through an attack against civilian institutions centered on
the presidential palace, the assassination of President Salvador Allende (the
first president from the left to take office), and the imposition of Gen. August
Pinochet as acting president.
From 1970 though 1989, Chile was subjected to authoritarian rule. The
centerpiece and justification for the existence of this regime was the necessity
of radical economic reform, in order to put in place a market economy, the
privatization of public enterprises, and the internationalization of the domestic
economy, following the economic principles of the Chicago economist John
Friedman. While the initial success was great, the vulnerability of Chile to fluc-
tuations in international markets produced an internal crisis in banking and
near collapse of the domestic economy, 1982–1984, in which 16 banks and
nearly 60 percent of the system’s financial assets were liquidated at an esti-
mated cost of 30 to 40 percent of the GDP. At this point, Chilean economists
proposed a solution to the crisis by bringing the state back in to sustain domes-
tic markets through the development of a regulatory state that would intercede
between the domestic economy and international markets. This shift in eco-
nomic policy making has generally been referred to as the movement from the
primacy of a core group of technocrats known as the Chicago Boys to a new
group labeled the Santiago Boys, innovators in free market economics who
focused on the role of a regulatory state, protecting internal markets from
fluctuations in international markets which might have pernicious effects on the
domestic economy. By 1988, the impact of economic restructuring was such
that a lively, competitive domestic economy was in place with an international
capability to situate Chile effectively in international markets, primarily through
its ability to produce high quality copper and fruits, vegetables, and wines.
So confident were Pinochet and his supporters of their economic successes
as a vehicle for transforming national politics that, when it became apparent
that civilian opposition to the regime had not disappeared but was becoming
increasingly vocal, the regime agreed to an October 1988 plebiscite. Having
agreed to abide by the outcome of this vote, either a sí or no, the regime was
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caught without a way to avoid opening up the system once there was resounding
support for the “no” option, to bring an end to the Pinochet regime. Attempting
to take control of the situation, the regime focused attention on writing a new
constitution, with Opposition participation, which would defend the principles of
a free-market economy and write into that basic document a political arrange-
ment whereby the voice of the right would be guaranteed permanent represen-
tation in Congress, especially in the Senate, and Pinochet and the military,
protected from recriminations. Once that document was in place, a second
plebiscite was held in August 1989 on the new constitution, one which ac-
cepted that document as the vehicle for returning to democratic rule. In accord
with the time table agreed to, presidential and congressional elections were
held in December 1989 in which a coalition of center-left parties won the
elections and the country returned peacefully to democracy in early 1990.
Generally, the success of this transition back to democratic practices is at-
tributed to two factors: first, recognition that the economic restructuring which
had taken place under Pinochet was working and producing notable results,
benefiting most Chileans when compared to the inflation and economic insta-
bility of the past, and, second, the success of the protracted negotiations be-
tween a coalition of the major parties in the center and left and the Govern-
ment, in which both sides agreed upon a common framework for governing
the country. This “pacted” democracy” produced initially a “constrained” poli-
tics in which the conditions designed to protect Pinochet, the Right and the
military were seen by many as excessive, but over the years these have all been
mitigated by the passage of time (for example, the death of Pinochet) and
adjustments (viz., the curtailment of military autonomy), and the greater ben-
efits achieved with the new strength accorded to legislative institutions and the
courts, reestablishing the rule of law and respect for electoral outcomes in
presidential and congressional elections as decisive. In reestablishing civilian
supremacy, the coalition of parties on the center-left has consistently won the
last four elections, moving elected government from centrist leaders (Patricio
Aylwin in 1990 and Eduardo Frei in 1994) to the democratic left (Ricardo
Lagos in 2000 and Michelle Bachelet in 2006). The coalition on the right has
continued to compete in national election and, while unable to obtain sufficient
support to elect a president, it has had sufficient weight to be able to continue
to represent its interests in Congress. More importantly, the left has been folded
back into mainstream politics with the election of the last two presidents (Lagos
and Bachelet) accepted as legitimate and their legislative programs able to be
passed and implemented.
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Looking back over the last 200 years, what stands out in Chilean govern-
mental experience comparatively is how Congress has evolved and been sus-
tained over the years, despite many challenges (the most important of which
were during the Pinochet years). For, today it is clearly the most important
governing institution. This is something to which not even the United States
can lay claim, despite the hopes and intent of its founding fathers in designing
a constitution which they hoped would endure.
Peru
In moving to West Coast South America and the Northern Tier Republics, we
enter a very different political world. In contrast to the success stories of re-
democratization and the consolidation of democratic regimes in the ABC coun-
tries (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile), Peru, Venezuela, and Colombia have
a very different track record in the struggle to sustain democratic practices,
through liberalization and inclusiveness. There the outcomes have been much
less felicitous. Peru continues to struggle to incorporate its indigenous peoples,
concentrated in the highlands, and mass mobilization through political party
organizations has remained fluid, except for the survival of the Aprista Party.
Oil-rich Venezuela has never been able to resolve the dichotomy between those
who have benefited from the country’s oil wealth and a party system embrac-
ing upper and middle income groups and the poor who have revolted under
the leadership of Hugo Chávez to destroy what seemed to most outsiders
a very successful party democracy. This resurgence of the sort of populism first
harnessed by the Peróns has gained dominance in today’s Venezuela with
a vengeance. In contrast Colombia, with one foot in the Andean world and
another in coastal communities facing the Pacific and the Caribbean, seems to
have become locked into an unending pattern of guerrilla violence and strug-
gling middle-class party politics that is very old and at the same time very
contemporary, in an archipelago of regional capitals scattered throughout the
country that have always defied centralization.
What characterized Peruvian politics for much of the twentieth century was
delayed modernization and the prolongation of a traditional order. These de-
velopments, coupled with the difficulties of transcending the divisions between
coast, sierra (a highland plateau with non-contiguous mountain valleys), and
montaña (the eastern slopes of the Andes that descend into the Amazonian
jungle), have always made it difficult to build both a state and a nation. Ex-
tended elite rule (1820–1929), the long recovery required to transcend the
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devastation left by the War of the Pacific, and the failure of revolutionary
politics to restructure state and society (1929–1939), meant that Peru en-
tered the post-World War II era with none of the advantages secured in Brazil
and the Southern Cone. In fact, the intellectual foundations of modern Peru,
both conservative and revolutionary, and the attempt to explain this delayed
modernization in economics and politics led to wide acceptance of an oligar-
chic thesis: the myth that a unified power structure had long dominated Peru-
vian society versus the reality of a divided elite at odds with each other as much
as with other groups challenging their power and privilege.
The unique outcome of this extended debate was a major role for intellec-
tuals in shaping modern Peru, rather than pragmatic politicians, by advancing
revolutionary thought: González Prada (the originator of the oligarchic thesis
in the 1890s), José Carlos Mariátegui (in his restatement of Marxist thought to
fit Peruvian reality in the 1920s), and Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre (in advanc-
ing the concept of Indo-América as the authentic Latin America in its fusion of
Hispanic and indigenous cultures and peoples). Carried into the world of poli-
tics these ideas fueled the entrance of the middle sectors into politics via
a revolutionary counter-elite movement: the Popular Revolutionary American
Alliance (APRA, the adjective for which is “Aprista”). APRA’s initial quest for
power in the 15 years preceding World War II generated violence and repres-
sion by force, first with the military negating the Aprista victory in 1931 presi-
dential elections; then the July 1932 Aprista revolt in Trujillo on the northern
coast, followed by military reaction in which party leaders and followers were
massacred in the ruins of Chan-Chan outside Trujillo; and lastly the Aprista
revenge in the April 1933 assassination of President Sánchez Cerro.
Following the stand-off between the military-backed government of Oscar
Benavides (1933–1939) and the Apristas, a major effort was made during the
government of Manuel Prado to reconcile differences between the coastal elite
and Aprista leaders (1939–1945). The outcome was agreement that in the
next round of elections the Apristas would be free to compete for seats in
Congress, but would not field a presidential candidate. Subsequently, José Luis
Bustamante y Rivero was elected president in 1945 and governed until 1948,
with APRA controlling Congress. This initial attempt at reconciling their differ-
ences at the ballot box and by sharing power, with one side controlling the
presidency and the other, Congress, ended in a naval revolt in 1948 triggered
by Aprista partisans. At this point the Army intervened once again and General
Odría was installed as president, with the mandate to destroy the Apristas by
repression, 1948–1956. An asylum case ensued, with Haya de la Torre taking
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refuge in the Colombian Embassy, and the Colombian government refusing to
hand him over to Peruvian authorities.
In 1956 a new effort was made to resolve the differences between the two
sides by negotiating a return to democratic rule, but with the understanding
once again that, while the Apristas would be free to compete in Congressional
elections, an Aprista candidate for president would not be tolerated. Manuel
Prado was reelected president in 1956 and much more attention was given to
putting in place an arrangement in which all could work together, without
constraints on who might serve in Congress, and letting the majority principle
determine legislative outcomes. This era of convivencia (living together through
a politics of accommodation and accord) worked well, even in relations be-
tween Congress and the Presidency. New actors appeared on the scene, with
an expanded number of parties now in place spanning the political spectrum,
from the Odristas on the right to the Apristas on the left, with new Christian
Democrats and Acción Popular (AP) at the center.
When new presidential and congressional elections appeared on the hori-
zon in 1962, great hope was expressed that there would be a peaceful transi-
tion from one administration to the next. Elections took place on schedule, but
were indecisive and needed to be resolved in Congress. The military discov-
ered at the last minute that in behind the scenes negotiations the Apristas and
the Odristas had struck a deal, with the principals Haya de la Torre and Manuel
Odría meeting behind closed doors to agree that as a majority bloc they would
vote together for a common candidate (Odría) in exchange for a coalition in
the new congress which would give the Apristas a solid majority. Not being
happy with the prospects of this outcome, the military re-intervened and im-
posed a moratorium, 1962–1963. A new round of presidential elections then
took place, with the block against an Aprista presidential candidate continuing.
By then Acción Popular (AP) had picked up much larger support in the center
and advanced their candidate as the one capable of breaking the stalemate.
Cementing their coalition with the Christian Democrats, they were able to elect
the AP candidate, Fernando Belaúnde Terry, president for the 1963–1968
term of office. However, the Aprista-Odrista accord held firm for Congress
with that alignment continuing to have a majority and the AP and the Chris-
tian-Democrats in the minority. The great hope in these years was that with the
erosion of support for the Apristas and the rise of the AP as the party of the
center, a new more democratic alignment could be produced in which, while
the Apristas would have a plurality in Congress, they would no longer present
the threat of an electoral majority, with the capacity to elect a president.
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Crisis politics, however, returned in 1968. With Congress and the Presi-
dency stalemated, without the ability to get reform-oriented legislation passed
and signed into law, except for a weak agrarian reform law, the sensitive issue
of national control of the country’s petroleum resources by a foreign oil com-
pany became headline news (the International Petroleum Company had been
granted subsoil rights years earlier). When negotiations with the Government
in the Offices of the President broke down and the scandal of a missing page in
the contract, crucial to Peru’s regaining subsoil rights, hit the news, the mili-
tary intervened, put Belaúnde Terry on an airplane out of the country, and
assumed power – this time with determination to impose radical reforms by
fiat. In short, with this action the long-standing attempt to secure governmen-
tal reforms and the incorporation of revolutionary expectations into populist
political parties, first Aprista-based, and then by moving a more moderate AP
party organization to the foreground as an alternative, failed. Younger military
officers – imbued with the ideology of reform and revolution, much better
trained than their old-line superiors, and confident in their recent victories
over revolutionary guerrilla movements in the highlands – took power with the
belief that with the support of the people they could carry out long-suppressed
revolutionary expectations and build a new Peru.
Under General Velasco Alvarado (1968–1975) the military imposed a radical
agenda, beginning with expropriation of the International Petroleum Company,
followed by agrarian reform and “Peruvianization” of banking (i.e., national-
ization). To this was soon added a new contract with the Southern Peruvian
Copper Corporation, giving the Government much more favorable terms; merger
and consolidation of the fishing industry in particular and Peruvian industries
in general, and “multilaterialization” of foreign trade, which meant lessening
economic dependency in trade on the United States and increasing trade with
the Soviet-bloc countries. From the beginning the new economic model, which
drew on Yugoslav experience with state-owned enterprises and a restricted
private sector in a market-oriented economy, was a colossal failure, given the
fact that Peru simply did not have a state apparatus commensurate with the
tasks at hand. Success in eliminating the old economy was one thing; con-
structing a new one, another. Complementing major changes in the economy
was the goal of creating a new society, in which the old party system was to be
replaced by mass mobilization through a controlled social movement from above,
known as SINAMOS.
Failure to establish a new order under Velasco Alvarado generated a tem-
pering of the “revolution.” Taking advantage of Velasco’s illness, a more mod-
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erate group of military officers rallied around Gen. Francisco Morales Bermudez,
who assumed the presidency (1975–1980). With military unity now at risk
and the imperative of finding a new economic and political framework through
which to govern, the senior military opened a dialogue with the business com-
munity and the Aprista Party. By 1977 a full-fledged transition was underway.
First, an accommodation was reached with the Apristas, followed by the con-
voking of a constitutional assembly in 1978, agreement on a new constitution
in 1979, and the scheduling of national elections every five years, beginning in
1980. The death of Haya de la Torre, the Aprista leader, August 2, 1979
changed the expectations considerably. In the elections which followed, on
schedule, Belaúnde Terry was re-elected for a second term of office (1980–
1985) with a 45.5 percent plurality.
While expectations were high in the return to democratic rule and a market-
economy, neither government nor the business community was able to meet
expectations. The failure of this second Belaúnde government in economics
and politics was followed by the resurgence of the Aprista Party, which with 46
percent of the vote in the first round and 48 percent in the second, saw its
candidate Alán García elected to office and able to take office for the first time
(1985). Notable changes certainly had taken place in Peru. Whereas in 1963,
the last presidential election before extended military rule, voter registration
was 19.1 percent of the eligible population, by 1985 it had increased to 43.4
percent. And, in that context, despite all the upheavals in Peruvian politics, the
Aprista Party had not only survived, but also had demonstrated its ability to
outperform the other parties and political movements. But, performance-wise,
its capacity to govern effectively proved to be just as disastrous, for, while
García was successful in rebuilding a populist coalition for electoral purposes,
he was unable to deal effectively with the problems before him during his term
of office, 1985–1990. When he left office, the economic crisis was even
greater with inflation running an estimated 3500 percent and a 20 billion
dollar foreign debt, of which the Government was in default to the IMF and
other international agencies for almost 2 billion dollars.
In the next round of elections, Alberto Fujimori and his movement called
Cambio 90, with 80 percent of the electorate voting, took office for the 1990–
1995 term. While inflation was up to 7,659 percent by the end of the year,
Fujimori initiated a series of economic reforms that began to produce results
for the first time in years. More importantly, faced with a security crisis at hand
with the guerrilla movement Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) more active
than ever before, and working with the military and police, he was able to
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check that guerrilla movement in the highlands and minimize its presence on
the coast. Accompanying these actions, however, was an increasingly authori-
tarian presidency. In April 1992 he dismissed Congress and instituted govern-
ment by decree. In late 1993 he secured a new constitution, more to his liking,
and called for new elections in November 1992 in which Cambio 90 gained
control of 40 of the 80 seats. In December that same year the military cap-
tured Abimael Guzmán and other Sendero leaders.
Compared with the disastrous records of his predecessors in economics and
security, these accomplishments made it possible for him to be elected for
a second five year term, 1995–2000. But with these successes went a man-
date which he interpreted to be one endorsing his authoritarian actions. Com-
plicating this second term was the fact that not only had he been unable to
erase the guerrilla movements in their entirety, as exemplified by the ability of
a small guerrilla group, MRTA, to seize control of the Japanese embassy in
December 1996, but also public knowledge of his abuses of power increased
rapidly, with a series of scandals and dirty tricks linked to surveillance of the
opposition and an opposition press and media publicizing them. When tapes
regarding these activities were released, it confirmed the public’s worst fears.
In that context, the opposition, which had been largely stilled during his first
term of office, became increasingly vocal. Unable to establish a basis for the
legitimacy of his increasingly authoritarian presidency, Fujimori found himself
trapped by his authoritarian populist style of operations and censored both at
home and abroad, one that included the naming of 80-member Organization
of American States observation team which was appointed to monitor his ac-
tivities as 2000 elections approached. The final coup de grace was the release
of videotapes, secretly recorded by his security chief, Vladimiro Montesinos,
documenting the shady and illicit operations of the President and his allies.
Faced with this evidence and an aggressive opposition led by Alejandro Toledo,
Fujimori resigned and left the country for Japan, with a respected member of
Congress, Valentín Paniágua becoming interim president until a new round of
elections could be scheduled and a new president elected.
In the presidential elections which followed in April 2001, Alejandro To-
ledo was elected and assumed the presidency for the 2001–2006 term. From
the beginning Toledo’s administration was a troubled one in the context of the
enormous problems facing the country. His chief asset, as a son of the poor,
was the legitimacy he had as the first person to serve in the office of the
presidency as someone who had risen to the top of the political system from
below on the basis of his merits, from among the country’s poor majority.
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Given the alternatives and the enormity of the problems facing Peru, it is no
small accomplishment that he, his administration, and his country were able to
struggle through his term of office and were able to guarantee another round
of democratically-held presidential elections, held on schedule. Out of this con-
text, with the old parties gone and a host of political movements spanning the
political spectrum mobilizing the electorate, a resurgent Aprista Party once
again return their head, Alán García to office for a second term in 2006, with
far more understanding for the difficulties facing their country and the need
for an administration with less focus on rhetoric and more on the substance of
how to respond to the enormous economic and political problems facing the
country.
Venezuela
In contrast to all these developments in Peru and the ABC countries, the resur-
gence of radical populism in Venezuela, of the ilk first identified with the Peróns
in Argentina in the 1940s, calls attention to the fragility of sustaining demo-
cratic practices – even in an oil-rich society such as Venezuela – when the
problems of a poor majority are neglected for an extended period of time,
especially under circumstances coupled with economic turbulence. For, despite
all the progress made in Venezuela in sustaining democratic rule from 1959 to
1999, political party competition, based on two dominant competitive parties
offering alternative programs and policies, with mass constituencies, was un-
able to head off a fundamental rupture in the existing political and economic
order. Responding to mass demands for major change in the existing political
system, immediate attention to the hardships imposed on the poor by the eco-
nomic crisis of 1994, and the failure of the existing parties to respond to the
crisis – Hugo Chávez, formerly a career military officer, founded a mass-based,
left political movement, called the Fifth Republic Movement. First jailed for his
radical politics in an attempted coup, he subsequently led his movement to
electoral victory in December 1998, on a platform advocating writing a new
constitution and changing politics and society in Venezuela fundamentally to
the benefit of the country’s poor majority.
With a new constitution drafted and approved by popular referendum in
1999, Chávez was reelected president in 2000, under a new provision in the
constitution, changing presidential terms from 5 to 6 years. Further turbulence
ensued when Chávez undertook reform of the country’s state owned oil com-
pany, Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA). Faced with opposition by 7 of its ex-
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ecutives, Chávez fired them. Management retaliated with a lockout, bringing
oil production to a standstill. This was followed by a military coup removing
Chávez, April 11, 2002. Demonstrations in favor of Chávez led to a reversal
of this action in 48 hours, his return to office, and agreement to submit this
controversy over his radical leadership to a recall referendum, as provided for
in the new constitution, in 2002. This recall failed to remove him from office.
In 2006 he won his bid for reelection with overwhelming support. But at this
point, with opposition increasing against his authoritarian actions, when he
proposed a new referendum with major changes in the constitution, including
his bid to eliminate limits to his two terms of office, his actions to consolidate
his rule failed, 51 to 49 percent.
With this immediate situation in mind, and with an eye to the collapse of the
established parties, their replacement by political movements spanning the po-
litical spectrum, and the realignment carried out by Chávez in enfranchising
the poor and bringing them into the political arena through mobilization-ori-
ented politics, there are three points of reference drawn from the past, which
have relevance to the current situation. First, there is the demise of personalist
rule in Venezuela in 1935, with the ending of the dictatorship of Juan Vicente
Gómez; mass mobilization 1935–1945, and the rise to power of Acción
Democrática 1945–1948, as a center-left political movement. Second, there
was strong reaction from the right against the imposition of a center-left re-
form agenda in 1948, the overthrow of that government, and the installation
of the Gen. Marcos Pérez Jiménez dictatorship, 1950–1958. Third, the out-
come of that stand-off and the replacement of Pérez Jiménez was a “pacted”
democracy, which provided 34 years of stable democratic rule, coupled with
economic progress, based on oil, until a burgeoning economic crisis in 1989,
culminating in the economic crisis of 1994, brought down the accomplish-
ments of those years.
Despite Venezuela’s oil wealth, what is now clear in hindsight is the eco-
nomic and political decline which began in the 1980s and it undermined demo-
cratic rule. This was centered not only in the failure of economic policies de-
signed to establish a more diversified and productive industrial and agricultural
base for the country, but also in the banking industry in how to build a more
effective interfacing between public and private financing of development ac-
tivities. Coupled with this were problems at the heart of the country’s economy:
the oil and gas business, in opening new fields, updating outdated equipment,
and improving overall production and refining of the country’s oil. Comple-
menting this was ossification of the country’s competitive, dominant two-party
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system. This was centered in the “pacted” democracy agreed upon in 1958,
after the overthrow of the dictatorship of Pérez Jiménez (1950–1958), in
which center-left Acción Democrática (AD) and center-right COPEI domi-
nated the political arena and rotated in and out of office across the years until
1999.
At the outset the agreements reached among the various groups contend-
ing for power were all seen as healthy signs of Venezuela’s nascent democracy,
especially in the way in which revolutionary groups engaged in guerrilla activi-
ties to upset the new state were defeated and eventually folded into a competi-
tive party system, by agreeing to compete for power at the ballot box and
participate in congress in debates over appropriate legislation for dealing with
the country’s needs and priorities. Using once again the two key variables first
identified by Dahl in assessing democratization, liberalization and inclusive-
ness, alluded to in the preface to these country case studies, democratic prac-
tices in Venezuela can be and were frequently judged successful. This was true
especially during the era in Latin America marked by resurgence of military
rule in the 1960, ‘70s, and early ‘80s. But, decisions and compromises made
along the way, as to what the priorities would be and what would be set aside as
non-negotiable issues, also eventually corrupted the process. The two biggest
issues were the failure to come up with an effective way to deal with corruption
in the state apparatus, in undoing the negatives of party-based political ap-
pointments and the use of public funds for partisan purposes, as well as how to
use effectively the country’s revenues from oil and gas to close the gap be-
tween the well-to-do and the poor. Fundamental reform and attention to social
inequities simply became side-lined over time by more pedestrian party politics.
When a full-fledged banking crisis hit the country in 1994, in the context
of an inflationary spiral which was out of control, the country’s liquidity be-
came a huge issue. At the time Carlos Andrés Pérez (AD) was in power, for
a second term (1989–1994). Electorally, he had been hugely successful in
putting together a winning political coalition that could be characterized as
“Neoliberal Neopopulism.” “Neoliberal” had become the catch-phrase for the
market-friendly economic development strategies centered on deregulation of
the economy and privatization of the state-owned enterprises which had domi-
nated the economy, not just in Venezuela but all over Latin America during
these years, primarily under pressure from the United States, to stimulate new
economic growth. “Neopopulism” was, in turn, the jargon used to capture
new-style populism, the strategy of using nationalistic rhetoric and socioeco-
nomic issues designed to capture the vote of the poor as well more affluent
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members of society to produce winning majorities in competitive elections.
CAP, the nickname for the president, was especially adept in using this rhetoric
to convince a majority of the Venezuelan people that he had a program and
a set of policies for dealing effectively with the country’s needs. But, as had
been the case elsewhere and before in using populism to produce majorities
through rhetoric and political charisma, centered around personalist political
movements eschewing formal party organization (viz. the original model cre-
ated by the Peróns in 1940s Argentina and resurrected by Fujimori in the early
1990s in Peru), the crisis of the moment coupled with the arrogance of power
and political corruption generated political disaster for the incumbent and the
country. Pérez’s economic and political problems escalated without control,
leading to his impeachment, the first in the nation’s history.
Perez’s impeachment and the subsequent collapse of Acción Democrática
made the return to power of Rafael Caldera (for his second term, 1994–
1999) and COPEI, a certainty. But, as an old man facing a horrific economic
and political situation he had neither the ability nor the stamina to change the
course of either politics or the economy. Overwhelmed by his political prob-
lems in building and sustaining a ruling coalition and inconsistent economic
policies, he struggled to find a way out of the country’s economic conundrum,
but the best he could do was muddle through his term of office.
It was in this setting with the ossification of this “pacted” democracy and an
unresolved economic crisis that was producing enormous economic disloca-
tions and hardships for all sectors of society, but especially for the poor, that
Hugo Chávez – with a political charisma in his country not seen since the
heydays of the Peróns – assumed power. His defeat of the established “political
class” and marginalization of the economic elite, coupled with his capacity for
galvanizing mass support behind him (especially the poor and the forgotten
ones), has become both as legendary and as divisive as what the Peróns accom-
plished in Argentina, but with the difference that Venezuela’s wealth in oil and
surging international petroleum prices has given him an economic basis with
sustained revenues never enjoyed by Perón. While Chávez’s economic record
has been weak in terms of substance, and his political position has weakened as
he has remained in power, the longevity of his rule as an elected president
sustaining a huge core of support stands in contrast with Perón’s relatively
brief rule. For, despite all the problems encountered in consolidating his rule,
Chávez has completed one full six-year term of office under the new constitu-
tion that he and supporters produced (2000–2006) and is now well into his
second term (2007–2012), despite increasing dissatisfaction with his rule.
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This populist breakthrough and rupture of the prevailing democratic order
carries with it all the potential for locking Venezuela into a pattern of divisive
politics paralleling Argentine experience in the chasm which exists to this day
between Peronista and anti-Peronista partisans. Whereas in today’s Argentina
politics is dominated by two contending political forces, the Peronista Party
(which has sustained its majority now for nearly two decades) and the Radical
Party, Venezuela is likely to be faced with a three-way split: Chávez’s Socialist
Party (the name most frequently used today to refer to his political movement)
which still has majority support versus the center-left (the core of which is the
old Acción Democrática alignment) and the center-right (concentrated around
the country’s Christian Democrats, known as COPEI).
Colombia
Compared and contrasted with the other South American cases selected here
for brief country profiles, Colombia is as different from the others as any might
lay claim to be. What stands out in this instance is Colombia’s status as
a consolidated limited democracy. The basis of this status is threefold: a politi-
cal system reflecting and built upon a country that is as diverse geographically
as it is politically; the long-standing dominance of two major parties, the Liber-
als and the Conservatives, dating back to the formation of an independent
Colombia; and the prevalence of a regionalism and factionalism throughout its
political history that have always presented difficulties in implementing funda-
mental change.
The challenges to Colombia’s limited democracy and the difficulties in ex-
panding democratic practices to embrace less advantaged groups economically
and those at odds with the system have always centered on institutionalized
violence and the politics of protest. Political elites and mobilized middle sectors
in Colombia have for most of their country’s political history been willing to
live with a higher degree of institutionalized violence than their counterparts in
most other countries. While upper and middle sectors of society have been
unwilling to alter the basis of power by admitting lower sector politicians and
activists to fuller participation in reshaping state and society, they have made
major accommodations in the political order at crucial intervals, when faced
with institutional breakdown and the possibility of guerrilla insurgency getting
out of hand. To understand this political option comparatively, it might be
helpful to keep in mind another instance of institutionalized violence in a lim-
ited democracy: Northern Ireland where its institutionalized violence contin-
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ued for roughly 75 years, before achieving a peace agreement with the pros-
pects of transforming social and political relationships, versus the Colombian
case where institutionalized violence has continued as a problem for now well
over a century. The longest periods of high level conflict in Colombia are those
dating back to the War of a Thousand Days (1899–1902), one that has been
enshrined in literature in Gabriel García Márquez’s One Hundred Years of
Solitude, and the post-World War II conflict known simply as La Violencia,
1946–1958. The La Violencia era was characterized by two, related major
events which triggered a crisis pointing to breakdown. The first was the pres-
sure for change accumulated through demonstrations (1946–1953) that ter-
minated in uncontrolled rioting in the capital Bogotá, referred to as the bogotazo.
This occurred while a meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Organization
of American States was going on in the nation’s capital in 1946, and was
triggered by the assassination of the Liberal reformist leader Jorge Gaitán. The
second was the intervention of the military on one of its rare incursions into
politics when the country bordered on collapse: the Rojas Pinilla coup d’etat
and the establishment of a populist authoritarian regime under his rule, 1953–
1957. The outcome in this case was a pact among the principals permitting the
country to return to democratic rule in which for a designated period of time
the two major parties would rotate in office. The legacy of this past can best be
summed up in today’s limited sovereignty in the midst of institutionalized vio-
lence and uncontrollable drug trafficking – the down side of globalization – in
which every time the guerrilla insurgency threatens to inundate the prevailing
political and social order the military raises its visibility and negotiations with
the guerrillas are re-opened.
Matching these cycles when institutionalized violence reach a crisis point,
such as is the case at present, are eras of relative peace under political accords.
The most successful of these, in providing relative peace, was the National
Front experience, 1958–1974. This was the result of a “pacted” democracy
under a political accord involving the principals known as the Pacto de Punto
Fijo (1958). During this era, well-developed mechanisms were developed for
interest group representation, both through business organizations, for ex-
ample coffee growers and industrialists, as well as political representation within
the established parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives. Yet, at no time, was
the countryside effectively folded into the established order; hence, the contin-
ued recourse to violence by those outside the system.
Recent politics have reflected this on-going tension in Colombia, between
the institutionalization of elite accommodation and responsiveness to new middle
113LAWRENCE S. GRAHAM • GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY
sector groups entering politics, and the failure to guarantee effective mass
participation which would require a major adjustment in the internal balance of
power. Illustrating this pattern more recently are the César Gaviria presidency
(1990–1994), which was marked by reform, openness to new groups enter-
ing politics, and negotiation with guerrilla movements, followed by the Ernesto
Samper presidency (1994–1998), in which there was a return to political
stalemate and increased guerrilla activity.
During the Gavíria presidency initiatives such as broadening the political
leadership, increasing political participation and controlling the drug lords and
violence were priorities. As a consequence, Gavíria was successful in getting
a new constitution approved, one which entered into effect in July 1991. Added
to this was follow-through in cracking down on the drug lords and their car-
tels, the primary accomplishment being the capture and death of Pablo Escobar,
the leading drug lord at the time. Gavíria and his governing team were also
equally successful in designing policies leading to strong economic perfor-
mance. But, with Samper’s assumption of power, a new cycle of system decline
and disintegration set in, with political stalemate once again being at the fore-
front, accompanied by an escalation of violence. While election of Andrés Pastrana
(Conservative) in June 1998, was intended to inaugurate a new era of peace
and cooperation, the reverse occurred; by the end of his term, FARC (the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and the smaller National Liberation
Army had control of 60 percent of national territory. Yet, in the next presiden-
tial election, in 2002 Alvaro Uribe was elected in the first round of voting with
52.9 percent of the vote. This was a leader who presented himself as a hardliner
and outsider, as head of a new political movement outside the two established
parties, known as the Primero Colombia movement.
Today these cycles in Colombian politics continue – eras in which there is
sufficient recovery in politics and economics to avoid extended crisis and break-
down, followed by new stasis, with resurgence of rural violence and increased
activity by the drug lords in marketing cocaine, only to be followed by a new
cycle of reform and adjustment in the country’s political economy.
Mexico
More so than any other country in the circum-Caribbean region, Mexico of-
fers insight into a very different set of political dynamics in that portion of Latin
America most affected by the continuing presence of external actors influenc-
ing internal affairs. The largest country by far within this region, it is the only
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Latin American state with a common border with the United States. The prob-
lems Mexico has faced throughout its history in defining state and nation are at
the same time shared with all the other countries in the region. This group of
nation states, in contrast to Mexico, consists of very small countries, be they
located in Central America or the Caribbean. Because Mexico is a large state,
second only to Brazil in size and population in Latin America, it is simulta-
neously a major actor within the Caribbean basin, offsetting the United States
and providing an alternative regional actor in interstate relations throughout
this region that frequently helps these countries limit the influence of the U.S.
For Mexico the nineteenth century was caught up in internal and external
struggles to define both state and nation. As a consequence, independence in
1822 did not generate the same dynamic in establishing its own distinctive
national identity as was the case with the South America countries. The loss of
territory to the south and to the north, coupled with a succession of weak
national governments in Mexico City, unable to establish effective jurisdiction
over the provinces/states in what emerged as the core of modern Mexico,
generated a two-way struggle for control. On the one hand, there was an
ongoing debate between the advocates of strong central government versus
those favoring federal arrangements which would respect the distinct regional
entities that today comprise the Mexican federal system. On the other, there
was an overlapping struggle among those favoring conservative rule, either
some version of monarchy or dictatorship, versus liberal concepts of gover-
nance, identified with republican forms of government and more democratic
practices. To this mix must be added the problem of mestizaje, the mixing of
Spanish and indigenous people, for despite a majority of the population blend-
ing together the two, there was until the Revolution of 1910 a small elite
proud of their Spanish heritage (gachupines) and approximately one million
residents, members of at least thirty distinct indigenous groups who to this day
have not been integrated into the country’s political life nor even speak the
same language as the dominant groups.
As already noted, building a national state required confronting the loss
first of modern-day Central America in the 1820s, followed only a few de-
cades later by Texas and parts of today’s southwestern U.S. In addition, during
this same period, Guadalajara, Yucatán, and Zacatecas, all were considered
serious risks for secession. These two aspects should help clarify why there was
a constant struggle between those defending the autonomy of the Mexican
states and those wanting centralized control. The governing compromise reached
in the Constitution of 1824 merged these concerns, providing for a division of
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federal power into executive, legislative, and judicial branches, the creation of
states with a similar separation of powers, and provisions for representative
government and political independence for each province.
However, the tensions between monarchists and republicans continued to
be manifested. The secession of Texas in 1836 made clear that the form of
centralization advocated in the 1824 Constitution was ineffective for defend-
ing national territory. To this must be added the loss two decades later of more
than half its territory to the United States in the Treaty of Guadalupe. Mexico
bordered on collapse throughout this period, as a series of governments rose
and fell, including a second attempt at Monarchy, under Maximilian (1864–
1867). Finally, in 1867, liberal forces regained the upper hand and established
the federal Constitution of 1857 and elected Benito Juárez as president. For
the next fifty years, at least on paper, a federal system remained in effect.
With the rise to power of Porfirio Díaz, a strong national state was estab-
lished for the first time, in the years 1876 to 1910. While this was accom-
plished at the cost of suppressing regional elites, centralized administrative
organization was finally put in place. This was also a period in which there was
a good deal of economic progress, through attracting foreign investment. But
this was a dictatorship which also increased the inequities in society, in the
contrasts between a centralizing elite supporting Díaz who benefited from
economic take-off and the rest of society saddled with crushing poverty.
While Diaz and his supporters were easily displaced in 1910, the difficul-
ties began with the attempts to form a new government. In the Revolution
which followed from 1910 to 1930 various regional groups came into conflict
with each other. Each faction had its own philosophies and interests, the conse-
quence of which was more than a decade of disorder, coups, and counter-
coups, coupled with rural violence. The regional alliances that emerged, in
which each had little confidence in the others, explain why when they met to
write a new constitution in 1917 there was virtually unanimous agreement on
a revival of federal arrangements. This new constitution respected the bicam-
eral design of a national congress, and the structure of sovereign states and
free municipalities as the basis for more decentralized government. However,
as the political movements identified with the Revolution converged in the cre-
ation of a single hegemonic party, the PRI (the Institutional Revolutionary Party),
a new national government emerged, centered on the principle of six-year
presidential terms, with no reelection. The process of centralization was rela-
tively quick, with the presidency of the republic gaining direct control not only
over the legislative and juridical branches, but also over the states and munici-
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palities, through its dual leadership of state and party. By 1940, under the
presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–1940), this process was largely com-
plete. In nationalizing the petroleum and electricity industries, the central gov-
ernment assumed responsibility for planning, organizing, and implementing
programs to administer use of the nation’s scarce resources. Backing up these
initiatives were the government’s two most important unions: the Confedera-
tion of Mexican Workers and the National Confederation of Peasants.
From 1940 to 2000 the PRI regime was hegemonic, rotating its presidents
as heads of state and party every six years, while maintaining the imagery of
democracy. Through regularly scheduled federal, state, and local elections and
a controlled opposition, the top leadership from President of the Republic to
governors to municipal presidents directed political and economic affairs. For
40 years this governmental arrangement created a framework within which
sustained economic growth and rotation in public office occurred, but not
without challenges and changes as time went by. Its legitimacy stemmed from
its identification with the Constitution of 1917 and the goals of the Mexican
Revolution as well as its ability to sustain the support of its mass constituencies,
embodied in the three wings of its revolutionary party: the peasantry, the workers,
and the middle sectors of Mexican society (school teachers, bureaucrats, and
small trades people). For most of this period flexibility in the system was at-
tained by balancing progressive initiatives, identified with such themes as Mexi-
can nationalism, improved social conditions for the majority, and flexible wage
policies, against more conservative ones, designed to maintain order, stability,
and a favorable climate for economic development and investment. For ex-
ample, Lázaro Cárdenas (1930–1940), Adolfo López Mateos (1958–1964)
and Luis Echeverría (1970–1976) can be identified with the former, while
Plutarco Elías Calles (1929–1933, founder of the PRI), Miguel Alemán (1946–
1952), and Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964–1970) belong to the latter. Matching
them are centrist administrations which were mixed in their policies and prefer-
ences: Manuel Ávila Camacho (1940–1946), Adolfo Ruiz Cortines (1952–
1958), and José López Portillo (1976–1982). Still other patterns can be see
in the administrations of Miguel de la Madrid (1982–1988) and Carlos Sali-
nas de Gortari (1998–1994) – the former, being a case of centrist policies,
used to bring about major administrative changes internally in order to redirect
priorities in economic development and the latter, consisting of significant
privatization initiatives, opening up the economy to foreign investors, and making
an accommodation with the Church.
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In bringing PRI hegemony to end, in recognition that times and circum-
stances had changed dramatically, again the Mexican presidency played a key
role in the peaceful transition to a more open, democratic society. Yet another
president and his administration must be recognized for their initiatives taken
from the center: Ernesto Zedillo (1994–2000). None of this is intended to
minimize the role of the opposition, for the first changes in the system did
come about because of widespread opposition in the face of the political crisis
of the late 1960s, especially in the rapidly growing cities that necessitated
a response by government. Nor should one minimize the economic crises which
required reform, as was the case in the debt crisis of 1984 that marked the end
of rapid economic growth and which in turn contributed to widespread disillu-
sionment with the existing political system. Likewise, enormous political change
took place within Mexico during the 1990s in which a viable opposition emerged
for the first time, accompanying the country’s economic transformation into
a more open economy. Accompanying the move away from a state-dominated
economy to a market-based system more compatible with worldwide trends
was political liberalization, in which electoral controls were relaxed at the mu-
nicipal and state levels, generating more competitive local elections and greater
pluralism in Congress.
Culminating this transition was the presidential election of 2000, in which
all constraints on electoral participation and competition were removed. This in
turn created the conditions under which the victory of the PAN opposition
candidate, Vicente Fox (2000–2006), occurred and generated subsequently
a competitive environment in which the election of a second PAN president
Felipe Calderón (2006–2012) occurred. Not only have Mexican elections
become truly competitive over the last eight years (2000–2008) in a three-
way split (PAN/PRI/PRD), but for the first time the Mexican Congress has
become a free-standing institution, no longer dominated by the Presidency, as
a really separate and independent branch of government with its own voice,
able to challenge, limit, and require the president to respond to its demands
and control of the legislative process.
Uruguay
In this survey of the diversity of political experience in Latin America, through
the use of case studies illustrating major patterns, Uruguay stands out in the
uniqueness of its political system. A very small country similar to the Central
American republics in size, yet more akin historically to city-states elsewhere in
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the dominance exercised by its capital city Montevideo – between Brazil and
Argentina – it is an integral part of “European South America,” those south-
ernmost regions of the continent where massive European immigration over-
whelmed the native peoples found there in colonial times, extending northward
across country borders into southern Brazil, upwards to the state and city of
São Paulo. What sets Uruguay apart from this region as well as the rest of Latin
America are the innovative political reforms its leaders have undertaken in the
search for a more sustainable and responsive democratic regime, in the midst
of periodic crises. In seeking to undercut the weaknesses of presidentialism as it
has evolved elsewhere in Latin America, these leaders have over time placed
institutional limits on presidential power (including experimentation with a plural
executive, only to return to a single office holder accountable to the legislature),
sustained the primacy of their National Assembly as the dominant political institu-
tion, and developed a double, simultaneous ballot to allow full representation of
alternative candidates and political preferences in national elections.
Like Colombia, for most of its history Uruguay has had a dominant two-
party system reaching back to the early years of its republic under the labels of
the Blancos, now known at the National Party (a center-right party whose
origins lie in an older upper class in place before the waves of massive immigra-
tion), and the Colorados (a more centerist party, embracing European immi-
grants concentrated in urban areas). But, unlike Colombia, it has evolved po-
litically over the last decade in such a way that the historic parties have been
challenged to sustain their relevance as dominant forces in politics by the emer-
gence of a reformist bloc on the left known as the Broad Front (Frente Amplio).
While the Front’s origins date back to the polarization of politics in the
1971 elections and the fragmentation of the existing party system, which pre-
ceded Uruguay’s decline into military rule, 1973–1985, its endeavors to pull
together left-wing groups into a broad coalition that would transform national
politics did not produce major results until the late 1990s. Its appearance as
a major force in Uruguayan politics dates from the 1999 presidential election.
While that election was won by Jorge Battle (the candidate of the governing
Colorado Party who put together a winning coalition by forming an alliance
with the National Party), the Frente Amplio emerged with the largest bloc of
votes in the Uruguayan Congress in the first round of balloting in October of
that year. That particular coalition government lasted a scant two years, until
the National Party withdrew its support, but the Battle presidency survived for
the remainder of its term of office under the rules governing presidential poli-
tics. In the October 2004 elections, however, the Frente Amplio won a major-
119LAWRENCE S. GRAHAM • GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY
ity with 51.7 percent of the vote and its leader, Tabaré Vázquez, assumed
power for the 2005–2010 term as president, thereby transforming politics in
Uruguay into a dominant three-party system and setting the country on a course
emphasizing political renewal, economic recovery, and a reexamination of the
human rights abuses committed when the country was under military rule.
Like Chile, Argentina, and Brazil and despite strong democratic traditions
paralleling those of Chile, however, Uruguay fell under the influence of the
military during the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, in the face of eco-
nomic and political upheavals that threatened the basis of the country’s eco-
nomic prosperity and its reputation as a stable democracy. This collapse of
democratic rule and its restoration warrants particular attention because it is an
important part of the reason why and how Uruguay can today be classified as
a consolidated democracy.
Paralleling patterns in Argentina and Brazil whereby the military took
a more active role in politics and faced with a growing economic and social
crisis in the mid-1960s, in the 1966 elections Colorados elected retired Gen-
eral Oscar Gestido as president. Assuming power in early 1967, under a new
constitution, the Constitution of 1967 which replaced the Constitution of 1830,
when Gestido died in December that same year, his vice president Jorge Pacheco
Areco succeeded him for the remainder of that five year term. Regardless of
the government’s endeavors to suppress the revolutionary Tupamaros, vio-
lence spiraled upward and peaked in August 1970 with the assassination of
a U.S. security official and then a year later with the kidnapping of the British
ambassador. But, then as elections approached in late 1971, the Tupamaros
declared a truce which permitted national elections to be held in a brief but
relatively tranquil environment. In that setting three candidates emerged: Gen-
eral Mario Aguerrondo, a hardliner, supported by a faction within the Colorados;
Senator Wilson Ferreira Aldunate, with a reformist agenda, appealing to more
moderate Blancos, and Juan María Bordaberry Arocena, as the candidate of
the majority of the Colorados. Despite controversial election results centered
on who had a plurality, Bordaberry was declared the victor and took office for
the 1972–1976 term. In that setting; politics degenerated into bitter divisions
over political, social, economic and ideological issues, and the economic situa-
tion worsened. As the crisis grew more severe, Bordaberry declared a state of
internal war and the military stepped in aggressively, the consequence of which
was the defeat of the Tupamaros by the end of 1973. Disillusioned with civilian
rule, much in the same way as was the experience of the military in Argentina
and Brazil, the military assumed an increasingly aggressive role within govern-
120 ON THE STATE OF LATIN AMERICAN STATES. APPROACHING THE  BICENTENARY
ment, following in particular Brazilian concepts of national security, which ended
up with their forcing Bordaberry to resign in June 1976 and their assumption
of power.
But, when the military sought to consolidate their control of the govern-
ment through a new constitution, submitted for popular approval by plebiscite
in 1980, the civilian leadership from right to left rose up and banded together
in opposition to this violation of the country’s democratic traditions, the con-
sequence of which was the defeat of the proposed document 57 to 43 percent.
From 1980 to 1984, with a new retired military officer as president, a dia-
logue ensued between the coup leaders and their civilian opposition, the con-
sequence of which was, after protracted debate and continuous protests,
a negotiated agreement that the military would return to the barracks, national
elections would be held the end of 1984, and a civilian would take office
March 1, 1985. In those elections, Colorado leader Mario Sanguinetti emerged
as the victor.
Under Sanguinetti (1985–1990) democratic rule was reestablished and
the process of national reconciliation was begun, one which proved to be no
easy task. In the next round of presidential elections in late 1989, National
Party leader Luis Alberto Lacalle defeated the Colorados and took office, 1990–
1995, until a new round of national elections in which Sanguinetti was re-
turned to power, 1995–2000. At that point, since no party had a majority in
the bicameral National Assembly, the National Party joined the Colorados in
a coalition government. These were the years of political and economic recov-
ery for Uruguay, in which democratic reforms and attention to human rights
issues, coupled with economic policies designed to revitalize the economy
through regional integration (vis-à-vis Mercosur, a trade accord centered on
Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay), provided relief from the tensions, disloca-
tions, and conflict of the previous decades.
From this point forward, with full participation of all political groups with-
out constraints and a broad based consensus that all would respect democratic
rules and practices, the Frente Amplio gained increasing popular support. The
1999 national elections were conducted under a constitutional amendment
requiring primaries in April for the selection of presidential candidates for each
party and a general election October 31 for the National Assembly in which
none of the presidential candidates received a majority. In the November run-
off, the primary competition was between Jorge Battle, the governing Colo-
rado Party’s leader, and Tabaré Vázquez, as head of the Frente Amplio, which
was decided in Battle’s favor through support from the National Party. But, as
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noted above, two years into Batlle’s presidency the National Party withdrew
from the governing coalition and in the next round of national elections, Octo-
ber 2004, the Frente Amplio was finally able to achieve majority power and
place its leader Vázquez in the presidency. With majorities in both chambers of
the National Assembly and widespread consensus that, with the military back
in the barracks and the Constitution of 1967 in place as the country’s basic
charter, a framework for guaranteeing full participation and open contestation
of all significant public issues had finally been achieved and a democratic re-
gime, consolidated.
Trends in the Governments and Societies
of Latin America
Through the foregoing 8 country case studies what should stand out for the
reader is the diversity of the Latin American experience in building national
states struggling to make democracy work and to create productive economies
that can attend to their societies’ needs. While there is an enormous range of
variation in country size, natural resources, economic performance, govern-
mental experience, and geopolitical location, there are region-wide trends worth
noting.
First, issues related to defining state and nation have been resolved. This
sets Latin America as a whole apart from the rest of the developing world in
which in so many cases issues in building state and nation continue to be
a problem. As an older group of developing national states, whose indepen-
dence dates back to the nineteenth century, their attention since independence
has focused on building viable governments and economies able to respond to
the political, economic and social needs of their peoples. All began with
a similar set of concerns at independence: the desire to build national states
patterned after Western experience which would embrace the ideas of order
and progress. There is an essay by the Argentine writer Jorge Luis Borges
called “The Garden of Forking Paths”, whose title calls attention to the overall
integrity of Latin America as a distinctive world region in its particular mix of
peoples and cultures – this is the garden – in which political leaders and the
choices they have made have led their evolving states in very different direc-
tions. At independence all began with the same trilogy of actors: large landhold-
ers, the Church, and caudillos, who in time gave way to the institutional military.
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Second, for all the difficulties they have encountered in making democracy
work, the democratic ideal has remained a constant. These are ideas derivative
from Western experience, be it European or North American, shaped in large
part by the French and the American revolutions and writers exploring ideas of
liberty, equality, justice, and human rights. In South America in particular, as
Robert Burr has noted in his book By Reason or Force: Chile and the Balance
of Power in South America, 1830–1905, the model often became recreating
the European state system in the Americas. To this governmental model, espe-
cially influenced by the Napoleonic state in the reforms introduced in France
after the Revolution and spread throughout the Continent, have been added
concepts derived from the United States in how to build and structure demo-
cratic institutions. While there was some experimentation with constitutional
monarchy at the outset (viz., the Brazilian case under Dom Pedro I and II) and
willingness later to consider incorporating parliamentary experience to make
accountability work more effectively (for example, Peruvian constitutional in-
novations over the years), the overwhelming preference has been for building
presidential republics centered around the separation of powers in executive,
legislative, and judicial branches of government. To this day all the Latin Ameri-
can states remain presidential republics, although they vary enormously in how
they have handled executive power.
Third, all (with the exception of Cuba under Castro and revolutionary at-
tempts to alter dependency relationships in Central America during the 1980s)
share in common prolonged experience in the twentieth century with political
and economic modernization, without attaining easily a breakthrough into the
consolidation of democratic systems of government and market economies. As
a consequence of these initiatives, one can identify six patterns in government
and society: 1) a common Western institutional model emphasizing the central-
ity of the state, 2) marked elite “dissensus”, 3) fragmented mass political cul-
tures, 4) the vitality of pre-industrial urban values despite innovative entrepre-
neurial initiatives, 5) marked heterogeneity in social institutions and the super-
imposition of historic epochs within national society, and 6) cyclical patterns in
politics in the alternation between authoritarian and democratic rule, derived
from unresolved problems leading to regime breakdown in crisis situations and
how to rebuild civil society in the aftermath. Depending on where these states
are situated geopolitically, there is a seventh factor: the presence of the United
States and how political and economic elites work with or against their coun-
terparts in the U.S.
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Centrality of the State
In contrast to the United States, where there is general skepticism regarding
the capacity of government to resolve the public’s needs, throughout Latin
America citizens look to government to resolve the issues, the problems, the
needs that confront them. This attitude was originally the foundation of the
preference for state-centered economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s and
the prevalence of public enterprises in critical economic sectors, as a way to
offset the power and influence of foreign corporations. While market-friendly
strategies have dominated economic discourse since the 1980s, most citizens
in this region of the world still look to government first to resolve their needs.
A major part of the collapse of democratic practices in Venezuela and the rise
of Hugo Chávez’s radical populism stems from the expectations of the poor
that government do something about their problems and respond to their needs.
This expectation was also a huge part of the support which the Peróns elicited
from working class Argentines – the “shirtless ones” (los descamisados) in the
1940s and early 1950s – and the continuation of the Peronista Party as
a major force in Argentine politics ever since. There is, however, one dimension
in the centrality of the state which constitutes a new departure from the politics
of the last half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth: the
rise of well-institutionalized public bureaucracies throughout Latin America
which mediate and serve to provide continuity between order-maintaining re-
gimes and periodic breakthroughs of revolutionary mass movements, designed
to readjust socioeconomic and political relations. Whether authoritarian or rep-
resentative forms of government predominate, the state apparatus in all these
countries today possesses a similar bureaucratic core, in which decision-mak-
ing powers are concentrated in a host of governmental agencies, in which
there is a fusion of bureaucratic and political roles, and in which the central
ministries follow a uniform set of organizational principles, expressed in codi-
fied laws, marked centralism, and a similar nomenclature.
Elite “Disssensus”
This awkward word “dissensus” is intended to call attention to a pattern in
human relations which is the opposite of elite consensus or consensual elites.
The latter has often received attention in what is frequently identified as one of
requirements of consolidated democracies. This viewpoint is exemplified by the
work of John Higley and Richard Gunther (eds.) Elites and Democratic Con-
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solidation in Latin American and Southern Europe. The core of the shared
values which this perspective emphasizes in consolidated democracies is con-
currence that political conflicts will be resolved by two primary mechanisms:
the use of the ballot box in regularly scheduled elections to determine how
competition for power will be handled and the use of the majority principle for
determining legislative outcomes in legislative bodies. Throughout Latin Ameri-
can political history, while democratic ideals have more often than not been
a constant and authoritarian practices have consistently been troubled with
problems of legitimacy, there has been real difficulty in sustaining agreement to
resolve political conflict through the use of the vote to determine who will
govern and to use the majority principle to determine legislative outcomes. The
breakdown of democracy in Chile in the September 1973 military coup against
the Government of Salvador Allende and the imposition of authoritarian rule
under General Pinochet reminded everyone of the fragility of democracy in
that country, in which it was assumed prior to this event that this was one of the
most democratic countries in Latin America. Less dramatic, but equally impor-
tant, has been the breakdown of democratic governance in Venezuela and the
collapse of that country’s dominant two party system and the radical populist
breakthrough carried out by Hugo Chávez in 1999. The only exception to
date to this repeated problem of democratic breakdowns in Latin American
political experience is Costa Rica in Central America, a country which has
sustained democratic rule since 1948, with an unbroken series of honest elec-
tions since 1953.
Fragmented Political Cultures
Fundamental disagreement over the rules to apply in processing conflict and
change in government, which divide political elites, is matched by the preva-
lence at the mass level of fragmented political cultures – the sub-communities
within society from whom political elites draw their supports. This fragmenta-
tion within the social fabric is reflected throughout the region in the mosaic of
divergent life styles, contrasting institutions of a political, social, economic, and
religious nature that operate in countries with marked regional disparities. Cases
in point would be the chasm created in Argentina by the marked differences
between those who support the Peronista Party (historically, a working class
and lower-middle class political culture) and those who oppose it (linked with
the more established upper-middle classes and elite life styles) and the Bolivarian
Revolution, as Hugo Chávez would characterize his political movement based
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on the poor and those historically dis-enfranchised, in Venezuela. The latter is
a movement which has swept away nearly all preexisting political parties and
alignments.
Preindustrial Urban Values and Life Styles
While metropolitan centers in each of these states reflect a life style similar to
that of other metropolitan areas in North America and Western Europe, in
provincial towns and cities throughout Latin America one encounters an upper
sector life style and set of conservative values identified with the pre-industrial
urban cultures of the Mediterranean world, transferred into the Americas
through immigration from Southern Europe both before and since indepen-
dence. This is a very old urban culture, preceding the Industrial Revolution,
present in small towns and provincial centers throughout Greece, Italy, Spain,
and Portugal and which immigrants have brought with them into the Americas.
This urban culture dominates similar small towns throughout Mexico; extends
southward through Central America in the provincial towns present in all these
countries; into small towns in interior Colombia and Venezuela; across the
Andean highlands in Peru and Bolivia and into provincial centers in the pampas
of Argentina, to communities in the lake district of southern Chile, and the
Argentine Patagonia. This pre-industrial urban culture has demonstrated the
same tenacity and vitality as it has throughout southern Europe and underlies
conservative options in politics.
Heterogeneity in Social Institutions
and Superimposition of Political Styles
Within these countries, political, social, economic, administrative, and religious
organizations exhibit tremendous diversity, spanning the developmental con-
tinuum, from traditional to modern organizational forms. As a consequence,
previous political structures identified with earlier historical experience con-
tinue to exist side by side with those institutions identified with modern indus-
trial societies. Euclides da Cunha, author of the Brazilian classic Rebellion in
the Backlands (Os Sertões), captures this especially well in the confrontation
between the new republic identified with European modernizing influences at
the end of the nineteenth century and early twentieth with the culture, religion,
and politics of the interior that has long rejected changes imposed from the
outside. This juxtaposition of divergent life styles is readily apparent as one
126 ON THE STATE OF LATIN AMERICAN STATES. APPROACHING THE  BICENTENARY
travels within these countries from capital cities into the interior or from one
region to another at the subnational level. To cite an example again from
a single country, one encounters tremendous diversity in Brazil, in travels in-
land from the Atlantic coast as well as from north to south, into the regions
which today are set apart as states within the Brazilian federation. In northeast-
ern Brazil the sugar cane culture of coastal Bahia stands in marked contrast
with the semi-arid backlands called the sertão. Farther to the north, in the
Amazon basin, Belém near the mouth of the Amazon and Manáus farther
inland on the river are a world apart from the small towns and villages scattered
throughout the jungle, many of which are inhabited by indigenous peoples
with only relatively recent contact with the rest of the country. Traveling south-
ward to Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo one encounters two very different metro-
politan areas – the former identified with the building of modern Brazil in
spanning the centuries from its imperial era to the bustling 1960s when Rio
was both the nation’s capital and the preferred place of residence for the well-
to-do with its relaxed, distinctive life style. São Paulo in contrast has been and
remains the economic center of Brazil in its banks, industries, factories, and
urban conglomerations that make it one of the world’s largest metropolitan
areas. Immediately to the interior of that city is the state with the same name,
with its miles and miles of productive agricultural land, in which coffee, soy,
and grain production stretch throughout a rolling countryside. Yet, another
region is the Brazilian far west, with its ranches and recently established cities
and towns centered around the cattle industry. Matching each of these regions
and sub-regions are different styles of politics and activists: Urban political
leaders, working-class politicians, political bosses, large-scale landowners,
middle-class farmers, military officers, enlisted men, peasant leaders, and or-
ganizers of rural workers.
Cyclical Patterns and Politics
As a consequence of the intermingling of these diverse life styles and marked
regional differences, responding to political and economic modernization, one
needs to contrast the values of continuity, reform, and adjustment with those of
rupture, revolution, and confrontation. The issue to be faced here is whether
or not the last wave of authoritarianism (with the military frequently in charge,
beginning with the mid-1960s, during the 1970s, and into the 1980s) and
the resurgence of democratic practices and democratic regimes (throughout
the 1980s and 1990s and into the first decades of the twenty-first century)
constitute a fundamental breakthrough and reversal of earlier cyclical patterns
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of politics. One view is that the frequency of democratic breakdowns reflects
the alternation between eras of authoritarian rule, in which power is concen-
trated in the executive branch of government with public policy issues more
likely to be resolved or repressed in the bureaucratic arena, and periods of
democratic rule with more open government and debate of issues in public
spaces. An alternative way of looking at politics across time is to emphasize the
distinct political paths pursed in the various republics in response to internal
political, social, and economic dynamics. For example, the contrasts between
Chile and Mexico are enormous. For most of its political history, Chile has
evolved in the direction of more open governance through the mediation of
a representative multiparty system and strong legislative institutions, despite
the hiatus of the Pinochet years in which the military dominated politics and
political party activities were suppressed. In the Mexican case, the Revolution
of 1910 followed 30 years of dictatorship and became a profound political
and social upheaval transforming state and society, out of which came 60 years
of single-party rule, from the 1940s to the end of 1990s, which – despite all
its democratic trappings – was authoritarian. What followed has been a transi-
tion to democratic rule as we moved from the twentieth into the twenty-first
century. Against these cases, the experience of Venezuela must be juxtaposed,
in which there was the breakdown of party democracy after 40 years of
a competitive, dominant two party system. The emergence of Hugo Chávez
with his Bolivarian Revolution constitutes the first major instance of radical
populism in the twenty-first century, and it is now matched by the Evo Morales
government in Bolivia and the upheaval currently going on in Ecuador, which
while less well defined in terms of a single dominant personality, is more likely to
evolve in the direction of an ill-defined mass movement, reflecting the same
tensions and frustrations seen earlier in that country among those long ex-
cluded from effective participation in national politics.
Conclusions
If we return to the image of Latin America as a garden of forking paths in which
national leaders have led their countries in a variety of different directions,
there is one fundamental alteration in the balance of power, if we look back at
where we stood at the inception of independence from Spain and Portugal.
Two of the traditional power contenders are gone and the remaining one has
been dramatically changed by the course of post-independence national politics.
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The military in all the Latin American republics have emerged after their
last experiment with authoritarian rule (1960s–1980s) greatly reduced in their
power and their ability to intervene in national politics. In the past, one of the
problems in democratic consolidation was centered in the recourse to military
caudillos and later the institutional military by disaffected conservatives, in
calling on them individually or collectively to save the country from radical
changes in the internal balance of power when the Left threatened to take over.
The most dramatic failure of military rule is the extended attempt by the Ar-
gentine military to govern, having become convinced of the incapacity of civil-
ian leaders to rule. After 18 years of domination (1966–1984) and a disas-
trous military defeat in the Falklands War (1982), the conclusion reached was
that the military was neither capable of governing nor, having seen politicization
destroy its internal cohesion, of conducing a war, and that the best option of all
was to return to the barracks.
The land-owning elite in contrast have disappeared as a major stakeholder.
Both the Mexican Revolution of 1910 and the 1968 military intervention in
Peru are the clearest examples of the imposition of land reform, the ending of
large-landed estates as the dominant form of land tenure in rural areas, and the
curtailment of the economic power held by large landowners for so many years.
Where the landed elite survived the longest was in Argentina, but there the
economic transition over the years from a state-based economy to a market-
friendly one has changed the internal dynamics in the twenty-first century, to
one where the commercialization of agriculture has produced a business struc-
ture in which the producers of beef and wheat are today much more likely to be
business enterprises rather than the properties of a small, privileged elite of
family-run estates.
While the Church is still a major institutional actor, it is no longer at the
forefront of politics nor is it an actor shoring up traditional society and conser-
vative politics. Two examples suffice: the Church in Mexico and El Salvador.
During the Mexican Revolution, the Church was the most important element in
rallying civilian forces opposed to the Revolution in the cristero movements so
prevalent in the Bajío (the rich highland valleys of southwest Mexico centered
in the state of Guanajuato). Once the Revolution was over and the PRI regime
was consolidated as a secular state, the Church for decades remained on the
sidelines. Once the transition to democracy occurred in1999, and the PAN
replaced the PRI as the party controlling the Presidency, one of the first things
accomplished was to lay to rest the standoff between Church and state, in
recognizing the important role the Church has to play in Mexican society as
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a religious institution and as the social conscience of the country; but, no
longer is the issue of its direct political influence relevant. In El Salvador, today
(2008) 15 years after the Peace Accords and the assassination of Archbishop
Romero while celebrating mass at the highpoint of the internal civil wars so
prevalent in El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, the Church continues to
play a vital role as an advocate acting on behalf of the poor and the victims of
the death squads, all of which have been incorporated into the new focus on
national reconciliation and rebuilding state and nation in a democratic context
throughout Central America.
The radical alternatives to the traditional stakeholders, the revolutionary
movements of the 1960s in South America and the 1980s in Central America
likewise have been tempered as the years have passed. In neither case, after
major upheavals have revolutions come about. But rather in the most recent
waves of re-democratization which began in the late 1970s and came to domi-
nate the 1980s and 1990s, both the Right and the Left have been folded into
competitive democratic processes. The last of these democratic transitions has
been the victory of the opposition in the April 2008 elections in Paraguay, in
which the dominance of the Colorado Party finally ended after more than 60
years, and the first president not affiliated with the Colorados took office,
Fernando Lugo, a Bishop in his country’s Roman Catholic Church who pre-
sents real problems for the Church’s Papacy. There the political changes which
began in 1989 in the ousting of General Stroessner have finally come to
a close.
Elsewhere in the rest of South America, social democratic parties with ma-
jority support dominate the governments of Brazil and Chile. In the former,
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva is now well into his second four-year term (2007–
2010) after a successful first term (2003–2006), and Michelle Bachelet, rep-
resenting the Socialist Party in the center-left coalition known as the Concertación
de Partidos por la Democracia, is president of Chile (2006–2010). Yet, this
picture which suggests democratic consolidations throughout the region is far
from complete. The resurgence of radical populism, using socialist rhetoric
and mobilizing the poor and forgotten ones against the rest of society, has
captured the headlines first in Venezuela, under Chávez, and since in Bolivia
under Evo Morales and in Ecuador, under a faction-ridden movement some-
what like the others that have always troubled that country. The social demo-
cratic success stories in Brazil and Chile as opposed to the resurgence of radi-
cal populism in northwest South America in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador
share a common ingredient: the issue of how one should respond to the un-
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pleasant reality of poor majorities. Neglected as they were in Venezuela, they
have the explosive capacity if the right sort of leader emerges of dealing their
countries enormous setbacks in politics and the economy. On the other hand, if
another kind of leadership emerges, no matter how unpleasant it may be for
well-to-do conservatives, programs can be established and procedures adopted
to embrace them in the fabric of national society and politics. This is the ex-
ample set by how left-center politicians have played their options in Brazil and
Chile.
In short, at this writing, democracy and reliance on markets are on the
upswing throughout Latin America, with the possibility that these countries at
last will be fully embraced within the framework of Western political, social and
economic policies and practices, as long hoped for within this region. The most
recent and last political and economic transition, that of Cuba, is now fully
underway. In the imperfect world in which we live, hope is alive and well, but
enormous unresolved political, social, and economic issues remain. And, the
struggle for democracy and social justice and economic well-being for all con-
tinues unabated.
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COLIN M. LEWIS
The State and Economic Growth
in Latin America
The state is conceptually distinct from both economy and society, with
inherent interests in expanding its scope for autonomous action, assert-
ing control over economic and social interactions, and structuring eco-
nomic and social relations. These interests derive primarily from the state’s
concern to establish and maintain internal and external security, to gener-
ate revenue, and to achieve hegemony over alternative forms of social
organization. [...] States assume empirical reality through regimes that
attempt to establish political order, set terms for political interaction,
allocate leadership positions and power resources, and determine the
representation of interests within decision-making contexts. Regimes at-
tempt to negotiate and impose formal and informal rules about how the
state will relate to the economy and to the society; durable and legitimate
regimes have greater capacity to achieve these goals than do those that
are less institutionalized (Grindle 1996: 3–4).
The polity makes and puts in place the economic rules of the game.
[...] However, we do not know how to create polities that work. We have a
lot of practice in a lot of countries around the world trying to restructure
polities, but we have very, very limited ability to do so. [...] To illustrate [...]
When Latin American countries became independent in the early nine-
teenth century, most of them borrowed from the United States Constitu-
tion because it was a set of formal rules that looked as though they worked
quite well. They worked all right for the United States; but they certainly
did not work well for Latin America (North 2003: 4–5, 8).
Discussion about the stance of the state dominates much of the social science
and history literatures on Latin America. Reviewing the experience of the last
century or so, several questions head the discussion agenda: was the state
active or passive; did the state inhibit or promote growth; what factors condi-
tioned state action and to what extent was it prone to “capture”; was the state
capable and autonomous or did government intervention trigger rent-seeking
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and macroeconomic inefficiency? This issue subsumes – and extends – earlier
accounts in the economic history and development literature which tended to
periodise the Latin American experience since the mid-nineteenth century in
terms of alternative phases of growth and development or of growth and crisis.
First, the phase of state construction and largely passive government associ-
ated with export-led growth, c. 1870s–1920s. Second, of the economically
and socially active state from the 1930s to the 1960s, a period of intervention-
ism, welfarism and “forced” development associated with the so-called import-
substitution industrialisation model. Third, the phase of dynamic international re-
insertion (and crisis) of the 1970s and beyond, associated with increasing
external indebtedness, a growing presence of transnational corporations in
“national” economies and culminating in the hegemony of the new economic
model (variously described as neo-liberal or neo-conservative). Specific “state”
and “market” configurations are attributed to each of these periods. The oli-
garchic state of the decades immediately before and after the turn of the nine-
teenth century was responsible for the formation of markets. The populist state
of the middle third of the twentieth century presided over “directed develop-
ment” (or stabilising growth) and “set” or indicated prices – of factors, com-
modities and products. The “privatising state” (or neo-populist state) of the
late twentieth century which, based on a popular-business alliance, was de-
picted as either restoring market mechanism or, for the first time in Latin American
history, creating conditions in which unfettered markets function.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the struggles for Independence
weakened (and in the case of large parts of Spanish America virtually destroyed)
the existing administrative apparatus. Although challenged by other European
powers in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries and subject to in-
creasing tensions from within, the panoply of Imperial government and much
of the substance of mercantilist commercial monopoly had remained intact.
Indeed, administrative reorganisation in the late eighteenth century reinvigorated
imperial administration and defence while efficacious programmes of “develop-
ment” (fomento) and liberalised intra-empire trade (comercio libre) promoted
economic revival in many parts of the continent after decades of stagnation and
decline (Bakewell 1997; Burkholder & Johnson 1998; Lynch 1986; McFarlane
1998; Prados de la Escosura 2006). Administrative reorganisation and eco-
nomic growth, driven by metropolitan security and fiscal requirements, suc-
ceeded in the immediate objective of promoting a flow of treasure to Europe.
But at the cost of triggering political antagonism and social tensions which
would ultimately contribute to the collapse of the “colonial compact”.
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In promoting a mercantilism revival, the Bourbon Reforms in Spanish
America and the Pombaline Reforms in Brazil represented a “second con-
quest” of Latin America, to use the term coined by Lynch (Lynch 1986), and
conflicted with liberal ideas being transmitted to the continent during the En-
lightenment. At the same time, these measures demonstrated the apparent util-
ity of state intervention (Coatsworth 2006; Burkholder & Johnson 1998; Lynch
1986). This paradox would influence later government action. Nevertheless,
the immediate consequences of the end of empire were state shrinkage, admin-
istrative weakness and a legitimacy gap. With only a few exceptions, economic
dislocation, incipient social revolution and intra-elite rivalry coupled with a loss
of bureaucratic competence seriously weakened the capacity of emergent states.
The reach of independent states was constrained by a loss of the monopoly of
violence, foreign intervention and a retreat into subsistence.
Yet with very few exceptions, by the early decades of the twentieth century,
the central state was much stronger than its regional counterparts. Economic
and political decision-making had become more centralised and national gov-
ernments appeared secure from internal challenge. Arguably, some of the most
novel features of statehood were to be found in the economy and the field of
economic policy-making. New banking institutions, commodity boards, and
regulatory agencies seemed to be firmly under bureaucratic control. A Gerschen-
kronian-style project of “national” development enshrined in the analyses, pre-
scriptions and policies of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin
America was rapidly disseminated after the 1940s. (The English acronym for
the Commission is ECLA: the Spanish and Portuguese, CEPAL – hence cepalista
and cepalismo.)
If ECLA strategy subsequently became narrowly associated with programmes
of forced industrialisation (in part deriving from Hirschman’s concept of unbal-
anced growth), the original intention had been to upgrade domestic enterprise
by means of demand management and societal modernisation. Cepalismo ex-
plicitly addressed the needs of the (industrial) entrepreneuriat but echoed many
earlier pre-occupations. ECLA statism was not anti-business, nor was it anti-
foreign or anti-export. Cepalista ideology and strategy was, however, informed
by export pessimism, an assumption that after the second world war global
commercial and financial growth would be sluggish and skewed in favour of
trade in manufactures. Consequently, government action was required to mod-
ernise and restructure the Latin American economies: markets were insuffi-
cient; only the state was capable of delivering the incentive structures neces-
sary to induce change (Pazos 1982; Kay 1989; Ffrench-Davis, Palma & Muñoz
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1994; FitzGerald 1994; Evans 1995; Thorp 1998). Government interven-
tion would facilitate a “renegotiation” of the continent’s relationship with the
international economy: forced industrialisation would re-order both domestic
economy and society, and the nature of global insertion.
Nevertheless, growing perceptions that cepalismo was anti-market and that
government-sponsored programmes of import-substituting industrialisation had
resulted in structural inefficiency and macroeconomic volatility fuelled debates
about the role of the state that gathered momentum in Latin America during
the 1970s and underwrote the “sea change” in the state-market equation that
occurred in and after the 1980s, when the so-called Washington Consensus
became the hegemonic model (Bates & Krueger 1993; Sunkel 1993; Grindle
1996; Smith & Korzeniewicz 1997; Thorp 1998; Barton 1999; Weyland
2002). Whether triggered by the debt/loan crisis or increasingly negative as-
sessments of the costs (and limited benefits) of “hot-house” industrialisation,
there was a growing rejection of economic interventionism and increasing sup-
port from many sectors of society for greater transparency in politics and eco-
nomics – for democracy and the market. Hence, during the 1990s, the market
was projected as the source of legitimacy: the state was legitimised though
delivery of growth with macroeconomic stability, a condition that could only be
guaranteed by the market.
Despite these apparent shifts and ruptures, this paper will argue that since
the late nineteenth century Latin American states attempted to “embed enter-
prise”. In the latter part of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries this was
done through external economic opening and pragmatic intervention in do-
mestic markets. After the 1930s, and more especially the 1940s, there was
a greater correspondence in domestic and external policies as government in-
tervention became more explicit and the state sector increased in size. Never-
theless, the quest to foster business was sustained throughout this period, even
if the policy rhetoric became more nationalistic and statist. To what extent this
succeeded in creating “national” enterprise capable of competing in a global
environment when Latin American states “retreated”, and “closed” economies,
opened in the 1980s remains a subject of debate. Certainly, strategies associ-
ated with “neo-populist-business alliance” regimes of the 1990s and the “mar-
ket-friendly” governments of the democratic left of the early 21st century seemed
designed to foster enterprise. (By c. 2005, there was a tendency to categorise
radical administrations as either “democratic left of centre” or “neo-populist”:
governments in Brazil and Chile epitomise the former, those of Bolivian and
Venezuela, the latter.)
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Forming the Oligarchic State:
economics and politics
The oligarchic state, largely in place by the 1870s, remained the main expres-
sion of political organisation until the 1910s or, possibly, the inter-war dec-
ades. This period saw the establishment of institutions formally modelled on
those of Western Europe and the United States of America, principally drawing
on ideas of constitutionalism and republicanism promoted during the French
Revolution and wars of American independence (Abel & Lewis 1993; Bakewell
1997; Bushnell 1993; Bushnell & Macaulay 1994; Halperín Donghi 1993).
Economic policies and models were nominally based on concepts of laissez
faire and laissez passer developed in late eighteenth-century Britain, suppos-
edly responsible for the English Industrial Revolution and the rapid pace of US
economic expansion in the nineteenth century.
Institutional building in the early national period (c. 1810–1850s) was
messy, involving contending ideologies and no little violence. Dignified by ref-
erences to the competing political ideologies of conservatism and liberalism, or
of centralism versus federalism, for emerging “national” agro-commercial elites
of the second quarter of the nineteenth century, politics was essentially a crude,
personalist struggle amongst regional factions. These contested to occupy space
vacated by Iberian authority, and were also anxious to pre-empt the threat of
social revolution or ethnic violence from below, namely by liberated slaves,
Indian communities politicised by the struggles of the revolutionary period,
and those of mixed race mobilised by the promise of greater social and eco-
nomic freedom by insurgents and royalists alike (Bushnell & Macauley 1994;
Halperín Donghi 1993). Issues of economic reconstruction and state-building
were secondary to elites bent on survival and establishing a monopoly of power.
Legitimacy was hardly a consideration.
By the third quarter of the nineteenth century, more institutional political
structures were displacing regimes associated with regional bosses (caudillos or
caciques), save in Chile and Brazil, where modern institutions were already in
place, and in Central America, where the process took longer. A mix of domes-
tic and external factors helped secure the oligarchic state and shaped its policy
agenda. Factional success, or exhaustion, in local and regional conflicts that
had characterised the post-Independence decades facilitated a reconstitution
of elite solidarity. The rapid growth of the world economy after the 1840s
provided new power resources for state-building and, possibly, a broader spread
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of elite factions. Above all, producers and merchants benefited from a privati-
sation of economic assets. During the middle third of the century there was
a massive transfer of factors of production from public and corporate to pri-
vate hands. Nominally implemented in accordance with liberal precepts, this
involved the disposal of public land, the secularisation and distribution of assets
of the Roman Catholic Church, the break-up of communal Indian estates and
the seizure of territory occupied by nomadic Indians (Bushnell & Macaulay
1994; Halperín Donghi 1993). Increasingly, land, labour and capital were
monopolised by producers supplying primary commodities to overseas mar-
kets. In parallel there were attempts to configure domestic practices with inter-
national norms in areas such as fiscal, monetary and banking policy: Civil,
Commercial and Mining Codes were enacted, designed to secure property
rights and foment investment – at least for those with the power to invoke and
upheld formal legal provisions (Salvatore 1999; Haber, Razo & Maurer 2004;
Dye 2006). The assumption was that a correspondence with economic policies
being applied in the USA or Western Europe was appropriate for Latin America
and would secure for the countries of the continent a process of economic
expansion similar to that of the North Atlantic world.
The history of state-formation in the half-century following Independence
demonstrates that institution building proved most problematic in those areas
where the revolutionary wars lasted longest (for example northern South
America), where there were large indigenous populations (such as the Andes
and Mexico), and where silver mining had been an important element in the
colonial economy (Halperín Donghi 1993; Bushnell & Macaulay 1994; Earle
2000). Latin America paid a high price for Independence in terms of growth
lost: the development gap between Latin America and the rest of the world (as
well as within the Americas) widened considerably during the first half of the
nineteenth century (Coatsworth 2006; Prados de la Escosura 2006). In Bra-
zil, where the struggle for independence was short and occurred “late”, and in
Chile, where military conflict was short-lived, national administrations were
fairly rapidly and successfully established. National consolidation was also sus-
tained by economic growth. Although the relatively smooth nature of the tran-
sition from colony to co-Kingdom, when Rio de Janeiro became the capital of
the Portuguese world, and independent empire should not be exaggerated, the
early development of coffee exports, which rapidly out-performed the “colo-
nial” staple, sugar, generated the new opportunities and resources that forged
the state (Uricoechea 1980; Murill de Carvalho 1980). Chile benefited from
its strategic location as a West Coast entrepôt, producing and shipping grain to
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neighbouring republics (and, after the 1840s, to California) and copper to
mainland Asia and Great Britain (Bauer 1975).
This raises the question of whether domestic institutional order conditioned
the ability to seize economic opportunities resulting from international eco-
nomic growth or whether external commercial openings – and the resulting
increase in resources – fostered regime consolidation. Many of those who
promoted Independence assumed that it was the former. The reality, however,
may have been different, namely that it was the growth of the international
economy after the 1840s that ultimately fostered domestic institutional build-
ing and state modernisation: the market made the state, rather than the state
the market. This remains a matter of controversy. Writing about mid-nineteenth
century Peru, Gootenberg maintains that trade may have made the state but
the state was thwarted in its efforts to embed the market (Gootenberg 1988:
88). For Salvatore, also writing about free trade (ideology and practice), inter-
national insertion facilitated state-formation but market societies only followed
after a considerable lag (Salvatore 1999: 30–35). What is beyond doubt is
that those societies most able to realise a flow of exports – particularly “new”
commodities such as wool, wheat, non-precious metals and coffee – were
amongst the first to enjoy domestic sovereignty and, possibly, pre-empt or
reverse the process of territorial disintegration.
With few exceptions, nation-states hardly existed in Latin America in 1850.
Boundaries were ill-defined, administrative units separated from each other by
distance rather than precisely demarcated frontiers. Few in the continent would
have understood the concept of nationality or citizenship – political rights
were narrowly circumscribed, slaves were neither citizens nor subjects but prop-
erty and, in many regions, Indian communities still existed as societies apart,
subject to distinct legal and fiscal arrangements. For most people living in Latin
America at mid-century, the landed estate, rather than the nation-state, consti-
tuted the “political universe” (Halperín Donghi 1993; Miller 2006). Linguistic
and ethnic divisions, as well as form of economic activity, isolated groups one
from another. By 1900 this had changed. The incidence of domestic political
instability declined during the third quarter of the nineteenth century and there
was greater security of international frontiers. Symbols of “stateness” prolifer-
ated. Constitutions were enacted, legal codes passed into law, national armies
created (substituting for provincial militias or irregular forces commanded by
rural strongmen), national postal and telegraphic services were set up and
“national” currencies were issued. There were, too, attempts to inaugurate
national systems of primary education and, in some capital cities, newspapers
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began to aspire to a national status if not to national circulation. In those areas
that had experienced mass immigration, military conscription and “national”
education were viewed as mechanisms to “make” the good citizen and forge
national patriotism. An image of the nation-state was created and diffused
(Miller 2006).
It was at this point that the struggle to conform Latin American political and
economic norms to perceived practice in the North Atlantic world began to
bear fruit, in contrast to failed attempts at modernisation in the River Plate and
further north in the 1820s and 1840s. The emergence of greater opportuni-
ties for Latin America in the world economy was illustrated by the buoyancy of
primary product prices throughout the middle third of the nineteenth century
(W.A. Lewis 1978). Some countries, like the Argentine, were even able to skew
the terms of trade in their favour beyond the turn of the century by diversify-
ing export schedules (Cortés Conde 1973). Export growth valorised local as-
sets and generated additional resources, notably for the central state or groups
strategically placed to capture a disproportionate share of additional resource
flows. Arguably the most critical economic organisations in late-nineteenth
century Latin America were railways and banks, sectors where the national
state assumed an increasingly important role as promoter or operator or both.
This implied greater state access to resources. It also implied the provision of
legitimacy-enhancing public goods.
The production of new commodities and the diversification of export sched-
ules either promoted regime consolidation or, by modifying existing regional
power relations, regime change. Either way, the net result was regime moderni-
sation. Much, of course, depended on the sectors to whom these new re-
sources accrued and how they were spent. Nevertheless, it is instructive that in
cases as distinct as the Peruvian and the Argentinian, the export of new com-
modities generated a massive increase in state resources and investment in
infrastructure. Taking British investment data as a proxy for larger changes,
between 1865 and 1887 the nominal value of Peruvian bonds placed on the
London money market increased nine-fold: the British holding of Argentinian
public bond increased by a slightly smaller factor. During the same period
direct British investment in railways in Peru increased more than twelve-fold
and in the Argentine by a factor of 10 (Cortés Conde 1973; Oszlak 1982;
Hunt 1985). (It should be remembered that a proportion of portfolio debt was
also applied to railway building.) As well as promoting domestic market inte-
gration and export production, improved internal communications strength-
ened the hand of central government. Along with the Remington rifle, the
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railway and the telegraph became symbols of “order and progress” and of
“peace and administration”. In this respect, the state had to “reinforce” the
market. State nurturing was necessary to embed the market which, well beyond
the mid-nineteenth century, was a “weak” institution in many regions of the
continent, as indicated above.
With export expansion, came imports and the prospect of enhancing state
revenue. Imports, financed by export earnings, appeared to promise a secure
source of revenue – and one that could be mortgaged to underwrite foreign
borrowing. Capacity to borrow and a “commitment” to repay also implied
greater state competence and, possibly, greater market coherence. Thus states
were able to expand the supply of public goods – political order and economic
and social “consumables” such as transport and education facilities. If the growth
in the foreign trade sector did not broaden the fiscal base, at least it deepened
the purse into which government could dip. Inflows of foreign funds reduced
the cost of state borrowing and may have weaned some administrations away
from dependence on inflation as a means of financing the state (Marichal 1989).
The ability of a government to borrow implies a capacity to tax, in this instance,
to capture a share of rents generated by commodity exports. Taxation and
borrowing also involve credibility and commitment – an ability on the part of
the government to repay and a willingness on the part of tax payers to contrib-
ute to the fiscal burden. Hence, the shift from inflationary financing, “discov-
ered” during the early national period (see Amaral 1998), to borrowing (cou-
pled with a credible capacity to tax) points to the embedding of the state and
market relationships (see Bordo & Vegh 1998, 33–34). External borrowing,
however, was not costless. It carried implications for domestic monetary policy
and the threat – and sometimes the reality – of supervision by foreign banks as
regimes in Buenos Aires, Lima, Rio de Janeiro and beyond discovered in the
1890s, and even earlier (Aceña, Reis 2000).
It is no coincidence that around the third quarter of the nineteenth century
there were further efforts at “market-embedding”. Perhaps the most notable
were attempts to impose capitalist norms on land and labour “markets” (Bushnell
1983). Overtly driven by liberal precepts of property, mechanisms such as the
Lei da terra (1850) in Brazil, the Ley Lerdo (1856) in Mexico and similar
projects in the Andes, were designed to promote freehold and prohibit corpo-
rate/collective land-holding (Gootenberg 1988; Dye 2006). As indicated, the
result was a massive transfer of assets into private hands, usually existing
latifundistas. In the Argentine and Chile, the so-called “desert campaign” against
nomadic Indians had a similar effect. Despite the liberal rhetoric, land-holding
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became increasingly less “democratic” between the 1860s and 1880s. In vari-
ous parts of Latin America, progressive land projects had been debated around
the middle of the nineteenth century. Often these were connected with schemes
to attract immigrants, influenced by policy and practice in the USA. Little came
of these projects. One-off disposals, resulting from the alienation of formerly
communally held and ecclesiastical property and the seizure of fertile frontier
zones from nomadic populations, were commandeered by agro-export elites
through the application of market and non-market mechanisms.
Legislation relating to “labour” was more piecemeal, often subject to re-
peated revision, though no less controversial in its impact. In plantation econo-
mies such as Cuba and Brazil, the massive surge in export production un-
doubtedly strengthened archaic institutions such as slavery. Yet even in these
cases there were subtle changes in labour relations. The trans-Atlantic slave
trade came to an end in the 1850s – around the time that the institution
effectively died in other parts of Latin America. From the 1860s to the late
1880s (when slavery was finally abolished), immigration, the freeing of differ-
ent categories of slaves, the use of Asian contract labour (in Cuba) and the
recruitment of domestic non-slave labour made for greater complexity in la-
bour relations in the São Paulo countryside and the sugar sector in Cuba.
During the last decades before abolition, and despite the concentration of
slaves on paulista coffee fazendas and Cuban sugar estates, the majority of
rural workers in these regions were technically free (Moreno Fraginals 1984;
Lamounier 1993, 2000). And, slaves were capable of resistance. Similar con-
troversy surrounds other mechanisms – debt peonage, share-cropping and
contract labour (enganche), prominent everywhere but especially associated
with the Andean and Central American countries and with Mexico (Blanchard
1980). Were these devices the means of extending slavery or did they consti-
tute a phased transition to a “free” labour market? Relatively new research
tends to challenge earlier negative constructions placed on these mechanisms
and depicts them as contributing to the emergence of wage-labour and, possi-
bly, the fitful consolidation of a labour market: at local level labour markets func-
tioned and there were institutions – formal and informal – capable of imposing
sanctions in the case of contract violation by either party. This is the construction
placed upon a re-examination of histories of resistance and coercion.
Mass immigration effected a more obvious and a more thorough-going
change in the labour market and to labour relations. Between the mid-nine-
teenth and the mid-twentieth century, the Argentine received around seven
and a half million immigrants, Brazil something less than five million. They
141COLIN M. LEWIS • THE STATE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
were, respectively, the second and third most favoured destinations of Euro-
pean emigrants after the USA. Other countries, notably Uruguay and Cuba,
also received substantial numbers of immigrants. In addition, Europeans settled
temperate regions of Chile and, to a lesser degree, Colombia. Indeed, virtually
every country attracted immigrants but mass inter-continental free migration
flowed overwhelmingly to the grasslands of southern South America. Given
that these countries were “competing” with the USA and other areas of recent
settlement, the mass movement of people implies economic opportunity and
a semblance of political order. Immigration of this magnitude had a significant
demographic, social and political impact. Again, controversy surrounds the
long-term consequences of mass immigration. Did subsidised and contract la-
bour depress wages or did subsidies represent a “savings” advance to would-be
settlers, thereby contributing to individual/family welfare as well as to mac-
roeconomic efficiency by increasing factor availability? Did immigrants provoke
socio-political change, and was mass immigration a demographic “gift” or “bur-
den”? Almost 70 percent of all immigrants entering Brazil remained there, only
a little over 50 percent did so in the Argentinian case. These were substantial
“gifts” of, often literate and socially mobile, human capital. International mi-
grants hardly sought to locate in subsistence activities. Rather, they contributed
to the formation of labour and land markets, and of the market economy.
Monetary reform was another area where institutional change can be ob-
served. The early monetary history of independent Latin America was largely
one of inflation and turmoil. The cost and method of funding revolutionary
and post-independence conflict, coupled with a decline in silver production,
undermined the currency in many areas. Additional pressure was placed upon
money supply and the exchange by the adverse balance of trade: bullion and
specie drained abroad prompting recourse to paper. After the mid-century
there were renewed efforts to stabilise the exchange: imported doctrines and
export earnings – along with foreign investment – facilitated greater order
(Drake 1994; Aceña & Reis 2000). Nevertheless, it was not until the latter
part of the nineteenth century that monetary stability appeared to be secured.
By this stage, the Gold Standard was internationally dominant and many policy-
makers peddled the orthodoxies of fiscal discipline and state creditworthiness.
In the struggle to retire paper and remove the legal tender status (actual or
informal) of foreign money, “national” coinage was vaunted as a symbol of
statehood and a device to advertise the paramountcy of the central state. The
route to monetary order – particularly the Gold Standard – was painful, not
least for regimes incorrigibly wedded to the “developmentalism” of unbacked
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paper currencies or mining regions that favoured silver as a “national” metal.
In addition to fiscal rectitude, securing convertibility involved monetary and
banking debates about a state monopoly (or otherwise) of the right of issue and
the establishment of a monetary authority to supervise both banks and the
money supply. These were sensitive matters of domestic political economy for
regimes balancing sectional and regional interests. Governments of small, “open”
Latin American economies with shallow domestic capital markets faced huge
problems in accumulating (and conserving) reserves. There was a trade-off
between “openness” and “developmentalism” in fiscal and monetary policy.
States faced a trilemma – fixed exchange rates, open capital accounts and
interventionism: they could have recourse to any two of these instruments, but
not all three. There were limits to the quest for virtue: the benefits had to be
seen to outweigh the costs. Domestic critics of the Gold Standard sustained
a vociferous opposition from the side-lines. Opponents were always ready with
an alternative project should the price of fiscal discipline, particularly at times
of generalised instability and credit contraction in the world economy, provoke
discontent (Gootenberg 1988; Marichal 1996). The political costs of mon-
etary virtue could prove greater than the supposed economic advantages. Nev-
ertheless, the provision of monetary order can be presented as an indicator of
state competence – an ability to tax (rather to inflate). Did this also signal a new
“contract” between state and citizen – the provision of public goods in ex-
change for fiscal exactions? Whatever, the impetus to market consolidation pro-
vided by monetary stability should not be under-estimated.
Economic liberalism, however, was tempered with pragmatism and subject
to sectionalist special pleading. Was this economic realism, a mercantilism hango-
ver or a response to Listian and Hamiltonian ideas? For example, after the
1880s industrialists in Brazil, Chile and Mexico could count on a significant
degree of protection even if the tariff was still primarily regarded as a fiscal
device (Birchal 1999; Haber 1989; Kirsch 1977; Suzigan 1986). Duties
were becoming increasingly discriminatory and manufacturers could benefit
from a softening of the exchange rate. Less consistent tariff protection was also
available to manufacturers in Peru and Colombia (Ospina Vásquez 1955; Thorp
1998; Thorp & Bertram 1978). Unsurprisingly, the ability of industrialists to
influence what might be described as macroeconomic policy depended on
connexions with the dominant export oligarchy and a capacity to press
conjunctural or strategic advantage – governments were invariably more re-
sponsive to the clamour for protection when short of cash. “Emergency” tariff
hikes were rarely rescinded when fiscal crises passed but the incidence of pro-
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tection could be eroded by currency appreciation or import price falls (Kirsch
1977; Suzigan 1986; Haber 1989). In addition, politically influential sectors,
like hard-pressed Argentinian and Brazilian sugar producers, could always rely
on special assistance (Villela & Suzigan 1973; Cerutti & Marichal 1997; Dávila
& Miller 1999).
Yet only after the turn of the century was the export-led growth model
associated with the oligarchic state seriously challenged. The process and pro-
gramme was questioned by those segments of the elite who had not benefited
from policies of the period or who were particularly adversely affected by in-
creased instability in world commodity markets and by intellectuals who ques-
tioned the economic efficiency and social implications of a system based largely
on the production and processing of a limited range of commodities for exter-
nal markets. Others were exercised by societal change triggered by export-led
growth, notably mass immigration and urbanisation (in Southern Cone coun-
tries) and by the prominent role assumed by foreign companies in strategic
sectors. Nationalist and radical criticisms were also articulated by aspiring mid-
dle class groups and some segments of organised labour clamouring for greater
access to politics and a welfarist stance in state policy. From these criticisms and
concerns, a populist challenge would emerge by the end of the 1930s, with
a new project and a different view of integration in the world economy. By the
second world war developmentalism – welfarism, industrialisation and greater
political openness – were firmly established on the agenda.
Between the Oligarchic
and the Populist State
In a number of countries, the oligarchic state was under pressure by the early
decades of the twentieth century. Were demands for change triggered by societal
modernisation associated with the production of linkage-rich “democratic”
commodities? Or was the re-ordering of political institutions a reaction to those
demands? Alternately, did increased external sector volatility undermine politi-
cal arrangements created, or long-sustained, by resource flows resulting from
early insertion into the world economy? Undeniably, the international economy
was changing. Commodity prices were softening, the rate of growth of the vol-
ume of exports was slowing and capital flows becoming more erratic (Pérez
Brignoli & Cardoso 1979; Sheaham 1987; Halperín Donghi 1993; Thorp 1998).
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Even without the first world war, price instability, changes in global polarity,
and new institutional and ideological developments within the continent would
have led to demands for greater economic and political accommodation. At
this point, most Latin American societies were quite different in size and com-
plexity from those that had existed in the middle of the nineteenth century or
even 1900. The old order collapsed first, and most dramatically, in Mexico in
1910–1911. That said, nowhere else in Latin America was there a social
upheaval of a similar magnitude – at least not until the Cuban Revolution of
1959. The overthrow of the Porfirian system has been variously explained by
regime sclerosis, bureaucratic inertia and miscalculation in the face of mount-
ing opposition, the consolidation of a counter-elite and multi-class nationalism.
There was, too, peasant land hunger, social discontent and poverty triggered
by decades of increasing inequity (Weiner 1999). Other regimes confronted
similar difficulties but there were differences of degree and no other govern-
ment encountered organised opposition in the countryside to the same extent
as the porfiriato in the late 1900s.
Arguably, the most potent forces working for change in many countries
were nationalism and demands emanating for the largely urban middle classes
for greater access to power, processes triggered by macroeconomic instability
(Sinkkink 1991; Halperín Donghi 1993; Weaver 2000; Miller 2006). At this
stage, nationalism and populism were to become especially pronounced in the
Southern Cone and Brazil, most precisely – and precociously – epitomised by
the administration of Batlle Ordóñez in Uruguay, the Radical ascendancy in the
Argentine and the Alessandri presidencies in Chile. Later expressions were
varguismo and Peronism in Brazil and the Argentine, respectively. Perhaps
because they were articulated earlier, these demands seemed to have been most
easily accommodated in Uruguay (Finch 1981). In the Argentine and Chile,
export sector crisis made for messier political adjustments (Peralta Ramos 1992;
Weaver 2000). Urban groups were demanding accommodation in the political
market place at precisely the moment when the rate and rhythm of economic
expansion were becoming more erratic. Hence politics appeared as a zero-sum
game. Additional groups could not be accommodated by re-distributing the
proceeds of future growth: accommodation implied re-allocating existing re-
sources, a more delicate operation that challenged the very existence of a re-
gime and, perhaps, even of the state itself.
Nationalism, though not necessarily xenophobia and autarchy, became an
increasingly potent force throughout Latin America in the inter-war decades,
associated in some countries with indigenísmo and hispanidad. Nationalism
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heightened concerns about statecraft, yielding more nuanced attitudes to for-
eign interests, and challenged previous concepts about the role of the state
(Sinkkink 1991; Weaver 2000; Miller 2006). Nationalism also served as
a cement for proto-populist alliances in some countries and assumed a more
overtly anti-liberal and anti-internationalist tone by the 1930s. Nationalist and
developmentalist regimes of the 1930s were framed by economic dislocation
provoked by the first world war and, more especially, by the inter-war depres-
sion. In addition, they were conditioned by criticism of the economics and
politics of export-led growth voiced earlier by commentators like Bunge and
Encina and by radical thinkers such as Mariátegui and Prado (Abel & Lewis
1991). These ideas were seized upon by sectors such as the military, bureau-
crats and industrialists, as well as nationalists (Sinkkink 1991; Weaver 2000).
All argued for a more pro-active role by government to ensure greater local
consumption of commodities for which overseas demand had contracted, do-
mestic production of items that could no longer be imported and, possibly, the
application of ad hoc welfare measures to pre-empt further social discontent.
This implied a greater role for the state in factor markets, and as a producer
and a regulator. During the inter-war period central banks were created (or
existing agencies transformed into central banks) in all the major and middle-
sized economies. Other financial bodies – credit agencies, reinsurance corpo-
rations and commercial banks – also proliferated. In the 1930s exchange con-
trol became the norm, commodity boards multiplied and overseas trade and
financial transactions were highly regulated. Virtually everywhere, the state
“grew” (Evans 1995; Vellinga 1998; Thorp 1998; Bulmer-Thomas 2003).
Policy debates and institutional developments of this period had an influ-
ence on post-second world war strategies of import-substituting industrialisa-
tion. The relatively speedy recovery of most Latin American economies from
the worst effects of the depression by the early/mid-1930s similarly influenced
later thinking by creating the impression of bureaucratic competence and mac-
roeconomic management efficiency. Yet it would be a mistake to project back
into this period expectations and programmes of the post-second world war
decades. During the 1930s economic policy was piecemeal and directed to-
wards export substitution – “economic internalisation” – rather than industri-
alisation per se. Increased domestic industrial production was an important
element in this process but it was a part rather than the whole. Moreover,
particularly in the early 1930s, Latin American policy-makers were by no means
convinced that overseas demand for exports would not recover nor foreign
capital markets not re-open. Hence, the predominance of orthodoxy in many
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spheres of domestic economic policy, attempts to service the foreign debt, and
efforts to protect exporters. How could it be otherwise when export interests
remained politically powerful and fiscal resources were overwhelmingly derived
from taxing overseas trade and borrowing. Only after c. 1936 did domestic
economic strategies and international economic policy become more adventur-
ous and unorthodox – and displayed a willingness to take advantage of great
power rivalry (Abel & Lewis 1991; Di Tella & Cameron Watt 1990). Debate
continues. For Brazil, positions are particularly polarised: Hilton argues that
there was a major policy change in 1930 (Hilton 1975); exploring the political
economy of industrialisation, others point to a conscious, coherent application
of a new development model only in the late 1930s (Draibe 1985; Suzigan
1986; Villela & Suzigan 1973; Wirth 1970, 1985). In the Mexican case,
Cárdenas sees pragmatism as policy-makers responded to demands for recon-
struction and stability following the Revolution while coping with a succession
of shocks imported from the USA during the late 1920s and the early 1930s
(Cárdenas 1994). However, for Chile there is more consensus: there was
a trend towards industrialisation throughout the inter-war period, either as
a result of early instability in the external sector or due to conscious efforts by
government to promote manufacturing (Muñoz G. 1968; Thorp and White-
head 1987; Palma 1991).
Many contemporaries viewed these developments as signalling a height-
ened degree of “economic” sovereignty, and greater state competence. If the
oligarchic state had been exercised by internal challenges to sovereignty ema-
nating from recalcitrant provinces and the real threat of ethnic violence, the
populist state was more concerned about class relations (Malloy 1977; Bergquist,
1986). Hence an emphasis on diffusing “social representation” within the state
(Oszlak 1982). Paradoxically, and running counter to contemporary assump-
tion, increased internal sovereignty may have been countered by a decline in
“external” sovereignty. Volatility in world commodity and financial markets pro-
voked attempts by foreign business interests, aided by their governments, to
defend assets in Latin America in the face of nationalist demands, economic
contraction and increased international rivalry (Abel & Lewis 1991; G. Di
Tella & Cameron Watt 1990; Gravil & Rooth 1978; Hilton 1975). This inter-
play of domestic forces and external pressures posed problems for a number of
regimes. Responses to these challenges varied across the continent. From these
responses, three categories of states may be identified. First, those that adopted
a Gerschenkronian position, employing “ideology” or “national project” in or-
der to upgrade state competence and in so doing came to project an image of
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efficacious management of domestic and external relations. These states ob-
tained greater legitimacy. Second, regimes which, due to a perceived lack of
need (or an inability to do more), implemented only limited modifications to the
institutional status quo. Finally, states that surrendered a substantial degree of
sovereignty in order to survive in the colder climate of global recession and
rising internal and international tensions.
Countries such as Brazil, Chile and Mexico were representative of the first
group. In Chile and Brazil a national project based upon industrial growth and
regional economic regeneration gave the central state enhanced domestic au-
thority and, apparently, greater competence in the management of relations
with domestic actors and external agents (Abreu 1990; Hewlett & Weinert 1982;
Muñoz G. 1968). In the Mexican case, these objectives were subsumed in the
“ideology” – and the iconography – of the Revolution and, ultimately, encapsu-
lated in the strategy of “stabilising development”. Internal economic regeneration
from the destructive phase of the Revolution and the impact of the inter-war
depression culminated in the radicalism of the Cárdenas sexenio that witnessed
massive state action in the rural and urban sectors (Cárdenas 1994). In all
three countries – though to a much greater degree in Mexico – domestic
sovereignty appeared to have slipped in the 1920s. National and regional
politics had become more violent in Brazil and Chile during the decade as
challenges to the central administration proliferated. This instability was not
unconnected with weakness in key export sectors. Possibly this made the task of
re-establishing central authority more urgent and, ultimately, more successful.
It is instructive that, although starting from very different positions, the central
state in Brazil, Chile and Mexico became highly interventionist. Welfare pro-
grammes – education reforms, an extension in social insurance provision and
labour legislation – were stressed in all three. Mexico and Chile were the first
in Latin America to establish official organisations that would become national
development agencies, namely, Nacional Financiera (NAFINSA) and the
Corporación de Fomento (CORFO) respectively. There was too a proliferation
of price-support or state buying agencies for a range of domestic and export
staples, all firmly under the control of the central government and, in Brazil
and Mexico, exhibiting distinctly corporatist tendencies, often entailing the
“representation” of workers and employers, producers and consumers, as well
as the state (Gordon-Ashworth, 1984). Government intervention in the com-
mercialisation of commodities displaced private, often foreign, agents. Greater
state action in the banking sector also facilitated more adventurous monetary,
exchange and external debt management strategies. Hence, these governments
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were depicted as “re-capturing” control over monetary policy and adopting
a nationalist stance in negotiations with foreign interests – and their domestic
clients.
The Argentine and Colombia best typify the second group of countries
(Alhadeff 1991; Kalmanovitz 1983; Palacios 1980; Peralta Ramos 1992).
Here, despite similar developments in the banking sector and commodity mar-
keting – and much innovation in economic strategy, there was less “ideology”
and less “project”. In the 1930s, the commitment to economic liberalism and
the prevailing pattern of economic activities was more entrenched or, possibly,
less challenged. There may have been less pressure for a radical re-definition of
the reach and composition of the state. Perhaps domestic politics was too riven
– or rival blocs too evenly balanced – to permit the emergence of an opening
for change at this point. This may be the lesson of the upsurge in political
violence in Colombia in the 1940s and the rupture in Argentinian politics
represented by Peronism after 1946. The third group of states is probably best
represented by Nicaragua and Cuba (Pérez 1988). These states might have
acquired international recognition by the twentieth century and a degree of
domestic sovereignty but they had hardly secured the exclusion of external
authority. Now, in the inter-war period, elements of statehood were ceded (or
re-ceded) to US pro-consular officials and/or business as overt external assist-
ance was vital to sustain the regime and/or the state.
“Populist” Developmentalism
As suggested above, in many countries during the inter-war decades the eco-
nomic position of the state shifted from minimalist regulation (based loosely on
liberal tenets conditioned by the experience of crisis management) to more
explicit attempts to influence the availability of key goods and services. Later,
several regimes attempted to combine entrepreneurial and macroeconomic
management functions, processes that were associated with a re-structuring of
state and economy during phases of “forced” economic development. Govern-
ment policy initiatives, which had been ad hoc and pragmatic, became increas-
ingly pro-active and focused in response to changing perceptions of both the
role of the state and the efficiency of the market (Thorp 1998; Weaver 2000).
As the state grew, bureaucracies mushroomed and state corporations prolifer-
ated – and came to exercise a tighter control over resources. Did official eco-
nomic policy become more coherent and effective, or did it merely appear to
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be so? To what extent did a growth in the role of the state promote social and
sectional conflict rather than integrating modernisation?
Economic policy – specific programmes and the ideas underpinning them –
was clearly shaped by many groups and organisations, the influence and weight
of which changed over time. Some of these originated within the state itself,
others emanated from traditional producer bodies, relatively recently consti-
tuted segments of the business sector, the military and more diffuse social
constellations including politically vocal urban middle and working class groups.
Arguably, the diversity of lobbies acting upon the state at different moments (as
well as particular national characteristics and a shifting external environment)
explains both a re-scheduling of policy priorities and the ideological eclecticism
(or inconsistency) of strategy during the period. The diversity of these configu-
rations also touches upon the debate about the autonomy of the state and its
ability to devise and select policy options and to command resources.
From the 1930s to the 1960s there was a tendency for a widening spec-
trum of prices – of factors, services, commodities and products – to be “ad-
ministered” or “indicated” by the state (Ffrench-Davis, Muñoz G. & Palma
1994). These features were not peculiar to Latin America but only in the non-
market economies of Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia was the size of the state
sector larger (Bates 1989; Gereffi & Wyman 1990; Naya, Urrutia, Mark &
Fuentes 1989). In many countries, politics also became increasingly “adminis-
tered”, whether by civilian or military regimes. There were political parties
(and trade unions) of the state and political organisations that behaved as if
they were the state. Economics and politics became statist and nationalist:
boundaries between the public and the private blurred – perhaps even more so
than in the early nineteenth century. While there were exceptions, these ten-
dencies assumed a near continental dimension. In larger and more pluralistic
societies the trends were institutionalised and formalised: in the case of Central
American and Caribbean kleptocratic regimes, they were personalised. Under-
pinned by the research and theorising of ECLA, forced industrialisation be-
came the policy goal of many administrations for several decades after the
second world war, a goal that justified interventionism. However, Latin Ameri-
can statism, entailed a partnership between government and the private sector.
Initially, confined to domestic private business, the alliance subsequently in-
cluded transnational corporations. The balance of power between state and
business varied across the continent and changed over time. The private sector
had greater influence in Colombia and Mexico, while government assumed
a stronger directive role in Brazil, certainly in the 1970s (Draibe 1985; Evans
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1979, 1994; Hewlett & Weinert 1982; Jenkins 1977; Prebisch 1970, 1981;
Thorp 1998; Weaver 2000).
Cepalista analyses and prescriptions fell on fertile ground after 1948 when
the Commission was established in Santiago. Negative views about the terms of
trade likely to be encountered by commodity exporting economies – that price
differentials between primary products and manufactures were locked into
a downward trend rather than following a cyclical pattern – seemed to be
validated by the recent historical experience of Latin America. As Prebisch’s
examination of data on Britain’s terms of trade for the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century appeared to prove, once the temporary upsurge provoked
by war was spent, primary product prices would continue inexorably along
a downward path. The second world war also confirmed structural changes in
the global economy which exacerbated the problems of primary producers.
The world economy was now centred on the USA, a mature economy with
a huge productivity advantage and a rising propensity to export coupled with
limited import requirements reinforced by strong protectionist tendencies.
The congruence of experience and theory was a winning combination that
contributed to the rapid diffusion of ECLA developmentalism amongst policy-
making elites in Latin America (FitzGerald 1994; Love 1994; Pazos 1982;
Sunkel 1993). If assessments of the external environment were negative, there
were grounds for domestic optimism. Following a process of learning-by-do-
ing during the second world war, and a sense that many countries in Latin
America had coped with the problems of the depression rather more effectively
than governments in Europe, several administrations were prepared to em-
brace interventionism. ECLA provided both the justification and the design to
do so. Several processes and events contributed to growing confidence in state
competence and the new development ethos. The most telling were: the accu-
mulation of foreign exchange reserves during the second world war; a rapid
growth of manufacturing output in several economies from the early/mid-1930s
to the early 1940s; a modest surge in intra-regional trade during the war
(particularly in the Southern Cone); the apparent effectiveness of official agen-
cies (particularly commodity boards and development “banks”) in coping with
crisis – confirming a process of learning by doing (Thorp 1998; Weaver 2000).
These outcomes and mechanisms point to the capacity of (successful) states to
manage conflict and capture power-resources. Accumulated reserves, sustained
by (temporary) high export prices and the assumption in some countries (nota-
bly Mexico and Brazil) of continuing US aid in the immediate post-war period
offered to ease the transition from one pattern of growth to another. Post-
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depression recovery, growth in manufactured output, and economic and politi-
cal institution building were also interpreted as signalling state outreach. A re-
negotiation of the external connexion was both essential and feasible if the
Latin American economies were to maximise the limited advantages to be de-
rived from continuing global insertion after the 1940s.
The main policy instruments of developmentalism are well-known: exchange
control (often manifest in multiple exchange rates that gave preference to manu-
facturing); protectionism (non-tariff barriers to trade and exchange regulations
were employed in conjunction with, sometime in preference to, discriminatory
duties – again discriminating in favour of preferred segments of industry);
forced saving; and market expansion/deepening (Dornbusch & Edwards 1991;
Fajnzylber 1983; Ffrench-Davis, Muñoz & Palma 1994). Overvalued, but
not necessarily stable, exchange rates prevailed for much of the period and
were consistently applied to the advantage of the industrial sector. While only
Mexico managed to defend a stable exchange rate throughout the classic pe-
riod of ISI (Cárdenas 1996; Reynolds 1970), the repeated devaluations that
characterised other economies hardly benefited commodity producers as de-
valuations were accompanied by windfall taxes on exporters. This was consist-
ent with cepalista trade theory which argued that markets for exports were not
price responsive. Devaluation taxation of exports was also consistent with the
regime of exchange and export profit “nationalisation” and the distortion of the
domestic terms of trade in favour of the urban sector. As the principal source of
foreign exchange, but not necessarily accumulation, the export sector was con-
sistently squeezed by state agencies. Inflation was the main, but not the exclu-
sive, mechanism of forced savings. Having looted social insurance funds (caixas)
to finance the construction of the Volta Redonda iron and steel complex, re-
gimes in Brazil learnt to milk – politically as well as economically – the social
security system. While funds remained in surplus, they were an important source
of forced saving. By 1960 virtually the whole of the Uruguayan workforce was
enrolled in social insurance schemes. In Chile the figure was over 70 percent of
the economically active population, 55 percent in the Argentine, around 25
percent in Peru and Costa Rica and 23 percent and 16 percent in Brazil and
Mexico, respectively.
Periodic extension of the insurance systems, in the 1940s and 1960s,
increased the scope of forced accumulation but when out-payments exceeded
fund income, the real cost of pension and benefit payments was reduced by
inflation. The most sophisticated system of forced savings was devised in Brazil
during the miracle years. As this was a period of relatively low inflation, alter-
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native mechanisms were constructed to capture resources. These mechanisms
included: a general strengthening of market signals (for example, indexation);
tax reform (a fairly rigorous application of federal tax law coupled with gener-
ous allowances/exemptions for investment in targeted sectors and areas); and
institutionalised saving – all formal sector workers were compelled to contrib-
ute to social insurance funds, the national housing bank (its resources were
used to finance road building in Amazonia) and indexed individual savings
accounts (Abreu 1990; Malloy 1979). Subsidies that targeted producers and
preferred borrowers sustained business confidence while select consumer sub-
sidies and an extension of hire purchase served to activate demand. This was an
alliance of government, segments of the “national” bourgeoisie, and foreign
corporations with a pronounced urban bias. From time to time, organised/co-
opted urban labour was also brought within the scope of this state-protected
“development alliance”. Applied with some consistency and increasing sophis-
tication, this package of measures explain the Brazilian miracle, “miraculous”
because high rates of growth were sustained for several years with “histori-
cally” low rates of inflation. Yet, for the continent as a whole, it still remains to
be explained whether this was a state-business, or a business-state, alliance
(Evans 1979, 1994; Sinkkink 1991; Schneider 2004).
Few would deny the success of the state in capturing economic resources
during the phase of hot-house industrialisation. As suggested, this took various
forms. Financial markets were effectively “nationalised” from the 1940s in
most counties, even where private banks and credit providers remained visible
or even prominent. Central banks controlled the allocation of formal-sector
credit through loan and discount operations and the manipulation of reserve
requirements. During periods of inflation, interest rates (and rate differentials)
were set by state agencies and credit rationed by them. At a time of financial
repression, access to credit mattered much more than nominal rates of interest.
Formal credit was channelled through the banking system to preferred sectors
and agents – not least loss-making state utility corporations and industrial en-
terprises (ECLA 1971; Kelly de Escobar 1985; Garrido 1988). And, in addi-
tion to credit generated via the printing press and allocated through the bank-
ing system, there were the mechanisms listed earlier, notably the ever-widening
social insurance net and Brazilian-style refinements (Mesa-Lago 1991). At
issue, then, was not the ability of the state to cream-off financial resources,
rather it was about the efficiency of credit allocation and the capacity to pro-
mote indigenous, state-assisted “national” capitalism (Anglade & Fortin 1985,
1990). By the 1980s, the language of the debate had shifted from positive
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expectations of credit creation and national entrepreneurial capacity to nega-
tive assessments of financial repression – capital markets were not working and
forced savings had resulted in rent-seeking.
Nevertheless, mechanisms like inflation/credit creation and social insurance
expansion ensured that, notwithstanding substantial direct investment by TNCs
in the 1960s and massive state borrowing overseas in the 1970s, by far the
greater part of investment was domestically financed. This does not means that
the welfarist element of ECLA developmentalism should be underestimated, as
the improvement in social indicators confirms. Welfare expenditure (including
food and fuel subsidies and expenditure on education) was an integral part of
the strategy of “stabilising development”. Investment in the social infrastruc-
ture even more than in the economic infrastructure was critical to the
sustainability of the pro-industry urban alliance as well as serving narrower
Keynesian functions. There were substantial improvements in standard welfare
indicators – literacy rates, life expectancy and birth – during the classic age of
import-substituting industrialisation, yet relative inequality rose, and there was
absolute decline in welfare in many areas during the 1980s (Urrutía 1991;
Maddison 1991, 1992; Abel & Lewis 1993; Thorp 1998; Astorga, Bergés &
FitzGerald 2004).
As already stated, cepalismo may have been interventionist and statist: it
was neither anti-market nor anti-business. The role of the state was to insulate
and nurture domestic entrepreneurial talent. The state was to serve as an inter-
mediary between new businesses and an unfavourable external environment,
sheltering firms from unfair competition and providing access to essential in-
puts, not least capital and technology, and serve as a conduit for aid from
external sources (Prebisch 1950). There may also have been presumption that
some countries might emerge as exporters of basic wage goods. Drawing on
the W.A. Lewis thesis of a modern, capitalist sector developing on the basis of
unlimited supplies of labour siphoned from the “traditional” and on the evi-
dence of installed manufacturing capacity and intra-regional trade in manufac-
tures during the war, the development of industrial exports seemed to be on the
agenda. Popularised in the 1950s, the Lewis concept of growth assumed
a “closed-economy”: unlimited supplies of labour facilitated accumulation in
the “modern” sector (W.A. Lewis 1949, 1954). These ideas dovetailed with
ECLA pessimistic thinking about limited external inflows of capital, evidence of
an incipient “demographic explosion”, and the experience of a growth in trade
in locally produced manufactures in the 1940s. For some policy-makers and
analysts, prefiguring what would later be depicted as the East Asian path, this
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combination of circumstances suggested the possibility of industrial expansion
based on the export of basic wage goods.
Theoretically coherent, these expectations acknowledged that restructuring
the Latin American economies would remain import-dependent in the medium-
term. Moreover, although they only assumed concrete form subsequently, the
market-orientation of ECLA developmentalism was also confirmed by projects
such as regional integration and agrarian reform. Regional integration, pressed
with some success on amenable Central American republics in the 1950s, was
rooted in concepts of efficiency and competitiveness. Economic integration
would facilitate the emergence of large-scale, efficient firms exposed to the
rigours of competition from producers in neighbouring countries but still pro-
tected from unequal competition in the regional market place by overseas con-
glomerates. Isolated in small, national markets, businesses were unlikely to achieve
optimal size or efficiency (Porcile 1995). The emphasis on agrarian reform
also reflected, among other concerns, recognition that growth and efficiency
were market-size constrained, though in this case the emphasis was as much
about qualitative deepening as quantitative expansion. Agrarian reform would
bring more producers and consumers into the market and would ease supply
side bottlenecks on food staple availability. Reform was also envisaged as slow-
ing the drift from the countryside to the towns. These were growing anxieties
by the 1960s when rural-urban migration made millions of former subsistence
farmers dependent on the market and sluggish agricultural supply responses
were fuelling inflation and eroding income available for expenditure on manu-
factures (Furtado 1977; Sunkel & Paz 1970; Sunkel 1993; Ffrench-Davis,
Muñoz G. & Palma 1994).
From the perspective of the “neo-liberal” 1990s, the results of classic
cepalismo are easily disparaged. Yet the achievements were substantial. For
almost all major economies, the increase in industrial valued added was impres-
sive between 1950 and 1974. Annual average rates of growth in industrial
added value were 6.2 percent: for Brazil and Mexico, the rates were 8.7 percent
and 7.4 percent, respectively. Indeed, high rates of industrial growth were sus-
tained in these economies throughout the 1980s. Moreover, the macroeconomic
performance of the continent compares favourably with that of other areas be-
fore and during the “classic” period of forced industrialisation. For example,
between 1929 and 1983 Asian GDP per capita increased at annual average
rate of 2.24 percent: the Latin American figure was 2.63 percent. The best
performing Asian economies were Korea and Taiwan, with rates of 4.89 per-
cent and 3.80 percent per annum respectively: Brazil, the best performing
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Latin American economy achieved 5.32 percent; Mexico, the second ranking
economy registered 3.30 percent. The worst performing Asian and Latin Ameri-
can economies were India (1.43 percent per annum) and Cuba (1.25 percent).
Latin American growth rates also compared favourably with those of Western
Europe and the USA. Between 1913 and 1950, annual average compound
rates of growth for Latin America were almost double those of the North
Atlantic economies: from 1950 to 1973, the Latin American figure was virtu-
ally within half a percentage of the average of these countries and from 1973
to 1980 about 60 percent higher (Maddison 1991: 17).
Dismantling Populist Political Economy
Nevertheless, the process of import-substitution began to encounter problems
by the late 1960s. Criticisms of ECLA policy prescriptions and the analysis on
which they were based multiplied. Dependistas observed that import-substitut-
ing strategies had resulted in further distortions and intensifying underdevel-
opment. Manufacturing – demonstrably the most profitable sector of the
economy – was unbalanced and externally rather than domestically integrated.
Production was capital-intensive and skewed towards the manufacture of con-
sumer durables – motor-mechanical, electrical and pharmaceutical goods. This
necessitated the perpetuation of inequitable patterns of income distribution.
Above all, the sector was dominated by an oligopoly of TNCs that, importing
technology and components, financed operations on the basis of local accumu-
lation and siphoned profits overseas (Sunkel & Paz 1970; Kay 1989; Sheaham
1987; Sunkel 1993). Nationalists, too, were antagonised by the import-de-
pendence and the low endogenous multiplier associated with foreign domi-
nance of the industrial sector. Like dependistas, they lamented the inculcation
of inappropriate patterns of consumption. They were also antagonised by crowd-
ing out of local businesses and a tendency, increasingly observed in the latter
part of the 1960s, for foreign conglomerate to escape from the consumer
durables ghetto, to which they had been confined for much of the post-1930s
decades, to penetrate the production of wage goods (tobacco products, tex-
tiles and domestically consumed foodstuffs), hitherto largely the preserve of
locally-owned firms (Kay 1989; Sunkel 1993; Sheaham 1997). Where was
the much vaunted capital goods sector, so cherished by strategic planners and
military-supported regimes of the 1940s? Liberals (and later neo-liberals) ob-
served rent-seeking, a product of over-zealous regulation, and macroeconomic
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instability triggered by demand creation – monetary expansion and easy credit,
notoriously reflected in inflation and balance of payments crises. Liberals also
pointed to the misplaced pessimism of cepalismo: world trade had grown rap-
idly after the 1940s and international liquidity increased after the 1950s. Fur-
thermore, liberals stressed the competitive failure of forced industrialisation.
Although by the 1960s the export sector was no longer the prime generator of
savings in most Latin American economies, commodity exports remained the
principal earner of foreign exchange (Fajnzylber 1990; Meller 1991).
Criticism of cepalismo is telling but may also have been somewhat mis-
placed (Sunkel 1993). ECLA predictions about the post-second world war
global economy were obviously wrong, though the analysis was not entirely
illogical given the climate of the time when they evolved. Assumptions about
the scale and quality of Latin American entrepreneurship and state competence
were certainly optimistic. Yet the development strategy formulated in Santiago
de Chile was more cogent than has been recently allowed. Negative criticisms
of ECLA developmentalism are over-conditioned by the outcome of import-
substituting industrialisation and neglect the larger corpus of strategies within
which forced industrialisation was located (Hirschman 1963; Love 1994; Sunkel
1993). The cepalista development project involved more that simply import-
substitution and autarky. It assumed an enduring – if reduced – connexion with
the global economy and was not unconcerned about efficiency and competi-
tiveness. ECLA strategy was flawed more in the application than in the incep-
tion. Cepalismo was a policy framework that was argued in the right place at
the wrong time. Foreign aid was not forth-coming in the post-second world
war period, notwithstanding the expectation of “good neighbour” countries
like Mexico and Brazil and a widespread clamour for a Marshall Aid pro-
gramme for Latin America. Things might also have been different had the
“third” Bretton Woods agency been established. The General Agreement on
Trade and Tariffs (GATT) was but a pale shadow of the International Trade
Organisation that was to have stood alongside the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD/
World Bank). There would be no World Trade Organisation (WTO) for another
fifty years. Had Latin America obtained funding from the USA on a scale
commensurate with Western Europe in the early years of the cold war, or re-
ceived aid and soft agencies loans similar to East Asian economies in the 1950s
and 1960s or had the developed economies in the 1940s been prepared to
grant to Latin American exporters of manufactures the access to their markets
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that they granted the Asian tiger economies in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s,
circumstances would have been very different for proponents of “authentic
cepalismo”.
In some respects ECLA was culpable. If the cepalista project failed because
only elements of it were selectively applied, this was partly due to the political
naivety of proponents of the project. To paraphrase Sunkel: the problem lay
not with cepalismo but the cepalistas (Sunkel 1993: 28–33, 45–48). Indeed
some cepalistas were already expressing anxiety about the outcome of forced
industrialisation strategies by the late 1950s (Love 1994). However, it took
another twenty years or so before a neocepalismo paradigm was formulated.
Acknowledging criticism and accepting the need for theoretical refinements,
renewed emphasis was placed on efficiency and international competitiveness.
Post-1940s regimes, struggling to accommodate the demands of urban sector
interests, notably the middle classes and to a lesser extent urban labour, and
balance the conflicting claims of pressured export sectors and aspiring domes-
tic businesses were inevitably inclined to apply parts of the developmentalist
programme and not others. Keynesian style demand management was applied
in contexts that lacked in-built constraints against inflation and at a time when
many economies were operating at full capacity. Favouring the production of
durables addressed the demands of middle-class consumers starved of imports
and won the approval of emergent business lobbies and offered the prospect of
immediate political returns in terms of job creation. While it might have been
economically logical – in some countries – to concentrate effort on heavy
industry, the political pay-off would have been less in the short-to-medium
term (Sinkkink 1991). Accordingly, in the 1950s and 1960s, import-substi-
tuting industrial expansion was easier to sell than other elements of the cepalista
“package”. Agrarian reform antagonised still powerful rural interests. Effective
regional economic integration was opposed by nationalists, the military and
vested business interests. These elements were, however, critical to the viability
of the cepalista project. Indeed, the importance attached by the Brazilian mili-
tary regime to raising rural production after 1968 (largely through an exten-
sion of the rural frontier and the introduction of new crops) and similar empha-
ses on capitalist modernisation in the countryside elsewhere in the 1970s and
1980s (including state aid for agri-businesses producing domestic food staples
and export commodities), validate earlier ECLA anxieties about constraints to
development imposed by rural backwardness (Foweraker 1981; Goodman &
Redclift 1982). The revival of integrationist projects, for example the
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MERCOSUR/L and the resuscitation of the Andean Group, in the 1980s and
1990s, equally testifies to the relevance of another “failed” ECLA initiative
(Porcile 1995; Ffrench-Davis, Muñoz G. & Palma 1994; Thorp 1998).
If, in many instances, national political priorities account for the selective
absorption of elements of the developmentalist package, as Prebisch himself
recognised in his 1955 report on the Argentine, scope for import-substitution
was already limited in some of the larger economies. In several branches of
manufacturing in the Argentine, there was little relative change in the compo-
sition of output between the 1920s and 1950. Already by the inter-war pe-
riod, domestic suppliers had captured the greater share of the market in the
production of basic commodities such as ceramics, clothing, publishing and
printing, paper, and tobacco. The way forward lay in vertical industrial integra-
tion or production for export. What occurred, however, was horizontal diver-
sification – the production of more of the same for a highly protected home
market. At mid-century, import-substitution beginning with the manufacture of
wage goods was only viable for any length of time in economies where the
contribution of manufacturing remained low until the 1940s. In some coun-
tries, for example Chile in the 1920s, export-led industrial growth or autono-
mous industrial expansion, had already eroded this option (Díaz-Alejandro
1970; Dorfman 1983; Mamalakis 1976; Muñoz G. 1968).
In addition, as suggested above, cepalista analysts initially found it difficult
to respond to, or acknowledge the validity of, criticism (Prebisch 1981; Kay
1998). Even while pressing for regional economic integration and agrarian
reform, many ECLA ideologues appeared blind to export sector constraints
arising from an over-commitment to manufacturing. There was a reluctance to
accept that an export policy or an agricultural policy was required alongside an
industrial policy. Starved of resources and often subject to “cheap food” price
controls, rural producers responded by reducing output. It was illogical, on
the one hand, to accept the existence of an agricultural bottleneck and, on the
other, to assume that farmers would respond to rising food and raw material
demands triggered by industrialisation and urbanisation while starved of in-
vestment funds and foreign exchange. Only in Mexico, where substantial in-
vestment had been made in the countryside in the 1930s, and where private
producers were actively supported by the state in the 1940s, was there posi-
tive growth in rural output per capita for much of the middle third of the
twentieth century (Reynolds 1970). Later, during the miracle years in Brazil,
there was some success in raising rural production and productivity (Abreu
1990). Yet, in most countries, as labour drained to the cities and profits were
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creamed off by official buying agencies or through the distortion of domestic
terms of trade, output stagnated or fell. Hence, as the easy phase of import-
substituting industrialisation began to run out of steam, critics of the cepalista
project became more vociferous and pervasive.
“Retreat” to the Market
If government economic strategy from the 1940s to the 1960s was apparently
influenced by a determination to promote structural change, issues of effi-
ciency and international competitiveness tended to dominate the policy debate
thereafter. This often involved a reduction in the rhetoric of nationalism and
social reformism (in those countries where these considerations had featured
on the policy agenda). By the 1980s, a questioning of state-directed develop-
ment was giving way to the neo-orthodoxy that became the dominant ideologi-
cal framework of the 1990s. The pro-active state was being displaced by the
“dismantler” state charged with “privatising” economic activity – returning the
economy to the market. In the 1990s, the discourse shift from the “minimalist”
to the “capable” state. Neoliberals dominated the academic and policy debate
in the 1980s (Grindle 2000, 29–30). Responding to the intellectual chal-
lenge associate with the writing of North, greater emphasis was placed on the
role of institutions (as mechanisms capable of fostering or inhibiting growth):
there were “good” sets of institutions and “bad”. Hence the need for “capable”
states, which required legal reform, fiscal reform, privatisation and central bank
independence, and the language of the debate which emphasised “transpar-
ency”, “credible commitment” and “accountability” on the part of the state
(North 1990; Grindle 1996).
With hindsight, two distinct responses to the exhaustion of the easy phase
of import-substituting industrialisation (and the economic and political instabil-
ity that resulted) can be distinguished – neo-structuralism and neo-liberalism
(Bitar 1988; Sunkel & Zuleta 1990). In some countries there was a firm com-
mitment to one course of action from the outset, in others policy lurched first
in one direction and then the other. Nevertheless, for much of the 1970s and
1980s, Latin American economies would be neatly categorised as applying
either neo-liberal or neo-structuralist strategies. This classification ignores these
early uncertainties (or policy oscillations) and neglects shared characteristics.
Initial uncertainties as to the ultimate direction of policy are best illustrated by
the Argentinian military regimes of the 1960s and 1970s. Although the term
160 ON THE STATE OF LATIN AMERICAN STATES. APPROACHING THE  BICENTENARY
was not used, the Onganía military government (1966–1969) was committed
to industrial deepening. It spoke of the need for structural change and greater
efficiency. It also indicated that economic and social “reform” would take prec-
edence over political “reform” and that a return to civilian rule would only be
contemplated when the results of economic restructuring would ensure stable,
disciplined democracy. The ethos – and much of the language – of the regime
prefigured that of the 1976 military golpe which removed the discredited
administration of Isabel Martínez de Perón (1974–1976). The 1976 military
clique instituted the notorious proceso de reorganización nacional – another
set of rules for the re-ordering of economy and society. However, while the
Onganía regime had favoured industrial deepening, partly thought the medium
of TNCs (in the teeth of opposition from nationalist officers), the proceso advo-
cated neo-liberal remedies. The national bourgeoisie had failed to deliver sus-
tained, efficient industrialisation. Firmly committed to the doctrine of national
security, the Argentinian armed forces of the 1970s were convinced that indus-
trialisation had simply resulted in a general loss of economic dynamism and the
emergence of socially dangerous sectors (P. Lewis 1990; Peralta Ramos 1992).
And, there were substantial similarities between neo-liberalism and neo-
structuralism. The first common characteristic, as implied above, was neo-
authoritarianism. It was assumed that the shift towards a more accumulationist
model could best be accomplished in a closed, highly regulated political envi-
ronment, thereby depoliticising the economic decision-making process
(O’Donnell 1973; Anglade & Fortin 1985, 1990). Virtually from the South-
ern Cone to Mexico, violence – state terrorism – became an instrument of
policy, usually justified as the only means of fighting internal subversion. De-
fending “western, Christian, democratic values”, the armed forces and the po-
lice in a number of countries engaged in kidnappings, “disappearances” and
bloody campaigns in town and countryside. Repression served various pur-
poses: opposition was cowed and economic policy formulation isolated from
special pleading and compromises that had typified so-called “inclusive popu-
list” regimes of the past. The second characteristic was wage compression.
Wage compression assisted accumulation, of critical significance if inflation was
no longer to be used as a mechanism of forced savings, and lowered produc-
tion costs. By reducing domestic production costs and demand, wage contrac-
tion made a double contribution to global reinsertion – international competi-
tiveness and export availability. Hence, the third characteristic, international
reinsertion – most clearly manifest in massive external indebtedness and, to a
lesser extent, export growth. There was a dreadful symmetry in these features.
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State violence and economic shock tactics reduced the political effectiveness
and influence of those viewed as most able to derail the new project.
The difference between regimes applying neo-liberalism and neo-structur-
alism are well documented. Neo-structural remedies were applied in slightly
less violent political frameworks than the neo-liberal (Smith & Korzeniewicz
1997). Or, possibly, the phase of repression was shorter and less brutal. Moreover,
while all neo-authoritarian regimes justified recourse to coercion in order to
promote growth with stability, administration applying neo-structural remedies
fairly early sought to construct a new political consensus in favour of change.
Growth was not the only source of legitimacy, there were explicit references to
social policy and promoting “responsible opposition”. These were certainly
features of the Brazilian miracle. The Brazilian regime was not alone. In other
parts of the continent, “social pacts” sometimes re-appeared on the agenda
during the 1970s and 1980s. The most dramatic contractions in wages were
observed in Chile and the Argentine during the early-mid 1970s when real
wages were virtually halved. Elsewhere cuts were less savage and trends more
obscure. Nevertheless, from the mid/late 1960s, there was a general tendency
for wages and salaries to fall and the share of national income accruing to
wage- and salary-earners to decline (Foxley 1982).
Conceptual and strategy differences between the economics of neo-liberal-
ism and neo-structuralism are similarly well known. While both approaches
were designed to remove distortions, neo-liberals extolled the virtues of shock
therapy to change structures and expectations: neo-structuralists favoured
phased reforms. Neo-liberal measures focused on the micro – the excision of
elements that inhibited the impact of real price signals. Neo-structuralists were
more concerned about sectoral imbalance and institutional inefficiency. It was
argued that markets were far from perfect. On the contrary, there were many
examples of market failure in Latin America. The state could be an effective
generator and allocator of factors. Thus, while neo-structuralists and neo-
liberals accepted the need for an efficient state, the former envisaged a con-
tinuing, indicative role for government: neo-liberals assumed that government
economic action should be minimalist and neutral. By the 1980s, neo-struc-
turalists, not least in Mexico, were arguing that efficiency-raising investment
should precede international opening, challenging neo-liberal assumptions that
the market would itself foster productivity gains once allowed to function. For
neo-structuralist, “social cohesion” remained a policy issue and reducing in-
equality was a long-term objective, hence the enduring concern with “social
pacts”. Neo-liberalism acknowledged that high levels of absolute poverty con-
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strained market growth and represented systemic inefficiency but saw social
progress resulting from the “trickle down” affects of growth. Above all, neo-
structuralists viewed industrialisation as essential for economic development.
Neo-liberals were more concerned about maximising comparative advantage
and assumed that manufacturing output would grow with the return of macr-
oeconomic stability, in parallel with recovery in other sectors – provided the
industrial sector was internationally competitive (Bitar 1988; Ffrench-Davis
1973, 1988; Sunkel &Zuleta 1990).
Mexico provides several illustrations of “social pacts”, which took many
forms, ranging from formal agreements amongst government, business and
workers (for example, the war-time accord during the Ávila Camacho sexenio
and more structured arrangements of the De La Madrid and Salinas de Gortari
presidencies), two specific projects, such as those designed to subsidise the
distribution of basic necessities or tailored to the needs of a particular sector or
social group. Examples include: the Mexican Food System (SAM/Sistema
Alimentario Mexicano); (CONASUPO/Compañía Nacional de Subsisténcias
Populares); the National Solidarity Programme (PRONASOL/Programa Nacional
de Solidaridad); Economic Solidarity Pact (Pacto por Solidaridad Económica);
Stability and Economic Growth Pact (PECE/Pacto por la Estabilidad y Crecimiento
Económico). Arguably, “stabilising development” may be presented as a “grand
social pact”, constructed by government to embrace segments of business and
labour. Other examples are the 1973 Three Year Plan in the Argentine and the
1994 Social Pact in Colombia. Social pacts have a vital role to play in proc-
esses of economic reactivation with social redistribution within the context of
macroeconomic stability, namely of squaring the circle between accumulationist
and consumptionist strategies in order to sustain structural modernisation –
both economically and politically (Dornbusch & Edwards 1991: 1–2). Other,
classic examples of “social pacts” are presented by the heterodox plan austral
(the Argentine), the plan de emergencia (Peru) and plano cruzado (Brazil) of
the 1980s. For the first time in the history of those countries, a wages and
salaries freeze was accompanied by a price freeze, with wages and salaries
being set to take account of residual inflation. However, as the experiences of
these plans demonstrates, while “entering” a “social pact” may have not been
easy, “exiting” was much more problematical.
The connexions between neo-authoritarianism and international liquidity in
the 1970s remains a matter of conjecture. Regimes pursuing neo-liberal and
neo-structural strategies borrowed abroad and promoted export growth.
Deindustrialisation in the Southern Cone republics meant a resurgence of tra-
163COLIN M. LEWIS • THE STATE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
ditional exports and/or a diversifying mix of new commodities. Further north
there was an erratic growth in the participation of manufactures in exports. To
what extent this was a direct response to policy measures or a “natural” out-
come of macroeconomic change can be questioned. Less open to interpretative
debate is the sharp contraction in manufactured output and exports in coun-
tries like Chile and the Argentine, following abrupt opening, in contrast to
industrial deepening in Mexico and Brazil. It is also clear that, with the debt/
loan crisis and the failure of heterodox stabilisation programmes – classically the
plan austral and plano cruzado – in the 1980s, the ground was prepared for the
hegemony of the neo-liberal Washington Consensus “remedy” of the 1990s.
Support for heterodoxy in the 1980s can be explained by the domestic
political and international economic contexts in which it was applied. Looking
back to orthodox stabilisation packages of the 1950s and 1960s, promoted by
the IMF, and neo-liberal measures of the 1970s, associated with military gov-
ernments, proponents of heterodoxy saw clear lessons. Reducing state expendi-
ture (not least by cutting subsidies to consumers and producers) and charging
real prices for services, factors and foreign exchange had provoked “correc-
tive” inflation and recession. The result was political protest that compromised
the commitment to pursue stabilisation packages to their logical conclusion.
Political will collapsed in the face of popular protest or sectional special plead-
ing. These were not attractive propositions for new, democratic governments
or authoritarian regimes attempting to open a dialogue with the opposition
(Frenkel & O’Donnell 1994: Smith & Korzeniewicz 1997). Consequently, al-
though heterodox policy-makers shared with their orthodox predecessors the
received wisdom of the need to stabilise the economy, the task they set them-
selves was stabilisation with growth rather than stability through recession.
Heterodox analysis also viewed inflation somewhat differently from proponents
of orthodoxy and structuralism. While their views were closer to those of struc-
turalists, who argued that inflation was occasioned by supply-side bottlenecks,
they maintained that orthodox solutions, which envisaged inflation as (almost
exclusively) driven by excess demand, were inappropriate by the 1980s be-
cause they failed to take account of inflationary expectations. Mechanism such
as indexation had institutionalised inertial inflation, which had become built
into the system. Inflationary expectations, or inertial inflation, could not be
tackled by orthodox remedies such as cutting expenditure, reducing subsidies,
and raising taxes and utility charges. Yet, borrowing from neo-liberalism, shock
measures were seen as the most effective means of dealing with in-built infla-
tionary pressures.
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There were lessons to be learnt from the initial success and ultimate failure
of heterodox stabilisation. First, as with successful stabilisation in the 1990s,
the return of confidence did not trigger an upsurge in savings, as policy-mak-
ers assumed, but a consumption splurge which strained both domestic produc-
tive capacity and the reserve position. Neo-liberal reformers of the 1990s
were thus made aware of the need to strengthen the reserve position in ad-
vance of stabilisation. Substantial reserves facilitated both investment in pro-
ductive capacity, in the medium-term, and an “import cushion”, in the short-
term, to dampen inflationary pressure associated with a demand surge. This
said, planners in the 1990s found it much easier to accumulate reserves than
their predecessors in the 1980s when global recession weakened commodity
prices and international capital markets were depressed by debt overhang and
manifest a pronounced anti-Latin American bias. The second lesson learnt from
the failures of the 1980s by later policy-makers was the need to take prompt
action to resolve the fiscal deficit. Regimes applying heterodox policies in the
1980s were more concerned with the political and social deficits than the fiscal
position and looked to expand social and economic investment. Perhaps, by the
1990s, earlier failures had induced greater realism or tolerance on the part of
electorates. Moreover, the worse of the debt crisis was over by the 1990s. The
international financial system had not collapsed – bailed out by first-world tax
payers and the poor in the third world. As bank profits rose, inter-governmen-
tal agencies and private banks themselves adopted a more relaxed attitude to
debt write-down and were anxious become involved in the easy profits to be
acquired from debt restructuring and privatisation deals.
From the perspective of the early 21st century, the hegemony of neo-liberal
(or neo-conservative) strategies can be confirmed (IDB 1996; Thorp 1998).
The “ten commandments” of the Washington Consensus are now well-estab-
lished: fiscal discipline, reallocation of public expenditure to directly productive
activities, tax reform, financial liberalisation, unified and competitive exchange
rates, labour market “flexibilisation”, trade liberalisation, economic openness,
privatisation and deregulation. Yet, the defining characteristic is fiscal disci-
pline. State expenditure must be covered by revenue (or limited borrowing)
and not by monetising the public sector deficit. This implies fiscal and budget
reform. The tax system has been simplified in many countries and the efficiency
of tax gathering improved, not least through a crackdown on evasion. Increas-
ingly, budget reform has involved the devolution of expenditure (and a distri-
bution of revenue) to lower levels of government.
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The second major characteristic is deregulation. Internally, this has meant
that prices must be determined by the market – progressively legislation has
removed from the state the role of fixing (or indicating) prices of factors, goods
and services. Externally, it has meant opening the economy: reducing tariffs
and simplifying tariff regimes and removing non-tariff barriers to trade; and
removing exchange control. Most administrations have sought to peg the rate
of exchange though few went as far as the Argentine, anchoring the local
currency to the US dollar, and reducing the Central Bank virtually to a cur-
rency board. (At the time, the Argentinian government maintained that the
Convertibility Plan [1991–2001] introduced a new monetary system.) The
fall-back position being dollarisation – a solution of last resort that was consid-
ered and dismissed in the Argentine around 2000, and remains much disputed
in Ecuador.
The third most obvious feature is privatisation. The size of the state sector
and its role in the economy has been considerably reduced by the disposal of
state corporations. In some countries the role of the central state was curbed
by constitutional reform which passed responsibility for social expenditure to
the provinces (or, in the case of pension provision, to the market). Privatisation
has served a number of objective in addition to state shrinkage and returning
economic decision-taking to the market. It removed one of the principal ex-
penditure pressure points – the operating deficits of state corporation that
accounted for a substantial portion of the overall fiscal deficit. Privatisation was
also used to reduce the debt burden and, where state enterprises had been
purchased by foreign consortia, strengthen the process of economic opening.
As implied above, economic opening (global reinsertion) was the fourth main
feature. This process has been institutionalised not so much by unilateral tariff
reform but, as stated, by privatisation and international treaties – including
membership of the WTO and adhesion to regional free trade blocs such as the
MERCOSUR/L, Andean Group and NAFTA.
A final characteristic was social policy reform – modifying social insurance
and healthcare regimes and changes to the labour code (Lewis & Lloyd-Sherlock
2009). Again, these measures were consistent with other “elements of the
package”. Changing labour legislation and social insurance regimes implied
reducing the role of the state in determining the price (or rather the cost) of
labour. With the disposal of state enterprises, financing pensions and healthcare
(along with state education) represented the remaining pressure point in the
budget. As with the sale of government corporations, “privatising” social serv-
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ices was envisaged as a mechanism to return decision-making to the market. It
was also projected as a means of depoliticising (or increasing the neutrality of)
taxation and expenditure. Social insurance “reform” was also intended to deepen
domestic capital markets.
Proponents argued that neo-liberalism were the only alternative for Latin
America: applied consistently, the Washington Consensus recipe would facili-
tate growth with stability and, through sustained growth, greater welfare for
the mass of the population. If there is another, defining feature of the 1990s
and the continued application of market-friendly policies in the early 21st cen-
tury, it is that neo-liberal policy were (and continue to be) applied in a demo-
cratic or, at least, an electoral framework – even if many emergent democracies
remain fragile (Grindle 1996; Weyland 2002). In contrast to other moments
of policy change, not least the 1970s or the 1930s, the mass of the population
is being periodically provided with an opportunity to comment on policy and,
to date, (at least in such countries as Chile, Brazil and Mexico) continues to
vote in favour of “market economics”, albeit with a greater emphasis on social
programmes that target the poor. Inevitably, the nature of democratic/electoral
participation in neo-populist regimes of the 1990s applying neo-liberal pro-
grammes, triggered a discussion about the re/construction of civil society, citi-
zenship, civil rights and the forging of a political market place – alongside the
economic (Diamond, Linz & Lipset 1989; Smith, Acuña & Gamarra 1993;
Weyland 2002). In Northian terms, does this point to the consolidation of an
institutional framework endowed with a capacity to demonstrate – and deliver
– credible commitment?
There is little doubt that macroeconomic stabilisation, not least policy ele-
ments such as privatisation, has radically changed the environment within which
business operates. However, the road to stabilisation, sustained growth and,
indeed, privatisation was far from smooth and the process hardly linear. There
was much back-sliding (ideological and actual). Yet, the history of stabilisation
and structural adjustment suggests that macroeconomic stability and the crea-
tion of more space for the private sector was welcomed (in principle) by virtu-
ally all sectors of the domestic entrepreneuriat. However, the consequences of
fiscal discipline (namely reduced state subsidies) and economic opening were
not always as warmly embraced. There were challenges and costs as well as
gains for the business community. The gains were clear enough: new-found
macroeconomic stability reduced market uncertainty, often resulted in fairly
rapid growth and promised future wealth gains. However, stability also implied
new uncertainties – competition. Prices became real – for consumers (who
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became more discriminating) as well as firms. Competition meant that mecha-
nisms previously employed to limit the old uncertainties (for example, price-
fixing, and good, old-fashion corruption or “capture” of the state) no longer
work. Echoing Chandler (1990), Kosacoff argues that enterprises have to ad-
just in scope and organisation to meet the challenges of the market (Kosacoff
2000: 176–177) Do changes in scope and scale signal the emergence of
a dynamic industrial capitalism?
And there was the issue of timing and sequence. How much support was
government prepared to offer the domestic business community to modernise
before liberal financial and trade policies were fully implemented? Moreover,
increasingly during the 1990s, the role of the “capable state” in sustaining the
new model – through constructive microeconomic policy and social measures
designed to ease the pain of adjustment and promote socio-political to buttress
change – came to be recognised. After stabilisation and structural reform, is
the state becoming involved in social reengagement to “fix” support for the
market in a period of continuing global uncertainty? This may be so in such
countries as Chile, Brazil and Mexico, though hardly in others like Venezuela
and Bolivia where remedies of the 1990s have been rejected, and increasing
international volatility, notwithstanding the “China effect”, regarded in much
the same light as externally induced shocks in the inter-war period.
Conclusion
Institutionalists present two scenarios in which change may occur. The first
assumes a profound shock to the system: either an endogenous shock, for
example the Mexican Revolution, or a shock from without, such as the first
world war or the inter-war depression. The second scenario occurs when or-
ganisations agree that an existing institutional arrangement is no longer work-
ing and that change is essential. In the latter case, restructuring may result
from a reconstruction – from within – of relationships amongst organisations,
possibly involving the inclusion of new groups. The formation of the populist
state after 1930 has traditionally been presented as signalling a rupture. The
old order was destroyed by the inter-war depression, which undermined oli-
garchic organisations and allowed new social formations to establish a novel
structure. This view may be challenged. The proto-populist state should rather
be seen as an internal adjustment of the old order as existing groups accommo-
dated/absorbed elements – notably urban sectors – challenging the system.
168 ON THE STATE OF LATIN AMERICAN STATES. APPROACHING THE  BICENTENARY
There was an appearance of change in institutional arrangements but the con-
stellation of players remained much the same, at least initially. How may the
neo-authoritarian order (which gave way to the neo-liberal) be viewed? Argu-
ably, the neo-authoritarian order reflected a last-ditch effort by powerful or-
ganisations to preserve the substance of the old system while neo-liberalism
represents a growing prevalence of the view amongst extant organisations that
the old institutional structure could not be sustained and that a new arrange-
ment had to be agreed upon.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, effective integration into the
world commercial and financial system transformed Latin America, promoting
institutional change on several fronts. Some of these were anticipated and wel-
comed, or relatively easily accommodated, others were not. For example, for-
eign immigrants were embraced as workers, settlers and vectors of social and
ethnic “modernisation” but not when they introduced ideologies and practices
that challenged dominate arrangements or when their consumption patterns
and desire to remit funds threatened the external accounts. Similarly, foreign
capital was much appreciated, save when clustered in key sectors or when
foreign bankers, bondholders or investors voiced adverse opinions about host
states or clamoured for home government action.
The first “globalisation” of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries, and second of the late twentieth, offered opportunities and posed chal-
lenges for states in Latin America. The gains from international insertion were
not, however, shared equitably by all sectors or by all countries. Was this be-
cause some areas were but imperfectly integrated into the world economy,
because international markets were inherently unstable and moving against Latin
American producers or were the rules of the game rigged against Latin Ameri-
can players? There were certainly considerable differences in the export and
general economic performance of the Latin American economies during the
period of oligarchic liberalism. It is equally clear that economic “liberalism” as
practised in end-of-the-nineteenth-century Latin America was far from ortho-
dox. States intervened in the economy both to promote the formation of mar-
kets and to influence them.
The inter-war depression had a profound impact on the Latin American
economies. It was inevitable that, as in other areas, the crash would influence
the economic policy debate and its ideological underpinning – as well as out-
comes. The immediate consequence was not a policy revolution nor a quest for
novel solutions. By the end of the decade, social and economic policies may be
depicted as innovative, were largely internally coherent and tended to be ap-
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plied with a degree of consistency. In the main, however, it would be erroneous
to depict measures of this period as proto-import-substituting industrialisation.
In many cases, policy regimes were increasingly counter-cyclical (though deficit
spending was not a continental phenomenon), designed to promote aggregate
domestic demand growth – to reactivate economies so as to prevent market
collapse. Regulatory agencies and mechanism of interventionism multiplied. Eco-
nomic internalisation – endogenising growth mechanisms – was successfully ac-
complished and facilitated recovery, largely to the benefit of existing companies.
These interventionist measures were welcomed by most business groups, notably
those producing tangible goods and services for domestic markets.
Between the late 1940s and the 1970s, industrialisation was the principal
objective of government policy throughout the region. During this period all
economies embraced import-substitution. In some cases, such as Brazil, Mexico
and the Southern Cone republics, industrialisation may already have been
underway before the process was dignified with the intellectual imprimatur of
cepalismo. Other countries, like Colombia and Cuba were late-comers, only
fully absorbing the ideology in the 1960s, precisely at the moment when the
paradigm was being challenged. The main policy instruments of Latin Ameri-
can developmentalism were distortion of the domestic terms of trade in favour
of manufacturing, an overvalued (unstable) exchange rate, negative or low real
rates of interest and protectionism. The main features of the period were, for
most economies, fairly rapid growth, absolute welfare gains and inflation. The
language of policy was nationalist and statist but economic policy was not anti-
capitalism nor autarchic. Increasingly, the exchange rate was allowed to take
the strain of development strategy. Opportunities for rent-seeking multiplied,
to the benefit of preferred sectors of the business community – at least in the
medium term.
Volatility in the external and fiscal accounts underwrote the lurch towards
neo-structuralism and neo-liberalism in the late 1960s and early 1970s. By
this stage, “stabilising development” was perceived to be giving way to socially
destabilising political protest, the most obvious manifestations of which were
urban terrorism in the Argentine and Uruguay, rural discontent in many re-
gions, the fear of civil war in Chile in 1973 and the onset of conflict in Central
America as discredited traditional authoritarian regimes found it impossible to
stem protest by the politically excluded. It had proved impossible to move from
“unbalanced growth” to “stabilising development”.
The emergent appeal of neo-liberalism after the mid-1980s was also asso-
ciated with violence, not least economic violence triggered by failed hetero-
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doxy. Hyperinflation, even more than the institutionalised terrorism of the late
1960s and 1970s, destroyed the alliances that had administered the post-
second world war developmentalist and neo-developmentalist projects. By the
end of the 1980s, the international environment had also changed. The appar-
ent ending (or easing) of the debt crisis and the collapse of communism in
Europe and Africa seemed to validate the vitality of the global capitalist system.
Certainly, the influence of the “Washington agencies” increased.
Whether the new economic model can be sustained remains a matter of
debate. Neo-liberal economy, tempered by social redistributionism, has de-
monstrably survived in Chile and Brazil, in the face of a transition from centre-
right to centre-left governments, and notwithstanding patterns of income dis-
tribution that remain highly inequitable. In Mexico, too, and equally in the face
of historic levels of income inequality, the basics of the economic project of the
1990s broadly continues – perhaps unsurprisingly as the “party of develop-
mentalism” (the PRI) has been substituted by the “party of business (the PAN).
Nevertheless, as Latin America moves decidedly into the post-Washington Con-
sensus era, and as recent events in Venezuela and Bolivia demonstrates, pow-
erful forces can be marshalled against the remedies of the 1990s that promised
growth with stability and equality, but tended to deliver growth with volatility
and increasing inequality – even when overall levels of absolute welfare im-
proved. The dominance of the neo-liberal (or neo-conservative) economic model
in the 1990s derived from the failure of heterodoxy – the last attempt at neo-
structural solutions to the loss of dynamism exhibited by strategies of “easy”
forced industrialisation – and the debt/loan crisis that consolidated interna-
tional reinsertion. As the global environment becomes more uncertain in the
early 21st century, it remains to be seen which of the new “leftist” models will
gain ascendance in Latin America: a resurgent cepalismo auténtico that de-
ploys the rhetoric of doctrinaire statism, or “democratic social market econom-
ics” founded on economic internationalism.
During the last seventy years there have also been substantial welfare gains,
notwithstanding increasing inequity. Growth from the 1930s to the 1970s
disproportionately benefited the upper and middle classes and organised la-
bour, the urban sector and manufacturing interests. Whether countries apply-
ing post-Washington Consensus market economics will observe gains for
a wider spectrum of the population, and result in greater equality remains
a matter of debate – though indicators for Brazil and Chile since c. 2005 have
been positive. Proponents of the new economic model, and its post-Washing-
ton Consensus variant, maintained that inflation was the principal cause of
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poverty and inequality. If so, it follows that ending inflation has prevented
conditions deteriorating further. Echoing early nineteenth-century liberals, the
current market orthodoxy presents the market as a force for social peace, politi-
cal harmony and material abundance. Hence, the shift from “supporting busi-
ness” to “supporting the market” and facilitating the social and economic in-
corporation of the poor into the market. In this sense, similarities between
some of the rhetoric of late nineteenth-century and late twentieth-century lib-
eralism mask a fundamental difference. The market is now conceived in terms
that are much “larger”, relatively and absolutely, and engagement with it more
inter-active or participatory. If the mass of nineteenth-century rural workers
produced for the market but did not consume from it, their early 21st-century
counterparts are envisaged as in and of the market. If nineteenth-century liber-
alism was pragmatic and (largely) concerned with the economic, at least in
terms of the language of the discourse, since the 1990s considerably greater
emphasis has been placed on the economics and the politics of participation. In
short there is an emphasis on the necessary proximation of engagement in the
economic and political market places.
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The State and National Economy
in Latin America
Presentation
The state in Latin America is a political unit with sovereignty over a territory. It
represents a population, and consists of a set of institutions with authority to
make the rules that govern the society. The national economy as a social system
of production and distribution of goods and services is one important dimen-
sion of the society and its culture. For example, regarding free market mecha-
nisms, the institutions of the state have the responsibility to establish satisfac-
tory conditions for the national economy, such as fair competition, low infla-
tion, guarantees of rights (not only property, but also economic and social
rights), and social welfare. In Latin America the role of the state includes the
provision of conditions and incentives for economic growth, better distribution
of wealth and opportunities for human development, as well as strengthening
the ability to progress in a very complex and dynamic international order amid
increased internationalisation and globalisation. The state should seek reason-
able ways to integrate the economic dimensions into a social system, where the
principal goals are human development and social welfare (Valdivieso 2002).
In spite of the macroeconomic performance and economic growth in Latin
America in the last two decades (Noriega 2009), some characteristic features
of underdevelopment, such as inequality, poverty, and insecurity, continue to be
the main obstacles to a better future in the region.
According to the information and evaluation of scholars and specialised
international agencies, Latin America remains one of the most iniquitous re-
gions in the world (Dion 2007; socioeconomic indicators in Comision Económica
para América Latina 2008). The gap between rich and poor continues to
increase and nearly 25% of the population lives on less than USD 5 per day.
One dimension of poverty is unequal access to basic goods and services, e. g.
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sanitary conditions and education (Vidal 2008; Yoshioka 2009). The quality
of many private and public services remains low, and social violence is increas-
ing. Nevertheless, the majority of countries have a normative framework that
provides rational economic policies and welfare. However, the practical con-
ditions for development and human security are very low; poverty, social
exclusion and inequalities are formidable obstacles. Furthermore, the partici-
pation of important social sectors in the social and political system is decreas-
ing, and there are many places where the political and institutional conditions
are dangerous and the governments do not have enough capability to exer-
cise the sovereignty needed in their territories (Morrison et al. 2003; Kirby
2003, 108–122; Valdivieso 2006). In several places, the public institutions
do not work regularly, the expanding corruption affects the trust of the popu-
lation and violence is dominant. For instance, political practices inspired by
market theories and democracy are not possible. Therefore, there is a high
degree of uncertainty and insecurity with respect to the future. In conse-
quence, the main task of the state in Latin America is to search for ways to
overcome these features, and integrate domestic economic growth and
globalisation in a social and institutional order with justice sustainable for
future generations.
This study argues that the current contradictions and tensions in Latin
America are a consequence of legacies of certain specific patterns and experi-
ences of development since the time of colonisation in the sixteenth century.
Marginalisation and social exclusion, restricted autonomy, lack of stability, and
lack of consolidated democracies are some of the current conditions in Latin
America that are a result of long historical precedents. Historical tradition,
especially the conquest and colonisation of Latin America by the Spanish and
Portuguese, helps to explain how some of these factors came to exist and
persist; the historical legacy of colonisation has had many consequences for
Latin America: the transfer of European institutions, which influence every-
thing from urbanisation to religion and culture, measures which separated the
natives from the colonists, and a conservative social structure that is very dif-
ficult to change. Authoritarian traditions and economic dependence on com-
modities are further legacies and practices from the colonial period. In the
nineteenth century, the application of liberal economic principles produced
a radical transformation of living conditions in Latin America. Liberalism’s positive
legacies included foreign trade and external investments. On the other hand,
liberalism reinforced the status of Latin America as a peripheral region in the
international order – very dependent on foreign capital and technologies. In
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Table 1. Socioeconomic indicators in Latin America, 2005–2009
Countr y
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela
América Latina y el Caribe
Population
in mill ions
(2009)
40 134
10 227
197 592
16 933
47 282
4 623
10 030
14 001
7 339
14 017
7 468
108 896
5 751
3 444
6 341
28 536
3 352
28 362
586 590
Gross domestic
product per capita
in USD (2007)
9 396.3
1 090.2
4 216.5
6 126.5
2 843.1
5 085.1
3 464.1
1 624.2
2 252.4
1 665.5
1 420.4
7 093.7
884,9
5 205.6
1 466.5
2 750.9
7 255.1
5 788.6
4 732.3
Poverty in %
(2005, 2006,
2007)
54
30.3
13.7
46.8
18.6
44.5
42.6
47.5
54.8
68.9
31.7
61.9
29
60.5
44.5
28,5
34,1
Sources: CELADE: Centro Latinoamericano y Caribeño de Demografía, División de
Población de la CEPAL: Revisión 2006. Base de datos de población; D. POB. N.U.:
División de Población de las Naciones Unidas; CEPAL: Comisión Económica para América
Latina y el Caribe: División de Estadística y Proyecciones Económicas. Unidad de Estadísticas
Sociales (www.cepal.cl).
modern Latin America, socialist ideology and Catholic social teachings were
incorporated into many of the policies of Latin American governments. The
major achievements of Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) were higher
GDP growth rates in Latin America during the periods 1945–1972 and 1972–
1981 than had been achieved before or since, and faster growth of GDP per
capita. However, ISI reinforced structural problems for development (protec-
tive barriers, lack of effectiveness, high-cost production, more dependence).
Neoliberalism opened the markets, strengthened the private sector and refor-
mulated the relationship between state and national economy. Through neoliberal
policies, Latin America may have inserted itself better into the world economy
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through globalisation, but with high social costs. Currently, Latin America needs
stronger states with capabilities of providing essential functions, and there are
four important related tasks: economic growth, social equality, redesign of public
institutions, and democratisation of democracy. The goals of the new reforms
are: an increase in state regulations, a decrease in poverty and social develop-
ment, and decentralisation of government leading to more local government
for more input from citizens. In present-day Latin America, there is a new
approach to the connection between the state and the national economy through
reforms: reforms should aspire to respect and promote human beings and their
rights; public institutions should adapt their structures to social and economic
needs through greater participation and decentralisation; a consensus between
public actors and civil society is essential; the follow-up function of citizens and
their organisations is crucial for implementation and efficiency.
In the first part of this study, we present the main consensus on the require-
ment to lead the national economy to support human development in contem-
porary Latin America. We then continue by presenting the historical models of
development and their legacies for the region: colonial and Enlightenment,
liberalism, socialism, social-Catholicism, industrialisation, neo-liberalism, and
the influence of US policies. In our conclusion, we summarise the positive and
negative legacies of the past models, and present and conceptualise the current
state policies for reform and modernisation in Latin America as a serious effort
to structure the economy in a socio-political order centred on human develop-
ment and social welfare.
This study summarises the results of a long period of research on the state
and the national economy in Latin America. I first want to acknowledge the
financial support that made the research possible: National Fund for the Devel-
opment of Science and Technology in Chile (Fondecyt), number 1071073;
the Catholic University of Chile, Committee on Research of Public Policies
Program and FONDEDOC supported me with various grants throughout the
early stages of my research. I presented portions of this study at many confer-
ences, seminars and courses, where I received comments. Three seminars in
particular – the semester-long Internet Seminar “Neoliberalismus versus
Neostrukturalismus” at Catholic University and Universität Tübingen (1997),
led by Harald Barrios and Patricio Valdivieso (see http://tiss.zdv.uni-tuebingen.de/
webroot/sp/barrios/index.html), the week-long International Seminar at the
universities Santa Cruz, Federal do Rio Grande do Sul and Luterana do Brasil
(December 2001), and a seminar-workshop at the Polish Institute for Interna-
tional Affairs (December 2007), were particularly helpful to me in revising and
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improving manuscripts related to the topics of this study. I also wish to thank
those students who took my course about models of development in Latin
America at Duke University (spring 2008).
Human development as the principal task
for the state and the national economy
The state and the national economy make sense if their goal is the promotion of
the human being in both an individual and a collective dimension. The main
motive of its economic policies and development programs should be the progress
and welfare of the majority of the people, for the people and by the people.
The task includes providing adequate economic, socio-political, institutional,
and cultural conditions for the development of the human being. A growing
consensus about human development and the tasks of the public sector has
developed worldwide in recent decades. Regarding this idea, there are diverse
local, national, and international initiatives to improve domestic and interna-
tional conditions in the area of human development and security. The concept
of human development brings together several efforts in the academic world
and in the United Nations. The conceptualisation includes all conditions that
promote human capacities, so that every person can be an architect of their
own development in their collective and individual dimensions, including “hu-
man life”, “liberty”, and “competencies” for progress and a better future. The
concept of human development and its characteristics are sustainable for the
following reasons: first, they synthesise political, philosophical, and religious
principles with a broad consensus in our time; second, they express essential
principles for the stability of constitutions and institutions in the modern world;
third, they find clear support in the international community of states and na-
tions (see for example Carta Democrática Interamericana at http://www.cidh.org/
Basicos/Basicos15.htm, 20.03.2009). The meaning of human development
and its characteristics suggest that all conditions that promote life, liberty, so-
cial well-being, and development of and by the people, will enrich societies and
the international system. Consequently, the promotion of human development
is not only a matter of socio-economic and individual conditions, it is also
related to social structures, political life, institutions, and political culture, and
should be the main goal of the state.
In the contemporary world, since the end of the cold war (the 1990s),
international forces have worked energetically to promote the economic poli-
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cies of countries, development, democracy and social participation. The most
powerful and influential international actors in the world, such as governments
of industrialised countries, and international organisations dealing with issues
including security, finance, and international cooperation, have supported ini-
tiatives that promote economic and social development and exercise of rights of
peoples as agencies in different countries (Hastedt 2005: 285–290). As a
result of these efforts, there are several policies and programs that promote
human development.
Everything mentioned so far constitutes an important frame of reference in
the discussion of the task of the state in relation to the national economy in
Latin America and its strategies. In this region, living conditions for the major-
ity are precarious (low income and education level, etc.). In synthesis, we can
argue that the policies of states and national economies should focus on human
development.
Legacies of European discovery, conquest
and Enlightenment in the contemporary
situation in Latin America
Conquest
Latin America has had an important place in global discussion on development
and international cooperation. This fact is a consequence of extended poverty,
marginalisation, social exclusion and racial discrimination, lack of opportuni-
ties, restricted autonomy by the intervention of external powers, and poorly
consolidated democracies. Numerous intellectuals, politicians, and critics of
Latin America believe that the region is composed of pre-modern societies
which do not have the capacity to begin a process of sustainable development.
It has been noted that the political culture is extremely authoritarian, centralist,
and not inclusive, and that the society is segmented and not integrated (Wiarda
et al. 1996). When asked about the causes that explain such perspectives and
evaluations, scholars have pointed the finger at the legacies of colonisation
from Spain and Portugal. Since the nineteenth century, many people have ad-
mired the progress achieved in other regions of the world, especially Western
Europe and the United States of America. They have blamed the Spanish and
Portuguese, though, for the poor results in Latin America. Two examples from
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the first half of the nineteenth century were the Argentinean publicist Domingo
Faustino Sarmiento (1861) and the Chilean publicist José Victorino Lastarria
(1844). Consequently, the conquest and colonisation of Latin America by the
Spanish and the Portuguese were the first cause of underdevelopment by these
people.
The first legacy of these European countries is the basic economic struc-
ture, social order, and culture that were transferred to Latin America. Spain
and Portugal transferred a socio-economic feudal order and authoritarian po-
litical culture that were difficult to change (Barros Arana 1865). Although the
Iberian world had marked feudal characteristics, they were different from other
places in Europe because of their long war for the recovery of territories occu-
pied by the Arabs. In the territories that fell under control of the Christian
kingdoms, the feudal social structure was reinforced by the practices of placing
the captive Arabic population among the conquerors. The Arabs were legally
under the control of the Crown, and at the same time were servants of the
representatives of the Crown. In the economic dimension, they brought eco-
nomic institutions and forms of production, such as highly regulated agricul-
ture, cattle, mining, handcrafts, and commerce. In this feudal society, aspira-
tions for social mobility did not exist because people were born and remained
with the same social status for their whole lives. In these times, Latin America’s
feudal society reflected the pattern of the authoritarian state that had emerged
in the Iberian Peninsula: a hereditary state, an absolute monarchy that gov-
erned with the nobility of military origin, together with the hierarchy of the
church. Culturally, there were notable aspects that reinforced the feudal social
order in Iberian and Latin America, among them parochial culture, intolerance,
and discrimination (Bataillon 1978; Paz 1982). After centuries of cultural
coexistence, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries Christian Iberian culture
became intolerant, and everything that appeared to be a threat for unity was
considered suspicious and destroyed. Second, the Iberians’ perception of the
world was focused only on Europe and parts of Asia and Africa, and they
assumed that the civilised world was divided between Christians and Pagans
(barbaric); Christianity was identified as a model of civilisation. Therefore, in
times of geographical discoveries and colonisation overseas, the Iberian societies
had a strong prejudice against other cultures, and thought their own culture
superior.
The type of state colonisation used by the Iberian monarchies explains
a social and cultural heritage which was difficult to change (Valdivieso 1994).
Castile and Portugal were the first states that conquered territories outside of
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Europe and colonised the native population. At the beginning, both states,
Castile and Portugal, had the experience of colonisation in the Atlantic Ocean
islands and on the coast of Africa, where their actions were limited to the
formation of commercial factories, without colonising the native population.
Slavery was practised in order to provide labour. The first experience in the
Americas was the colonisation of the Canary Islands in the Atlantic (1470). In
these islands, the new Iberian state created by the monarchs Isabel of Castile
and Fernando of Aragon made the decision to colonise territories and not
European populations, deciding to establish direct state control on the Canarian
land and on their inhabitants. It was the first experience of colonisation outside
the Iberian territories. At that time, the rulers organised a new state in their
European territories. For this reason, they looked favourably on the fact that
the Christian perspective became dominant and intolerant of other beliefs and
cultures (Muslim, Jewish, etc.). The monarchy wanted cultural and political
unity of their population in their empire, so minorities were not tolerated and
were forced to be assimilated, to become Christian or leave the Iberian territo-
ries. The monarchy desired consolidation of their state and power in both
places, inside the Iberian territories and outside in the new colonised territo-
ries. During this era, the University of Salamanca was an academic centre with
enormous influence inside and outside of the Iberian Peninsula. Scholars at
Salamanca wrote about arguments to support the modern absolute state, and
to work for an international order of nations. Their analysis reflected their
interest in understanding the many changes that were occurring at the time.
One well-known author was the Dominican Francisco de Vitoria, whose lec-
tures on theology were very influential. In the Canary Islands and in Latin
America, the monarchy were in favour of the evangelisation and assimilation
(Christianisation and acculturation) of the native population, that is, their con-
version into loyal Christians, like the farmers in Iberia. Because the monarchy
prohibited the practice of slavery from the beginning, the goal of the native
populations was the conversion of their beliefs to those of Christianity. The
desire of the monarchy to have unity and control in the new territories made
the use of tools for control necessary to consolidate the state. For this reason,
the monarchy was very interested in the development of official colonial poli-
cies, and during this stage began a process of regulation in the territories of the
monarchy. Numerous activities and rights regarding the use of land quickly
became regulated, and this became another legacy in society and culture. After
the conquest of the American territories, the monarchy operated through ca-
pitulations (capitulaciones). These agreements were stipulations for discovery
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and conquest, where the rights and the obligations of the conquerors were
described. Through this instrument, the monarchy was always considered as
the proprietary of the countries and populations of the conquests. The groups
of conquerors (huestes de conquista), who organised the voyages of discovery
and colonised territories and people, were not private entrepreneurs. The con-
querors did not make plans to build factories. The huestes did not have abso-
lute freedom because of the regulations of the monarchy. Their activities were
based on territorial rights and rights over the native populations under the
control of the monarchy. According to the capitulaciones as agreements to
colonise the conquerors had to colonize territories with Europeans, create
cities according to the urban model of the Iberian Peninsula, and practice the
same kind of agriculture as in Europe. In time, the capitulaciones and ordenanzas
became more detailed, and strictly regulated several aspects of life in the colo-
nies (König 1998). Hernán Cortés, the conqueror of the territories of the
would-be state of Mexico, received a set of ordinances in 1523, with instruc-
tions on the names that should be given to geographical places, with the crite-
ria to establish cities, the architectural form, and instructions on the treatment
and protection of the native populations. Pedro de Valdivia, who conquered
(1541) the territories of the would-be state of Chile, without having received
a prior “capitulation”, tried to legalise his occupation of the territory. He re-
quested that Emperor Charles V recognise every territory belonging to the
monarchy. In the letters of the conquest of the would-be Chile that Valdivia sent
to the emperor, he tried to convince the monarch of the advantages of control-
ling the territory and population, the creation of cities, the promotion of Euro-
pean agriculture, and the evangelisation of the native population. Hernán Cortés
used the repartimientos and encomiendas – systems for the labour done by the
natives – not only to abuse the natives, but also as a mechanism to improve the
situation of the governed territory. The natives of the labour force under the
conquerors had to work in agriculture, mining, public services, etc. The forced
labour system benefited the territories of the monarchy.
What were the consequences of the colonisation and Europeanisation mod-
els in America? First, the transfer of institutions and the European lifestyle to
the American territories; second, the formation of a legacy of more than 500
years on the continent that would influence everything: urbanisation, bureau-
cratic-state organisation, legalism, lack of clear distinction between public and
private interests, social structure, productive systems, culture, and religion.
The colonisation had some positive effects for the future development of Latin
America: the regulations of the monarchy on the colonisation and the eco-
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nomic interests of the conquerors promoted the diffusion of European prod-
ucts, especially vegetables and animals. These had a multiplier effect on the
development of transactions and productive activities. For example, the entire
population of the American territories enriched its diet with new products (see
facts and data in Bulmer-Thomas 2006; Bauer 2008). The ordinances and
instructions of the monarchy stimulated the mining industry, systems of trans-
portation and communications, and commerce. The same ordinances clearly
indicated how the Europeans should live, in cities, for couples and families, and
how they should manage education (schools and universities). With the goal of
implementing and monitoring their political decisions, the monarchy created
a bureaucratic-administrative apparatus like those in other kingdoms of Eu-
rope. The monarchy did not have any other option to control the territories
and reinforce their development program in the American regions. It was the
one and only possibility to consolidate political control in America because of
the distance between the Iberian Peninsula and the American territories. There-
fore, the bureaucratic apparatus took control of the American territories by
removing the conquerors through force or persuasion. For this reason a sec-
ond conquest is often referred to: the first one was the conquest of the con-
querors, the second was the conquest of the state over the conquerors and
territories. The facts lead us to the conclusion that the monarchy – through the
framework of the process of formation of the state in the Iberian Peninsula –
practised a genuine program for colonisation whose objectives were more than
exploitation (Pietschmann 1980). The state wanted control of the conquered
regions, first through regulations and norms, and afterwards through direct
control over the territories and control of all important human relations in their
societies.
Christianisation in the new territories to be civilised was a way to achieve
control in the long run. The monarchy formulated policies to control the native
population with serious consequences for social conditions in Latin America. In
the period of discovery and the first colonisations, until the end of the fifteenth
century, the monarchy authorised the work of the natives in the mines and in
agriculture, and labour institutions (repartimientos and “commissions”) were
created in America. The conversion to Christianity, the imposition of a lifestyle
as vassals, and the labour which benefited the conquerors represented a radical
change in their living conditions. In the following Instructions of the year 1503
for the administration of Española Island, the monarchy declared: “For the
salvation of the Indian, it was necessary that the Indians be distributed into
towns, that they live together, that they should not walk in the mountains, and
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that they should have their houses inhabited with their women and children,
and that they should have agriculture to work” (König 1998: 25). What did
the monarchy intend by these instructions? That the native people should live
like European peasants (married, with children, in towns, working in agricul-
ture). This goal was possible only through a European re-education process.
From the perspective of the native inhabitants of America these obligations
were absurd because they were forced to live like aliens in regard to their own
lifestyle and traditions. Of course it was not usual to live in towns, with indi-
vidual houses, with nuclear families, doing agricultural work and stockbreeding
like in Europe.
One of the main instruments of civilisation was urbanisation; through their
ordinances and official supervision, the monarchy ordered the creation of towns
and cities with authorities, representatives of the state and Church, who had
the task to control, re-educate, and Christianise. At the same time, officials
were to control abuses against the natives (König 2006). In the beginning, the
monarchy thought that joining the life of the natives to that of the colonists
would be positive, because the natives would benefit from the lifestyle of the
colonists and embrace it. However, in time, and as a result of a debate regard-
ing atrocities in the American territories, the monarchy became aware that
joining these two different lifestyles was not working out. To protect the native
population, the official policy became division of races (New Laws of 1542),
and the mission of re-education of the natives remained in the hands of the
missionaries and officials. From this native population, the monarchy wanted to
see cultural assimilation and education of good vassals. Measures were taken to
weaken the control by the conquerors over the natives; their education was
assigned to the missionaries, the labour system was regulated, native towns
(communities) were formed. All of these measures separated the natives from
the colonists. Thanks to these policies, in many regions of the continent the
Indian communities maintained similar structures to those of the pre-Hispanic
period (family and community with a central role), and languages and native
traditions survived (Troyan 2008). On the other hand, these policies led to
a limited autonomy which corresponded to the image that the Europeans had
of them: under age, in need of protection, represented by Spanish officials or
missionaries, and able to reach the status of other subjects only by means of re-
education. From the time of independence, when protection by the monarchy
came to an end, the Indian population became very vulnerable, not well-inte-
grated, and poor (Menjívar 2008).
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Enlightenment and independence
In the eighteenth century, the Enlightenment became one of the most influen-
tial intellectual movements in Latin America. Politically, the Enlightenment had
two manifestations: liberal and absolutist Enlightenment. In the liberal Enlight-
enment, the society and state were conceived as a result of a contract, an
agreement among individuals with previous rights to any associate-political
institution, who do not renounce those rights (from John Locke). Consequently,
the main goal of the state was to protect those rights, and as a result they
needed a constitution and institutions to guarantee the rights and the work of
the state. On the other hand, the absolutist Enlightenment defended the prin-
ciple of the divine origin of political authority, namely the monarchy. At the
same time, the absolutist Enlightenment justified the absolute power of the
monarchy because of the actions in favour of the people: sound management
of the economy, modernisation of the state and its functions (political-adminis-
trative rationalisation), incentive for sciences and general progress of the coun-
try. These ideas motivated practical actions by rulers in the eighteenth century:
state reforms to enlarge the degree of centralisation and to increase their effi-
ciency (specialised bureaucracy, administrative system, armies, public finances,
etc.), incentives for manufactures and urbanisation, among others. Economi-
cally there were two variants of the Enlightenment, free trade and mercantilism
(protectionism).
The Enlightenment arrived in Latin America in the eighteenth century through
the absolutism of the Spanish and Portuguese monarchy (the Bourbons). They
initiated a period of profound economic and political reforms focused on
a rationalisation of administration of their territories, with significant implica-
tions for the later development of the region. The Enlightenment was also
present in the intellectual movement of natives, who carried out their inde-
pendence and practised the first development strategies in the new national
states (Lynch 1989).
The Spanish and Portuguese monarchies wanted to rationalise and modern-
ise the administration of their territories through a division of labour of the
different regions of the Empire for more efficient exploitation. In so doing,
Latin America became the “colony” and “periphery” of the empire. Latin America
was to have a productive function for supplies and commodities, and be
a market for the manufactured products of the Metropolis. In 1778, the Span-
ish Empire, like Portugal, dictated regulations for free trade, with the aim of
ending the contraband of foreigners in their American territories. Furthermore
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they wanted to stimulate internal trade and increase taxes through a larger
commercial flow. The mining industry, the main area of Latin-American export,
received incentives through the elimination of taxes on production, technical
missions, and abolition of monopolies to induce the investment of the natives.
Agriculture also received incentives, especially the production of agricultural
goods to export (tobacco, cocoa, wheat, animal products, etc.). The policies of
the monarchy, especially free trade, produced economic diversification, and
increased production and exports, but also in the long run produced a depend-
ence on commodities. Some regions were favoured over others, and manufac-
turers did not receive incentives from official policies because the Europeans
only wanted the expansion of their own manufactured products (Villalobos
1990). Geographically, the trade expansion favoured regions that during the
previous period had been completely insignificant, such as Cuba in the Carib-
bean, the Oriental Band on the Atlantic South American coast (Argentina and
Uruguay), Chile, and the Caribbean sector of Venezuela. Those regions now
had the advantage of being specialised in products that were in demand inter-
nationally (sugar, dairy and meat products, cocoa and other tropical products).
Many handmade products were seriously affected due to the trade liberalisa-
tion because they were in no state to compete with the European manufactures
(better quality and prices).
The administrative and political reforms aimed to change traditional rela-
tions which became dominated by the local interests of Latin America. During
the eighteenth century, the metropolitan authorities began to send specified
officials, loyal to the monarchy, to protect their interests against local groups,
to collect taxes efficiently and guarantee defence. The monarchy created new
viceroyalties (virreinatos) and general headquarters (capitanías generales) to
improve the system of defence and stop the contraband carried out by foreign-
ers (especially in the zones of Sacramento, the Caribbean, South of Chile,
etc.). The Bourbon Monarchy eliminated a series of special privileges of the
Church, especially the secular and religious corporations. Their final goal was
to weaken the influence of the powerful American elite groups and consolidate
their own power.
One can identify clear legacies in Latin America from the period of absolut-
ism: for instance, the inclusion of Latin America in international markets solely
as commodity producers and consumers of manufactured goods and technolo-
gies. Politically, absolutism created an ideal order for progress in Latin America
with direct influence on future authoritarian governments (governments of the
people, but without participation from them). In absolutism it is possible to
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identify the origin of Latin American political practices to carry out moder-
nisations from the head of the political system, without significant participation
from the people.
The pattern of Enlightenment in the first
development strategies of the new Latin American
states and consequences, 1810–1830
The ideas of the Enlightenment supported a program whose goals were to
reach a similar level of development as those of the European models (France
and England) and the USA. The plan consisted of an application of a program
with political, economical, and social reforms. The political reform included the
introduction of modern institutions, representative institutions based on the
principle of popular sovereignty, republics as associations of equal citizens,
written constitutions with prescriptions on the separation of powers to guaran-
tee fundamental rights. The economic reforms provided measures for the im-
provement of free trade, elimination of the restrictions for free markets and
stimuli to facilitate the use of natural resources with modern technologies. The
social reforms aimed to eliminate the institutions which neglected the idea of
human dignity and equality, for example slavery, special taxes on the native
population, protection of particular interests of religious corporations, titles,
etc. These policies were consistent with the belief in equality of the citizens
before the law. The first independent governments implemented a program of
free trade reforms, allowing external trade for new ports, elimination of taxes
on production, introduced constitutions that declared their countries repub-
lics, based on the principle of popular sovereignty, division of powers to guarantee
individual rights and equality before the law, elimination of institutions that
were against the principle of equality (slavery, special taxes, noble titles, unjus-
tified primogenitures, etc.); new educational institutions, societies, libraries and
a press to diffuse knowledge (Tobler et al. 1994).
Unfortunately, the expected prosperity after independence did not occur
because the new states were drained by the enormous efforts to finance the
wars of emancipation. As a result, the new states had many debts, and the
recovery of exports was very slow. Because of this, free trade reforms were not
successful. On the contrary, the new states began to receive a great quantity of
good quality imports, which affected local producers, especially the traditional
manufactures. The majority of the new states did not have common interests,
and the political and social elites were divided. There were groups that com-
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peted in imposing their ideas regarding political order, thus producing civil
wars and authoritarian regimes. In summary, the period immediately after inde-
pendence was characterised by economic stagnation, political instability, chaos,
and authoritarian leaders. The Enlightenment was not successful, and most of
the new states did not experience a real revolution, and continued colonial era
practices or fell into long periods of chaos. This situation had high costs for
Latin American countries, producing stagnation, and the loss of opportunities
for progress by the economies and societies. In comparison to other countries,
which were modernising, in Europe and North America, Latin American soci-
eties remained poor and underdeveloped.
Liberalism, socialism, and Catholicism
Liberalism
Liberalism, a middle-class movement for liberalisation that developed in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, competed with other political and intellec-
tual actors, such as socialism, social Catholic teaching, anarchism, conserva-
tism and fascism, for a place leading development. In the economic sphere,
liberalism claims to guarantee free initiatives by people, free activities, free
enterprises, and freedom of work without restrictions. All artificial tax burdens
on economic activities should be eliminated (for example, union and corporate
privileges). The state should not intervene in economic activity. The natural
laws of supply and demand should act in its place. Liberalism required an open
society for the free development of the people. It therefore promoted the elimi-
nation of barriers that did not permit social mobility and limited individual
development (barriers such as rigid social classes, diverse forms of unjustified
control, dictatorship of particular interests, etc.). According to liberalism, the
society should grant equal opportunities to all of its people. As a result, the
society, just like the economy, should be regulated through the principle of
equality of opportunities and free competition, the only factors needed to pro-
duce social harmony. Liberalism inherits the Enlightenment’s belief in the ra-
tional and communicative human being. In other words, free and autonomous
human beings should be the one and only natural and legitimate basis for the
economy and its policies.
The formative phase of liberalism in Latin America began in the period of
1750–1850, as in many other countries in the Western world. Many liberal
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principles were present in the Enlightenment from the eighteenth century, but
political movements only started in the second half of the nineteenth century.
In those times, Liberalism inspired models and goals of development as well as
cooperation in the new American states. During the first period of the Latin
American emancipation or Independence movement (1776–1825), liberal ideas
were diffused and practised. One may recall: the representative political desire
to have institutions was based on the principle of popular sovereignty; the idea
of the republic was understood as an association of equal citizens; the aspira-
tion to have a constitutional system that guaranteed individual rights; free trade,
the elimination of obstacles to free initiative and production (taxes, state and
corporate monopolies, etc.); the change of institutions, which were previously
against the idea of social equality (slavery, taxes on native Indians, noble titles,
corporate privileges, etc.); the desire to undertake educational reforms to
incentivise the use of modern competences and capacities, like the introduction
of applied sciences. However, the first strategies failed because there were
unfavourable conditions in many of the new states during the period immedi-
ately after Independence (1825–1850/1870). In numerous cases, the situa-
tion became difficult because of the political instability and economic stagna-
tion. There were only a few states that had early stability, and in both cases
there was a marked continuity with the colonial period (strong, authoritarian
regime, paternalism, centralisation, interventionism; formal concessions for the
new principles of popular sovereignty and equality before the law, etc.). The
first case was the conservative government in Chile from the 1830s; the sec-
ond was the monarchical system in Brazil from the 1820s. The other states
were governed by authoritarians like Gaspar Francia in Paraguay and Juan
Manuel de Rosas in Argentina.
Between 1830 and 1840 a climate of self-criticism and insecurity domi-
nated in almost the entire region (Del Pino 1954). Various scholars and politi-
cians criticised their society and were disappointed with the results of the first
development strategies after Independence. One of the more influential think-
ers of this time was Simón Bolívar, who modified the belief of the natural ca-
pacities of the Latin Americans to have their own government, and adopted the
perspective of the authoritarian Enlightenment. In these times, the majority of
intellectuals identified the Iberian past inherited from colonisation as a result of
the mistakes made in the region. In this context a new generation of future
politicians were born, who took an extremely pessimistic position with regard
to the reality of Latin America. They became the receptors and vehicles of
Western liberalism. The diffusion of liberalism in this generation was possible
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thanks to the regular contacts between the societies of Latin America and Western
Europe, through the arrival of newspapers and books, the emigration of Euro-
peans and trips of Latin Americans to the United States and Europe (Valdivieso
2006). They observed in Europe liberal, socialist and other movements that
mobilised against traditional structures, and the majority of these groups tried
to move from authoritarian political orders to democratic societies. In addition,
the people of Latin America observed with interest the prosperity of the coun-
tries that were experiencing the first phase of their industrial revolution. Nu-
merous Latin Americans assumed that there were consolidated liberal princi-
ples of the financial and industrial bourgeoisie in Western Europe, and that as
irreversible economic liberty and democratisation expanded, it would produce
enormous possibilities for the development of Latin American societies.
The British government followed certain beliefs of Adam Smith in the 1840s,
especially the policies of free trade with less restrictions. England needed com-
modities and new markets to be able to sell its manufactured products. The
Latin American liberals wanted to open the Latin American markets for Euro-
pean and North American trade. Meanwhile, Latin American production should
have been reoriented for export. Logically, a strong and real change in the use
of productive factors to fulfill the beliefs in progress through free trade was
necessary.
All previous tendencies led to the emergence of a new liberal elite in Latin
America. There were young people with intellectual motivations who really
believed that Liberalism could help the progress of their societies (Zea 1963).
Therefore they were willing to actively participate in the modernisation proc-
esses in their countries. They created different political parties which translated
their ideas into political programs and concrete development strategies to trans-
form their countries. The new liberal elites had some common characteristics,
such as the conviction of the need to practice the superior model of liberal
development that originated in Western Europe and North America. They ar-
gued for the position of superiority of the European culture in comparison with
the inherited culture of Latin America. They had a strong desire to transform
Latin America according to the cultural model of Europe (political systems,
economic structures, cultural values). The liberal elites of Latin America con-
sidered that international cooperation would only be possible through a greater
presence of Latin American economies in international markets, as exporters of
commodities and food, and as importers of consumer goods, capital and tech-
nology. They wanted foreign investment and technology to improve the pro-
ductive activities for exports. Furthermore, they hoped for the arrival of Euro-
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pean immigrants who would settle in their countries and cooperate through the
transfer of knowledge and capital.
Regarding the political order, there were differences in each case. In some
cases there were genuine libertarian movements, like the Western European
political movements against the absolute monarchies. In others, the principles
of liberty were understood only in terms of an advantage in economic relations
(Tobler 1994).
Liberal strategies of development
In contrast to the experiences in other regions of the world, the introduction of
liberal political institutions in Latin American societies did not signify the en-
largement of political participation. The new Latin American states were gov-
erned by small socio-economic elites, who occupied the most important posi-
tions inside the social and political hierarchies. They controlled the most impor-
tant economic activities. The ideological differences and conflicts among elite
groups in the new states were the result of conflicting interests or lack of
experience of self-government. During the colonial period, institutions were
always controlled by the monarchy. The forms of government varied according
to the scenario: there were centralised governments and dictatorships. Latin
American governments adopted constitutions and some rules introduced from
liberalism, such as the existence of legislatives, electoral systems, and the writ-
ten recognition of individual rights. In practice, however, the style of govern-
ment was centralised, paternalist, and authoritarian.
Several conditions in the industrialising countries of Western Europe stimu-
lated the production and export of primary products and the import of manu-
factured goods (Bulmer-Thomas 1994; Valdivieso 1994; Kirby 2003): first,
the demand of different goods that could be supplied by Latin American econo-
mies, raw materials for industry (tin, copper, cotton), foodstuffs (coffee, beef,
wheat, bananas and sugar); second, new technologies – especially the railway
and steamships – dramatically cut the costs and time of getting these products
to the European markets; third, growing European and US investment in Latin
America – spurred both the production of export commodities and the infra-
structure (machines and railways), the import and export businesses, and the
banking and insurance sector that offered credit to Latin American govern-
ments; by the end of the first world war, the US was the largest investor in Latin
America (Bulmer-Thomas 1994); fourth, the civil and political unrest which
marked the first half-century of post-independence, began to resolve and al-
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lowed the Latin America countries to play a more significant role in world trade
up until the Great Depression.
The Latin American governments promoted foreign trade and focused their
economies on promoting the export of commodities to the world market
(Valdivieso 1994, 1996, 2006). The public and private sectors were inter-
ested in investments in transportation infrastructure, modern communications
and the financial sector. In addition to these policies, diverse legal reforms
facilitated the production of exports, for example legal reforms for the privati-
sation and individualisation of the agricultural property of Indians and the Church.
All of this was influenced by foreign trade; the most dynamic forces were the
demand for Latin American commodities, foreign investment in the finance
infrastructure to stimulate export systems (ports, transportation, banking, etc.)
and facilitate the import of technology and goods. The leading sectors of eco-
nomic growth were agriculture and mining production. During this period
a fast modernisation process took place: means of transportation improved
with the introduction of steam navigation and railroads, and urbanisation in-
creased. The markets became better connected and more efficient because of
improved transportation technologies, greater volume of merchandise, and lower
export costs.
The increased presence of Latin American economies in the international
markets produced profound alterations in the countries. These changes pro-
foundly affected the living conditions of the population, productive systems in
fields and cities, labour conditions, property systems, demography, etc. Over-
all, modernisation mostly affected regions with a production potential for the
markets. Foreign trade stimulated economic activity through, for example, the
processing of raw materials, making inputs for the dynamic sectors (machinery,
tools), and increasing incomes. Yet, many other areas remained traditional,
without any change in institutions or social organisations. Some economic sec-
tors where liberal strategies had a greater impact included agriculture, mining,
services and the public sector. The international demand stimulated the incor-
poration and extensive exploitation of land, and by means of legal reforms,
fiscal and communal properties were privatised, and the native Indian commu-
nities and Catholic Church were dramatically affected. Agriculture produced
goods to export and satisfy the demand generated by areas of development in
large cities and in mining centres. Through economic international relations,
the mining industry was favoured by technological progress, the reduction in
transportation costs, and the introduction of new technologies for production
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(machinery, steam energy, procedures to process minerals, electricity, etc.).
The export activities and modernisation of economies in urban areas generated
a demand for diverse services. The growth of the public sector was made
possible thanks to the resources generated by foreign trade and access to inter-
national loans. Taxes on trade were the main source of financing for the public
treasury, and permitted public sector investments (see data in Bulmer 2006).
Some relevant social changes took place in Latin America in the period
1870–1930. New social forces emerged, such as the growth of a middle class
and a small, but in places militant, working class – both of which were able to
impulse new social dynamics and change.
Liberal policies improved economic growth, which was stimulated by for-
eign trade and by external investments throughout the 1930s. Commodity
exports offered Latin America a dynamic role in the world economy for about
six decades, allowing the region to achieve significant growth in exports and in
GDP over the period. During this time, there was notable progress in trans-
portation (railroads, steam navigation, etc.), communications, financial and
monetary systems. All of these positive effects generated a basis for the subse-
quent development of Latin American countries and their strengthened pres-
ence in a more global economy (Valdivieso 1994).
The issue of the negative effects of liberal strategies on the international
markets started to be discussed as early as the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury when liberalism was in crisis. In Latin American societies, there was criti-
cism about the region’s weak position in the international order. There was
a feeling of dissatisfaction with the dependence of Latin American countries on
commodities, foreign capital, and foreign technologies.
Latin American countries transformed themselves into “monocrop” econo-
mies, dependent on the export of one or two products for most of their export
earnings. The countries became more vulnerable to fluctuations in the prices
these commodities fetched on the world market, and markets simply disap-
peared for some products (for example Peruvian guano or Amazonian rubber).
Economies that depended for their economic growth on the export of primary
commodities reinforced obstacles to industrialisation (Bauer 1975; Valdivieso
1994, 1996, 2006; Kirby 2003): since the production of export commodi-
ties was often in the hands of landlords or foreign companies, there was little
incentive to reinvest profits in industry; industrial development served the needs
of the export economy and limited to goods for which there was a large con-
sumer market in the modernising regions, like breweries, flour, clothing or
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shoes. The Latin American economies were highly dependent on importing
many of the goods needed both for consumption and as economic input, and
industry retained a tiny sector. The taxes on these imports constituted the
state’s principal source of revenue.
This critical appraisal led to the dependency theory created in the early
1950s, which rejected the integration of Latin American peripheral economies
to the capitalist world. This theory blamed the industrialised countries for de-
pendence and underdevelopment in Latin America.
Socialism and Latin America
The socialist movement started in Western Europe in the nineteenth century
and represented a response to a series of problems stemming from structural
transformations in the economy, society and politics. The principal concerns of
socialism were: How can living conditions for the common man improve with-
out having property or means of production? The socialist answer to this ques-
tion came from theoreticians and union representatives, and has formed the
basis of socialist teachings since the middle of the nineteenth century. The
socialists rejected the liberal economic order, because they felt that it did not
improve the living conditions of workers and people without property; the
absolute right to private property was considered a source of exploitation and
discrimination. For socialism, the ideal economic order included central plan-
ning in which the state performed an important function, and where the key
productive sectors of the economy were managed by the state; socialists be-
lieved that this was only possible with the egalitarian co-participation of the
workers in business management (Valdivieso 2006). The state could intervene
in the flow of income to achieve better redistribution. Through these mecha-
nisms, social policies could improve the social conditions of different classes,
especially by means of income and property taxes. The socialist state was con-
ceived as an instrument to attain social justice, equality and social support. For
this reason, the state should have many roles in the economy. The political
system should be represented by the majority, and the political system should
be participatory so that the disadvantaged social sectors could have an influ-
ence in politics. As a result, socialism struggled in many countries for more
electoral and universal rights without restrictions. Finally, socialism favoured
a general education which provided the people with skills to actively participate
in the construction of socialism, to practice solidarity, and to direct individual
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interests to benefit common interests. All values and competencies should be
transmitted through the educational system; for this reason a system of public
education was essential.
The first socialist ideas in Latin America were spread during the middle of
the nineteenth century (Di Tella 1993). This diffusion was produced through
means of publications from foreign countries and trips of Latin American scholars
to Western Europe. None of the Latin American countries were influenced by
those ideas in their practical development in the nineteenth century, since the
representatives of socialism failed to reach relevant positions in the political
systems. In some countries, such as Chile and Colombia, there were opposition
movements against established governments, and the socialist ideas were paral-
lel to liberalism. In both countries, the liberal movement was born in alliance
with a socialist movement that incorporated a sector of urban workers and
handcrafts. Both movements were defeated, though, and only liberalism sur-
vived as a political movement with consequences for the development of the
countries. A second movement, in which anarchist and socialist ideas were
mixed, began in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. It was the case
in some countries that a greater degree of modernisation was experienced due
to their presence in international markets. Modernisation was expressed in three
important phenomena: rapid urbanisation; the birth of modern labour sectors,
particularly in the mining industry, manufactures and transportation; and the
arrival of many immigrants from Europe. The modern labour sectors created
labour organisations and leftist movements (socialist, anarchist and commu-
nist), which were encouraged by the ideologies of the immigrants (anarchism
and socialism). These organisations and new political parties pressured the
society and the liberal state through strikes and mobilisations. They wanted to
achieve a democratisation of the political systems, greater participation and
social reforms. The period between 1910 and 1930 saw a rise of socialist
movements. Some of the movements were similar to the Western European
movements during the nineteenth century, although there were also other
movements that were more original. In the 1920s, a very prominent ideology
arose in Peru, named the Aprismo. The founder was Raúl Haya de la Torre,
who had witnessed the Mexican Revolution in the previous decade, and contin-
ued to study in Europe. In Mexico, he observed reforms such as agrarian
reform and diverse redistributive measures. He had the perception that Mexico
had an original government for the first time in its history. He imagined that the
revolutionary government was an authentic representative of the people and
no longer a foreign model. As a result, his ideas to create an indigenous politi-
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cal movement in the entire continent were formed, and he founded the Alianza
Popular Revolucionaria Americana (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance,
APRA). The main goal was to create a party with multiple classes, including the
support of labourers, the rural population and minimum wage workers. The
Russian model of revolution was ruled out, because Latin America did not have
a large working class and the labourers were not representative. He was con-
vinced that the only way to change capitalism and end the liberal system was by
a new, indigenous political movement. In order to obtain a representation of
the majority, an alliance of social sectors directed by the middle class was needed.
In his ideology, the movement would reform the state, creating state adminis-
trators in the economy, to plan, introduce social reforms like agrarian reform,
and increase social services. In the theories of Haya de la Torre there were also
corporate elements among ideologies of different parties (from right to left).
The corporate spirit focused on the idea that the social sectors should have
direct representation like organised corporations, which was the contrary of
democracy. Another important intellectual was José Carlos Mariátegui, a Peru-
vian, who emphasised the problem of the native Americans and the need to
redistribute land (agrarian reform). In his book Siete Ensayos de Interpretación
de la Realidad Peruana (1928), he described the possibility of a revolutionary
change by means of an ideological elite pursuing socialist values such as equal-
ity, solidarity, etc. According to Mariátegui, the native population would enthu-
siastically participate in the movement because of their tradition of social coop-
eration from pre-Colombian cultures. By the end of the 1950s, socialist move-
ments had acquired great force in Latin America. This was the result of
a situation that existed throughout the continent, and will now be described.
Latin America had very little participation in international trade at that time;
their products were not in great demand, they lacked foreign investment, and
their development was mostly ignored by the industrialised countries. Most of the
Latin American countries experienced problems of underdevelopment such as
low economic growth, rapid urbanisation, and extreme economic polarisation.
The policies of development that stressed the need for greater investments in the
countries and economic growth, without considering the need for structural so-
cial reforms, were criticised because these strategies seemed insufficient.
The Cuban Revolution was revealing step by step to anyone who cared to
see the true nature of what they called socialism there.
Nevertheless, the underdeveloped countries began to demand justice. At
this time, the socialist ideology discovered the Teoría de la Dependencia (de-
pendency theory), which had a great impact on the thinking of leftist intellec-
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tuals and politicians. Dependency theory attempted to explain underdevelop-
ment from the point of view of Marxists, some of them focused on the quanti-
tative indicators of underdevelopment, and blamed the exploitation of Latin
American countries by the industrial countries as the cause of underdevelop-
ment. In their mind, the exploitation had its historic origins in the imperialism
of the world powers since the discovery and conquest of America. The defor-
mation of Latin American internal structures was condemned as the result of
foreign control and exploitation. The supporters of dependency theory all agreed
with the following statements: the external conditions of underdevelopment are
the most important factors; the unjust social structures in the marginal coun-
tries were not the result of an autonomous historic development, but of the
control of external hegemonic powers; the stages of underdevelopment and
development do not move towards more development; the development of
some countries is a result of the underdevelopment of other countries, and in
the long term, the real cause of underdevelopment is the development of the
world capitalist system; external dependence is the structural condition of the
underdeveloped countries; dependence and underdevelopment are produced
in every situation in the world, core and marginal countries, metropolitan and
provincial regions, urban and rural, large and small properties, business own-
ers and workers. Therefore, exploitation is a general phenomenon, and signi-
fied misappropriation of the surplus produced by labourers. The diagnosis of
dependency theory on the causes of underdevelopment of Latin American coun-
tries led to the idea of solving this problem by means of a revolution. This was
the beginning of changes, first using the term “bad capitalist system” within
every country, through redistribution of resources, greater representation, and
finally the end of dependent relations between countries (Dos Santos 1973).
Generally opposed to liberalism, socialism was not implemented as a devel-
opment strategy by Latin American countries. Cuba was the only country that
experienced a socialist revolution with long-range projections. Thus, only the
Cuban Revolution gave rise to a socialist strategy, consisting of the transforma-
tion of political, social, and economic conditions. There were revolutions in
other countries; however, these socialist experiments were usually short-term
and generally abandoned.
The model of Cuban socialism
Before the revolution, Cuba was a country that depended economically on the
sugar production of North American markets as well as tourism. The invest-
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ments of American businesses in Cuba were substantial, the majority in land
and the sugar industry, along with other productive areas. However, there
were groups of Cuban businessmen who participated in these investments. In
the 1950s the Cuban economy encountered serious problems. The fall in the
external demand for sugar caused an economic depression and increased un-
employment. Politically, Cuba was governed by Fulgencio Batista, who came to
power at the beginning of the 1950s and was supported by Cuban business-
men, by the union movement controlled by the state, and also by members of
the communist party. Batista’s government gradually became an authoritarian
dictatorship, centralised and less and less representative of the population.
Batista suspended constitutional rights, closed the Congress, and continued
a policy linked to US security. In the 1930s, Cuban political parties were formed.
In the 1950s, the parties opposed Batista. In this context, Fidel Castro began
his political career, and followed the beliefs of José Martí, who at the end of
nineteenth century had fought for national independence. The opposition con-
tained educated young groups from the University of Havana. Opposition groups
favoured a radical nationalism and demanded a change in the political system.
After various failed attempts to end the government of Batista, the opposition
movement succeeded in 1959 (Annino 1996: 504–522). Originally, the move-
ment wanted the re-establishment of the democratic Constitution of 1940.
Furthermore, they wanted to give property to the small farmers, and to legally
guarantee the right of the workers so that they could receive 30% of the busi-
ness profits. In addition they wanted to increase the salaries of agricultural
leaseholders, and returned properties that had been expropriated by the gov-
ernment of Batista. Lastly, it strove to guarantee land, education, and health for
all Cubans.
In March 1959, Fidel Castro became prime minister of Cuba, and intro-
duced the first law of agrarian reform that limited the maximum size of prop-
erty to 400 hectares. With the aim of gaining the support of the workers’
unions, he promulgated a new union statute so that union members could be
directly represented. Thus, the young workers who identified with Castro could
obtain control of the union. In 1960, Castro radicalised agrarian reform and
created a system of agricultural credits to support small and medium-sized
farmers. In addition, the government organised a system of agricultural coop-
eratives with the same objective. The government confiscated property from
rich Cubans and Americans. This produced an open confrontation with the
United States, which severed relations between the two countries. United States
put international pressure on Cuba, cut it off from the inter-American security
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system, boycotted its economy, and finally supported an invasion against Castro
(1961), that failed and ultimately strengthened the solidarity of the Cuban
government. Furthermore, Cuba joined political and economical forces with
the Soviet Union to guarantee security (against the United States, sugar mar-
kets, cooperation for development). Moreover, the Cuban Revolution’s survival
was assured by means of an institutionalisation of social organisations that
guaranteed the control of the population (Domínguez 2008). The first institu-
tionalised organisation was the milicia armada (armed militia), founded at the
end of 1959, composed of workers and university students. In 1960 the Asso-
ciation of Cuban Women and the Committee of Defence of the Revolution
were formed, organisations that opposed the internal counter-revolutionary
enemy. As a result, committees of defence of a revolutionary function were
installed in each neighbourhood and business. At the same time other promi-
nent organisations were established to assure the control of the population in
fields and cities. As an apparatus of coordination of all organisations, Revolu-
tionary Organisations Integrated was installed (1961). It became the basis for
the Cuban Revolutionary Party. Everybody who believed in the Party was to
recognise and defend the principles and programs of the Revolution. Thus,
they should obey the rules of the Party, be an example at the workplace, and
participate actively in the militia. In each work unit, the bosses were selected to
become new members of the Party. Lastly, a state bureaucracy was recruited by
the Party.
The search for adequate economic policies for the country was very diffi-
cult, and many ways to organise the economy were planned. Cuba was ac-
cepted in the community of socialist republics, from which it received much
support. However, the production of sugar and other primary products could
not be industrialised. Economically, the productivity of Cuban markets and con-
sumption by the average Cuban was low. Yet some important social goals were
reached: a huge increase in educational establishments, the lowering of illit-
eracy, progressive health systems, a decrease in infant mortality rates, and the
elimination of extreme poverty. Internationally, Cuba always had to face Ameri-
can pressure. For this reason it wanted to become an ally of the Soviet Union
in the early 1960s. Yet Cuba continued with its own international policies and
relative independence. In the 1960s and 1970s, Cuba supported revolution-
ary movements all over the world and was the role model for the underdevel-
oped countries that were against capitalism. At present it has an alliance with
the Chávez administration in Venezuela. Today, Cuba is experiencing the worst
crisis in its entire history, with the fading away of communist countries, the
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decrease in the demand for sugar affecting its export market, and the possibility
of receiving subsidised products such as petroleum from the former Soviet
Union. Cuba faces international isolation and persistent pressure by the US
government.
Catholic social teaching
Religion, and churches, have always had a great influence in the Western world,
especially in Latin America. This topic is essential in our study for the following
reasons: the Catholic Church is an international organisation that operates
everywhere in the world, and has had an enormous impact in economic, social,
and political development, especially in Latin America; remember the impact of
Pope John Paul II with his Vatican Diplomacy and his impact on the end of the
cold war in Europe, or the actions and interventions of Catholic foundations
(endowments, universities, research, etc.) and Christian movements (volun-
teers for example). Catholicism has had a long history with models and policies
for governments based on principles called “Natural Law” and “Social teaching
of Catholicism.” From the times of colonisation, Catholicism has had a great
influence in the Western world, especially the Iberian Peninsula and Latin
America. Catholic social doctrines became especially relevant starting in the
nineteenth century, because of a greater awareness of social injustices in the
world.
For a long time, the principal concern in Catholicism was peace and secu-
rity, and Natural Law justified riots and wars. After the second world war, it
became clear that these doctrines were not sufficient to ensure justice among
the nations, and for countries to have peace and development. Pope Pius XII
changed the question about justice in time of injustice or war, emphasising
what can be done to have peace, to produce peace in the world (under which
conditions the world can have stable peace). At the time of the creation and
first stages of the United Nations (1945–1960), John XXIII demanded to
create a world order of peace that guaranteed respect for human rights, de-
mocracy and development. The subsequent popes and the Second Vatican
Council (1960–1965) followed this direction (Second Vatican Concilium,
Gaudium et Spes). The last two centuries have seen some special developments
that must be considered in order to understand the transition of Catholic be-
liefs. In the nineteenth century, similarly to alternative intellectual and political
movements, Catholicism formulated a diagnosis, proposals and policies for the
solution of the increased socioeconomic and political problems in the world
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(poverty, exclusion, disparities in human and social development, etc.). This
occurred first in Western Europe, and afterwards in other regions of the world.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Catholicism had a conflictive rela-
tion with the modern world, which was becoming more secularised. In the
Catholic countries, relations with the state were particularly difficult, especially
in the 1870s and 1880s. In Europe, the French Revolution was the starting
point of a secularisation process that debilitated the traditional position of Ca-
tholicism in the society and state. In many countries, the Catholic Church lost
its material base (educational institutions, foundations, charity, etc.). The Church
lost its position in public institutions. In addition, alternative movements emerged
(liberalism, socialism, anarchism, communism), and Catholicism developed
a very negative vision with respect to the modern world and especially liberal-
ism. The first practical answer to these challenges to lead in the area of modern
social problems and social influence were through charitable activities such as
the conferences of San Vicente de Paul, a foundation of patronage for young
working people, and organisations to support craftsmen. The basic idea of
these initiatives was to support and win over the most vulnerable population.
In Catholicism two positions emerged regarding the solutions to modern
social problems: societal re-foundation and social reform. Both positions be-
gan to compete with each other to become the official position of the Catholic
Church. The re-foundation position favoured the renewal of the corporate
society, and had a very strong influence in modern “corporatism”. It denied the
legitimacy of the modern society, post-revolutionary society, and individualistic
modern values, regarded modern society as a mistake, false and distant from
the essential nature of humanity (Natural Law). The reason for this position can
be explained in the following way: in the corporate society of other past peri-
ods (the Middle Ages), each person had a place in the social hierarchy deter-
mined by birth (social order). This order was destroyed by the new individual-
istic and rationalist ideas of modern times (modern thinkers, modern capitalist
economy, etc.). These new ideas would have given origin to revolutions and
economic reforms that imposed a strong individualism and the rules of the
controlling elites. The reform included the following: agrarian reforms to pro-
mote individualism, liberalisation of the labour market to benefit capitalists,
deregulation of economic activities to favour the strongest people, and the
elimination of corporations. According to the concept of Catholicism, the places
that were modernised and industrialised had a capitalist order for market pro-
duction. The motor of the society became the principles of individual interest
and competence. The liberal order and capitalism were rejected by Catholicism
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because it was considered that their foundations were erroneous and their
consequences unjust for the social order and peace, because of socioeconomic
and political asymmetries. From the point of view of Catholics, the new politi-
cal, economic and social liberal systems were spread all over the world, giving
rise to anarchical relations, and imposition of more powerful people. Poverty,
misery, social exclusion and insecurity were the consequences. In this regard,
the only way to act against those tendencies consisted of a political and social
reform, reconstruction of the corporate order that preceded liberalism, intro-
duction of new regulations, corporate representation in public decisions and
an improved distribution of products for equality. From these beginnings, di-
verse corporate models and development strategies were derived and the no-
tion of “social justice” became popular. The problem with these proposals was
that the society had already changed and was no longer a corporate society
(the people did not feel any more that they were part of a corporation). The
more division of work in the society, economy and culture, the greater the
amount of pluralism, and corporate reorganisation will not be possible. The
imposition of the corporate order of society is artificial and limits individual
freedom and social mobility. Besides, there are no examples regarding the posi-
tive relationship between corporate order and equality.
Unlike the re-foundation position, the reform position accepted the capital-
ist order, and recognised its contribution to development: economic growth,
increase in jobs and improvement of living conditions in general. But it criti-
cised the social consequences for the majority, especially insecurity in several
dimensions (low income, bad working conditions, nonexistence of social insur-
ance for the majority, etc.). It proposed two solutions: first, social politics;
second, practice of solidarity in form of associations and unions to improve
living conditions. The reform position had resonance in the teachings of Ca-
tholicism and practices in different countries. Catholicism formed a program to
achieve economic development with growth and solidarity. The program con-
sisted of a social policy, action of associations, action of institutions, political
activity of the Christian people, etc. From the end of the nineteenth century, in
several countries, political parties introduced social legislation in order to im-
prove the social security of workers (disease, accidents, old age, etc.), working
regulations (no work on the Sabbath, working regulations for women and chil-
dren, state inspections of working conditions, the right to create unions, etc.).
Together with other movements, Catholicism offered its model to achieve jus-
tice and peace in the world. Catholicism was internationally diffused and had
an enormous impact on international cooperation and strategies of develop-
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ment. The following initiatives had special importance: organisations related
directly to the Church (Conference of San Vicente de Paul, nongovernmental
organisations, universities, among others), Concilios (meetings of bishops; for
example the First Vatican Council in 1870–1872, the Second Vatican Council
in the 1960s); activities by Catholic orders (for example, the Jesuits). There
were certain ideas from the Catholic doctrines that represented a patrimony of
reflection and these were an essential part of the Christian message: first, the
truth that the human being can be understood through rationality and faith;
second, this truth can be expressed through certain principles and social val-
ues, which stems from the encounter between the evangelical messages and
social life problems; third, the principles and values with social consequences
are: charity, dignity of the human being and associated human rights, commu-
nal property, and solidarity. The values that should dominate in the society are
truth, freedom, and justice. These principles are the fundamental criteria for
the interpretation and evaluation of social phenomena, and from these princi-
ples all social action and economic policies should evolve. These aforemen-
tioned ideas are the arguments to support the social function of private prop-
erty. The universal destiny of goods introduces the principle of subsidiary
(subsidiariedad). Every human being or society with power and capabilities
should have the attitude to aid others (“subsidium”) through means of support,
promotion or development. Therefore, this principle declares that powerful
people or societies should not abuse the population, but support them. This
principle does not exclude the idea that the state should have a very active
function. Also, subsidiary demands active participation from communities and
institutional organisations in daily social life. Another related principle is soli-
darity. All rules and structures in society should express solidarity as a common
good (bonum conmmune). However, solidarity is a virtue because it represents
the decision to be responsible for the wellbeing of every person and common
good. The practice of solidarity uses the consciousness of debt that everyone
has in society and before God. In the social thought of Catholicism there are
clearly stated goals: every person must try to achieve the truth and act in
conformity with its demands; the recognition of the individuality of every-
body to realise their personal aims; justice is a constant desire and action to
form social relations with an equilibrium; of course, there are several forms
of justice in several situations and under diverse conditions (commutative,
legal, distributive).
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Catholic social thought in Latin America
Starting from the second half of the nineteenth century, Catholic thought has
served as an inspiration for political movements with models of justice and
economic development in Latin America (Valdivieso 2006). The Catholic Church,
which had been part of the state since the period of discovery, enjoyed a privi-
leged position in the state and society. In the eighteenth century there were
state attempts to gain control over the Church, but its privileged position was
never questioned. In addition, the Church managed the educational system,
charitable institutions, civil registration of births, marriages and deaths, etc.
During the independence period, the Church maintained its position, and was
sanctioned constitutionally. In Latin America, the constitution of the nineteenth
century declared the Catholic religion the official religion of the state and
prohibited the practice of other beliefs. Starting in the 1840s, intellectual and
new political movements arose that questioned the privileged position of the
Catholic Church and demanded the secularisation of the state and society (to
be more liberal or more socialist). During the 1860s and 1870s, the liberal
movement obtained control of the state and introduced reforms to debilitate
the position of the Church: public education, freedom of other religions, public
services for registration, loss of corporate privileges. In some countries, Ca-
tholicism reacted by means of the creation of the Conservative Party to defend
the interests of the Church in the country. Meanwhile, the Catholic Church
began to create private schools and educational centres of higher learning to
assure religious education (for example the Catholic University in Santiago,
1889). The Catholic Church saw its loss of influence on the state and its
privileges in society as a serious crisis. In its opinion, the causes of the crisis
were the new intellectual and political movements: liberalism, socialism, etc. At
the beginning, the Catholic Church reacted defensively, but at the same time
a period of renovation began.
At the end of the nineteenth century a social process of modernisation
began in Latin America, the transition from a corporate social order to a class
society, causing an increase in social problems. These problems began with the
social economic transformations that took place as a result of modernisation
(liberal legislation and capitalism, changes in the demographic structure and
migrations, inflation, lack of regulations, abuses, etc.). In this context the anar-
chists and socialists began to spread, and a labour movement was born, acting
through means of strikes. Catholics perceived that the social problems were
a consequence of mistakes of liberalism in the state and society and criticised
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those tendencies. Meanwhile, Catholicism was losing its influence in the poorer
sectors of the society. Consequently, there was great interest in social problems
and social solutions. The contribution of Catholicism to the solution of social
problems was supposed to help to improve its own position in the state and
society.
Latin American Catholics began to look for answers to social questions
from the Western European experience because the European Catholic Church
faced similar problems. They observed that Western European Catholics were
active and mobilised. Catholic social movements worked with patronages
(patronatos), cooperatives, popular organisations of self-support and social
legislation. They began to develop similar initiatives in their countries. In Chile,
one of the most important activities was the “Patronato Santa Filomena”
(Valdivieso 1998, 2006). This organisation was created to attract and support
the youth during their life. This experience helped the social elites to be aware
of the real social situation in popular sectors. A progressive elite was born and
struggled to improve the social conditions of the country. This sector produced
many politicians and important priests. The new social Catholic movement grew
quickly and included labour associations, patronages, study circles, student
associations, etc. There were also other similar Catholic movements in other
Latin American countries. In 1955, the general session of Latin American
bishops created a Latin American Episcopal Conference. This Conference made
a great effort to find solutions to the social problems of the continent. The
desire of many Catholics was to transform the unjust social economic struc-
tures. For instance, in the 1960s, the Latin American Church had an impor-
tant trajectory in social matters: organisational experience, tools for mobilisa-
tion of Catholics, social institutions, Catholic media, etc. The Catholic Church
recovered an important role in national life, regaining power and influence.
The Church was a legitimate institution that appealed to the social conscious-
ness of Chile in order to improve national solidarity and social action.
In the 1960s, important events took place. At the international level, the
Cuban Revolution demonstrated a possible alternative for other Latin Ameri-
can countries to solve their social problems without capitalism, through social-
ism. The answer of the government of the United States was the strategy “Al-
liance for Progress”, an aid program focused on moderate Latin American
governments. The goal consisted of structural reforms for economic growth
and an increase in democracy and development. Urban growth accelerated,
increasing popular expectations of greater citizen participation. Moreover, the
strategy of ISI did not bring success, and poverty continued to spread. Conse-
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quently, scholars and politicians were convinced that structural reforms were
necessary to triumph over underdevelopment: modernisation reforms (agrar-
ian, education, housing, health, etc.), nationalisation of resources, programs to
improve living conditions.
In the Catholic world, the Second Vatican Council (1960–1965) had huge
repercussions. The bishops put an emphasis on reforms, looking for solutions
to economic and social problems. In Latin America, the bishops met in Medellín
(1968), Colombia, in order to discuss the consequences of the Council in the
region. The bishops stated that the Church favoured a transformation to an-
other consciousness. Several sectors with a privileged socio-economic position
had to be responsible for the human needs of poor and marginalised people.
The bishops wanted the social elites to practice their solidarity, to encourage
the exercise of fundamental rights in their countries and contribute to surpass
the problems that maintained underdevelopment in society. The Latin American
churches called upon Catholics to participate actively in the transformation to
a fair society and declared their preferential option for the vulnerable popula-
tion. Their specific concerns were centred on the misery of the rural popula-
tion, housing deficit, low income, desertion of schools and infant undernour-
ishment. According to their thinking, the causes of all these problems were
slow economic growth and lack of justice. The bishops demanded structural
reforms to change the situation and reach the goal of effective participation in
the state and institutions.
In the political world, Christian Democratic parties (DC) were formed at
the end of the 1950s. The DC was inspired by the principles of the Catholic
Church and support by the US Government and the German CDU Party. In
Chile, for example, the DC won the presidential election in 1964 with Eduardo
Frei Montalva as president and obtained a parliamentary majority in 1965.
With this great support the DC embarked on a “Revolution in Liberty” that
consisted of structural reform programs to reach the goals of growth with social
justice. The program’s priority was to increase economic growth, infrastructure,
institutional and social reforms. The Christian Democrat government (1964–
1970) carried out agrarian reform and stimulated work associations in farms
and factories, changes in the educational system, the development of a massive
housing program, and reform of labour legislation. The reform measures com-
bined two central principles of Catholic thought: state functions and promo-
tion of associations. The economic policy of the government tried to increase
industrialisation through means of an integration strategy with neighbouring
countries. Consequently, Chile became a part of the Pacto Andino (Andean
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Pact) in 1969. Moreover, to finance social programs, the government made
tax reforms and legislated a patrimony tax. Another way that it acquired re-
sources was the nationalisation of the copper industry, which was in the hands
of USA corporations. In order to curb inflation, the government reduced the
fiscal deficit and made moderate use of monetary emission (mechanism of pub-
lic financing). The Chilean government was the recipient of international loans
and resources from international cooperation. The United States offered sup-
port through its Alliance for Progress. The achievements of this government
were mixed. The public educational system was expanded, agrarian reform
accelerated, work associations increased, copper produced resources for the
country, and inflation stopped until 1967. Later, the inflationary goals were
not reached due to the persistent pressure by several groups to increase their
economic benefits (social spending, income, etc.). But all political actors even-
tually became radicalised; the leftist parties wanted a revolution while the con-
servative parties wanted a counter-revolution.
Catholicism had profound consequences for the development of Latin
America. From the principles of Natural Law and Catholic social teaching as
well as some popular social science ideas to criticise an unjust social order,
Catholicism emphasised the necessity of growth with social justice and emanci-
pation from controlling relationships, but did not agree with revolutionary
movements to overthrow unfair economic, social and political institutions.
A popular version of political theology in Latin America was theology of libera-
tion. It was created in the 1960s and 1970s, in the context of increased
underdevelopment and poverty. It placed special emphasis on the focus that
Catholics should have regarding poverty, and related the liberation of poor
populations to biblical passages.
Structuralism and industrialisation
Structuralism is a school of thought on economic development that influenced
Latin America from the end of the 1940s to the end of the 1970s, and began
to again in the 1990s. The main organisation that spread the ideas of structur-
alism in Latin America was the Economic Commission for Latin America and
the Caribbean (ECLAC, www.eclac.cl). Latin American structuralism had
a solution for the causes of underdevelopment in Latin-American and proposed
a strategy that was accepted in Latin American countries and became official
policy. During the general economic crisis of the 1980s this strategy was dis-
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credited, and lost its influence in many countries. Consequently, structuralism
began to decline. The ideas of structuralism were reformulated as neo-struc-
turalism in the 1990s.
International economic context
Some transformations in the international economic system are important in
order to understand the structural proposals. During the nineteenth century,
the industrialised economies experienced an extraordinary boom, and an inter-
dependent international economy was born. However, by the end of the nine-
teenth century, the United States and Germany had surpassed the United King-
dom as economic powers and thus ended a long period of the rule of free trade
under British dominance. Furthermore, the first world war caused distortions
in the international economy affecting many regions that depended on free
trade. The European economies lost influence, while the US economy acquired
a more important role as a world power. The Great Depression (1929–1933)
and the second world war reinforced these new tendencies. In the period of the
Great Depression, the governments of the industrialised countries tried to pro-
tect their societies from unemployment through protectionist policies; these
measures included the control of exchange rates to avoid more imports, the
control of capital, and intervention to achieve full employment. These and
other policies favoured the recovery of the local economy, but affected interna-
tional markets and economic relations. The displacement of Europe and the
increased importance of the United States of America in the world economy
had enormous consequences for development. In contrast to the complemen-
tary economic relations between Western Europe and Latin America, the United
States was competitive in many areas with the Latin American countries be-
cause it had a lot of natural resources and was, for example, an important
exporter of commodities (foods, minerals, etc.). Besides, the European coun-
tries substituted the importation of commodities through their own production
and protected trade; some countries with colonies or former colonies in Africa
and Asia began to substitute the imports of other areas through preferential
agreements. In addition, there were some technological developments which
allowed the industrialised countries to become more efficient in the use of
commodities. All these changes had strong repercussions in the Latin America
economies; the demand for their products diminished, and access to the mar-
kets became very difficult. The foreign trade of Latin American countries be-
came unstable and its economic position and status fell dramatically.
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The economic crisis of 1929–1933 hit at the heart of the primary com-
modity-exporting model of development, had deep consequences and gener-
ated a pessimistic perception of the future. Most Latin American countries
faced a sudden and sharp decline in the prices for their products, and faced
debt repayments that did not decline; as a result, spending on imports had to
be drastically cut back. As governments depended on customs duties for most
of their revenues, the effect was particularly severe. At the height of the crisis,
an estimated half of Latin America’s workforce was unemployed. Latin Ameri-
can governments abandoned free trade policies, the crisis forced governments
to take a much more active role in the economies of their countries – initially
through immediate efforts to manage the crisis. Through interventionist meas-
ures, every government started to manipulate its currency and commercial
taxes and stimulated productive sectors in the domestic market. Governments
instituted public works programs and other forms of spending to generate
demand within their economies, and used import quotas and tariffs as a way of
stimulating industrial production by protecting the domestic market from com-
petitive imports. In 1932, the crisis began to ease, exports recovered, but
governments took steps to consolidate these early moves toward industrialisa-
tion and several interventionist policies did not stop. This was the case in the
countries that included conditions for the growth of industrial sectors (previ-
ous industrial development and domestic markets). In other countries, such as
those of the Caribbean and Central America, small and slow development con-
tinued by exporting without much economic success. In conclusion, the Great
Depression influenced the transformation of economic policies in Latin America;
the main change consisted of a transition in the economic system and increased
regulations with new state instruments.
In the 1930s and 1940s, these efforts developed into a new model of
development based on manufacturing at home goods which had previously
been imported: ISI and the welfare state. During these years, the industrial
sectors of some countries experienced substantial development (Argentina,
Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Chile and Uruguay) and the main branches of the
industrial sector became food and durable goods. Latin American states changed
their functions and incremented their intervention in economic and social life;
in comparison with the liberal states of the previous period, the new state
became more dynamic and a central actor for development. From the middle of
the nineteenth century until 1930, the majority of countries practiced only
limited intervention policies, such as monetary, financial, and tariff. Later, the
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governments created a complex tax system, introduced income distribution,
and became a business state.
The second world war stimulated the industrial development of Latin American
countries. Imports decreased because the industrialised countries had all their
resources focused on the war. Yet, the demand for Latin American products
increased and Latin American countries received resources to invest in internal
production. A very important factor for the industrial development of Latin
America became the foreign policy of the United States. After the war, the
United States became the world’s primary economic power, and its importance
for the foreign trade of Latin America increased, but the region lost impor-
tance for the globalised US economy. The US concentrated all its efforts on the
reconstruction of the countries that had been directly affected by the war. This
situation was very unfavourable for Latin America because the demand for and
prices of its products decreased, while all imports experienced an increase in
prices.
After the war, as a response to the economic isolation of Latin America, the
ECLAC was created, which formulated a strategy for industrialisation through
import substitution. The executive secretary of the ECLAC, Raúl Prebisch,
developed a theory of international relations also known as the theory of pe-
ripheral economies. In his theory, the terms “centre” and “periphery” were
used to classify the countries according to their level of development and status
in the international economic order. This classical theory of economics, where
international work division and international trade provide advantages for eve-
ryone, was criticised because of its unfavourable consequences for countries
exporting commodities. The reasons were: the low prices of commodities, the
concentration of productivity progress only in the industrialised countries, the
weak position of the underdeveloped countries in facing the international crisis,
and the asymmetric structure of international trade. According to the ECLAC,
the one and only solution for this problem was industrialisation led by the state.
These arguments were spread through Latin American countries by intellectu-
als and prominent politicians like Celso Furtado in Brazil, Aldo Ferrer in Ar-
gentina and Aníbal Pinto in Chile. They all argued in favour of an industrialisa-
tion promoted by the state. Consequently, industrialisation through import sub-
stitution was implemented as official strategy, and developed as a coherent
state-led industrialisation in countries like Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Colom-
bia, Chile and Uruguay between 1950 and 1970. In countries whose primary
commodities still found easy export markets, or in countries whose markets
were too small to facilitate it, ISI did not develop to the same degree.
210 ON THE STATE OF LATIN AMERICAN STATES. APPROACHING THE  BICENTENARY
ISI policies
The state played a key guiding role in the ISI strategy through creating
a climate for the development industry. The ISI policies were characterised by
economic protectionism, high tariffs, and monetary intervention to favour the
domestic industrial sector. Furthermore, the state directly supported the indus-
trial sector by means of credits and privileges, investments in infrastructure,
and public demand. The state increased its direct intervention in economic
activities through the nationalisation of mining and energy sectors (steel, pe-
troleum, electricity), the creation of public businesses, and many regulations.
As a result, the 1950s and 1960s were characterised by enormous growth in
the industrial sectors of many Latin American countries (Muñoz 1990).
Growing population and high levels of migration to large cities created
ever-growing demands for infrastructure and services. The urban centres be-
came the most prominent markets for the industrial sector because employment
increased incomes and the demand for exports, while concentrating invest-
ments in infrastructure for transportation, energy, financial markets and trade.
The development of industrial activities favoured the diversification of produc-
tive systems because of their multiple effects. The state grew substantially, and
was involved in new organisations, agencies, and manufacturing activities.
Between 1950 and 1970 some countries entered a new phase: the forma-
tion of basic industries and capital goods. Industrialisation generally moved in
four stages: non-durable consumer goods, such as foodstuffs, beverages, phar-
maceuticals and clothing which were the easiest to manufacture; durable con-
sumer goods such as household electrical goods; intermediate goods such as
inputs for cars or machinery; capital goods such as iron and steel production
(Sunkel 1970). Without resources or technologies for this transition, countries
opened their markets to foreign investment in the industrial sector, largely try-
ing to associate with multinationals. Some multinational companies, for exam-
ple Japanese car industries, set up subsidiaries to manufacture for worldwide
and regional markets, sometimes with conditions that they use inputs manufac-
tured nationally by relatively small domestic firms (Tsunekawa 1989). At the
end of the 1950s and during the 1960s, ISI reached its highest point in the
most populated countries thanks to the development of steel, chemicals, cars,
and electronic industries, and the dynamics of growth gave rise to the exporta-
tion of some industrial goods. The industrial exports increased their participa-
tion in the intra-regional commerce from 9% to 21% (the exporting countries
were Brazil, Mexico and Argentina).
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In the smaller countries such as Chile and Uruguay, ISI lost its dynamism.
These countries sought to deal with the situation by complementing this strat-
egy with new initiatives: greater investments in the industrial sector, expansion
of markets in the region, the stimulus to export other products other than
traditional commodities, to obtain and invest resources in the economy. They
also practised structural reforms directed by the state as they tried to improve
industrial development conditions: agrarian reforms and other redistribution
measures in order to strengthen internal markets, educational reforms geared
to improving the conditions of the labour markets. Unfortunately these initia-
tives were not successful.
ISI had positive legacies. First, GDP growth rates in Latin America in the
periods 1945–1972 and 1972–1981 were higher than had been achieved
before, for instance faster growth of GDP per capita than in the past. Second,
by supporting production, manufacturing, new transport and communications
infrastructure and energy supplies became dynamic sectors for growth. Third,
by regulating the labour markets and providing social services, ISI and the
welfare state model brought benefits to workers in the new industries, labour
codes and social security benefits.
In general terms, ISI had some problems. First of all, theoretical deficits,
the theory of peripheral economics and the ISI model were influenced by cer-
tain points of view between 1930 and 1950, and also by economic policies
practised by industrialised countries in periods of crisis (depression, wars, etc.).
The strategy of the ECLAC for Latin America was based on the false assump-
tion of reaching industrialisation through export substitution and economic
intervention. There was great optimism with respect to the economic conse-
quences of political intervention in the economy. The problem of the ECLAC
model was that it did not take into account many important factors in the
process of industrial development – for example social factors, dynamic rela-
tions, and complex interactions between manufacturing and other productive
sectors such as agriculture – nor did it consider the importance of foreign
trade for industrialisation.
One characteristic inherited from ISI was the strengthening of the public
sector, which acquired new functions. By means of tariffs and credits, govern-
ments used financial mechanisms to locate resources in the industrial sector.
Governments spent a lot of money on mechanisms for redistribution by means
of social policies, construction of infrastructure and basic industrial businesses.
But the state was in no condition to finance all its activities fundamentally,
because taxes and credits were insufficient. The financial needs of the state,
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committed to many projects, tended to increase internal taxes at all levels.
Internal tax collections became one of the main sources of resources for the
state. While tax systems became very complex, they never solved any financial
problems, nor did they encourage productivity and efficiency. On the other
hand, the state did not have other options, because governments based their
legitimacy on the support of the labour sector, middle class and other benefi-
ciaries of ISI. In order to remain solvent, governments should have stimulated
the industrial sector, spent more money in social programs, and accepted inter-
national loans.
Lack of efficiency – with ISI, the government had a lot of power and,
continuing with tradition, used the power for personal interests, rather than
public-wide interest (e.g. social security funds were raided to help balance
budgets). High levels of tax evasion led to foreign borrowing and printing
money (major inflation).
During the era of ISI, nobody paid any attention to the minimum require-
ments of macroeconomic equilibrium for economic growth such as stable fiscal
expenses, a stable monetary system, and the dangers of inflation. As a result of
poor monetary and fiscal policies and a disregard for the rural sector, govern-
ments lost control over inflation. Typically, many diverse groups participated in
the process of economic negotiations, and exerted pressure to attain higher
wages (Hirschman 1965).
The supporters of ISI thought that industrialisation would help Latin American
countries overcome external dependence. However, Latin American manufac-
turing sectors were dependent on the imports of industrial supplies, capital
goods, and foreign technologies. For the development of basic industries, Latin
American governments should have attracted foreign capital and permitted the
accesses of multinationals to Latin American markets so that they could develop
those industries. Latin American countries were condemned to remain behind
in technology because they were consumers of foreign technologies. In addi-
tion, the dependence on exports persisted; thanks to the revenues of exports
the governments had access to financial resources for the manufacturing sec-
tor. But the small size of the exporting sector limited the plans of the govern-
ments, and also the possibilities of growth of the manufacturing sector.
In addition to the aforementioned problems, ISI was fundamentally con-
ceived to produce finished products for domestic markets. These industries had
difficulty managing the conditions to compete in international markets because
they had protected markets. Only a few countries, such as Mexico and Brazil,
were able to develop export competitive industrial sectors. Sooner or later,
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Latin American industries would face the problem produced by a lack of com-
petitiveness in world markets, thus becoming structurally vulnerable.
During the ISI period, many businesses were created with a large amount
of capital, and plants often surpassed the dimensions of the domestic markets,
especially in public businesses, where the criteria of efficiency was not focused
on profitability. Many industries lacked comparative advantages to produce
because the basic supplies to produce did not exist in those Latin American
countries. These businesses imported supplies and machinery thanks to state
subsidies. On the other hand, industrial development caused the loss of tradi-
tional manufacturing activities. ISI supported the production of many end prod-
ucts containing more advanced technologies than the traditional manufactur-
ing sectors used. In the past, in economies oriented to free trade and export,
groups with high incomes tended to consume expensive imports, the labour
sectors with lower incomes demanded the same goods at lower prices, which
were produced in their country. As a result, traditional manufactures had more
markets and developed (Sunkel 1970).
Greater productivity in agriculture to meet the growing demand in the
internal market required new investments, incorporation of new lands into pro-
duction, new types of cultivation and fertilisers, and irrigation and transporta-
tion systems. Likewise, important technological innovations were necessary to
increase productivity. However, during the period of ISI, agriculture suffered
from bad conditions in many countries, farmers lacked loans, and infrastruc-
ture was poor. For example, the agricultural sector was not able to satisfy the
new demands of modern sectors (urban, industrial, and services). The lack of
agricultural resources increased the price of food and raw materials in the
domestic markets, and it affected the demand for manufactured products. In
summary, the stagnation of agricultural productivity limited industrial expan-
sion, generated inflationary pressures, reduced the market for manufactured
products, and produced debts.
The distribution of the benefits of ISI was extremely limited. A large part of
the population remained vulnerable and in a marginalised situation. There was no
decrease in social and economic poverty and inequalities, nor a substantial eleva-
tion of the standards of living of the majority of the population. Industrial activi-
ties offered relatively few jobs because imported capital goods and technologies
did not require much labour. At the same time, many countries were becoming
quickly urbanised, the agricultural sector was experiencing a crisis, and migration
to cities was increasing. As a result, the growing populations did not have much
access to social participation, nor to political or economic integration.
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Neoliberalism
The principles and recommendations of neoliberalism to manage the Latin
American economies have a direct relationship with some of the transforma-
tions in the international economy in the last four decades.
In the 1970s a rapid internationalisation of products and services began,
thanks to the growing mobility of capital and the progress in transportation
and communications (ships, planes, computers, satellites, etc.). For example,
through the introduction of hardware advances and technology in the financial
markets, the decision of an investor could occur anywhere in the world with
complete information and in a short time. Investors could react quickly by
responding to economic or political changes. In recent decades, especially since
1980, there has been no limit to the mobility of capital; at present, one may
look for opportunities of investment anywhere at any time. All of this influences
the transformation in the international division of labour, and increases the
economic integration of countries. International competition increased in all
world markets and the conditions for investment become fundamental factors
in this process (legislation, labour markets, and production expenses). The in-
ternationalisation of markets have created international pressures for the adap-
tation of economies to these new international conditions. Consequently, those
countries with structural or domestic problems of production cannot expect to
adapt very well, and are the losers.
The oil crisis exercised strong pressures on the markets. During the Yom
Kippur War in the Middle East (1973), the members of the Organisation of the
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), formed in the 1960s, applied pressure
on the Western countries that supported Israel and the prices of oil increased.
This measure had a great impact on the worldwide economy, producing imbal-
ances and price fluctuations. Between 1973 and 1979, the first increases in
oil prices resulted in an increase in the prices of commodities. The second oil
crisis, which occurred in 1979–1980 and had a different political origin – the
Islamic Revolution in Iran and the first crisis in the Persian Gulf (1978, 1983)
– doubled the price of each barrel, and also had enormous repercussions on
the world economy. The industrialised countries had a stronger position than in
the first crisis, but the developing countries were more affected because the oil
prices were increasing while the demand and prices of commodities dramati-
cally decreased.
As a result of the oil crisis, the United Kingdom and United States changed
their economic policies. Starting in 1979, the conservative government of
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Margaret Thatcher abandoned economic policies geared toward state inter-
vention in the economy. The government drastically reduced state expenses,
and reformed the tax system (tax reductions, especially for businesses). These
policies were intended to stimulate more investment in the economy, and to
improve the market conditions to produce domestically (reduction in costs of
production). As a result, many state businesses were privatised despite social
protests caused by these policies; Thatcher’s government introduced legal re-
forms to limit the actions of the unions. In the United States, under the admin-
istration of President Ronald Reagan (1981), a similar trend began. The gov-
ernment wanted to stimulate competitiveness in the economy and economic
growth. If the conditions of production were good (low production costs),
then the economic activity would recover, and increase investment, thus creat-
ing more employment. To control inflation, a big problem in the American
economy since the 1960s, the Reagan administration cut social expenses and
decreased taxes to stimulate business production.
Since the 1960s, in South-east Asia, countries like Korea and Singapore
have shown the positive effects of economic policies focused on commercial
liberalisation and the attraction of external investors. Those countries quickly
overcame the problems caused by the oil crisis and since the 1980s have ex-
hibited very high economic growth rates.
The efforts of international economic organisations to overcome the eco-
nomic crisis of the last decades represent another important factor to explain
the changes in Latin America. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), an initiative that from its start (1947) defended the thesis that the
liberalisation of international trade led to greater welfare for all participants,
had strong repercussions in the liberalisation of international trade. In the ne-
gotiations of Tokyo (1973–1979), the member countries agreed to eliminate
non-tariff barriers (subsidies, import limitations, complex administrative norms),
and liberalise the markets for agricultural products and commodities. In Uru-
guay (1986–1993), participating governments debated how to overcome the
new protectionism of the industrialised countries, the liberalisation market of
agricultural products, the liberalisation market of international services, and
international protection of intellectual property (computers, software, CDs,
etc.). Furthermore, GATT explained to countries in which directions world
economic trends should go. Since the end of the 1970s, international mon-
etary and financial institutions – the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
the World Bank – have had the objective to maintain world stability especially
in monetary and financial issues and reduce inflationary tendencies in the world
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economy. To reach that goal, the IMF monitors and recommends special poli-
cies for countries. The World Bank conditions its financial cooperation to im-
plementing a series of economic policies that will give a guarantee of stability.
Emergence of neoliberalism
In the 1970s, the common perception that an important condition for economic
and social progress was state intervention lost popularity when the world economy
was shaken by the oil crisis and other related events. In this context, liberal
economic ideas reappeared, this time represented by neoliberal scholars.
Neoliberalism believed that the welfare state was responsible for the eco-
nomic problems in individual countries. It noted that the economies of those
countries suffered stagnation when the fiscal incomes decreased. The ineffi-
ciency in the economic regulation of the state and distribution of resources was
produced because the state did not want to make decisions on the basis of
economic criteria, but on the basis of pressure from social sectors that ben-
efited from their interventionist politics. In addition, neoliberalism held that the
size of the state tended to grow excessively without any possibility to react
rapidly to negative signs in the markets, and this intensified economic prob-
lems. Neoliberalism assumed that the one and only way to have a healthy
economy and be able to develop was through the market and opportunities for
private initiatives, and despite the regulations and artificial taxes of the state.
Neoliberalism wanted to introduce changes in the government system to
counteract the tendency toward the inorganic growth of states. The growth of
the state had benefited only a part of the population, the part that had a better
chance to exercise pressure. The state produced goods and services that were
worse than those produced by the private sector. Neoliberalism proposed
a free trade policy and globalisation of commerce without protectionist bonds
(to open markets, to eliminate distortions and inflexibilities). The state should
no longer have the role of distributing the majority of resources in the country.
Neoliberalism advanced the fundamental principle that individual liberty
and private initiatives should be guaranteed and stimulated because the indi-
vidual is the primary motor of progress. As a result of millions of individual
decisions, the market should be the principal mechanism for the distribution of
resources, and not the state. The role of the state should be reduced to regu-
lating to avoid distortions in the market so that individuals could make use of
their abilities and individual rights. What signified liberty to neoliberalism? The
central idea was the independence of the individual, and consequently the right
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to be free from internal instability and thus able to develop a creative capacity.
The market was the natural environment to exercise liberty. In the market, indi-
viduals formulated goals, and searched for ways to carry out the goals of other
individuals. For neoliberalism there were two ways to coordinate the activities
of millions of people: a centralised direction with the constraints of the totali-
tarian state, and the voluntary cooperation of the people in the market.
Society was organised on the basis of voluntary exchange by the people,
which created freedom for the market economy and a wealth of private enter-
prises. The laws of supply and demand were necessary because they led to
a natural equilibrium. Each person should use the available resources to pro-
duce and exchange goods, trying to maximise his/her benefits in the market.
These facts constituted a stimulus for the increase of productivity, division of
labour, specialisation of functions, and related economic progress.
Everybody trading goods and services in the markets had different prefer-
ences and resources. But they all should have the same opportunities to partici-
pate, and from this perspective equality of rights should prevail for everybody.
The state should contribute to increased equality, eliminate distortions, and
practice a secondary role. The state had no right to introduce an abusive
system of privileges. It should reduce its size, in order to stimulate the activity
of the private sector and competitiveness in the economy. The main function of
the state should be to create respect for general rules that assure a free and
voluntary coexistence (justice in the state, peace in international relations), to
monitor the transparency of the market, protect liberty and stimulate competi-
tive private markets.
State intervention was justified if it was necessary for the country; for ex-
ample if a priority was not assumed by private agents, the state could handle it
(social investments such as infrastructure in transportation and communica-
tion). Also, the state could intervene if there were monopolies or distortions in
the market, even when there were no basic equalities for the general participa-
tion in the market. In this case, the action of the state should generate condi-
tions for equality without using the mechanisms of the welfare state. The state
should not intervene in the economy to reduce unemployment in the economy
because its intervention produced artificial inflation that affected everybody
and did not provide an adequate solution to the problem of unemployment.
The state should not burden private economic agents with excessive taxes, and
should not keep factors that inhibit production.
In neoliberalism, people were naturally different, and consequently the re-
sults of their actions were too. Therefore, social justice consisted of recognis-
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ing the characteristics of the human being and allowing everyone to achieve
their goals with freedom and independence. State intervention to redistribute
wealth was considered unjust because it assumed that people with power, that
is, those who governed, had the ability to understand the actions and desires of
multiple social and economic actors in the society. This led to erroneous deci-
sions that limited individual freedom. Therefore, state intervention fomented
the imposition of particular interests by determined social groups. By so doing,
this distortion introduced injustice into society, and destroyed the principles
that had historically permitted development.
For neoliberalism, the market was: the most efficient system to foster volun-
tary cooperation by individuals, the most democratic and optimal system for
the distribution of productive resources, and the best guarantee of individual
freedom. In the markets, prices represented a multiplicity of dispersed informa-
tion, fulfilling the fundamental function of having access to information. The
free market guaranteed the possibility of obtaining the principle of commuta-
tive justice, the justice of exchange and reciprocity. Intervention, on the other
hand, damaged that principle of justice as well as the efficiency of the distribu-
tion of resources. The market was essentially democratic because its mecha-
nisms coordinated the wishes and preferences of the people. The market was
a self-regulated system, the result of multiple individual decisions and actions
prompted by private interests. If the market functioned according to its own
laws, the growth of the economy and a greater degree of social integration
would be possible. The real growth of the economy produced an increase in
employment, and better conditions for social integration.
Neoliberalism in Latin America
From the 1960s, the ISI strategy began losing its influence throughout the
continent. Several Latin American governments wanted to maintain this strat-
egy with complementary policies (e.g. greater investment, diversification of
exports) but did not have any success. Consequently, skepticism regarding the
capacity to solve the problems of underdevelopment appeared. The first at-
tempts at modifying ISI occurred at the beginning of the 1960s, first under
the conservative government of Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez in Chile (1958–
1964) and later in Argentina (at the end of the 1960s). During the 1960s
other countries such as Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico decided to develop
complementary strategies, basically by introducing reforms in commercial poli-
cies (oriented to stimulate the exporting sector). These countries remained
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highly dependent on earning foreign exchange from their traditional primary
commodity exports. Nevertheless, in some countries ISI still seemed to be
a viable option until the end of the 1970s, especially in Brazil and Mexico.
Before, those countries had had high economic growth rates and access to
international credits, which allowed them to finance imports of supplies, tech-
nologies, and capital goods.
In Latin America, neoliberalism began to take hold through the belief that
the efficacy of the market is the best mechanism to ensure the efficient produc-
tion of goods and services. Also, it was believed that the role of the state is to
ensure the free and effective operation of market forces, imposing these on
society by force if necessary. In the 1970s, the military governments of Chile,
Argentina and Uruguay abandoned the ISI strategy. After the first oil crisis, the
prices of commodities increased so these countries abandoned protectionism
and liberalised their foreign trade, convinced that an increase in international
competitiveness was the only way to solve the problems of fiscal deficit and
underdevelopment. These governments believed that foreign trade should be
the motor of economic growth. However, this goal was not reached in the
1970s because of several problems: deficient monetary policies, especially the
policy of exchange rates causing an explosion of imports and high consump-
tion while the export possibilities became worse. Later, at the beginning of the
1980s these countries experienced the same problems as other countries (re-
cession, economic contraction, debt crisis).
In the 1980s ISI faced a crisis situation everywhere. The economies of
countries were seriously affected by the problems of the international market,
especially the second oil shock and increasing indebtedness. All of these factors
produced modifications to the development strategies in those countries that
were still in the ISI phase. At the start of the 1980s, all Latin American coun-
tries were seriously affected by two external factors: lower prices for commodi-
ties and higher costs of credit. The fall in commodity prices was due to techno-
logical advances and the economic crisis in industrialised countries.
In the 1970s, both the public and private sectors of Latin America had
enormous debts. After the first oil crisis, international banking consortiums
had a large amount of resources and Latin American countries offered good
conditions for investment. In turn, those countries needed external resources
because of their chronic lack of capital. Apparently, greater indebtedness was
not problematic because the increase in commodity prices would mean an in-
crease in exports and income. Most of the credits were provided by the private
banking sector (in previous decades, the credits were only provided from pub-
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lic international banks). Instead of investing in productive activities, many re-
sources were wasted in consumption, speculation, and governmental budgets.
By 1982, the external debt had risen to such a high level that most Latin
American countries were in no condition to pay. Their annual debt payments
represented 59% of their exports.
The debt crisis began when Mexico declared its inability to make its debt
payment. Immediately there was a loss of confidence by the external sources of
financing which intensified the crisis. The consequences of the crisis were so
serious (as occurred in the 1930s), that they caused a change in development
strategy and an end to the ISI. Dealing with the crisis lasted almost a decade.
The actors involved were Latin American governments, private banking
consortiums, international financial institutions, and the government of the
United States. To avoid a financial collapse, all the aforementioned actors sought
a solution together. The main instruments to manage the crisis were the agree-
ments between creditors and debtors, and renegotiations of debts to extend
the payment period; between 1983 and 1991, 104 renegotiated agreements
were signed. Between 1982 and 1985, the renegotiations of debts translated
into higher interest rates. From the middle of the 1980s, more favourable
conditions for Latin American countries were proposed: facilities for payment
and larger loans by the World Bank. These changes were a consequence of
a new strategy to overcome the crisis, the Baker Plan, that basically proposed
measures to stimulate economic growth and enable structural changes. How-
ever, until 1989 there was no substantial improvement, while the feeling grew
that the crisis could only be ended by eliminating the debt. US Treasury Secre-
tary Brady called for creditors to contribute to the solution of the problem by
reducing the debt, and these subsequent measures finally contributed to end-
ing the crisis.
The governments of the industrialised countries and international agencies,
the IMF and World Bank, held the belief that the debt crisis showed the vulner-
ability and inability of the Latin American economies to overcome external
problems. After decades of high tariffs and state intervention in all areas of
economic life, Latin America had a rigid economic structure which was not
adequate to react to the changes in international markets. Therefore, the pow-
erful international actors, industrialised countries, the IMF and The World Bank,
insisted on structural adjustment programs to achieve higher exports through
trade liberalisation, attract foreign investment, and reduce government inter-
vention in the economy through privatisation. In order to maintain their credit
flow, Latin American countries had to turn to the IMF and the World Bank.
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Consequently, the compliance of the Latin American economies was absolutely
necessary because the international environment required it. At this time, there
was a lack of loans available, and conditions to receive new loans were very
difficult, while the international market was not good because of capital flight.
The gravity of the debt crisis forced Latin American countries to adopt belt-
tightening programs demanded by international organisations. Structural Ad-
justment Programs (SAPs) were programs designed to introduce neoliberal
policies, in order to get them to repay their debt. Latin America had to transfer
resources to debtors and industrialised countries, and the only way to accom-
plish this was by lowering imports, increasing exports and manipulating vari-
ables to achieve macroeconomic stability.
The new development strategy required the liberalisation of economies,
a commercial opening by means of eliminating protectionist barriers (tariff and
non-tariff barriers) and structural adjustments. Commercial liberalisation led to
the increase of exports that by the beginning of the 1990s had increased by
80%. The adjustment programs that were requested by international agencies
specifically required the reduction of fiscal expenses (fiscal deficit), restrictive
monetary policies to control inflation, reforms of tax systems to consolidate
treasury, elimination of state subsidises, removal of price controls (prices re-
lated to the law of supply and demand, including the prices of state services)
and deregulation of markets. In order to achieve economic efficiency, the Latin
American governments were to transfer public companies to the private sector.
Businesses were supposed to be managed using profit rationality. The speed
and change in direction was different in each case. Chile, Mexico, and Bolivia
were the first countries that adopted structural reforms, and Chile proved to be
a very successful model of neoliberalism in the early 1980s which made other
countries follow suit. However, countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Peru
continued for a short period with ISI policies based on state intervention in
their economies. Their unorthodox plans to stabilise the economy included
price controls, salary controls, and exchange rates. Yet the policies were not
successful, and as a result these countries adopted programs of structural ad-
justment that were being applied in other countries.
In the first half of the 1980s most Latin American countries adopted
neoliberal politics to generate resources in order to pay off debts. These poli-
cies basically consisted of reducing government interference in all sectors and
a fiscal write-off, reforming tax systems to increase fiscal income; eliminating
state powers over interest rates, credit provision and foreign investment, re-
ducing tax on profits and placing it more on consumption, and establishing the
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independence of central banks. Through liberalisation and realistic exchange
rates, the governments increased the significance of the market in allocation of
resources, and made the private sector the main instrument of economic growth
through privatisation of state companies, deregulation, secure property rights
and financial liberalisation. Another way was the privatisation of public compa-
nies and public utilities. Nevertheless, these measures were not enough to fi-
nance the fiscal deficit and debt services. Therefore, the governments author-
ised the emission of money, contributing to an increase in inflation. In some
countries, inflation reached three-figure sums.
The internal markets of Latin American countries experienced a serious
recession during this period because of the lack of capital, hyperinflation, capi-
tal flight, and a decrease in investments, production, and consumption. The
cuts in spending led to a deep recession in the early 1980s, while public social
services in health and education deteriorated, causing serious social problems.
Slowly, most Latin American countries abandoned emergency measures and
applied coherent long-range reforms. This seemed to be necessary in the pub-
lic sector of the countries to improve their institutions. By the end of the 1980s
the majority of countries had achieved sufficient economic stability to attract
private investments.
The drastic reduction of foreign trade barriers was one of the most interest-
ing aspects of these reforms. Latin American countries began a quick integra-
tion with the rest of the world, notably by improving their commercial rela-
tions. In many countries, modern exports grew substantially and created new
sources of employment. The liberalisation of trade led to a large increase in
productivity and economic growth, especially in the 1990s. The countries’
need to compete internationally improved the efficiency of their business com-
munity. Another important phenomenon was the greater integration of Latin
American markets. This process can be explained by the need of the countries
to export their products to external markets, and it created more competitive
economies.
During the 1990s most of the countries made large efforts to reduce the
size of the state by means of the privatisation of firms and financial institutions.
Argentina, Chile, and Mexico were the leading countries in privatisation, fol-
lowed by Peru and Venezuela. The principle behind their privatisation policies
was that the productive sphere of the state is no more efficient than its private
counterparts.
In the meantime, a change was emerging in the perception of Latin America.
Scholars and politicians of diverse political tendencies began to coincide in the
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opinion that the only way to end underdevelopment was the introduction of
structural reforms geared to open economies; accepted was the belief that
long-range growth could only be achieved through a new, favourable orienta-
tion of economic policies to the exporting sector. Many people who had fos-
tered traditional growth in the public sector in the 1980s requested drastic
reforms including greater fiscal discipline and more focus on international trade
and privatisation programs. Neoliberal reforms during this time became a turn-
ing point for Latin America – the point where several countries began to change
drastically.
The neoliberal approach had relevant economic consequences in Latin
America. The market-led approach replaced state-led development. Through
the reforms, growing heterogeneity in all goods produced became an impor-
tant effect of neoliberal reforms and adapting to market pressures. The capital-
intensive subsectors were more successful (had greater demand) than labour-
intensive subsectors, whose strengths relied on intensive use of natural re-
sources produced in capital-intensive plants (the Southern Cone, Brazil and
the Andean countries); another industrial strength was based on assembling
electrical goods, computers and clothes. (Mexico and Central America). There-
fore there were deep changes in the relations between the state and the society:
from the state having a monopoly on social provision to sharing it with private
groups, whether commercial, non-profit or family; from the state being the
source of all financing to private-sector financing.
US foreign policy in Latin America
US influence in Latin American countries has been and is a very important
constraint for the state and national economy in the region.
Between 1945 and 1960, American policies prioritised military and com-
mercial issues, practised direct interventions, and supported anticommunist
governments. In this period, great antagonisms between the USA and Soviet
Union characterised world politics. In technologies, the military and politics
there was a strong competence and both governments practised interventions
in Third World countries and supported opposition movements. During the
governments of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, conflictive relations reached
a climatic level. After the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO) in 1949, the Soviet Union responded with the Warsaw Pact in 1953.
In Berlin, both superpowers confronted each other to dispute the control of
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Table 2. US foreign policy in Latin America, 1945–2008
Adminis-
tration
Truman /
Eisen-
hower
Kennedy
Years
in office
1945–
1961
1961–
1963
Info on world
context
– American politics
prioritised military and
commercial issues,
practised direct inter-
ventions and supported
anticommunist govern-
ments
– Great antagonism and
competition between
the US and Soviet Un-
ion
– Conflictive relations
were high
– North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO)
founded in 1949, coun-
tered with Warsaw Pact
in 1953
– Disputed control of
Berlin, Soviet support of
communist govern-
ments, US attempt to
preserve stability in Asia
and lead reconstruction
process in Western
Europe through the
Marshall Plan
Relationship with
Latin America
– Diplomacy, signings of treaties, and
participation in inter-American
organisations allowed US governments
to have influence in LA
e.g. TIAR treaty for mutual assistance in
defence issues and Organisation of
American States (OAS)
– US supported LA governments
through military assistance such as aid,
training and weapons
– LA governments pleaded for more
economic aid from the US and for bilat-
eral relations in meetings of OAS
– “North-south conflict” – LA govern-
ments denounced unjust structure of
economic order and international trade
that always favoured northern countrie
– Different priorities: political approxi-
mation of governments and developmen-
tal programs
– Fear that beliefs of Cuban Revolution
would spread
– Providing weapons, teams and training
to LA armed forces
– Did not want to assist authoritarian
governments, so ended military aid to
Argentina and Guatemala and broke
relations with non-democratic govern-
ments like Dominican Republic.
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Johnson
Nixon /
Ford
1963–
1969
1969–
1977
– Feared advances of the
Soviet Union
– Cuba sent troops to
Angola
– US lost the Vietnam War
– US influence in Middle
East threatened by the Is-
raeli-Arab conflict of 1973
– Internally US plagued
with unemployment,
inflation, and political
tensions
– Thought more emphasis was needed
on real problems of region, such as:
decades of postponement, scarce social
development, poverty, inequalities, social
injustice, and lack of democratisation
– Alliance for Progress – three main
objectives: social development, structural
change, and democratisation, with most
important points of the program being to:
1) Develop and strengthen democratic
institutions,
2) Accelerate of economic and social
development,
3) Avoid analphabetism and improve
education in all areas,
4) Improve work conditions and wages
5) Promote health programs, especially,
the eradication of epidemics,
6) Reform tax policies,
7) Expand agrarian reforms,
8) Control inflation and restore fiscal
discipline,
9) Stimulate private enterprises to gen-
erate employment.
– Alliance lost its force with Kennedy’s
assassination
– Disregarded Alliance for Progress in
order to focus on other priorities in
domestic politics and improve the
domestic economy
– In LA, US supported non-democratic
governments again e.g.
Chilean military government of
A. Pinochet
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Carter
Reagan
Bush /
Clinton /
Bush
(1990–
2008)
1977–
1981
1981–
1989
1989–
current
– Priorities were: energy
crisis, economic
recovery, and security
– Cuba continued
intervention in Angola/
Ethiopia
– Soviet Union invaded
Afghanistan
– American embassy in
Iran was invaded by
Islamic extremists
– Abandoned the
dominant militaristic
goals
of the past and
incorporated more
cooperative elements
– Enlargement and
Engagement policy that
included the support and
promotion of democracy,
free market, and free
trade.
– Wanted to improve international im-
age of US, avoid friction with LA coun-
tries
– Constant approach to democratic
governments, with periodic meetings
with LA leaders
– Torrijos-Carter Treaty returned the
sovereignty of the Panama Canal to
Panama in 2000
– Focused on diplomatic procedures and
diminished use of military force
e.g. Providing aid to Nicaragua after
Sandinista Revolution of 1979
– Human rights was an important priority
– sent emissaries who made regular
reports
– Cut aid to countries such as Uruguay
and Argentina as a result of these
reports
– Moderately favoured all types of
states, so long as they were a guarantee
against communism and Soviet influence
– Re-established the sale of weapons
and delivered high volumes of military
aid
– Aid in wars against rebels
– Played an essential role in overcoming
the debt crisis in LA
– In LA, many countries that had had
authoritarian governments became demo-
cratic, except Cuba and a few others
– Strategy of Security for the Americas
(1995) – declared the prosperity and
liberty of their citizens as priorities,
recognised new threats: drug trafficking
and terrorism, trade and proliferation of
weapons, weak governments, ethnic
conflicts, humanitarian crisis, natural
disasters, immigration, tension in the
relations between civilians and military.
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– Main threat of Soviet
Union disappeared at the
beginning of 1990s,
making the US the
greatest economic and
military power
– LA increased in importance for US
because of proximity and destabilising
potential
– Cocaine production and trade
– Unequal income distribution and lack
of adequate regulation caused
discontentment and frustrations, and the
conditions for crime increased
– Immigration to US stimulated by low
life conditions/lack of possibilities
– USA’s solution was that democracy and
human rights could help to provide a
stable long-term political environment,
which could help the middle class to
economically grow and prosper
– Economy, development, free commerce
and privatisation could help consolidate
democracy and human rights
– Democracy as a guarantee for peace
– Free trade was the first prescription for
economic growth
– In 1991, US suffered from high
unemployment rates, so the stimulation
of domestic markets through exports was
necessary, making LA important markets
for US exports.
the city. The Soviet Union supported many communist movements and govern-
ments; for example, the communist government of North Korea in a war against
the USA. In Western Europe, the USA government led the reconstruction
process through the Marshall Plan and intervened to preserve stability in Asia.
Diplomacy, the signing of treaties, and participation in inter-American organi-
sations all had important roles for USA governments during this period. In
1947, the USA government signed a treaty for mutual assistance in defence
issues (TIAR), and in 1948 the foundation Charter of the OAS. Thus, the USA
governments supported Latin American governments through military assist-
ance such as aid, training and weapons. During this period, the US govern-
ments recognised any government able to maintain order. In Latin America, US
governments directly supported authoritarian and semi-democratic governments,
and intervened in the Caribbean and Central American countries. The Latin
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American governments pleaded for more economic aid from the USA through
their bilateral relations, multilateral diplomacy, and actions at the meetings of
the United Nations and the OAS. In regard to the “North-South Conflict”,
many Latin American governments denounced the unjust structure of the eco-
nomic order and international trade that always favoured northern countries,
and they demanded greater support from industrialised countries in the devel-
opment of South America.
During the era of President John F. Kennedy in the first half of the 1960s
the US had two priorities: closer political relations with moderate Latin Ameri-
can governments and aid programs for development. The Kennedy administra-
tion, fearing that the ideas of the Cuban Revolution would expand to other
Latin American countries, created an integral program with economic and mili-
tary aspects (Schoultz 1998: 356–358). The Kennedy administration was
convinced that the foreign policy of the US government in Latin America had
not been successful because it did not give enough attention to the real prob-
lems which characterised the entire region: decades of neglect, little social
development, poverty, inequalities, social injustice and lack of democratisation.
For instance, the US believed that a true economic and social revolution in
Latin America with US support was necessary, and that it would include a set of
deep structural reforms for change and progress. The official policy was titled
“Alliance for Progress,” and it had three main objectives: social development,
structural change, and democratisation. The most important points of the pro-
gram were to develop and strengthen democratic institutions; accelerate eco-
nomic and social development; defeat illiteracy and improve education in all
areas; improve work conditions and wages; promote health programs, espe-
cially the eradication of epidemics; reform tax policies; expand agrarian re-
forms; control inflation and restore fiscal discipline; and stimulate private en-
terprises to generate employment. The Kennedy administration promised 20
billion dollars over 10 years, and delivered one billion dollars in 1962. This aid
was channelled through the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the
programs were implemented through governments and several social organisa-
tions. The Program compromised the support of the ECLAC, which provided
technical personal and specialised studies. Militarily, the US aid financed pro-
grams against radical left organisations and public security, provided weapons,
teams and training to Latin-American armed forces. But the Kennedy adminis-
tration did not want to help authoritarian governments, ended military aid to
Argentina and Guatemala, and even broke relations with non-democratic gov-
ernments such as the Dominican Republic.
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After the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963, the Alliance
lost its strength. At the end of the 1960s, the administration of President
Lyndon Johnson disregarded the Alliance for Progress because there were other
priorities at home such as improving the domestic economy and gaining sup-
port for the American incursion in Vietnam. Presidents Richard Nixon and
Gerald Ford feared the advances of the Soviet Union. During their terms in
office, Cuba sent troops to Angola, the United States lost the Vietnam War and
the US influence in the Middle East was threatened by the Arab-Israeli conflict
of 1973. Internally, the USA suffered unemployment, inflation, and political
tensions. In Latin America, the US government supported non-democratic
governments again. For example, it used resources to finance the forces against
leftist forces and governments such as Chile’s socialist president, Salvador Allende
(Hastedt 2005: 300–301). In the second half of the 1970s, President Jimmy
Carter also changed the US foreign policy in Latin America. He was interested
in improving the international image of the USA. The Carter administration
was consistent in supporting democratic governments. This policy was carried
out through periodic meetings with Latin American leaders with whom the
president consulted on a series of matters. One of the most prominent cases
was the call from President Carter to sugar producers to discuss the subsidies
that his nation gave its producers, in Washington D.C. The Carter administra-
tion tried to resolve pending topics in order to avoid friction with Latin Ameri-
can countries. Among these topics, the most important one was the negotia-
tion and signing of the Torrijos-Carter Treaty, which returned the sovereignty
of the Panama Canal to Panama in 2000. The Carter administration focused
on diplomacy in the US foreign policy, decreased the use of military force, and
made human rights an important priority. The most popular case was Nicara-
gua; after the Sandinista revolution of 1979, the first reaction of Carter was to
talk with the new leftist government and provide aid. The president sent emis-
saries to different countries to find out the real facts behind the issue. With this
information, the Carter administration cut aid to countries such as Uruguay
and Argentina. Likewise, the US government enlarged the budget for the In-
ternational Commission of Human Rights and got 14 Latin American countries
to ratify the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Cuba continued its
intervention in Angola and Ethiopia, and the Soviet Union invaded Afghani-
stan (1979). The American embassy in Iran was occupied by Islamic extrem-
ists. In Latin America, Nicaragua fell into the hands of a leftist revolutionary
government (1979), and leftist extremist groups gained control of the govern-
ment of El Salvador. In Jamaica, President Michael Manley moved closer to
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Fidel Castro, and the small island of Grenada was invaded by Marxist rebels.
The dominant view of world policy in the USA was very insecure, and confron-
tations with the Soviet Union were common. The Reagan administration saw
Latin America as one of its main priorities, specifically Central America and the
Caribbean. The US government moderately favoured all type of regimes when
they were a guarantee against communism and the influence of the Soviet
Union. In military relations, the sale of weapons was re-established and high
volumes of military aid were delivered, such as 20 million US dollars to El
Salvador in 1985. The American government continued aiding Central Ameri-
can governments in wars against rebels. Likewise, the US government inter-
vened militarily in Grenada to remove Marxists groups. In Nicaragua the US
financed the “contras” movement and exercised a permanent military pres-
sure in the zone through the presence of aircraft off the coast of Honduras.
During the second Reagan administration, the US government proposed that
the leftist rebels of El Salvador work for change through elections. At the
same time, the Reagan government helped Mexico surmount its recession in
1982, and played an important role in overcoming the debt crisis in Latin
America.
In the 1990s, an integrated American foreign policy for Latin America
emerged. The US government abandoned its dominant militaristic goals of the
past, and incorporated more cooperative elements in inter-American relations.
The new policy was called Enlargement and Engagement, adopted from the
Republican government of President George Bush (1989–1993) onwards. It
was consolidated in the Democratic administration of President Bill Clinton
(1993–2001) and followed by the administration of the second President Bush
(2001–2009). This policy included the support and promotion of democracy,
free markets and trade. At the beginning of the 1990s, the supposed main
threat for the security of the United States, the Soviet Union, disappeared. The
USA became the greatest economic and military power, and had the added
prestige and satisfaction of being the winner of a long ideological battle. The
American model of democracy and a free market economy became hegemonic
in the world. In Latin America, most countries that had had authoritarian gov-
ernments between 1960 and 1980 became democratic, except Cuba and
a few other countries. The US government designed the Strategy of Security
for the Americas in 1995. In State Department documents, the government
declared the prosperity and liberty of its citizens as priorities. This would be
accomplished by protecting and maintaining world stability, especially in Latin
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America. The US government recognised new threats: drug trafficking and
terrorism, the trade and proliferation of weapons, weak governments, ethnic
conflicts, humanitarian crisis, natural disasters, and immigration. Latin America
acquired more importance for the US government, not only because of its
proximity (Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean above all), but also
because of its destabilising potential for the United States. Colombia, Peru, and
Bolivia have been the main producers of cocaine in the world and the United
States is probably the main consumer. This situation caused high expenses in
health care centres and increased crime in the streets. The Caribbean, Buenos
Aires and Mexico were the principal routes for the cocaine trade to the United
States. Although democracy was and is the rule, in some countries Latin Ameri-
can governments and institutions were weak. Income distribution and lack of
adequate regulations continued to be problems in the region. This causes dis-
content and frustration, and the conditions for crime and insecurity increase.
Thus, poor conditions for important sectors of the population and lack of
possibilities to improve living conditions and human development prompted
a large flow of immigrants to the United States, causing complex problems for
the society. The State Department declared the aforementioned issues as the
principal threats for the countries, and urged the need for political answers to
stabilise the hemisphere through an increase in prosperity. In the US govern-
ment’s view, democracy and human rights could help to provide a stable long-
term political environment, which could economically help the middle class to
grow and prosper. Economic development, free trade, and privatisations could
help consolidate democracy and human rights. Democracy was regarded as
a guarantee for peace. Free trade was the first prescription for economic growth
because it promoted the use of comparative advantages, competitiveness, in-
novation, and greater efficiency.
In 1991, the economy of the USA suffered high unemployment rates, and
nearly 10 million people could not find employment. Stimulation of the domes-
tic market through exports was necessary. In this context, Latin America and
the Caribbean became the third most important market for American exports
between 1987 and 1993. Latin American economies grew between 3 and 4%
per year, while the industrialised OECD countries only had a rate of 0.9%. The
American investments in Latin America reached 89 billion US dollars. Three of
the main oil exporters to the United States were Venezuela, Trinidad and To-
bago, and Mexico. Chile was the main producer and exporter of copper, Brazil
of steel and Jamaica, Surinam and Guyana of bauxite.
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Since the 1990s, the USA has played an active role in the promotion of
democracy and free markets. The US government has promoted presidential
summits known as the Summit of the Americas. In these meetings, presidential
groups have worked towards common goals. The US foreign policy created the
mechanism of meetings and consultations at a high level that began for the first
time in December of 1994 in Miami (later came Santiago in 1998, Quebec in
2001, and Mar del Plata in 2005, among others). The principal commitments
decided at the summits were: to promote communities, fortify dialogue among
social groups and a consensus regarding democracy, lend aid in areas such as
judicial and legislative procedures, governmental reforms and other institu-
tional changes, guarantee the respect of constitutional rights, promote instru-
ments for the defence of human rights, provide regular financing of electoral
processes, and fortify the role of local governments in each country. In 2001,
the fundamental Democratic Chart for strengthening democracy and protec-
tion mechanisms was created. The US government cooperated through the
Agency of International Development (USAID), regional programs set up to
fortify democracy, support regional institutions and networks that served as
agents for democratisation processes, promote human rights, ensure transpar-
ent elections, civil society, and decentralisation, and help implement judicial
system reforms. Part of the American aid was conducted through the Pan-
American Institute of Human Rights, the Center for Electoral Promotion and
Advice which carried out training, publications and offered technical aid to
governments.
Regarding relations between the armed forces and society, the US govern-
ment supported stronger trust between the two. The first Summit of Defence
of the Continent took place in Williamsburg in July 1995. There, 34 govern-
ments agreed to preserve democracy, develop measures of mutual confidence,
work for the subordination of the armed forces to civilian control, participate in
projects of humane relief and peace-keeping missions, and collaborate in the
war against drugs. A complete revision of its military contacts with the region
was initiated. The controversial School of the Americas was renamed as the
“Western Hemisphere Institute for Security and Cooperation”. The training
that was regularly provided to Latin Americans had a special emphasis in the
teaching of human rights. The peaceful resolution of regional conflicts was
supported. It offered mediation in the conflict that Peru and Ecuador faced,
2005–2006, supported negotiations for the end of the civil war in El Salva-
dor, assisted in the process of reconciliation in Nicaragua, and offered its serv-
ices in the territorial disputes between Colombia and Venezuela, and El Salva-
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dor and Honduras. In 1993, it led the multinational force of the United Na-
tions that restored the democratic government of Jean Bertrand Aristide in
Haiti.
The support and promotion of the free market and economic integration
played an important role in helping Latin American countries to achieve more
development and prosperity as guarantees of security in the Hemisphere.
Through the enlargement of multilateral credit agency capital, the US govern-
ment helped countries such as Argentina, Bolivia and Brazil to stabilise their
economies. These countries were benefited by special support to pay credit
services or undertake developmental programs. In exchange, the World Bank,
BID and IMF required them to undertake far-reaching economic reforms in
order to liberalise capital markets and trade, and facilitate privatisations. The
most symbolic case was Mexico, where the US government offered a package
of 40 billion dollars to avoid financial collapse in 1994. The free trade integra-
tion process was initiated by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA);
the USA, Mexico, and Canada became an important commercial area in the
world with 426 million people and a volume of trade totalling 289.3 billion
dollars. The US government justified the argument that NAFTA would create
more jobs in the United States. This was thought of as a balance to control the
instability that would come from Mexico. Thus, the United States was sure that
through trade liberalisation Mexico would start democratisation. Furthermore,
it was believed that trade liberation and cooperation would increase the control
of drug and human trafficking. In this period, the US government began free
trade agreement negotiations with Chile and other countries.
In 2001, President George W. Bush maintained the same political policies
as his father and President Bill Clinton: strengthening and promoting democ-
racy, free markets and free trade. However, from September 11, 2001, a new
pillar of security reinforcement was created. The terrorist attacks that took
place on that day affected American security profoundly. In a short time do-
mestic measures for security were taken such as restructuring intelligence serv-
ices, greater control of immigration, and creating a special department for the
protection of American citizens, the Homeland Security Office, and the Patriot
Act to prevent and investigate any source of terrorism. A new Strategy of
National Security emerged that emphasised preventive war. Any country threat-
ened by terrorist activities or supporting terrorist groups would face interven-
tion, even when an offensive attack had not been initiated.
US foreign policy formed a coalition for the “war against terrorism”. The
cooperation involved treaties for coordinated actions against terrorism, detec-
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tion measures, detailed lists of dangerous groups that promoted or practised
terrorist acts, and offensive actions against Afghanistan and Iraq. Complemen-
tary policies to improve security included: an increase in national security, eco-
nomic prosperity measures, reinforcement of the law, promotion of democracy,
and answers to other global issues such as the environment, population growth,
and health.
The Framework for Strategic Planning in 2004 followed national interests
and focused on peace and security. Sustainable development and global inter-
ests were included, such as the promotion of international understanding and
strengthening of diplomatic channels. The 14 strategic objectives did not in-
clude population or health issues.
The US government continued to support reinforcement programs for de-
mocracy, promoting the implementation of second-generation reforms which
were discussed at the presidential summits of the Americas. In this context, the
USA has supported programs that connect Latin American citizens with their
governments, decentralise political power, and promote citizen participation in
political procedures, public policies, transparency and government effectiveness.
The Human Aid, Conflict and Democracy Program, financed by USAID
since 1996, included an annual budget of 2.4 million US dollars, a figure
which had increased to 3.8 million US dollars by 2006. The objectives of the
program are: to support policies and anticorruption reforms through networks,
training and revising treaties; to protect human rights and achieve equal access
to justice which is implemented through training programs at the Pan-Ameri-
can Institute of Human Rights and OAS; to fortify democratic political parties
through financial aid; to support democratisation and decentralisation reforms
through specific programs for management and citizen participation.
The US government has continued programs that encourage economic
growth and free markets. Economic growth is essential to achieving stability
and security. The USA has continued with the program “Special Opportunities
for Development”, which promotes agriculture and trade, and spent 40.6 mil-
lion dollars in 2005 and 11.6 million dollars in 2006. This initiative aims to
stimulate private sector institutions that support small businesses, reinforces
civilian society through the promotion of unions (carried out by the Pan-American
Center for Labor Solidarity), and improves legal frameworks and justice sys-
tems through the Centre of Regional Studies of Justice.
Another program involved in the objective of economic development is the
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), whose budget was 1 billion US dollars in
2005 and 5 billion in 2006. The program is a global initiative that rewards
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actions that: favour effective social investments, fight corruption, and open mar-
kets. At present there are three beneficiaries: Nicaragua, Bolivia and Honduras.
The US government continues to implement its agenda of free trade. There
is new interest in continued trade with Latin America because of important
trade partners such as the MERCOSUR. Latin America and the Caribbean are
the main markets for American exports. NAFTA is another trade partner, and
has doubled the trade between countries in ten years. After the free trade
agreement with Chile (2003), American exports increased by 33%, and the
Chilean and American market together by 27%. American exports increased by
100% during the last decade.
In the USA, there is a very positive perception regarding the agreements
signed with Chile, Canada and Mexico. The American foreign policy agenda now
includes: negotiating a free trade agreement with Andean countries such as Peru,
Colombia, and Ecuador, ratifying the agreements with Central America and the
Dominican Republic, and extending free trade agreements to other countries.
The USA program of hemispheric cooperation provides 150 million US dollars
each year to various countries in order to fortify their commercial capacity.
An important focus in American foreign policy is to change former military
programs. There is special interest in the wars against terrorism and drugs. For
“Plan Colombia”, whose goal is to combat drugs, started in 2000 by the Co-
lombian president, Andrés Pastrana, the US government provided a package
of aid of more than 1.3 billion US dollars. Before 9/11 the main objective of
this aid was to stop and control the production of drugs, eradicate cultivations,
and offer alternative cultivation programs. After 9/11, the program was ex-
panded with more than 500 million US dollars to fight insurgency and prevent
traditional violence in Colombia, especially the guerrilla warfare of the FARC –
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia), ELN – Ejercito de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army),
and AUC – Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, the paramilitary self-defence
forces of Colombia. The US government wanted to avoid the possibility that
these guerrilla groups could transform themselves into allies of international
terrorist organisations. Since September 2001, the official list of terrorist groups
includes the ELN, FARC, and AUC. In 2003, American troops intervened to
combat guerrilla groups and organised crime. At the end of 2003, the US
government reinforced its cooperation with the launching of the Patriotic Plan,
a military offensive to recover territories in the hands of the FARC.
Anti-terrorist aid between 2002 and 2005 provided 30 million US dollars
in efforts to prevent ransoms in Colombia. In addition, a total of 3.9 million US
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dollars was used for the borders of Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina. In 2004,
20 million dollars was spent by Mexico to increase border security through
new technologies such as computer systems and training Mexican immigration
officials.
The US government has invested in weapons and military assistance. There
was a progressive increase of military assistance between 2002 and 2003, the
number of Latin-American troops trained by the United States increasing by
50%, the majority from Colombia, with 12,967 soldiers in 2003, while Bolivia
had 245, Panama 914, Peru 680 and Ecuador 662. Peru, Bolivia and Colom-
bia were cocaine producers. Colombia has been the major focus of instability
and potential terrorism in Latin America according to the United States. In
2000, military assistance began to decrease, in contrast to economic and so-
cial aid. However, military assistance recovered in 2002 after the terrorist
attacks. In 1996, military assistance was 161 million US dollars and economic
aid was 547 million. In 2000, economic aid totaled more than 950 million
dollars. In 2003, military assistance provided 866 million dollars and eco-
nomic aid totaled 937 million.
Currently, American foreign policy in Latin America focuses on democracy,
free markets, and free trade, and represents important progress in the Ameri-
can approach. Changes in the international context explain part of this trend.
Between 1990 and 2008, the economic and political stability of Latin Ameri-
can countries was very important for the USA to continue the path of prosper-
ity (Noriega 2009). Therefore, the United States had to safeguard its borders
against terrorism and organised crime. Through its support of democracy, eco-
nomic growth, and security for Latin American countries, the US government
has created allies and strong partners for its war against terrorism.
In Latin America there is criticism regarding some priorities of the USA.
One criticism is that the USA prioritises the military over other important top-
ics such as economic and social development. There is criticism of immigration
policies (approximately four million Aztecs had to wait to normalise their legal
situation as immigrants in the USA). Many people of Latin America believed
that US policy-makers ignored the financial crisis that struck Argentina, Brazil,
and Uruguay in 2002. Many people believe in trade and social development,
while rejecting terrorism and military security. Nevertheless, the facts and fig-
ures clearly show that there have been tremendous advances in cooperation
between the United States and Latin America.
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Summary
This study began with a discussion about how historical traditions have played
a primary role in shaping Latin America’s current situation; on the one hand
economic growth, on the other hand extensive poverty. Marginalisation and
social exclusion, restricted autonomy, lack of stability, and lack of consolidated
democracies are some of the current conditions in Latin America that are
a result of long historical precedents.
Three factors explain factors such as these (i.e. underdevelopment) in Latin
America in the present time: 1. Segregated society that is not integrated,
2. Authoritarian political culture (centralist, non-inclusive), 3. Lack of genuine
participation in political institutions. Historic tradition, especially the conquest
and colonisation of Latin America by the Spanish and Portuguese, helps to
explain how some of these factors came to exist and persist. Iberian societies
had strong convictions that their culture was superior, and their religion (Chris-
tianity) was seen as the pinnacle of civilisation. From initial colonisation, the
monarchies wanted complete political and cultural domination. The colonising
monarchies also wanted consolidation, and strengthening of their state for more
complete control of the native population. The monarchy’s regulations pro-
moted the spread of conservative European social structures, institutions and
products (vegetables and animals). At the same time, atrocities were committed
against native populations (illness, slavery, abuse, conversion) and a bureau-
cratic-administrative apparatus (legal and administrative) emerged that held
tight control with ordinances that outlined every aspect of colonial life. The
historical legacy of colonisation has had many consequences for Latin America:
the transfer of European institutions, a 500 year legacy that influences every-
thing from urbanisation to religion and culture, measures which separated the
natives from the colonists, and a conservative social structure that was very
difficult to change.
Authoritarian traditions and economic dependence on commodities are also
legacies and practices from the colonial period. The ideas from the Enlighten-
ment crossed the Atlantic Ocean with the spread of European colonialism and
the ruling governments in Latin America became absolutist and modern (Spain
and Portugal). These governments took free trade steps to provide incentives
for mining and agriculture to develop natural resources. Free trade produced
commercial expansion and signified concrete benefits for many sectors. How-
ever, measures for the improvement of production – like free trade, elimination
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of taxes that impeded production, stimuli to facilitate the use of natural resources
with modern technologies, investments to improve transportation, incentives for
promoting areas with export advantages like agriculture and mining – gener-
ated very vulnerable economic structures in Latin America, dependence on
commodities, and foreign trade. The fundamental economic goal was not ac-
complished, mainly because the economic systems of Spain and Portugal were
not in conditions to satisfy the demand of the American territories with manu-
factured products. Even after the colonial period ended, the rich/poor, de-
veloped/less-developed relationship between Western Europe and its former
colonies was established. Thus, Europe used its economic power to further
influence, control, and profit from Latin America’s economy. In most Latin
American countries, the economy and politics were still dominated by a small
Creole elite, descendents of the colonisers. This hierarchy of power was estab-
lished through Colonialism.
In the first decades of the nineteenth century, the costly wars for independ-
ence and differences in political ideologies among the elites were obstacles to
progress. The period immediately after independence was characterised by
economic stagnation, political instability, chaos, and authoritarian leaders. The
Enlightenment was not successful, and most of the new states did not experi-
ence a real revolution and continued colonial era practices, or fell into long
periods of chaos.
The application of liberal economic principles produced a radical transfor-
mation of living conditions both in Latin America and in the rest of the world,
and in the region reinforced open markets, foreign trade as a motor of eco-
nomic growth, and modernisation. In their new role in the international mar-
ket, Latin America countries acted as exporters of commodities and importers
of consumer goods, capital, and technology. The arrival of European immi-
grants was welcomed to help industrialise and cooperate through knowledge
transfer and capital. Liberalism’s positive legacies were foreign trade and external
investments, because improved economic growth left Latin America better pre-
pared for the subsequent stages in development and globalisation. On the other
hand, liberalism reinforced the status of Latin America as a peripheral region in
the international order – very dependent on foreign capital and technologies.
Despite socialist ideology being incorporated into many of the policies of
Latin American governments from the 1940s to the 1980s (ISI for one), Cuba
has been Latin America’s long-term manifestation of socialist revolution/gov-
ernment. There have been other revolutions and socialist governments in sev-
eral countries, but these have mostly been short-lived.
239PATRICIO VALDIVIESO  • THE STATE AND NATIONAL ECONOMY
The Catholic Church has had an extreme impact on economic, political and
social development around the world, and especially in Latin America. Like
other movements, the Catholic Church designed reform policies to address
socio-economic problems in Latin American such as poverty, social exclusion,
and inequalities in social development. The Church provided solutions for re-
forms to solve social problems and improve its status in relation to the state. In
the late 1960s, the Latin American Church encouraged agrarian reforms and
lower inflation, increased industrialisation, improved education, and supported
a program for more housing and changes in labour legislation. Some reforms
lasted, others did not, and they had many implications for the role of the state
even today. For example, all Latin American countries incorporated into their
constitutions the principles of solidarity and social justice as fundamental for
the state.
From 1940 until 1980, the state played a key guiding role in the ISI strat-
egy by creating a climate for industrial development. Tariffs on consumer im-
ports, import quotas, multiple exchange rates making state-favoured imports
cheaper, and politically determined interest rates to facilitate borrowing and
industrial expansion were all used. In certain strategic sectors (steel, petro-
leum, electricity), the state took a direct role in production, through either
nationalising existing industries, or establishing new ones. The attempt to
strengthen the industrialisation process led countries to attract multinational
companies and foreign investment to set up subsidiaries to manufacture for
their domestic markets, sometimes with the condition that they use parts manu-
factured nationally by relatively small domestic firms. The major ISI achieve-
ments were higher GDP growth rates in Latin America during the periods
1945–1972 and 1972–1981 than had been achieved before or since and
faster growth of GDP per capita. In some countries manufacturing became an
engine for growth, supported by new transport and communications infra-
structure, energy supplies, and specialist agencies for the development of the
industrial, mining and agricultural sectors. However, ISI had structural prob-
lems (1960s onwards): manufacturing with protective barriers for a relatively
small home market resulted in inefficient, high-cost industries, often having
a monopoly in their own market and lacking the competition that might spur
greater efficiency; the bias against industrial exports resulted in countries re-
maining highly dependent on earning foreign exchange from their traditional
primary commodity exports in order to import the materials needed by their
manufacturing sector. Yet these traditional sectors were often neglected or dis-
criminated against in the drive to industrialise, giving rise to a growing balance
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of payments deficit as countries faced reduced foreign exchange earning but
increased costs for imports for the capital investment needed by the growing
state industrial sector and for the social investment required by the modernisa-
tion process.
Neoliberalism replaced the concept that an important condition for social
and economic progress was state intervention to correct the imbalances in
markets. Instead, neoliberalism assumed that the one and only way to have
a healthy economy and be able to develop was the market and opportunities for
private initiatives, avoiding the over-regulation and artificial taxes of the state.
Neoliberalism proposed to generate a free trade policy and globalisation of
commerce. It would open the markets, eliminate distortions, get rid of protec-
tionist bonds, and take away from the state the control of the distribution of
resources. Neoliberalism also proposed to increase transparency and participa-
tion in the market. The new view was that neoliberalism was the only way to
end underdevelopment, and it should be done through structural reforms fo-
cused on open economies, and that long-range growth could only be reached
through a new favourable orientation of economic policies to the exporting
sector. The new strategy of development required the liberalisation of econo-
mies, commercial openings by eliminating protectionist barriers (tariff and non-
tariff) and structural adjustments like legislation. The adjustment programs that
were requested by international agencies specifically consisted of reduction of
fiscal expenses (fiscal deficit), restrictive monetary policies to control inflation,
reforms of the tax system to consolidate the treasury, elimination of state sub-
sidies, removal of price controls (prices related to law of supply and demand,
including state services), deregulation of markets, efficient distribution of eco-
nomic resources, increased privatisation of public and state businesses, and
profit management.
Through neoliberal policies, Latin America may have inserted itself better
into the world economy through globalisation, but that does not mean that
everyone has received the benefits from this. With the economic reforms of the
1980s and 1990s, Latin American countries experienced a serious recession.
This included lack of capital (because of debt payment), and a decrease in
investment, production, and consumption. Public social services like health and
education deteriorated and caused serious social problems, and 35% of the
population suffered from poor living conditions. The problems caused a large
amount of distrust in government.
At present, an alternative point of view to neoliberalism focuses on the
structural problems in Latin American countries. Population growth and inter-
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nal migration to urban areas gave rise to economic problems such as poverty
and the persistence of income inequalities. Latin American countries are de-
pendent on industrialised countries, both technologically and in terms of debt.
Everybody agrees that markets needed to be deregulated, liberalised, and par-
tially privatised, but alternative opinions believe that there should have been
complementary state action.
Conclusion: State, national economy
and reforms
After decades of instability and authoritarian experiences, since 1978 Latin
America has become a democratic continent with economic growth and progress.
Currently, there are five important related tasks: economic growth, social equality,
redesign of public institutions, democratisation of democracy and globalisation.
The signs of globalisation have been contradictory. On the one hand, greater
interdependence, transport progress, economic growth to respond to the needs
of large global economic players, rather than focus on the development of
one’s own country, and on the other hand, vulnerability as shown by the cur-
rent economic crisis (2008–2009), increased poverty, and social fragmenta-
tion. Governments have to lead by applying pressure to resolve both domestic
and international problems. The most persistent problem in Latin America is
the low level of human security, development, and socio-economic rights. Ex-
treme poverty and inequality have disqualified millions of people from becom-
ing “agents”. The institutional capacity of Latin American governments does
not appear strong enough to manage the national economy toward better liv-
ing conditions and social welfare for the majority. The region suffers from an
institutional delay, preventing it from facing the new challenges raised by
globalisation. Institutional delay causes problems of governability in several
countries due to a lack of state legitimacy. For example, in the last two decades
this crisis of governability has appeared as a recurring theme in many countries
(Arce 2009). In Latin America there has been disenchantment and disagree-
ment regarding the economic reforms introduced as a direct consequence of
the debt crisis and neoliberalism in the 1980s. The 1990s were poor in socio-
economic and human development. On the one hand, the economic indicators
presented a good GIP in relation to other regions in the world (annual average
Latin America 3.4%, United States 2.2% and European Union 2.0%). Without
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any doubt, economic growth and macroeconomic stability demonstrated the
success of first generation reforms. On the other hand, alarming information
from the World Bank indicated that 36% of the population was considered
poor. Moreover, the difference in incomes and living conditions between rich
and poor populations has increased dramatically, and opportunities for devel-
opment have become extremely unequal (Valdivieso 2003).
In Latin America there is growing awareness that free markets and eco-
nomic growth cannot operate alone, separately from social justice and political
democracy (Colloredo-Mansfeld 2009; García-Heras 2009). One can appre-
ciate that first generation reforms, neoliberalism and globalisation did not solve
many issues, because their object was to expand markets and support economic
stability.
Bad economic policy can erode political stability, but inequality in income
distribution and lack of opportunities, liberties and political expression can
create an unmanageable country. The improvement in quality of democracy is
not a natural consequence of the democratisation of political regimes. This
improvement requires, among other things, authentic civic participation. Dur-
ing the last wave of democratisation in Latin America at the end of the 1970s,
the experiences of political regimes led to the realisation that the existence of
democratic practices such as periodic elections, political parties, and classical
liberties are not enough to improve the quality of social integration, national
cohesion, democratic life and development. The latter requires authentic par-
ticipation of citizens, individually and collectively, in all spheres of socio-eco-
nomic and political life, as agents who can experience the basic promises of
democracy. Public opinion would like greater efficiency from states. For exam-
ple, excessive bureaucracy should be reduced, and social participation should
increase. The ways to have a better future are through citizen participation in
the administration of public policies, measures promoting transparency, effi-
ciency and nondiscrimination, and modernisation reforms (Valdivieso 2001,
2007).
Traditional contradictions between formal declared rights and the practical
use of rights persist in many countries of the world. Certainly, it is recognised
that every person has minimal rights that correspond to human rights and
a democratic government, but the majority of people have difficulty in exercis-
ing their basic economic and social rights. In many regions of Latin American
countries, many people do not feel protected from institutional or social vio-
lence. With difficult access to state institutions, many are forced to live in pov-
erty, systematic humiliation, and insecurity. The violence can be practised in the
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same institutions or services that are designed to serve the people. If the peo-
ple are materially and legally vulnerable and poor, and systematically humili-
ated, they cannot be well integrated in society and state, cohesion becomes
weak, and development becomes difficult.
Given this background, reforms are necessary to increase socio-economic
development, and the quality of life of the people and the democracy. If these
reforms are really used for the exercise of citizens’ rights in their day to day
lives, Latin American countries will achieve a better future. Currently, Latin
American reforms focus on redefining the tasks of the state and its institutions,
renovating the state apparatus, and fortifying its intervention to integrate the
national economy in a sustainable social order. For example, the present re-
forms aim to strengthen ties between the output of state institutions and input
of civil society (citizens’ needs). The relationship between state and civil society
needs to be redefined.
As in other regions of the world, in Latin America the state is an institution-
alised channel for modernisation and development. In some cases, there are
numerous circumstances that explain the strength of the states and institutions:
historical legacy, state identity, efficient institutions, and an increase in state
regulations in the two last centuries. Nevertheless, one cannot overlook the
important role of the civil society. At critical moments in historical develop-
ment, the society’s civil organisations have led strategies and projects for de-
velopment. For example, the Chilean economic model and several related poli-
cies were produced in the 1950s and 1960s through initiatives in the social
sphere, centre-left groups and extreme right or “gremialistas” and scholars of
the Catholic University of Chile. The same thing happened with justice reforms
in the 1990s through the efforts of some specific civilian organisations
(Valdivieso/Vargas 2003). Consequently, civilian society has gained influence
over time, and a case can be made that some of them have made excellent
contributions to modernisation and institutional change.
Currently, participation is a main ingredient of development. The concept
of participation refers to conventional and non-conventional participation. The
former is institutionalised participation – for example voting in elections –
while the second corresponds to participation in voluntary associations, pro-
test actions, or collective initiatives, and through confidence and trust in other
people or institutions. Latin American democracies have traditionally had con-
ventional participation. Therefore, regarding new reforms, greater participa-
tion and quality of democracy should be understood as the creation and opera-
tion of consultations and intervention mechanisms of people who are not part
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of the government apparatus, between electoral processes at several levels of
public policy.
Reforms
The struggle to modernise and develop Latin American countries started to
change in the 1980s, when the first steps in this direction were taken through
early reforms. “First Generation” reforms focused on opening the markets,
achieving macroeconomic stability, and reducing the state’s size and its role in
the economy. After years of attempting to implement the measures of the “Wash-
ington Consensus” (1990), it became clear that these reforms were not enough
to develop Latin American countries. Consequently, an understanding emerged
regarding the need for institutional and social reforms.
Reforms to the state, economy, and society in Latin America should express
the consensus of legal principles and documents such as the constitution, or-
ganic laws, and international agreements, and be related to human rights and
development. Civil, political, economic and social rights are interdependent
and related with economic, social and institutional reforms. To transform all
citizens into agents with full rights, a series of institutions and practices that
provide minimal social and economic conditions is necessary. In this way, the
reforms should improve health, education, and access to justice as conditions
for the use of rights and human development, among others.
One of the main arguments in favour of the necessity and importance of
new reforms in Latin America is that the region suffers from an institutional
delay, preventing it from facing the new challenges raised by globalisation.
New reforms can help to re-legitimate the state through support for the state,
citizenship participation, and more equality. The reform agenda can include
the modernisation and fortification of state activities (inputs and outputs), health
reforms, education, and other public services.
Latin America needs stronger states with capabilities to provide essential
functions. This is the only way to be stronger in a period marked by the effects
of the mega-trends of globalisation and democratisation. Globalisation pro-
vides possibilities for growth, cooperation, integration, and more connections
to global markets. As for democracy, Latin America now has four decades of
experience. The participation of the citizens in the decision-making process, in
planning, implementation, and control of policies and budgets, is essential to
gain consensus and social cohesion. These factors will contribute to increased
political legitimacy and governability. Besides, scholars see decentralisation and
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governability as key concepts from which to develop reforms. Decentralisation
signifies strengthening local governments such as municipalities because they
can promote efficiency in development and civil participation. Local organisa-
tions and institutions have the best chances to promote efficiency in develop-
ment and civil participation. A good example of decentralisation in reforms is
the participative decisions on fiscal budgets. Since the 1990s, several coun-
tries have introduced mechanisms for citizen participation at community levels
(for example, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Argentina and Chile). Through the dis-
cussion about budgets and fiscal expenditures, several citizens’ organisations
expressed their problems and needs, and took part in important decisions for
the future of their communities.
Goals of the new reforms are: to decrease poverty, introduce more regula-
tions, and bring about decentralisation of government to more local govern-
ment for more input from citizens. The new reforms included different fields
such as economic and public administration, more regulations to ensure no
monopolies occur (e.g. electricity, telecommunications or water supply) and
make sure standards are upheld, social security, education, health, politics to
improve citizen participation and reforms in the justice system. In a positive
sense, the new reforms are essential to improving participation and involve-
ment by more people in democratic institutions. At the same time, socio-politi-
cal, institutional and economic reforms are necessary for better economic per-
formance and conditions for democracy. From a more practical point of view,
new reforms are necessary in order to improve the living conditions of the
people and provide better governance.
Today, reforms are attempting to improve: living conditions, relations be-
tween the state and civil society and governability, and state justice. The most
important objectives for the reforms are the achievement of poverty reduction
and social development; better distribution of justice; better integration of vul-
nerable and marginalised sectors; a more efficient institutional framework, and
improvements in infrastructure. Some very important factors to consider in
relation to these reforms are: functional competition or creation of a better
atmosphere for free competition (through regulations); decentralisation; tax
policies; fight against poverty; cultural stimulus as an element of integration
into the society. The effective regulation requires an independent judicial sys-
tem, efficient legislative oversight of regulatory bodies, high levels of adminis-
trative competence, legal protection for producers and consumers, independ-
ent and inquisitive, media, and scrutiny by citizens and non-governmental
organisations.
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In present-day Latin America, there is a new approach to the connection
between the state and the national economy through reforms. First, reforms
should aspire to respect and promote human beings and their rights. Second,
public institutions should be reorganised to adapt their structures to social and
economic needs through greater participation and decentralisation. Third,
a consensus between public actors and civil society is essential, the only way
reforms can function is through gradual improvement because there are di-
verse interests and points of view in state and society, and changes in customs
are never fast. Fourth, the follow-up function of citizens is crucial for imple-
mentation and efficiency. Fifth, the re-design of institutions plus citizen partici-
pation operate as tools of political education to strengthen social networks.
Sixth, civil society organisations can operate as a bridge between citizens and
institutions by defending citizens’ interests. Seventh, the educational process
will engage in a constant fight against disinterested citizens, especially among
the youth.
Reforms, participation, and democracy
Democracy can be defined as a regime which offers access to the principal gov-
ernmental positions by means of elections, which are both clean and institution-
alised, and guarantees diverse liberties during and between these elections. As
a result, democracy is understood as a regime with basic characteristics such as
open, institutionalised elections. Nevertheless, these minimal conditions do not
assure democratic quality and the full participation of agents. As already men-
tioned, political institutions should extend the quality of agents through the
exercise of political, economic, social and cultural rights. The integration of
knowledge and social interest guarantees more efficiency, effectiveness, and
greater control of governmental acts. All of these factors are essential condi-
tions for economic performance, sustainability, and the fight against corrup-
tion. It is necessary that citizens and organisations increase their participation
and responsibility in the political process. This is the one and only method to
achieve representative and legitimate long term democracies. More interaction
by citizens in public policies will produce a greater quality of democracy. If
people find outlets for their active participation as citizens, they will develop
agency capacities. The next question to ask is how participation can expand.
The answer is not towards a few specialised social organisations different from
governments, but towards a greater amount of citizens.
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Citizens’ rights were not created by reforms, because they arrived along
with human beings. With greater steps toward more equitable access in the
world, it would become possible to exercise rights. With concrete possibilities
to exercise rights, vulnerable and marginalised people, majorities in Latin
America, could identify democracy as a minimal public good, like access to
justice and human security conditions. Furthermore, the exercise of these rights
contributes to the transition from a passive culture, without the input of citi-
zens, to a more critical and participative culture that allows democracy to
flourish.
The objectives of the current reforms are the democratisation of democracy
through the increase of access to basic goods, improvements in health systems,
and education. The result is referred to as re-legitimate institutions (the execu-
tive, legislative, judicial system, etc.). Economic performance is a necessary
condition to strengthen the middle class and eradicate poverty, and the experi-
ence of the last few decades shows that is it possible to achieve. In addition,
improvements in education have been essential to the exercise of human rights
and the increase in citizen participation in democracies. A good general educa-
tion is key for economic growth as well as for learning how political and justice
systems function with empowerment.
In the case of Latin America, there is no other way to develop than to
redistribute parts of incomes and opportunities. Redistribution is difficult be-
cause of opposition by privileged social groups and actors. For this reason,
redistribution should be prudently undertaken in order not to provoke an ag-
gressive response (the consequences in the past were not good). After stabilis-
ing the economy and restoring democracies with different degrees of quality,
Latin American countries must now make changes to increase equality, focus
on democratic practices, implement transparent practices, and become a more
integrated part of our globalised world.
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TADEUSZ PALECZNY
The State and Nation-forming
Processes in Latin America
Numerous controversies are associated with the search for a useful – i.e. true in
description and efficient in explanation – system for reconstruction of the progress
of processes of social, cultural, political and economic integration of the peoples
of Latin America. From the beginning they lead to numerous questions of
various degrees of generality and significance. Ordering these may allow us to
formulate more precisely the problem and define the path leading to a descrip-
tion of it, and also to explain the progress of nation-forming processes in Latin
America. Of special importance is the definition of their nature, and also of the
role of individual cultural units – family and tribal, ethnic, national, racial,
religious and language groups – in the reinforcement of national integration.
First, questions arise about the nature of the integration processes that
consolidate the various components, constituent elements, mostly racial, eth-
nic, regional and denominational, into broader social systems. Are we dealing
with the continuation of European models of integration, or with a new cul-
tural, political and economic order? Did Europeans, in this case Iberians, exert
a dominant influence on the shaping of Latin American societies? To what
degree may we speak in this case about an own, independent path of develop-
ment being forged in Latin American cultures? To what degree are we looking
at a homogeneous culture, and to what degree a multiplicity of cultures? Is it
justified to characterise an area of uniform religion, language, colonial tradi-
tion, and resulting values and common customs in the name of civilisation? Is
there a spirituality, a mentality specific to Latin American cultures whose mani-
festations are mysticism, irrationalism, and the tendency to formation of com-
munities? How big is the influence of racial amalgamation processes on the
Latin American “option” of integrative processes, including nation-forming?
For that reason, what is the position assumed by Latin Americans of mixed
racial origin, especially Mestizos? What role did the state play in the shaping of
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the cultures and civilisations of Latin America? Can one speak about the insti-
tution of the nation state, or would it be more proper to use the notion of civic
society? Are Christianisation and Europeanisation really the most important
processes of shaping of identity for Latin Americans? Is it possible to apply the
laws of westernisation, globalisation, and/or the model of Americanisation in
reference to the cultures of Latin America? Did the United States impose upon
Latin America the concept of “dependent” development? Is this concept being
implemented besides the economy and the state also in nation-forming processes?
Can the relatively highly integrated socially and cultured civic societies of Latin
America be characterised in the categories of nation states or nation cultures?
To order the questions, both asked and unasked, in this paper I distinguish
the following areas of analysis:
1. Can the indigenous Latin American cultures, represented by autochtho-
nous peoples, currently develop towards nation societies? Or is this more
a case of domination of connections of the pre-national type? Do Latin
American societies, with all their complexity, transform into groupings of
relatively homogeneous national culture, or rather into heterogeneous plu-
ralistic civilisation? What is taking place in the nation-forming processes
with local communities of autochthonous peoples, and also with ethnic
groups created by European and Asian immigrants? Do these cultures yield
to homogenisation, disappearance, and reduction to the identity of the Bra-
zilian or Mexican national identification type, or are there new areas of
connections appearing, characteristic of culturally complex and pluralist
societies? Are the categories of Latinos – white and non-white – integrating
and nationalising at the same pace and to the same extent?
2. What mechanisms were decisive for the actual development of integration
processes in Latin American countries? Can the individual phases of these
processes be quantitatively singled out? Have Iberisation and Christianisation
been among the most important processes shaping the cultural identity of
the Latinos? What role in Latin American nation-shaping processes was
played by the phenomena of Mestizoism, indigenism, pan-Indianism, and
pan-Americanism?
3. Are Latin American societies a continuation of European models of integra-
tion, and do they repeat the principles of nation-forming processes present
on the old continent? Do they select and shape their own path of cultural,
civic, and civilisational bonds? To what extent can we speak about the exist-
ence of original, separate principles governing the processes of assimilation
resulting from the nature of Latin American societies?
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4. Is it nations that we are dealing with in Latin America? If so, in what sense
and scope? Does the racial, ethnic and regional variety not form a signifi-
cant barrier in the transformation of complex, multicultural, highly non-
homogeneous, socially disintegrated, economically unstable, structurally
stratified civic societies into national cultures? What is the level of ethno-
centrism and nationalism in Latino ideologies and identities? Can one speak
about the opposition between European monocentrism of conservative po-
litical elites and cultural white minorities, and the polymorphism and plural-
ism of the liberally-oriented racially mixed and “coloured” Latinos?
The areas of analysis defined by the four groups of questions listed above
shall allow the ordering of notions and descriptions of the nature and progress
of nation-forming processes in Latin America. Nation or civic society, culture
or civilisation, multicultural and pluralist character or monocentrism and
homogenisation, conservative or liberal model of development, Iberisation and
enforced assimilationism or integration and voluntary acculturation, Christia-
nisation or religious syncretism, European, Western or a home-grown – Latin
American – path of development?
The actual nation-forming processes in Latin America run between the ex-
tremities of these dichotomies, embracing the dependencies of both types, con-
necting and configuring anew external and internal influences hailing from the
cultural heritage of indigenous inhabitants of Latin America and from the tra-
ditions of the arriving cultures, settling and colonising the continent.
Outline of analysis of nation-forming processes in Latin America
Culture
the Romantic model
Iberisation
Christianisation
language, religious, racial homogenisation
nation
monocentrism
conservatism
ethnocentrism
Civi l isat ion
the Enlightenment model
integration
syncretism
heterogenisation, assimilation, accultura-
tion, amalgamation, Latinisation
civic society
polymorphism
liberalism
pluralism
The table contains a simplified, general outline of the analysis that I use for
the further description and explanation of causes and results, genesis, progress,
and mechanisms that govern the development of nation-forming processes in
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Latin America. The societies of Latin American countries have been developing
according to both European and American – Western – cultural standards, and
to the mechanisms of political, economic, and cultural integration that they
themselves developed.
1. The state and national culture in Latin
American tradition
Two major European traditions have made a visible mark on the processes of
social, cultural, and political integration of peoples inhabiting the two Ameri-
can continents. Convergent in some aspects, they are nevertheless prevalently
divergent in their assumptions and impact on Latin American nation-forming
processes. The two great traditions, namely Enlightenment and Romanticism,
are similar in their belief that in the process of development and progress, the
peoples – autochthonous cultures of the two Americas – found themselves
beyond the mainstream, on the margins of events and phenomena dominated
by European national cultures. The partisans of both theoretical traditions
preached hegemony of national European cultures in the shaping of social and
cultural life in the British as well as the Spanish, Portuguese, French, and Dutch
colonies.
The Enlightenment preached the primacy of the state over tradition, lan-
guage, religion and culture – in its broad sense – as integrative and bonding
factors. The highest and the fullest stadium of development of societies in
Enlightened thought was the European nation state treated as a system of
organisation for civic society. The nation was also perceived in the categories of
state and political integration as a community of citizens equal to one another
and before the sovereign government. In Enlightened theories, the status of
nation was awarded only to those cultural communities that had their own
states. To exist and develop, a nation needed its own political organisation. On
the power of historical lag behind the romantic concept of Hegel – which made
reference to the assumptions of Enlightenment concepts on the primacy of the
natural national bond implemented in an own state – “bereaved” non-Euro-
pean cultures – as devoid of a certain “spirit” of the nation, the founding
principle that would award the primitive, wild, barbarian peoples with the abil-
ity to construct their own sovereign governments – of the right to political
national subjectivity. To quote Leopold Zea, “Hegel speaks of the existence of
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two Americas, in which the spirit finds implementation; one subjugated by
Anglo-Saxon nations, and the precursors of the other – subjugated by Iberian
nations. Both still need to conquer what has been left of nature, they must liber-
ate the spirit from the necessities that nature imposes on it” (Zea 1993: 37).
Following this concept, indigenous populations, tribal cultures lagging in
development behind European cultures and continuing their existences more
“in nature” than “in culture”, should be subjected to the civilisational influence
of European cultures, swallowed and incorporated by cultures of the “higher”
order. Following the same principle, the champions of protection of the rights
of autochthonous Indians, including the initiator of the idea Bartolomé de las
Casas, were building the foundations of the enlightened principle that the spiri-
tuality of individuals should be protected – not cultural groups sentenced to
being swallowed by European civilisation and disappearance or marginalisation.
The road to the eradication of autochthonous cultures was to lead through
Christianisation but also racial and ethnic amalgamation, which was initially
legally permitted.
The romantic cultural model of national integration considered the nation –
treated as a cultural community – as the most important factor and centre of
social integration. It is culture, and especially the language, religion, and the
belief in common ethnogenesis, that determine the division of humankind into
distinct nations and ethnic groups. States are only a certain developmental
phase of nations and – once they cease to fulfil their integrative functions –
they may disappear (Znaniecki 1990). In the “cultural” understanding, nations
and ethnic groups let the most important type of social integration emerge, and
the states only represent large cultural communities that may also create
civilisations. The differentiation of ethnic, national and racial groups leads to
such a division of the world where the dominant role is played by the fairly
homogeneous states. Nations that are better organised politically, more power-
ful militarily, and larger in the sense of human, economic, and territorial poten-
tial, show a tendency to expansion (Znaniecki 1990). Nations, according to of
the followers of this theoretical orientation, are the largest communities, grow-
ing basically from the same foundation as tribal and ethnic groups. National
affiliation is based on the fact of being born, and does not result from the
choice that is a consequence of origin. The identity of individuals is shaped
within a cultural group, within which there exists – apart from the sense of
a community bond – a powerful ideological bond shaped both on the grounds
of conviction about the existence of a common ethnogenesis and sharing the
same values, using the same language, and following the same religious creed.
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The state complements the cultural integration of the nation, and the sanction-
ing of its capacity to independent, sovereign existence. In this sense, the nation
becomes an autotelic, autonomous cultural group: the only one to have its own
state institutions.
Following the romantic tradition, where the dominant principle of shaping
the cultural and national bond is shared origin – biological heritage, the primi-
tive, autochthonous cultures in both the Americas had no opportunity to trans-
form into nations. In the new reality, the image of the social structure of popula-
tions of the two Americas, on the grounds of the radical assumptions, assumed
the form of dichotomy. On the one hand, there were the “savages”, socially
disadvantaged, culturally depreciated, religiously and civilisationally underde-
veloped, with the status of conquered people and slaves; on the other there
were the dominant “white lords”, Christians, representing higher developed
national cultures and European civilisation. In the initial phase, this model domi-
nated the processes of social and cultural integration, excluding from them
permanently the clan and tribal cultures of indigenous peoples.
The laws of the colonial model of development, dividing the cultures of
peoples inhabiting the two Americas into autochthonous and European – back-
ward, savage and barbarian, and civilised and developed – theoretically domi-
nated the social and cultural development at least to the times when the colo-
nies became independent, and practically – in the sense of changing the legal
and political order – to the moment of razing the dichotomous structure based
on slavery. To quote Leopold Zea, “Thus the Christian and European project,
which justified the first wave of expansion in the sixteenth century in America,
led to the establishment of the emancipative project of the Latinos early in the
nineteenth century. Incidentally, the emancipative project was the conclusion of
another European project, which in turn was the reaction of European moder-
nity to the antiquated project of Christianity. This reaction was visible in the
confrontation of Christianity with modernity. Part and parcel of modernity is
the European project, which aims at dominating the entire world, failing at the
same time to recognise the right of Iberian imperialism to hegemony. This is the
project of so-called Western Europe, carried out by the nations of the United
Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands in North America and in some areas of
the Antilles, spreading from there into the America that remains under Iberian
domination. This project is embodied in the North American Puritan concept”
(Zea 1993: 22).
The model of the Enlightenment, which allowed the establishment of inde-
pendent states within the same, Spanish-speaking, Catholic, Iberian cultural
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tradition, became attractive for the new republican political elites of Latin
America. It awarded the status of nation state to populations that were tribally,
ethnically, racially and linguistically divided. Operating at the same time were
the criteria of divisions transferred directly from the Hegelian tradition, where
ethnic origin and affiliation to a cultural group determined placement on the
scale of power, riches, and prestige. This is how the dimensions of social and
cultural stratification, regional and ethnic, and ideological and political divi-
sions developed and consolidated for at least three centuries. Following the
disputes about the scope of participation of members of non-European cul-
tures in the establishment of the new social order – also of the political and
legal, cultural, and economic nature – and cultural regulations, conservative
and liberal concepts arose and developed to defend the hegemony of the white,
Christian population, as did those that allowed the participation of members of
tribal and racial autochthonous groups. Additional conflicts and disputes con-
ducted against their background were borne from the presence of Africans
brought to both Americas as slaves bereft of the right to maintain their cultural
tradition. The coloured people had language, religion, and the values of na-
tional European cultures enforced, yet the scope of the phenomenon was lim-
ited and guarded by social, religious, and legal barriers.
The initial phase of building integrated Latin American societies was con-
ducted in the conditions of colonial territorial, administrative, legal, and struc-
tural links and relations, which with few exceptions excluded the possibility of
full participation of indigenous Indians and Blacks. The foundations of cultures
of the future states developed in the milieu of white colonial elites operating in
the administrative centres of Spanish, Portuguese, British, French and Dutch
colonies. After routing the French (apart from the Quebec province in Canada
and other remnants in the form of diaspora cultures, for examples the Acadians
and Cajuns) and the Dutch (apart from small enclaves in the Caribbean and
South America) from both the Americas, the Anglo-Saxon and Iberian models
competed against each other in both, with the latter being present in the Hispano-
American and the Lusitano-American variety in Brazil.
The cultural model found a far lesser area of implementation, as it rendered
more difficult the processes of integrating the citizens of the new states hailing
from various racial, ethnic or national, linguistic, and religious groups. Latin
America became an area of implementation of the Enlightenment principle iden-
tifying the nation with the civic society, and finding in the state – in line with
the Weberian sociological paradigm – the most important nation-forming fac-
tor (Weber 2002). Concepts taken from the Enlightenment allowed the estab-
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lishment and development of integrational principles according to which all the
citizens of the state could belong to the same cultural space and state space at
the same time. People who did not speak Spanish or Portuguese and/or did not
belong to a Christian religion were situated on the margin of national civic
societies. Such a situation was prevalent at least to the end of the twentieth
century. Currently, new concepts of the Latin American society-civilisation are
being formulated: universalised cultural domination, the pluralistic “cosmic race”;
new, multicultural nations mixed racially and ethnically; religiously syncretic
with hybrid, pluralistic types of cultural identities and bonds (Campa 1999;
Souto Maior 2003; Vasconcelos 1993).
In both Americas, the state became the most important factor for building
bonds of the national and civilisational type. Much like in other multicultural
societies of a postcolonial, immigrant pedigree, the processes of reinforcing
territorial integration, language homogenisation, civic solidarity, and the shap-
ing of supra-racial and supra-regional bonds occurred thanks to the state,
leading to the establishment and development of national identity. The civic
societies of Latin America are in different phases of the development of the
national bond in the conditions of multicultural, racially, ethnically and denomi-
nationally mixed population structure. Some, such as Argentina, Chile, Para-
guay and Brazil, are situated closer to the nation state, while others – less
integrated racially and ethnically, for example Peru, Ecuador and Colombia,
maintained territorial, political, economic and cultural unity thanks to the insti-
tutions of the state.
2. Models of nation-forming processes
in Latin America
Both the American continents became “the New World”: an ideological and
actual area not as much in a geographic as in a cultural sense, where ideas that
stood no chance of fulfilment in the “old” Europe could be implemented and
developed on a great scale. Some of them – for example the first attempts to
build conditions that would allow for integration and acculturation of Indians
with European cultures – Puritan, represented by the first Anglo-Saxon settlers
in British colonies in New England (Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Hamp-
shire), Quakers in Pennsylvania, and Catalan and Aragon in Spanish domin-
ions, as well as the Lusitanic population in Brazil – assumed the possibility of
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embracing “Indians”, the indigenous inhabitants of America, in the new cul-
tural community that the colonists were building. The model of racial and
cultural integration formulated by Bartolomé de las Casas in theoretical rather
than practical terms proved more utopian than realistic. In the initial colonisation
phase, both Spanish and Lusitanic conquistadors united with Indian women,
providing religious and legal possibilities for amalgamation. This, however, re-
sulted more from the position of the male colonising contingent than from
ethical principles or religious and scientific concepts. The consequence of that
fairly long phase of paternalism in relation to Indians has been the phenom-
enon of racial admixture, whose significance is growing. For Latin American
nation-shaping processes, this is a phenomenon that allows combination into
a single cultural – and not only social and political – whole the descendants of
both European and autochthonous racial, ethnic, and national groups.
From the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, nation-forming processes in
Europe gained momentum. At that time Latin America was the arena of attri-
tion between tribal cultures: ancient, primordial, living in a cyclical and closed
non-linear time, in a world dominated by magical practices, animistic beliefs,
and clan and tribal models of social organisation. European colonisers brought
with them not only new technology that was inconceivable for Indians, but also
the ideas and models of the new social stability and cultural order. These mod-
els were implemented without asking for acceptance from members of the autoch-
thonous cultures, without inviting them to participate or respecting their norms
or values; with the exception of elements of Indian heritage, mostly related to
plant husbandry, that were actually taken over selectively. The transfer of Euro-
pean cultures to both Americas was in fact a one-way system for a very long
time. The dominant national cultures of European colonisers would disregard,
marginalise, and displace the cultures of autochthonous peoples, replacing them
in an authoritarian, unilateral manner which disallowed any dialogue or mutual
integration, with the local cultural and civilisational models. Religion, language,
and state institutions became the basic elements of enculturation, and – through
the system of education – enforced European models of internalisation of cul-
tural norms and introduced Iberian legal and administrative regulations, and
eradication and destruction of organisational systems of the autochthonous
cultures.
Among numerous historically extant racial, ethnic, religious, linguistic and
regional groups transforming, especially as a result of the collision of cultures
at the time of great geographic discoveries and due to colonisation, only a few
achieved the status of politically sovereign nation states. The fastest and high-
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est level of advancement of nation-forming processes compared to other re-
gions of the world took place in Western Europe – mostly in the realm of
Christian and especially Protestant – Germanic, Galician, Iberian, and Anglo-
Saxon cultures. Most national civic societies, including those of Spain and
Portugal, based not only on the cultural ties, but also – if not primarily – on
those of a state and political nature, have a long and complex historical pedi-
gree, complex ethnogenesis, and frequently superimposing different dimen-
sions of racial, ethnic, denominational, and regional structures.
At the one extremity of the scale there are nation states with relatively high
cultural homogeneity, in fact mono-ethnic, with one denomination or at most
two dominant religious systems, uniform in language, and politically united.
The nations with uniform ethnogenesis and uniform state solidarity are mostly
old nations with a very long history such as the Jewish, Italian, German, French,
Spanish, Russian, and Polish nations. These are nation–cultures whose political
sovereignty is guaranteed by their own states. Situated at the other end of the
scale in terms of complexity and non-homogeneity are the multi-cultural, post-
colonial, and post-immigration civic societies, transforming into nation com-
munities of the new type in the historical process. In the case of nationally
homogenous states a great role (earlier than other state institutions) in nation-
forming processes was played by culture, including language, art, literature,
and religion; in the case of multi-ethnic, complex civic societies it is and has
been the state that is the most important factor uniting the non- homogeneous
population element. This group of civic national communities or “new nations”
(Gellner 1983; Lipset 1967; Kubiak 1975) includes nation states of colonial
or migration/immigration (or joint) origin, such as Brazil, Mexico, the United
States, Canada and Australia as well as Chile, Argentina and the remaining
countries of Latin America. Communities in the individual countries have
reached various degrees of social integration and cultural homogenisation in
the historical processes of the development of the racially, ethnically (incl. tribal
and national), linguistically, regionally and religiously complex human substrate.
Thanks to the relatively uniform racial and ethnic mix, certain communities,
e.g. the Argentinian, Uruguayan and Chilean, have reached a relatively high
level of cultural unity, closer to European nations than to the multi-cultural
civic communities of Peru and Bolivia. Mexico and Brazil, the most populous
countries, have elaborated their own, original models of national integration
based to a great extent on domination resulting from amalgamation of popula-
tion of mixed racial origin (Freyre 1951). The notion of the “model” refers to
a set of ordered statements on reality. The model aims to order and simplify this
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phenomenon, thus becoming helpful in the explanation and understanding of
its essence.
Looking for the most general dependencies in the processes of shaping of
nations with their own states (Anderson 1997; Kubiak 1975; Smith 2003;
Wiatr 1969: 250), sociologists distinguish the following models of nation-
forming processes:
1. Bourgeoisie and democratic. This is the classical path in the devel-
opment of European nations, shifting from the feudal phase to capitalism. The
historical turning point in the process of developing bourgeois national states is
believed to be the end of the eighteenth century, and especially the period of
reorientation of political values caused by the French Revolution, United States
Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution of 3rd May in Poland. The
democratisation of civic relations, liberalisation of economic, political and so-
cial links, the system of free-market economy, and individualism elevated by the
ethos of Protestant religious and moral values resulted in the development of
the new political doctrine of national civic states, where disproportions be-
tween the estates were removed. This is the path of national and state develop-
ment that was followed by the communities with relatively high cultural homo-
geneity and long earlier traditions of historical unity: France, England, Italy,
and initially also Poland and Ireland. It was the nation-forming model to which
the nation- and liberty-oriented independence elite of Latin America made ref-
erence and from which it drew inspiration. The republican ideologies of politi-
cal elites became imposed in the first phase of Latin American nation-forming
processes on the ideas of democracy. Nevertheless, in the earliest, postcolonial
phase the mechanisms for development of democracy in Latin American coun-
tries practically “missed” the course of nation-forming processes. Racial and
ethnic–national divides were very strongly correlated with social barriers, which
led to cultural and political exclusiveness of the white Latin American elites.
These elites implemented the particular, social and political interests in specific
models of state systems, making reference to democratic and republican ideas,
practically assuming the form of autocratic, if not totalitarian, rules of narrow
social categories dominated by the descendants of white colonists. Today, Latin
American civic communities are undergoing stepped-up democratisation pro-
cesses. This is the case for at least two groups of reasons. The first is linked to
the context of international relations, and transformations in the situation and
role of Latin American states in the structures of international organisations.
The processes of globalisation, modernisation and cultural universalisation make
Latin American states, especially those which are pluralist and multicultural
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such as Brazil and Mexico, yield to the external pressure of both the media and
legal and political campaigns (Stemplowski 1979). On the other hand, there is
a growing level of civic awareness and political subjectivity of Latin Americans
hailing from coloured, autochthonous and racially mixed categories of the popu-
lation. The models of democratisation of civic societies in Latin America as-
sume unique forms, which, however, in consequence lead to the doctrine and
ideologies of state nationalism under progressing cultural homogenisation.
2. Bourgeoisie-conservative. As Jerzy Wiatr stated, “the bourgeoisie-
conservative evolution of nations is present in two main variations: through the
transformation of an existing feudal state, or by the unification of a number of
divided feudal states into a single state organism and the building of a new
national rapport on the foundation of that organism. The history of the unifi-
cation of Germany in the latter half of the nineteenth century very well illus-
trates such a path of national development. As a rule, the bourgeois conserva-
tive path of national evolution left many national problems opened.” (Wiatr
1969: 263) The so-called Prussian path of national development is most evi-
dently built on the domination of a single privileged social and cultural cat-
egory, class, or stratum of bourgeoisie with an unquestioned position in the
structure of national–civic community. In a sense, fascism was a complement
for that part of the evolution of ideological doctrines and state structures of
Italy and Germany. The result of choosing this developmental path was cul-
tural, political, and economic expansionism. The turn of the twentieth century
brought an intensification of conservative tendencies in Latin America with
growing oligarchisation, and social and economic disproportions in the major-
ity of, if not all, Latin American states. The conservatism of political elites was
combined with the growing revolutionary tendencies of the poorest social strata
recruiting mostly from the autochthonous and racially mixed populations. The
phenomenon of growing disproportion not only on the scale of prestige, wealth
and power but also in focusing on the ways of achieving the ideologically
defined national values, brought about the rule of military and civil juntas in
Latin America, which slowed down the nation-forming processes. The govern-
ing elites in Latin American states used the idea of the nation and at the same
time implemented the policy of racial and social exclusiveness, which led to
conflicts and surges of revolutionary mood. These phenomena were especially
clearly visible in Mexico and the countries of Central America. In fact, though,
none of the Latin American civic societies was free from tensions and conflicts
caused by the politics of states dominated by white political elites, who based
their social status on the models of Western economic doctrines. In the first
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half of the twentieth century the systems of Republican Latin American states
assumed the form of conservative-oriented autocratic, centralised governments
of white postcolonial elites basing their rule on the doctrine of defence against
communism. Conservative governments in Latin American states formed the
foundations of their politics on international support from Western states, prac-
tically mostly from the US. The internal Latin American dimension of the “Cu-
ban missile” crisis was in the growing tensions and conflicts between pro-US
political and economic elites on the one hand, and on the other increasingly
radical, left-wing, pro-Marxist milieux, and intellectuals and leaders of social
liberation movements who found support among social masses. Within the
latter category originated the leaders of the new national and revolutionary
movements, which brought about the weakening and breaking of conservative
tendencies of the white political elites.
3. Postcolonial. The postcolonial path of formation of civic national com-
munities is characteristic of countries and democracies that formed within the
territories dominated by European or Asian (Japanese, Chinese) colonial influ-
ences, mostly in Africa, the South Pacific, and both Americas. In the early
phase of nation-forming process the United States and Canada as well as Bra-
zil, Mexico, the other countries of Latin America, and Australia were develop-
ing according to the rules of the colonial model. Colonial dependence and
military, economic and cultural domination led to imposition of the laws of the
dominant group upon the autochthonous peoples: of Anglo-Saxon Protestants
in North America, and of Iberian (Spanish and Portuguese) Catholics in South
America. As far as Latin America was capable of becoming liberated from the
political and cultural domination of the Spanish, Portuguese and British, it still
remains economically dependent on Western countries. Latin American coun-
tries – as the experience of the latter half of the twentieth century has proved
– could not function independently in economic terms, and operate according
to the principles of the “dependent model of economic development”. This
dependency is the result of colonial setbacks in technological, organisational,
and economic development. Hegemony in the processes of economic and so-
cial changes in Latin America belongs to the United States. Ever more often
theories are presented of globalisation of Latin America through Americanisation
(Frank 1967; Galeano 1983; Haines 1989; Huntington 2000).
The consequence of Iberian colonialism is not only the displacement of
languages and cultures of autochthonous peoples and their gradual disappear-
ance, but also the primacy of religions, traditions and values of white colonists
and settlers, that allows hardly any exceptions. This tendency undergoes slow
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changes and transformations. Through the phenomena of indigenism and pan-
Indianism, the growing importance of intellectuals and politicians coming from
outside the genetically European racial and ethnic milieux in nation-forming
processes, Latin America entered not only the phase of accelerated national
homogenisation but also of cultural universalisation in the Latin American ver-
sion in the latter half of the twentieth century. The Latin American “model” of
nation-forming processes is currently based on near-general racial amalgam-
ation, religious and racial syncretism, and ethnic hybridisation with far-reach-
ing linguistic, national and civic homogenisation.
Latin American states conduct a policy of integration with the world’s po-
litical and economic system, remaining dependent in organisational, financial
and military terms on the most developed states. One of the dimensions of the
neo-colonial dependency of Latin American countries, mostly on the United
States, is based on the formulation of the concept of so-called “dependent
development” by the political and economic leaders of Mexico, Brazil, Chile
and Argentina. (Galeano 1983; Stemplowski 1975; Stemplowski 1996).
Nevertheless, it was the decolonisation of Africa that was most spectacular.
The establishment of states marked the beginning of nation-forming processes
in most countries of that continent, under the conditions of ethnic, tribal and
religious fragmentation, and the lack of indigenous intellectual elites. “The
state borders of the majority of African, South American and Asian postcolonial
republics were drawn up along the dividing lines of colonial influences, which
in most cases followed the former divisions among European countries” (Wiatr
1969: 269).
4. Bourgeoisie-settler. This model of increasing national and state unity
is characteristic of countries of migrant pedigree, built on the foundations of
colonial administration. This is the model that the civic communities of the
United States, Brazil, Mexico, Latin American countries, Canada, and Austra-
lia followed. In these countries the state was the most important factor in in-
creasing territorial and cultural–national integrity. The common denominator
of all the post-migration nation states is the existence of a strong, hegemonic
national (racial, religious) group that contributes a set of basic cultural and
ideological values to the new community, including the common language (En-
glish in the US, Spanish in Mexico, and Portuguese in Brazil), a system of
religious beliefs (Protestantism in the US, Catholicism in Brazil and Mexico),
an administration dominated by the relatively homogeneous social category
(White Anglo-Saxon Protestant in the US and Lusitanic and Creole in South
America). Another feature of that model of development was the implementa-
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tion of a formula of military conquest and absolute domination over the au-
tochthonous population. The native American tribes were pushed away in the
United States, Brazil and Canada into marginalised, subordinate, and culturally
and socially degraded ethnic and tribal enclaves. It was only in the last decades
of the twentieth century that boosted and intensive processes of indigenisation
– that is the growing participation of the autochthonous population in the
social, political, economic and cultural lives of civic societies – took place. The
phenomenon of their indigenisation means on the one hand increasing cultural
variety of Latin American countries, and on the other increased democratisation
in social life. The autochthonous population does not as much “blur” into the
Peruvian, Bolivian or Mexican culture, but rather builds its own, syncretic,
hybrid models and standards of integration and types of cultural identity (Romero
1971; Posern-Zieliński 2005; Paleczny 2001b). Biculturalism, divided, double,
multiple identity, syncretic forms of religions, and racially and ethnically mixed
communities have been the dominant tendencies of changes in nation-forming
processes in Latin America in recent decades.
The bourgeois-settler model is based on the culturally dominant role of the
white elites, and is superimposed on their social and economic conservatism. In
the earliest phase, nation-forming processes are limited to the narrow catego-
ries of white settlers marginalising both the autochthonous population and the
descendants of African slaves.
The development of United States as a multi-ethnic, racially complex, reli-
giously pluralist civic community that transformed into a nation in its own state
has been described in numerous works (Kubiak 1975; Lipset 1967). The cases
of Canada and Australia were similar. The least space has been devoted in
sociological literature, at least in Polish, to the history of Latin American nation-
forming processes (Łepkowski 1977–1983; Paleczny 2004; Urbański 1981).
5. Socialist. Historically present in central and eastern parts of Europe,
though not solely, this model had its origin in Russia after the October Revolu-
tion. In the years 1945–1989, it encompassed Poland and other countries of
the so-called “communist bloc”. It seems that despite the fact that its conse-
quences are visible in the development of conditions for political and cultural
integration to this day (e.g. in Belarus), it is rather a “blind” ramification of
nation-forming processes. Despite numerous strenuous efforts, attempts to
establish “the socialist East German nation” or “the Soviet nation” failed. Nev-
ertheless, the model played its integrative, and nation and state-forming role in
numerous countries of Europe, and in other continents, for example in Viet-
nam, China, Cuba and Libya. Elements of the socialist model were taken over
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by social liberation movements, and movements for the ethnic liberation of
local populations in Latin America. They led to the radicalisation of social,
racial, and ethnic conflicts, assuming in the most extreme cases the form of
military revolutionary and terrorist movements, e.g. the Shining Path (Sendero
Luminoso) in Peru. One of the main exponents of this variation of the idea of
nation-forming processes, assuming the socialist utopia of the existence of
a system of social justice, was Ernesto “Che” Guevara. Elements of the socialist
developmental path were emphasised and manifested in the ideologies of radi-
cal groupings such as the Brazilian Landless Workers’ Movement and by Mexi-
can guerrilla leaders. The social phenomenon of the guerrillas features – much
like the conflicts between the Brazil oligarchy and coloured categories of the
rural population in Brazil – the transformation of postcolonial, racially and
culturally dichotomous Mexican society into a national community. To quote
Urszula Drzewiecka, “in different moments of history it [the guerrilla – T.P.]
assumed special features, yet its essence remained unchanged: the rejection of
the state mandate in favour of claiming rights by a variety of social groups. The
guerrilla of the twentieth century developed in two basic directions in Mexico:
the armed rural movement, and the urban movement based among others on
the ideology and practical example of the Cuban revolution. [...] Unfortu-
nately, the contemporary political and social stage in Mexico is not free from
the phenomenon of guerrillas actively operating in the Chiapas State. The
Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) have been fighting for over 12
years for the rights of Native Americans, questioning the successive attempts
by the changing authorities to solve the conflict. Enjoying the support of inter-
national public opinion, the Zapatista incessantly challenge the stability of Mexican
democracy, as – to quote Professor Soledad Loaeza – “the border between
lawlessness and democracy is indistinct in Mexico, which means that the
implementation of social postulates is attempted through direct pressure” (Drze-
wiecka, 24).
The disproportions on the scale of social positions – especially where prop-
erty, richness, affluence, authority and prestige are concerned – made the
unprivileged strata resort to the idea of socialist equality. The ideas of “Latin
American” socialism assuming the forms of revolutionary and national armed
movements became one of the components of nation- forming processes not
only in Mexico, Brazil and Cuba, but also in Chile, Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru,
Honduras, Nicaragua – in fact in all the countries of Latin America.
The distinctiveness and variety of historical nation-development processes
resulted in the variety of their relations towards one another. In the historical
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perspective, relations between nations depend on the type and nature of pro-
cesses that bring them together. The countries of colonial and migration pedi-
gree remained in the realm of the dominant political and cultural influence of
the original national communities. Going along their own path of development
and civic integration within their own state, the societies of the United States,
Mexico, Chile and Brazil took over the values, language, religion, norms and
ideologies of the countries of origin of groups colonising and settling their
territories. The transmission channels of population, ideas, technologies, and
elements of culture have remained open to this day. The political bond charac-
teristic of the relations between Mexico and Spain and between Brazil and
Portugal is supported not as much in joint economic or military interests, as in
the cultural heritage and natural ties characteristic of relations between the
country of origin and settlement, the colonising population and the colonised.
The processes of the development of civic societies and reinforcement of
national integration in Latin American countries were dominated by the bour-
geois-settler and postcolonial models. The fundamental distinctive features of
these overlapping models of nation-forming processes in Latin America include:
1. The presence of a hegemonic, dominant cultural group, imposing upon
autochthonous cultures the language, the religion, and most importantly
cultural norms and values as well as models of social and economic
organisation. Within almost the entire area of Latin America – with the
exception of certain regions dominated by the British, the Dutch, and the
French – these were predominantly the models of Spanish and Portuguese
cultures in the different phases of historical development. The notional equiva-
lent of cultural civilisational space of South America is given by the terms
“Hispanic America” and “Latin America” that point to the cultural heritage
and ties between the heritage of European colonisers and settlers and the
traditions of the local population. Suffice to say that Latin American civilisation
is based on Spanish and Portuguese languages, Catholic religion (with the
increasing participation of Protestantism of Anglo-Saxon origin, mostly from
the United States), values, and standards transferred from Europe and fixed
by the Creole and Lusitanic peoples and other descendants of European
colonisers and settlers.
2. Treatment of the native population as culturally lower, socially subordinate,
and economically dominated. Nation-forming processes were dominated
by the ideology of conquest and assimilationism based on absorption and
enculturation of autochthonous peoples. One of the dominant strategies
was displacement of the native population from their homelands, pushing
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them into cultural reservations, situating them on the margin of social life,
bereaving them of political rights, eradication from the areas subjected to
industrialisation and urbanisation, spatial isolation, and racial segregation.
Nevertheless, the phenomenon of eliminating the autochthonous popula-
tion in the countries of Latin America never achieved – thanks to accept-
able amalgamation, the admixture of races – such a scope or scale as in the
United States.
3. Domination of Christian values represented by the structures of the Catho-
lic Church. The profound role of the clergy and religious organisations,
and especially of Catholic missions in the shaping of Latin American cul-
tural identity. Religion became the most important transmission belt of
European values. Christianisation was and still to a great extent remains
– besides nationalisation and cultural universalisation leading to the ap-
pearance of civilisational identity as well as the phenomenon of globalisation
– the most important factor of social, political, and economic integration,
as well as cultural homogenisation.
4. The gradual acceptability of racially amalgamated categories of mixed popu-
lation, mostly Mestizos and Mulattoes as well as syncretic, mixed, hybrid
cultural groups such as the Quimbanda, Macumba followers, and univer-
salists to participation in social and cultural life (Bastide 1978; Brown 1986).
5. The increasing syncretism, polymorphism, and hybridism of communities in
Latin American countries. The most important and superior role in the
shaping of multicultural, pluralistic social structures and cultural identities
is played by state institutions. The state bond and civic solidarity provide
the fundamental factor in nation-forming process, which differentiates com-
munities that belong to the same cultural area. Connected to the state bond
is the sense of territoriality, and cultural objectivisation and internalised
identification with the motherland. State identity, the bond with the ideo-
logical motherland, and the racial and ethnic structure specific to each civic
community are the most important ingredients of national bonds in the
countries of Latin America, which merged into a single whole the varied
population substrate/element.
6. The pluralistic, complex character of civic societies and new types of Latin
American nationalism. The nations of Latin America still taking form in the
nation-forming processes in the very nature of things, due to the different
ethnogeneity, historical processes of colonisation and migration, presence
of autochthonous, African and European populations, participation of nu-
merous tribal groups, heterogeneous, complex civic communities in the
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processes of social integration besides the dominant categories of white
Iberian colonisers are heterogeneous, complex civic communities. These
communities formed the early sense of territorial, religious, and language
unity sharing the same traditions, i.e. all the necessary elements that consti-
tute a nation.
3. Main phases of nation-forming processes
in Latin America
The notion of “a phase” is not only a chronological definition referring to
a temporal sequence. It denotes a qualitatively discrete state of advancement of
nation-forming processes present in reference to specific communities in dif-
ferent periods of time.
The following phases may be distinguished in the development processes of
Latin American civic societies, nation–cultures, and nation–civilisations:
I. Ethnocentrism, Iberoconformism, domination of Iberian cul-
tural models, assimilationism. Characteristic of this phase, continuing
throughout the colonisation period and the beginning of the independence of
Latin American countries, that is from the early sixteenth to the late nineteenth
century, was the absolute domination of conquistadors–colonisers from Spain
(Castilia, Aragón) and Portugal (Lusitanic, Lusitanic-Azorean). Other Euro-
pean powers – France, England, and the Netherlands – competed against the
Spanish and Portuguese to influence the two Americas. As far as the North
American continent was dominated by British influence with the passage of
time, its southern part remained under the sole influence of Iberian cultures.
The administrative division of Iberian colonies in South America into viceroyalties
in Spanish-speaking dominions and captainships in Portuguese-speaking ones
assumed them to be exploitative. With the passage of time, the exploitative
attitude began to be balanced by the settlement orientation.
The autochthonous population and the African slaves brought to the colony
were subordinated socially and culturally to Iberian cultural models. Two as-
similation policies were applied towards the indigenous population and African
slaves, namely those of enculturation and exclusion, marginalisation, and driv-
ing into the reservations of tribal mono-ethnicity. The instrument of enculturation
used by the white settlers to take over the native Indian cultures was on the one
hand colonial administration, and on the other the institutions of the Catholic
Church, missions, and local parish structures. The tribes that found themselves
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in the processes of economic, territorial and cultural expansion in the field of
the interest of colonists were subjected to Christianisation and Iberisation, while
those who were situated beyond the realm of direct influence were the poten-
tial workforce – the conquered and exploited population.
In the first, Iberoconformist, phase of nation-forming processes, where the
only hegemonic culture entitled to development was the heritage transferred
from Europe by white colonists, two tactics were used towards the autochtho-
nous cultures: paternalist and authoritarian. The supporter and exponent of
the first was Bartolomé de las Casas, and that of the latter was Juan Ginés de
Sepúlveda. The first allowed the possibility of acculturation, integration of the
autochthonous population with colonists on the condition that they assumed
the religion, the language, and the values of the dominant culture. The latter
focused solely on exploitation, and territorial, cultural and economic expansion
pushed the native population into a subordinate role, that of the social culture
that was displaced, and sentenced to marginalisation and extinction – redun-
dant from the point of view of further integrative processes in Iberian colonies.
To quote Leopold Zea, “at the time of the first wave of expansion, Iberian
conquistadors – the Spanish and Portuguese – attempted to impose their ideas
on the subjugated Indians; it was mostly about Christianisation. No efforts
were undertaken to maintain the cultural identity, as it was believed that
a higher form of culture may not mix with lower ones. The spiritual world of
the Indians was to such a degree alien to the Christian culture and wrong that
it was even believed to be satanic. For that reason, attempts were made to
uproot their values and impose the Iberian culture brought by the conquista-
dors. [...] The goal behind the Iberian conquest was the total absorption of
natives, part of the project of expansion. Together with the natives, the local
models and beliefs were to be buried. The objective was to avoid contamination
of Christian culture. Nevertheless, the uprooting of local traditions and ideas,
even though temples were destroyed and gods were removed, turned out to be
impossible” (Zea 1993: 48–49).
With the passage of time, Indians would mix with the descendants of white
colonists through processes of amalgamation, producing a new category, and
later cultural group, of Mestizos, that was important for further processes of
nation-forming. Race admixture would gradually produce the “bridge” into the
cultural space. That allowed mixing of people of various racial origins within
a single civic society and national community. After Mestizos and Mulattoes in
Brazil, Indians became equally legitimate members of civic societies, albeit not
until the end of the twentieth century.
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II. Nationalism, cultural homogenisation, nation-forming ideol-
ogy and policy. This is the independence phase, of a republican nature,
occurring this time in all countries of Latin America including Brazil. It took
place in the earlier half of the twentieth century. The largest countries in the
continent, Mexico and Brazil, formed the principles for the construction of the
new, homogeneous, civic societies transforming towards national culture. The
turning point of that phase was the nationalistic policy of Porfirio Díaz and
Francisco I. Madero in Mexico, and of Getulio Vargas in Brazil.
The processes of nationalisation, the shaping of new types of cultural iden-
tity of the nationalistic type, assumed a conservative or liberal character. Early
in the twentieth century, people’s revolutions in the countries of Latin America
were strongly correlated with socialist ideologies. These led to the expansion of
democratic principles into the categories of population that had earlier been
excluded from nation-forming processes: the poorest coloured and racially
mixed population, mostly Mestizos and Indians. As Leopold Zea claims, “the
nations remaining under Iberian colonial role would strive to turn that project
into their own one. The revolution in the United States in 1776 and the French
Revolution of 1789 provided ideological justifications to the Latin American
project of liberation or liberty. Nevertheless, the Spanish metropolis assumed
a stalwart position in the question of allowing Hispanic Americans rights equal
to those of the Spanish. Spain would struggle to maintain the colonial project,
which in the sixteenth century focused the vehement dispute between Juan
Ginés de Sepúlveda and Bartolomé de las Casas. The partisans of the project of
liberation would support one of the two options: conservative or civilisational.
The conservative project, faced with the unyielding position of the metropolis,
proposed the maintenance of the cultural and political system inherited after
the Iberian colonisation yet already liberated from the metropolis. The Spanish
or Lusitanic [Brazilian – T.P.] order, yet without Spain and Portugal. This would
be the project of various Latin American conservative groups in numerous
places of that America” (Zea 1993: 23).
In this phase of nation-forming processes, the consolidation of civic society
around national values related to state ideology, territorial unity, and language,
religious and legal equality of citizens took place in Latin American societies.
Following the policy of “nationalisation” conducted essentially in most Latin
American countries until the 1980s, the following phenomena occurred:
1. Further expansion of the homogeneous realm of national identity and cul-
ture in the individual countries of Latin America. The broadening of that
identificational and cultural area took place through the construction of
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ideological and axiological unity around the interests represented by the
civic communities which were monolinguistic and mostly differentiated by
class and ethnicity. Intellectuals, writers, artists and academics on the one
hand, and representatives of the ruling elites on the other, became the
exponents of the nationalist idea, politically and culturally uniting the so-
cially, racially, and ethnically divided community.
2. Reduction of regionalisms and separatist tendencies of individual lands, states,
and provinces of Mexico, Brazil, and all the lesser countries of the conti-
nent. In that phase, the continuing and expanding territorial integrationism
found its expression in the spreading of the state–civic awareness leading to
the emergence of common areas of symbolic and mass culture. For the
intellectual elites, state territories were becoming ideological motherlands.
3. Social and cultural consolidation – especially in the ideological and territo-
rial dimension – against group separateness of ethnic and racial minorities.
Beginning with the 1980s, that is for nearly 20 years, there has been
a trend aiming towards the protection and maintenance of ethnic identity of
Indian groups, with a neutral (i.e. lacking) policy towards the cultural exclu-
siveness of other, including white, ethnic groups.
4. Development of ideological unity of civic society based on an attempt to
liquidate the results of a bi-polar, polarised model of class and layer/strata
structure. This was and still is the worst obstacle in the construction of full
cultural and ideological unity of the Mexican, Brazilian, Chilean, and Ar-
gentinian nations – not significant to an extent that could stop the process.
Nevertheless, the disproportions on the scale of affluence, prestige, and
power divide Latin American society into clear cultural segments. A consid-
erable proportion of Mexicans and Brazilians (with some estimates speak-
ing even of a third of the population) live on the margins of civic societies,
producing ties and identity proper for the declassed communities of ethnic
ghettos. Further, in some narrowly defined spatial frames of the favelas and
clusters of alienated Indian, Mestizos, and Afro-Brazilian minorities, a sepa-
ratist identity of the hybrid type develops. This is characteristic also of
criminal groups and gangs. It is a phenomenon that is common in Latin
American countries and visible also in the overlapping of ethnic and tribal
structures onto the hierarchies of criminal gangs and religious and cult
groups.
5. The establishment of a strong centrist ideological orientation based on the
eradication and elimination from social life – and from cultural and ideo-
logical circulation – of all the types of social radicalism situated both on the
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extreme right and extreme left of the political stage. The development of
the foundations for national unity at the expense of the radical, belligerent
ideological and cultural minorities of a socialist, feminist, anarchist, envi-
ronmental or pacifist nature has led and still leads to results opposed to any
assumptions. In Latin America it becomes impossible to slow down, not to
mention eradicate, a variety of “social liberation” movements (for example
in the “liberation theology” version), Landless Workers’ Movement, pan-
Indian awareness, and emancipation of cultural minorities.
6. Promotion of popular – national and symbolic – elements of mass culture
through their participation – increasing in both scope and significance – in
the mass media. Today it is television that shapes to the greatest extent the
scope of contents and values that are promoted by the national and commer-
cial broadcasters. The share of mass media in the creation of the national
dimension of culture is continuously growing. Public television channels, sub-
ordinate to governmental centres, are on the one hand the instrument of
ideological propaganda, while on the other they are a means that leads to
standardisation of language and customs, and homogenisation in terms of
values.
7. The technological and industrial developments as well as progress and
modernisation have brought new literary and artistic currents. The exem-
plary futuristic capital of Brazil became a symbol of modernist changes.
Modernist tendencies have not always operated in a functional union with
the needs and tendencies of the average Latin American, yet they fulfilled
the cultural and political aspirations of the governing elites and intellectual
creative milieux. Nevertheless, that peculiar modernism and postmodernism,
as one of the reactions to the European heritage and North American influ-
ence, paved an original – national and continental – Latin American path of
cultural development (Urbański 1981; Paleczny 2004).
III. Multiculturalism, pluralism, “open” civic societies. In this phase,
it is the phenomena of racial amalgamation, pluralism, linguistic homogeneity,
religious syncretism, and hybridism that begin to dominate. The lack of racial,
ethnic and national homogeneity as the basic feature of the new national com-
munities in Latin America was the barrier in social integration processes and in
cultural homogenisation. Imposed by European colonists, the ideological role
models of nation-forming processes in the first phases excluded and pushed
beyond the margin of the social and cultural community numerous autochtho-
nous and African groups. Race was the main obstacle on the path to accultura-
tion to Spanish and Portuguese national standards. Before the idea of the new
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state–nation appeared, as formed by the “El Libertador” Simon Bolívar, it was
narrow, particular, exclusive ideologies of cultural domination of the Creole
and Lusitanic people, the offspring of white colonists, that predominated in
Latin America. As Leopold Zea believes, “the variety of races, cultures, and
people, which did not form obstacles to the establishment of cultures and em-
pires in Europe, became one in America, due to the way that Europe con-
ducted colonisation and conquest in that part of the world. The same diversity
that in Europe helped to unify forces and to reinforce national characters would,
in America, result only in divisions and in the never-ending civil wars accompa-
nying them” (Zea 1993: 95).
On the other hand racial, ethnic, and national variety with the simultaneous
existence of dominant languages and Catholic religion became the reason for
searching for own paths of social integration. Following and imitating the Eu-
ropean models of nation-forming processes, representatives of political, eco-
nomic, and cultural elites would seek a method of connecting into a single
whole the entire multicultural, social mosaic. The basis for the Latin American
path of national development was formed by Simon Bolívar’s utopia based on
the promotion of vision and ideology of a single federated Latin American
state, thanks to which a single Latin American nation could rise and develop to
the like of the United States. That utopia was close to the American concepts of
the melting pot and Americanisation through assimilation of various cultural
minorities – no longer under Spanish or Portuguese hegemony – but to the
pluralistic, multicultural identity of the nation–civilisation type. Simon Bolívar’s
utopia became a way of “ploughing the sea”, that is promoting an idea that had
no chance of implementation in the context of particular interest of the govern-
ing elites, racial, ethnic, political and class divides, social conflicts, and party
divides. Nevertheless, it was this utopian model put forth by Bolívar that be-
came useful towards the end of the twentieth and early in the twenty-first centu-
ries in search of a new middle road between Western – European and American
– universalism, and racial, ethnic, political and economic particularism.
IV. Globalisation, universalism and Latino-Americanisation. The
phenomena of political and economic integration, the functioning of the
Organisation of American States, the political and economic as well as cultural
role of Mercosur, the development of joint markets within the NAFTA trade
bloc, and numerous other institutional initiatives in the field of international
relations have led – independent of the language and religious unity of His-
panic America and, to a great extent, also of Brazil – to an increased sense of
a civilisational continental bond. To quote Samuel Huntington, Latin America
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developed its own, unique configuration of interstate, territorial, and historical
ties that finds its main support in language and religion and leads to the opera-
tion of civic societies in their particular “civilisational space” (Huntington 2000).
Latin America produces its own supra-state, civilisational tradition of cultural
unity in the long historical process. This tendency was first expressed by Zea,
who wrote “thus on the one hand, we have the European history, the history of
internalising and assimilation, and on the other, the Latin American history of
different overlapping realities, in this or that way alien to the subject that re-
jects and adopts them” (Zea 1993: 19).
Late in the nineteenth and early in the twentieth centuries, Latin America
entered the path of its own civilisational development, different from the West-
ern, capitalist, rational system of international organisation. Positioning Latin
American civilisation in the context of spiritual, ideological, and cultural ten-
dency to encourage anti-Westernisation and anti-Americanisation, Zea claimed
long before Huntington that “the civilisational project that rejects the entire
heritage of Iberian colonisation in America is the juxtaposition for the other
[Western – T.P.] one. Following such an assumption, the need to transform
using the models of alien present is postulated parallel to the breakaway from
one’s own past. This fits perfectly the project of West European expansion
initiated in the seventeenth century after the period of Iberian expansion. Spring-
ing from the Puritan concept, this project presented its authors as privileged
subjects, predestined to conduct actions that would go far beyond what is
temporary and what results from circumstances. The eighteenth-century En-
lightenment philosophers reshaped that project into a civilisational mission to
be fully implemented in the nineteenth century, when the great West European
empires would take shape. The United States of Northern America, with the
manifested destiny of the country representing the highest form of imperialism,
will participate in the new division of the world. At the same time, the Latin
Americans supporting the civilisational project will internalise the Western project
and focus on its implementation in the America until recently dominated by the
anachronous, conservative Iberian project and drowned in Indian barbarism,
and therefore finding itself on the margins of civilisation. Moreover, race ad-
mixture, being the result of implementation of the Iberian project, helped this
marginalisation. The implementation of the civilisational project alien to the
experience of those who are trying to internalise it shall be boiled down to its
irrational imitation” (Zea 1993: 23).
In other words, after the phase of Iberian conformism, westernisation,
modernisation, and rationalisation of Latin American societies, the process of
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constructing bonds of a civilisational type is taking place. As Zea argues, “the
Latin American civilisational project, ignoring its own experience, will be driven
to internalise the experience that has never before been within its reach” (Zea
1993: 23).
Latin Americanisation means primarily racial amalgamation, language
homogenisation, ethnic pluralism, religious syncretism, and cultural hybridism
with social disproportions in wealth, power, and prestige. The elements of the
new “cultural mosaic” of the supra-state intercultural integration system are
civic societies acquiring towards the end of the twentieth century the status of
nations: Brazilians, Mexicans, Chileans, Argentinians, Paraguayans, and Ven-
ezuelans are not only politically and territorially integrated civic communities,
composed of different racial, ethnic and religious, and social categories – strata,
classes, oligarchies, residents of poverty districts – but they are also communi-
ties of national culture (Znaniecki 1990).
Latin Americanisation does not simply mean a “jump” from the face of local
autochthonous communities of regional racial groups to the civilisational phase
with the omission of ties of the national type. The construction of different
types of bonds and cultural identity covers a variety of phenomena: both of
regionalisation and of maintaining tribal–ethnic and racial distinctiveness, as
well as nationalisation and construction of civilisational solidarity beyond na-
tional unity. The phenomenon of distinctiveness of local autochthonous com-
munities, regional racial groups belong among those losing their significance,
situating themselves on the edge of integration and assimilation processes. Sepa-
rate local racial and ethnic communities are strongly correlated with the eco-
nomic and social criteria of stratification. Decisive for the ethnic and racial
particularisms in today’s Latin America are not origin, birthplace, or ethnic or
racial belonging, but rather position in the local structure and on the paradigm
of wealth, power, and prestige.
4. The role of the state
Until the end of the twentieth century, the state was more of an instrument of
pressure, an institution “appropriated” by the privileged social categories rather
than a means of building national solidarity and identity. The states – Latin
American republics – functioned as political institutions, maintaining deep so-
cial divides imposed on the racial, ethnic and regional variety. The institutions
of nearly all Latin American states served the protection of the interests of
275TADEUSZ PALECZNY • THE STATE AND NATION-FORMING PROCESSES
oligarchies, social groups taking root predominantly from the white, postcolonial
Lusitanic and Creole elites. The state policy of the republican states bore clearly
visible hallmarks of dependency on the United States. Not penetrating the
anatomy and systemic principles of operation of republicanism in Latin America,
four qualitatively different phases determining the role of the states in the course
of nation-forming processes are clearly visible.
A. The colonial phase, with the dominant role of Spanish and
Portuguese administration. State administration was focused on the subju-
gation of the indigenous population to the power of Spanish and Portuguese
colonists. The few European settlers who were neither Spanish not Portuguese
served in colonial contingents subordinate to those countries. It was the phase
of Iberoconformism and enculturation of the autochthonous population, and
later of its marginalisation and displacement beyond the territories settled and
administered by the European colonisers. Indians, and later slaves imported
from Africa, were becoming an inferior category of population, socially and
culturally alienated. The culture of Latin American societies took root in Eu-
rope, and was a derivative of Iberian cultures (derivada). Within the system of
absolutist monarchy, states allowed certain forms of self-government in the
colonies, especially when these were justified by the economic interest of the
dynasty. In the colonial period, the germs of a civic society and national state
formed, covering the prerogatives of the white Christian population.
B. The early republican phase and the Empire of Brazil. This
period in fact lasted throughout almost the whole of the nineteenth century.
Once Latin American colonies gained independence, Mexico and Brazil be-
came the countries with the largest populations in the southern part of the
continent. The two countries formed political systems ranging from the dicta-
torship of oligarchy, military and civil juntas, to limited systems of republican
national states. Emancipation of the autochthonous population was progress-
ing slowly. Towards the end of this phase, Brazil abolished slavery, which did
not automatically mean liquidation of racial inequalities and discrimination. The
first ideological and doctrinal forms of state nationalism were built. Moreover,
a sense of civic and at the same time national identity took shape and developed
among Chileans, Argentinians, Mexicans, Brazilians, Uruguayans, Colombi-
ans, and in lesser nation states. Towards the end of the phase, some Latin
American countries, and especially Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay – initiated
and conducted a planned policy of settling European immigrants, mostly Ital-
ians, Germans, Poles and Ukrainians. Immigration helped to speed up eco-
nomic growth, yet at the same time it led to upsetting the traditional social
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structure and cultural domination of Creole and Lusitanic political elites. The
beginnings of a sense of national unity began, often parallel to formation of
a critical attitude to the Spanish tradition and a search for role models in the
direction of the United States, France and the United Kingdom. Born in the
nineteenth century were the intellectual elites, “national” literatures, trends in
art, and formations of worldview. At this time not only were models drawn
from the heritage of Europe but also a local cultural tradition was established
and models of state organisation from other American countries were imitated.
The period of independence of Brazil at the time of the Empire meant qualita-
tive change in developing and maintaining the new political and cultural iden-
tity of Brazilians who were no longer subjects of the Portuguese crown. After
the period of European cosmopolitanism that was the Enlightenment, Brazil
entered the period of romantic discovery of separate identity and cultural sov-
ereignty for Brazilians. Even a certain fascination in the indigenous, Brazilian
element of Lusitanic, Indian tribal, and Afro-Brazilian cultures emerged. This
was the time of development of national Brazilian literature represented by
a range of authors including Antõnio Gonçalves Teixeira e Sousa, Joaquim
Manuel de Macedo, and Manuel Antônio de Almeida. Poets, especially the
most eminent ones such as Domingos José Gonçalves de Magalhães, Antõnio
Gonçalves Dias and José de Alencar, devoted plenty of space and attention to
the Indian element in Brazilian national culture in their poems. They presented
American Indians as noble people–warriors, developed morally, intellectually
and culturally. At the same time Brazilian painting and historiography flour-
ished. The initial phase of independence provided the grounds for the budding
processes of civic integration and national assimilation of Brazilians. The pro-
cesses of enculturation and transculturation were overlapped to an ever greater
degree on the dominant patterns of acculturation, i.e. the mutual mixing of
elements of cultures that belong to different racial and ethnic groups. As the
result of this process, the area of national Brazilian culture emerged. Following
the reorientation of national awareness, including its components – identifica-
tion of racial and ethnic groups, increased ethnic variety of the white popula-
tion – a shift in the value systems of social structuralisation took place in Brazil.
A transitory phase began in which the Brazilian community was shifting from
a feudal–slave economy to a bourgeois–capitalistic one. The path to full de-
mocracy was still long; nevertheless, the society – riven with internal class and
racial–ethnic divides – was acquiring a new dimension of integration defined
by the fact of increased national unity. The changes in agriculture and ways of
obtaining profits took place during the independence–modern period, still in
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the imperial phase. The turn of the nineteenth century meant domination of
sugar cane, coffee, and rubber tree plantations. These forms of agricultural
production, still concentrated in huge plantations, were based to a greater
degree on capitalist employment of workers rather than the feudal exploitation
of slaves. The shift from one means of production to the other was a long-term
process, and did not take place in a single leap. Nevertheless, the growing
category of agricultural labourers and industrial workers profoundly changed
the face of ethnically diverse Brazilian society. Changes were appearing at the
same time among the participants and recipients of culture in the new society,
whose circle was ever growing. Although it was strongly limited to the white
political and economic elites of Brazil in the field of written, symbolical culture,
it would at the same time assume a certain peasant-folk version, indigenous–
interracial, Afro-Brazilian especially in the elements referring to the patterns of
merrymaking, holiday-making, and everyday life. It was during this phase of
the Brazilian nation-forming process that the samba and elements of Indian
music spread among the lower social strata. Similar processes of building new,
national and civic identity and nationalistic ideas – especially in literature –
took place even at the end of the nineteenth century in other Latin American
states, especially in Argentina and Mexico.
C. The late republican phase, which continued throughout nearly the
entire twentieth century. Latin American states were going through a tumultu-
ous and yet clearly manifested evolution from totalitarian institutions governed
in the interest of particular, narrow social elites of juntas and dictatorships to
the democratic, liberal systems adjusted to the requirements of modern civic
societies and national cultures. Competing and clashing during this phase were
the concepts of a conservative, oligarchic state subjected to the dominant so-
cial category – the oligarchy against the liberal, democratic, revolutionary-
and-communist ideologies, and social and national liberation movements. The
largest countries, that is Mexico and Brazil, would shape their own policies of
national and social integration. European emigrants coming from outside the
Iberian peninsula and their descendants began to play an important role in
these processes. The movements of social liberty were multiplying and intensi-
fying, taking the shape of radical, revolutionary groupings of the ilk of the
Mexican National Liberation Forces (Fuerzas de Liberación Nacional, FLN),
the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación
Nacional, EZLN), the Brazilian movements of the landless, the Peruvian Shin-
ing Path (Sendero Luminoso), and other groupings of a military and terrorist
character. The local wars against state institutions, known as guerrillas, provide
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a constant and necessary element for the shaping of the national ideologies of
Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Chile. They flourished and assumed
a special importance in the 1960s and 1970s. Maturing among them was the
ideology and doctrine of the nation state, of the people’s democratic republic
(Bizberg and Frybes 2000). Besides the ideology of the elites, forms of civic,
state nationalism emerged and became reinforced. Latin American nations ceased
to be the expressed communities, and became symbolic and at the same time
realistic communities of national culture. The civic societies of Latin America
built their own models of integration, focused on their own heritage and tradi-
tion, and developed the first mature theoretical concepts and ideologies of the
nation. This was a phase of advanced nationalism in Mexico, Brazil, Chile, and
Colombia. The national cultures became altered, autotelic, free from depen-
dency on the European ideological and intellectual heritage. Latin America
“turned towards itself (ensimismada), individual countries shaped their own
national identities” (Wojcieszak 2000: 8). The process of migration that brought
wide groups of European ethnic origin mostly to Argentina and Brazil oc-
curred during this phase of development. Immigration radically changed the
proportions between white and coloured populations in these countries, and
remained not without influence on further deepening of ethnic differentiation
and racial exclusivism on the one hand, and on the mixing and overlapping of
components of various cultures on the other. The basic factor putting together
the racially, ethnically, and denominationally varied population element was the
state. Initially exclusive, oligarchic, and conservative, the state evolved ever
more towards the liberal, democratic systems of civic states based on elections.
The republican period – the phase of “new states” in Argentina, Mexico,
Brazil, and Chile can be divided into three sub-periods: a) destabilisation and
attempts to introduce democratic governments (the first half of the twentieth
century), b) the governments of military and civil juntas, and the period of
dictatorship of regimes (until the end of 1980s), and c) the period of the “new
democracy” that has continued since the end of 1980s to this day.
Plenty of new movements of a revolutionary, democratic, and liberal and
socialist character appeared in Latin America in the latter half of the twentieth
century. In most cases, they would assume the form of guerrillas, taking after
“Che” Guevara’s troupers and partisan groupings commanded by Fidel Castro.
Liberal, democratic, and national liberation movements engulfed the largest
countries of Latin America, including Mexico and Brazil. These movements
were as a matter of fact of local scope, yet they received a reaction from the
governments of central states. They involved and attracted the attention of
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domestic and international public opinion. The oligarchic, elitist state govern-
ments would gradually yield to social pressure. Yet the ideological and political
reasons for the new liberal and democratic movements in Latin America –
frequently of a leftist or socialist bias – were relatively complex and based
mostly on the following:
1. The particular and elitist character of state institutions serving the imple-
mentation of interests of narrow oligarchic political elites, mostly of a white,
European pedigree. The system based on autocratic governments of mili-
tary or civil juntas would “appropriate” the state, rendering impossible the
participation of broad social groups in sharing power and participation in
democratic civic procedures. The elitist, conservative, oligarchic character
of most Latin American states – if not of all of them – led not only to
political tensions, but also to social disproportions based on unequal access
to natural resources and on unfair distribution of national revenue.
2. The result of political tensions, being the consequence of social inequalities,
was a variety of protests, rebellions of different social groups and commu-
nities – ethnic and racial as well as and professional. Participants of all the
opposition movements were repressed, persecuted, imprisoned, and tor-
tured. Such phenomena, leading to escalated repressions towards a variety
of oppositionists, were especially strongly manifested in the 1960s. Brazil
and Argentina did away with members of left-wing political parties, and far-
reaching repressions were applied towards the rural population, mostly In-
dian, in Mexico and countries of Central America; the brunt of persecution
by state authorities was aimed against students, physicians, railwaymen go-
ing on strike in Mexico, and a range of other social categories.
3. This was the time when the tendency to liberalisation and democratisation
of political life appeared. The idea of national and socialist revolution was
replaced by a programme of liberal and democratic change, which allowed
liberalisation and democratisation of political life. The civic identity spread
to all – even the most underprivileged – social strata, leading, besides rare
exceptions, to an increased sense of nationalism.
D. The post-national, civil isational phase, when – beside na-
tional ones – systems of interstate and international integration
took shape. This phase had its roots in Simon Bolívar’s ideology of Latin
American federation, aiming at a single state organisation and integration of all
the former Spanish colonies. The particular interests of local economic and
political elites in colonial administrative units, as well as external influences
exerted by other powers, and especially by the United Kingdom, France, and
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the United States, made the highly uniform and homogeneous culture of Span-
ish colonies divide into separate states. The nineteenth century was a period of
territorial wars for the political borders of states dominated by elitist, exclusive
oligarchic groups. The twentieth century was a tumultuous time when civic
nationalism formed and when the democratic idea of nation–states became
more common. Parallel to country-based forms of nationalism, designed by
political elites, there was the ever persistent and developing sense of broader,
civilisational, Latin American identity. The scope of language uniformity, and
religious solidarity, growing from the grounds of sharing a common tradition
and cultural heritage, is rooted deep in time. It comes from the phase of politi-
cal unity of colonies, linguistic and religious homogenisation, with ethnic and
racial variety. The processes of automation, synchronisation, and hybridisation
of Latin American societies are parallel to the phenomena of cultural
homogenisation, national integration, and political unification. One of the mani-
festations of the functioning of this form of integration and identity is the
concept of “the cosmic race” (raza cosmica) put forth by Jose Vasconcelos. It
reaches more a creed than a theory of a tribal, racial, and ethnic identity
reshaping into a sense of social and civic identification with disappearing cul-
tural divides. The basic distinctive feature of this new, universalised identity was
to be the sense of social solidarism and religious identification (Vasconcelos
1993). For Mexico, this concept became the foundation of a new nationalism
and sense of Latin American unity developing towards the North American
one. Most countries of Latin America, and especially Mexico and Brazil, found
themselves in a phase of reconstruction of their national identity and redefini-
tion of the grounds of political, economic, and cultural integration. As anti-
Americanism was being replaced by the concept of pan-American ideology, the
civic societies of Latin American countries turned towards the multicultural,
pluralist model, following the path marked out by the United States.
The basic tendencies in transformations of national identity among mem-
bers of civic societies of Latin American countries in the 1990s included:
1. Processes of optimisation and building cultural unity and national identity
detached from the Spanish and Portuguese heritage. This process led to
awarding Chileans, Mexicans, Brazilians, and Argentinians the character of
civic societies, and also of cultural and national communities. At this stage,
national identity was characteristic not only of members of political and
intellectual elites, as it had been early in the twentieth century, but it spread
to all social categories of the population, irrespective of racial and ethnic
origin. At the end of the twentieth century, civic communities transformed
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to an ever greater degree into culturally separate nations. The nation-form-
ing processes led to the homogenisation of Latin American societies to an
uneven degree and at a different pace, shaping not so much the existing
sense of territorial and state bond but the awareness of cultural separate-
ness based on tradition and national heritage.
2. Changes in production relations. Technological progress and changes in
the systems of production and distribution management made Latin America
enter the phase of controlled dependent development towards the end of
the twentieth century. The notion of “dependent development” denotes on
the one hand the entry of Latin American countries, and especially of Chile,
Argentina, Mexico, Brazil and Uruguay, to the global economic (and finan-
cial) system, and on the other, the founding of national economies in coop-
eration with highly developed countries, and especially with the United
States. Besides subjugating the banking systems and state budgets of South
America to international control, this economic model, known as the “Latin
American option”, aids dynamic changes and transformations in the realm
of economic organisation and social structure. It leads to fast, uncontrolled
transfer of the rural population to cities. This phenomenon is the result of
changes in agricultural production. For over two decades, small agricultural
farms have remained below the threshold of production profitability. Agricul-
ture is based on huge farms, organised by global concerns, managed cultiva-
tion and breeding in a way adjusted to contemporary organisation and the
world’s economic conditions (Stemplowski 1978). They are very quick to
displace owners of small farms from the market. The number of pauperised,
landless and jobless residents of large cities is growing in Latin America.
3. The phenomena of industrialisation and urbanisation of the country. As far
as the processes of industrialisation are slower and weaker in Latin America
than those taking place in agriculture, urbanisation related to the mass
exodus of rural population into the cities assumed an unrestrained, sponta-
neous, and mass character. Another result of urbanisation – not necessarily
a positive one – was the rapid numerical growth of “poverty districts” –
ethnic and tribal ghettos lying beyond the margin and composed of people
bereft of traditional social and cultural heritage. Reconstructing their racial
and ethnic identity, the residents of these districts of Indian–African origin,
and racially mixed Mulattoes and Mestizos, mark – in a paradoxical manner
– the beginnings of a new, proletarian and plebeian version of national
awareness. The gatherings of urban population, independent of the class-
and ethnic-racial divides among them, develop their particular market for
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so-called cultural consumption. In the same way, elements of ethnic cul-
tures – ludic, related to entertainment and fun – have also become the
driving force behind homogenisation and cultural integration of the ethni-
cally mixed urban population.
4. The processes of territorial integration and the reduction of the tendency to
regionalise and polymorphise, leading to an increased sense of national
unity. Historical separatist tendencies of individual regions of Mexico, Bra-
zil and Colombia, especially related to certain types of agricultural mining
economies, made the most powerful marks on the most economically devel-
oped regions – for example in the Rio Grande do Sul state in Brazil – as
well as the most impoverished – such as in Mexico’s state of Chiapas.
5. The movement of religious revival and syncretism has become a highly
interesting and new phenomenon. Racial and religious syncretism leads to
further emergence of transcultural forms of identity, closer to Brazilian
national awareness than to other forms of local, particular identification
with regional or ethnic groups. One of the important functions of syncre-
tism is the universalisation of identity of coloured and racially mixed catego-
ries of population.
6. A specific variant of the processes of building supranational, continental
bonds is the phenomenon of pan-Americanism. The construction of trans-
continental, pan-American integration takes place mostly in the economic
and political dimensions. The states of the northern hemisphere develop an
ever better-functioning, organised and coordinated financial and economic
market, coordinated by international organisations such as the Organiza-
tion of American States and NAFTA. The integration of the two Americas:
the Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, rationalist, and individualist, and the Ibero-
American, Spanish and Portuguese-speaking and Catholic – is a phenom-
enon perceptible also in the cultural dimension. The borders of Latin American
civilisation are moving ever further north. The percentage of Spanish-speaking
citizens of the United States is growing now not only in Southern Califor-
nia, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas, but also in Nevada, Colorado, and
even New York and Illinois. On the other hand, the participation of the
United States in the economic development of Latin American countries is
expanding and deepening. Political and economic rationalism, economic
competition, freedom of the individual, fast technological growth – the
phenomena that define integrating trends for the economies of the US,
Canada and Mexico – have also become the decisive factors in the context
of cultural changes.
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The phenomena of Latin Americanisation, pan-Americanism, increased sense
of civilisational unity in the globalising world, are accompanied by the tendency
to search for own paths to integration, stemming from the indigenous cultural
and political tradition. One of the variations of Latin Americanisation is the
populist movements – operating on the grounds of anti-Western, anti-Ameri-
can, anti-globalist ideological assumptions – which in certain countries, such
as Venezuela, Bolivia and Nicaragua, assume the form of democratic socialism.
The President of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, became the leader and symbol of
this ideological and political path of international integration. Finding support
in the radical social movements represented by the categories of pauperised
coloured and racially mixed inhabitants of large cities, Chávez in a sense is
building grounds for Latin American solidarity of a new, supranational type
falling back on the classic concepts of “Che” Guevara and Fidel Castro, who
preached the domination of egalitarian and social revolutionary principles based
on the assumptions of social equality. The nativist movements have become
a certain alternative in the construction of Latin American identity – other than
national – of the socialist, proletarian type, referring at the same time to inde-
pendence traditions and national civic societies. Radical ideas and left-wing
movements have recently become institutionalised in Latin America. Presi-
dents of a number of Latin American states, including Brazil, Venezuela and
Bolivia, were elected to their posts to a greater extent thanks to falling back
on the principles of social solidarity rather than those of national unity. The
social solidarisation correlated with the ideas of nationalism assumes the form
of national revolutionary programmes, in which the main role is no longer
played by the richest white postcolonial elites but by the coloured and ra-
cially mixed categories of the population situated in the lower layers of the
social structure.
5. Latin American societies: communities
of national culture or civilisational
corporation – community?
One of the greatest sociological controversies related to theoretical attempts to
define the cultural nature of pluralistic Latin American societies is based on the
impossibility of finding a single model for the process of integrating people of
various racial, national, and ethnic (including tribal) origin. Due to the type of
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bonds, Latin American communities are situated between the models of state–
civic, economic, political and ideological uniformity, and of cultural – i.e. ra-
cial, ethnic, and religious pluralism. Which of these models – the political or
the cultural one – would better, that is more fully and adequately, render the
nature of integrative phenomena into a relatively uniform and homogenous
civic society? Are Latin American communities closer to the edge of political
and economic uniformity, and language homogeneity, allowing interpretation
and explanation in the categories of political, civilisational, and economic sys-
tem, or are they rather similar to a peculiar “multi-headed Leviathan”, that is
a certain cultural-national whole? Do Latin Americans feature a fairly uniform
type of identity, preach the same standards, respect similar values, or are these
rather individual communities characterised by political and cultural unique-
ness and national separateness?
The question whether civic societies in Latin America build nations or other
post-national civilisations is by definition unanswerable, just like the question
whether people hailing from different cultural groups are something of the like
of a corporation–grouping: a community of citizens of the state equal in the
view of one another and the law, or whether they form a homogeneous com-
munity of national culture. The societies of Latin America are both, they build
areas of state–civic and cultural–national integration.
The nation is defined in the most general sense as a historically devel-
oped very large community of people of territorial character, with
a characteristic relatively uniform culture, especially in the scope
of language and religion, conscious of their own separateness and
integrity, together with the psychological and ideological conse-
quences of this unity, fulfilling itself in its own state. In reference to
Latin American societies, the definition of the nation thus formulated contains
a few highly important components decisive for the essence of every nation.
Latin American societies are territorial groupings. On the basis of the territorial
bond, functions the notion of the motherland as a politically and culturally
shaped element of national identity of civic societies. Thus understood, territo-
rial groupings – native, with characteristic nationalist types of attitudes, base
their status not only on their own state and a sense of civic solidarity but also
on the language they share, and the system of values and symbols stemming
from their uniform religious tradition. In this way, civic societies in Latin Ameri-
can countries are sovereign, autotelic groupings that meet all the criteria along
which nations are defined.
285TADEUSZ PALECZNY • THE STATE AND NATION-FORMING PROCESSES
The factors constituting Latin American nations include:
1. Population, and its racial, ethnic and demographic charac-
teristic features. The data concerning the sizes of populations of individual
Latin American countries and their ethnic, racial, and religious mix are pre-
sented below in tables 1 and 2. Latin America is currently inhabited by ap-
proximately 550 million people. There are 34 states and 14 dependent territo-
ries in Latin America, covering together approximately 20.6 million sq. km.
The population of Latin America is a mixture of Europeans, indigenous Indi-
ans, Africans, and Asians, which has developed a number of important ethnic
and racial categories, especially of mixed type, for example Mestizos, Mulat-
toes, Zambos and Caboclos. The populations of individual countries of Latin
America are strongly varied ethnically and racially, depending on the propor-
tion of participation of the autochthonous population, Europeans, and Afri-
cans. In the majority of Latin American countries categories of population of
Asian origin are also visible. Dominant among the European population are the
descendants of colonists and settlers from Spain and Portugal. The percentage
of descendants of French, Italian, German, Polish, Jewish and Ukrainian immi-
grants is significant. The most populous country of Latin America, Brazil, is
currently inhabited by over 119 million people. The population of Mexico
reaches 110 million. Every second Latin American citizen lives in one of these
two countries. Integrative processes among the population of these two coun-
tries provide a model that is to a great extent representative of the entire area.
The two largest civic societies are dominated by a population of racially mixed
origin. In Mexico, 60% of the population are Mestizos, while in Brazil, even
though the percentage of racially mixed population is still second – according
to subjective declarations – to the population of white Brazilians, it reaches
approximately 45% of all inhabitants. The demographic characteristics of the
countries of the Andes are different from those of other states, as it is the
Indian population that is dominant here. Closest to racial homogeneity are the
racially mixed Chile and Paraguay. In these countries the decided majority of
inhabitants are Mestizos, yet Chileans and Paraguayans form populations with
a domination of national rather than racial identification. The definition of
“a Chilean” does not contain the notion of a “Mestizo”, and calling a Chilean
or Paraguayan a Mestizo carries a pejorative, negative undertone. The pro-
cesses of civic and cultural assimilation have in these countries gone so far that
we see here not only the domination of civic–national bonds and identity but its
near exclusivity, if the low percentage of the indigenous population is disre-
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garded. A similar situation on the grounds of uniform national identity is present
in Argentina and Uruguay. In those countries, racial – much like ethnic –
identity is reduced to national identification.
2. Territoriality. Characteristic of Latin American societies is a powerful
sense of territoriality that finds expression both in state and national ideologies,
and in people’s psychology and identity. From the very beginning, the idea of
territorial integration assumed one of the central places in the processes of
integrating colonists and immigrants into a civic society. The sense of a bond
with the motherland assumes an exceptionally powerful form with a clear domi-
nation of civic, territorial–state solidarity. The principle of territorial integra-
tion is comprised in the nation-forming processes of Latin American countries.
The most important role in the processes of territorial integration – in fact
from the earliest days of Iberian settlement in Latin America – was played by
the state. The sense of territoriality is, as Stanisław Ossowski believes, one of
the basic distinctive features of national solidarity, and is characteristic also of
Latin Americans. Besides a powerful subjective bond with the ideological moth-
erland, the state, the territory treated as home for all irrespective of racial or
tribal–ethnic origin, very distinctive types of local–regional identity are present
locally. Among the most obvious types of such territorial and cultural identity
are the gaucho regionalism in the Brazilian–Argentinian–Uruguayan border-
land; the “little” Indian homelands in Mexico, south of the Chiapas state; and
Caribbean islander enclaves of individuality, as in the case of Haiti and Puerto
Rico. The processes of regionalisation are one of the phases at the same time of
types of the phenomenon of cultural universalisation in Latin America. Cultural
universalisation means the broadening of the borders of the notion of home-
land, from the “private” tribal homeland, inheritance, home soil, native terri-
tory, and region to the “ideological” homeland of state and national type.
Cultural universalisation takes place through the processes of acculturation,
and, in the colonisation phase – dominated by Iberoconformism – was based
on the shaping of the regional (territorial and ethnic) identity of the autochtho-
nous type, while in the post-national phase it leads to the emergence of inter-
national regions, as around La Plata. The universalisation of the notion of
homeland takes place in Latin America through nation- forming processes.
Among other things, this means the broadening of the territorial, semantic and
semiotic scope of the notion of homeland. The people of the Rio Grande do Sul
state in southern Brazil no longer believe their identification with the “private”
homeland – the region – to be more important than that with the Brazilian
ideological homeland. Nor do they claim secession or political sovereignty. The
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Rio Grande identity, much like the gaucho and carioca in the Rio de Janeiro
State, overlap and coexist with a broader notion of territorial bond. This is not
only of a state and legal character but also, if not primarily, it is cultural. Brazil,
Mexico, Argentina or Chile are homelands for all citizens, irrespective of ra-
cial, regional, religious and ethnic differences. The feeling of civic solidarity is
not based solely on the sense of territorial and state bond, but also on linguistic
and cultural ones. In short, present here are all the components of national
identity.
Territorial and demographic characteristics of selected (largest) countries
of Latin America (data for 2003)
Countr y
Argentina
Belize
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Puerto Rico
Dominican Republic
Uruguay
Venezuela
Area
(in sq. km)
2,766,890
22,966
1,098,580
8,511,965
756,950
1,138,910
51,100
110,860
283,560
21,040
108,890
112,090
1,972,550
129,494
78,200
406,750
1,285,220
9,104
48,730
176,220
912,050
Population
38,740,807
266,440
8,586,443
182,032,604
15,665,216
41,662,073
3,896,092
11,263,429
13,710,234
6,470,379
13,909,384
6,669,789
104,907,991
5,128,517
2,960,784
6,036,900
28,409,897
3,885,877
8,715,602
3,413,329
24,654,694
Population increase
(in 2003)
1.05%
2.44%
1.63%
1.15%
1.05%
1.56%
1.56%
0.34%
1.91%
1.81%
2.66%
2.32%
1.43%
2.03%
1.36%
2.54%
1.61%
0.58%
1.36%
0.79%
1.48%
The processes of regionalisation are not only phenomena of expansion of
the territorial borders of the homeland, but also of increased political consoli-
dation, social unification and economic standardisation of cultural groups in-
Source: The World Factbook 2003, http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/
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habiting territorial units in individual countries of Latin America. More and
more widespread is the sense of a supra-state, international regional bond. An
example here is the Mercosur region, the borderlands between Brazil, Argen-
tina, Uruguay and Paraguay. “Latin Americanness” cannot be reduced only to
a certain type of identity, connecting the members of the Mexican or Cuban
diaspora in the United States. This is supra-state, international identification of
a civilisational type.
3. Historical continuity. Latin American societies have their traditions
of colonial and settlement: a historical memory connected with the long pro-
cess of linguistic, religious and racial integration, and group mythology as well
as ideologies related to the process of shaping the territory, development of
state organisations, principles of democracy, and civic liberty. In the basic mythical
and ideological canon functioning in the collective and individual awareness of
Latin Americans are the linguistic bond and a special type of folk religiousness,
as well as state and civil solidarity assuming the form of nationalism. A very
important role in the shaping of the tradition and common heritage is played by
the territorial bond: identification not so much with the state as with the home-
land, being the correlate of Latin American nationalisms. Not only territories of
states become homelands, but so do the regional areas that function in the
awareness of Mexicans, Brazilians and, for example, Colombians not only as
geographic areas, but as symbolic zones of economic, political, and cultural
unity. The historical continuity of Latin American societies grows on the ground
of dominant cultures of Spanish and Portuguese colonisers, but is comple-
mented with elements of heritage.
The relatively short – compared to other nations – collective awareness of
Latin Americans is also influenced to a certain extent by the pre-Columbian
beliefs and cultural products of Indian tribes, increasingly considered equally
important to European civilisational heritage. The phenomena of American
Indian pan-ethnicism and indigenism are among the most important elements
of the contemporary phase of development in the nation-forming processes of
Latin America (Romero 1971; Kearney 1996; Posern-Zieliński 2005). The
historical heritage shared by all Latin Americans – irrespective of their cultural
identity – also includes state symbols, including the anthem, coat of arms, flag,
and the cult of national heroes, especially strongly identified with the slogans of
social solidarity and struggle for national liberation, cultivated by political and
public authorities. The pantheon of heroes shared by nearly all Latin American
societies includes Simon Bolívar and “Che” Guevara. Mexicans have their own
national heroes including Emiliano Zapata, and Brazilians have Luis Barbosa.
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National heroes are an important part of cultural heritage and an element of
national ideologies and identities.
The historical heritage of Latin Americans is as complex and varied as the
traditions of cultures that they themselves or their predecessors hailed from.
The most important integrative dimension lies primarily in the – common for all
Latin Americans – area of state, economic, and increasingly cultural traditions,
manifested in the syndrome of supranational ties – the cosmic race – and also
among other things in the iconography of products of musical, film and literary
pop culture, art, architecture, and numerous other areas of activity including
sport, science and economy. Sport, and especially football, plays a particularly
important role in the development of national identities. Pelé, a footballer of
the Brazilian club Santos, helped to shape patriotic attitudes and nationalism to
a greater extent than several generations of politicians. Matches played by
national football teams are an important element of national identity and of the
sense of separateness within the space of a linguistic and religious community
of Latin Americans. Football matches played by national teams not only raise
powerful emotions and patriotic attitudes, but they have also led to armed
conflicts, as was the case of the war between Honduras and El Salvador, which
was, due to the immediate reason for its outbreak referred to as “the football
war”. With all the traits of an armed conflict, the football war broke out in
1969. The name was derived from information spread by the press and televi-
sion that the reason for the war was the World Cup qualifying match that
Honduras lost on 15th June 1969. In reality, the relations between the two
states had been tense much earlier, but nevertheless the match itself became the
factor which allowed the culmination of nationalism in the two communities.
The actual and more important reason for conflict were territorial disputes the
two countries held around border areas, settled in an uncontrolled manner by
the poor smallholders and landless Salvadorean peasants. Approximately 3000
people died in the conflict on both sides of the front.
4. Community character – being an attribute of nations showing
a justified belief in common ethnogenesis. In this case, the community charac-
ter is to a greater extent a component of a racial, ethnic or religious tie, being
more narrow than the national one (Weber 2002: 306–313). In the supreme
instance in the dimension of civilisational–cultural and state–civic integration,
the Latin American society is a “community of communities” of tribal, ethnic,
racial, linguistic, local, denominational, traditional, regional and national types.
The community component is carried and substituted in the dimension of civil,
political ties in the form of a new state nationalism expressed in the possibility
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of establishing – as Latin American theoreticians and politicians claim – the
new Mexican (Zea 1993), Brazilian (Freyre 1951), Bolivian or Chilean na-
tions. Latin American societies were formed to the greatest extent by the states
and a type of identity closer to political and cultural nationalism. To a signifi-
cant degree they are closer to the type of civil society defined by Florian Znaniecki
than that of the “national culture” community. Latin American thinkers were
more eager to use the notion of “civilisation” than that of “culture”, which to
a great extent rendered the complexity and variety of such societies as the
Mexican, Brazilian, and Columbian in their racial and ethnic, and consequently
also cultural, origin.
The sense of community: the specific bond based on personal identification
with persons not only being citizens of the same state but also representing
a similar or identical type of symbolic solidarity is based among Latin American
nations to a greater extent on mystical, irrational belief, and subjective and
deeply experienced spiritual union, than on the grounds of rational community
of interests. The community spirit of Brazilians, Mexicans, Chileans and Boliv-
ians is of a more spiritual, religious and psychological nature that has grown
against the background of belief in historical and territorial ties rather than that
of an economic or political nature. Social structure and political ideas are the
factors that decisively set Latin Americans apart due to the differences in their
income levels, social and professional prestige, and standing in the hierarchy of
power. These differences are still – even though to a decreasing degree –
reinforced by features of a racial and ethnic–tribal nature. The Brazilian or
Chilean character are, however, syndromes of national awareness and atti-
tudes, whose elements are common for all those citizens irrespective of racial,
ethnic or national origins. The sense of national community is a distinctive
feature among Mexican, Brazilians, and representatives of all national societies
in Latin America. It is more passionate, spontaneously expressed, and experi-
enced deeper than in European countries. The sense of national community in
Latin American countries always kindles more lively emotions than would be
justified in the case of linguistic, religious, economic or social unity. The com-
munity spirit also means orientation in the shaping of such types of identity and
personality that find acceptance of other people in the near and far social
environment. The questions of honour, prestige, social recognition, and accep-
tance of own position are more important for Latin Americans than their situ-
ation within the social structure. The sense of belonging and ties with the
community lead to a powerful emotional relationship with homeland, nation
and tradition. Elements of that tradition are not only the state, the president,
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and the national football team, but also a peculiar religious, linguistic, territo-
rial bond. This identity is based on the shared cult of heroes, saints, ancestors,
and also on a belief in cultural similarity and common history.
5. Relatively high cultural homogeneity of Latin American soci-
eties, especially in the scope of language and religion. The dimension of cul-
tural integration is very strongly correlated with the principle of relatively high
denominational homogeneity and language uniformity. The dimension of val-
ues, symbols, and products that connect all citizens over racial, religious, and
ethnic divides emerges more and more powerfully in the integrative processes
of Latin American societies.
One of the most important components of this unity is language. The
language that all Mexicans – with very rare exceptions – share is Spanish,
much as is the case with the Portuguese language for Brazilians. It is true that
these languages have by now become quite different from their European pre-
cursors, yet this fact reinforces even further the sense of national unity and
community, parallel to drifting apart from the colonial tradition. At the same
time, the sense of bond with the Creole or Lusitanic cultural milieu is weaken-
ing in both language zones, giving way to more general, egalitarian identifica-
tion with the nation.
Latin American societies are highly uniform in their denominational struc-
ture. Dominant here are Christian groups, mostly Catholic, with a growing
participation of Protestants and a fairly large share of other religions, especially
syncretic ones: Afro-Brazilian and Indian -Christian. Independent of the fact
that areas of denominational variety continue to exist is the Latin American
phenomenon of folk Catholicism: informal and extra-ecclesial. It is based on
the successful transfer of this sphere of group integration to the private, per-
sonal, and local space. In the countries of Latin America, religion is of a folk,
spontaneous, and individual nature rather than of an institutional, formal, and
group character. The ethos of Christian values combined with folk tradition,
tribal magic and rites, and the belief in the unity of the world of people and
nature leads to the evolution of the syndrome of mystical community tied to
powerful religious grounds.
The ethnic structure leads to the continuing separateness of numerous
groupings – differing in their cultural as well as their linguistic and religious
assets – both on local, tribal, neighbourhood, community and parish levels,
and on a global one too. The fact of maintaining an ethnic bond is to an ever
lesser degree an obstacle in the development of a broader civic and cultural
bond defined by integrative processes carried on the level of global society.
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Racial and religious characteristics of the largest countries in Latin America
Countr y
Argentina
Belize
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Racial mix
97% Whites (Indo-Europeans);
3% Mestizos, Indians and others
48.7% Mestizos, 24.9% Creoles,
10.6% Maya, 6.1% Garifuna,
9.7% others
30% Quechua, 25% Aymara,
30% Mestizos, 15% Indians
55% Whites, 38% Mulattoes,
6% Blacks, 1% others
95% Whites and Whites Indians,
3% Indians, 2% others
58% Mestizos, 20% Whites,
14% Mulattoes, 4% Blacks, 3% mixed
Blacks and Indians, 1% Indians
94% Whites (inc. Mestizos),
3% Blacks, 1% Indians, 1% Chinese,
1% others
51% Mulattoes, 37% Whites,
11% Blacks, 1% Chinese
65% Mestizos, 25% Indians,
3% Blacks, 7% Whites
90% Mestizos, 1% Indians,
9% Whites
55% Mestizos, 43% Indians,
2% others
90% Mestizos, 7% Indians,
2% Blacks, 1% Whites
60% Mestizos, 30% Indians,
9% Whites, 1% others
69% Mestizos, 17% Whites,
9% Blacks, 5% Indians
70% Mestizos, 20% Indians,
10% Whites
95% Mestizos, 5% Whites and
Indians
Rel ig ion
92% Catholics (less than 20%
practising), 2% Protestants,
2% Jews, 4% others
49.6% Catholics, 27% Protes-
tants, 1.5% Jehovah’s
Witnesses, other 14%,
none 9.4% (2000)
95% Catholics, Protestants
80% Catholics
89% Catholics, 11% Protestants,
less than 1% Jews
90% Catholics
76.3% Catholics, 13.7% Prot-
estants, 1.3 % Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses, 0.7% others Protes-
tants, 4.8% other, 3.2% none
85% Catholics (before Castro),
Protestants, Jehovah’s
Witnesses, Jews, Santeria
95% Catholics
83% Catholics
Catholics, Protestants,
indigenous Maya beliefs
97% Catholics, Protestants
89% Catholics, 6% Protestants,
5% other
85% Catholics
85% Catholics,
15% Protestants
90% Catholics
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Peru
Puerto
Rico
Dominican
Republic
Uruguay
Venezuela
45% Indians, 37% Mestizos,
15% Whites, 3% Blacks, Oriental
and other races
80.5% Whites, 8% Blacks,
0.4% Indians, 0.2% Asians,
10.9% mixed and other races
16% Whites, 11% Blacks, 73% mixed
races
88% Whites, 8% Mestizos, 4% Blacks,
practically no Indians
Spaniards, Italians, Portuguese, Arabs,
Germans, Africans, indigenous
population
90% Catholics
85% Catholics, 15% Protestants
and others
95% Catholics
66% Catholics, 2% Protestants,
1% Jews, 31% other religions
and non-believers
96% Catholics, 2% Protestants,
2% others
Source: The World Factbook 2003, http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/
index.html.
The white Catholics of European origin and heritage remain the culturally
and economically dominant category, while the proportion of coloured and
racially mixed social categories is on the increase. Catholicism, and growing
religious and racial syncretism, are decisive for the original and unique qualities
of the processes that integrate and form nations in Latin America.
6. National awareness. The decided majority of Latin Americans pride
themselves on their civic belonging and shape a sense of state and civilisational
nationalism specific to the countries of this cultural realm.
Latin American communities – multicultural in the sense of racial mix – are
not nations in the sense that we ascribe to the notions of “the French nation” or
“the Polish nation”, while at the same time meeting most definitional require-
ments that are set for such groupings. Latin American societies are in an ad-
vanced phase of the nation-forming process, shaping the bond of the national
type among Chileans, Bolivians, Colombians, not to mention Mexicans, Brazil-
ians, and Argentinians. National solidarity is superimposed on a narrower identity
of racial and ethnic community type, becoming unified in the dimension of
state and civic loyalty. There is also an ever clearer and broader dimension of
Latin American civilisation emerging, which is expressed through Catholic heri-
tage, the Spanish language, and a territorial bond that is in fact no longer
reducible to the component cultures of individual immigrant groups.
For this reason, one should not ask whether Latin American societies are
nations, but whether they perceive themselves as nations. The subjectivisation
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of the criteria of national belonging has in recent years become the dominant
tendency. For a Chilean or Paraguayan, the basic type of highly homogeneous,
uniform identity does not boil down to identification with the racial category of
Mestizos, but with the national culture and state being the determinants of the
civic category.
It might also be claimed that Latin American societies feature the character-
istics both of nation–cultures and civic societies–states on the one hand, and of
pluralistic, international, supra-state civilisations on the other. In this sense, the
term “Latin American” also covers a citizen of the United States of America of
Mexican or Puerto Rican national origin, considering their American identity
as obvious and broader than the racial identification of the Blacks or Mestizos,
the religious identification of Catholics and Protestants, the ethnic one of Indi-
ans, or – for example – of Brazilians of Polish or Italian origin. As far as
citizens of Brazil or Mexico use identifiers in the type of “a Brazilian” or
“a Mexican” while defining their own national (cultural) affiliation, a citizen of
the US coming from these countries and identifying himself or herself with
a broader type of cultural group would be more likely to express his or her
identity using the notion of “a Latin American”. The phenomenon of broaden-
ing of the borders of cultural identity overlapping the processes of political and
economic globalisation is spreading to an ever greater extent onto people com-
ing from various racially uniform or mixed groups. Hence this type of Latin
American, or simply Latino, identity is increasingly present next to Afro-American
or American Indian (pan-Indian) ones.
The processes of construction of the ties of civilisational, post-national,
supra-racial (mixed), interethnic, and multi-denominational Latin American
society are far more advanced. Superimposed on the phenomenon of
globalisation, “Latin Americanisation” of culture of members of the various
racial, religious, and ethnic groups is the phenomenon of language uniformity,
while enclaves of bilingualism and bi- and multi-culturality continue. The phe-
nomenon of bicultural reality is present in the identity proper for example for
Afro-Brazilians and Indians, and is dominated by linguistic, religious, political,
and economic identification aiming towards the national type, similar to Brazil-
ian, Mexican or broader – Latin American of the civilisational type (Paleczny
2005).
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6. The case of Brazil: nation-forming process
or phenomenon of Latin Americanisation?
The specific and unique features that differentiate the Brazilian nation-forming
process from other, similar, pluralist societies of immigration and postcolonial
origin include the highly developed phenomenon of racial amalgamation, crowned
with the near disappearance of that dimension of structuralisation. As far as the
component of racial variety and origin remains among the few rather second-
ary dimensions of distinctiveness and ethnic identity, it is based not as much on
the maintenance or establishment of conflicts and biases but rather on the con-
struction of a complex system of cultural identity of the new Brazilian nation.
The most important features of the Brazilian society that built the unique
civic–national mosaic of groups and people of various racial, ethnic and na-
tional origins include:
1. Superimposition and simultaneous presence of various mod-
els of pluralism: from national and ethnically monism, via monism or hybrid
bi-culturality (trans-culturality), to external and internal pluralism, increasingly
dominating the shaping of the current system of identity of Brazilians. These
mechanisms may be defined by the term “trans-culturality” (Lévi-Strauss 1964;
Wade 1997).
Mechanisms that belong to all the models of intercultural relations have
played and are still playing – with changing and unequal intensity – a role in
the Brazilian nation-forming process. I believe that the most important mecha-
nisms include three forms of influence:
a) racial mixing and establishment of transnational categories and groupings,
racially and ethnically mixed: Mulattoes, Mestizos, Cafuzos.
b) superimposition of ethnic and racial awareness with the disappearance and
reduction of the racial and ethnic dimension defined by the fact of tribal,
ethnic or national origin. The result of that process is the relatively early
disappearance of racism and discrimination resulting from the fact of racial
identity.
c) parallel presence of double, shared, symmetric national and ethnic identities:
Indian–Brazilian, Afro–Brazilian, Polish–Brazilian, Ukrainian–Brazilian, and
Italian–Brazilian. As a result, there are still frequent cases of bilingualism
and biculturality at the level of local ethnic groupings. Biculturality and
double, shared Brazilian ethnic and national identity survive not only in the
rural areas of the interior, but also in the large, metropolitan communities
of “ethnics” in Rio de Janeiro, Săo Paulo, Santos, Recife, and Salvador.
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2. Religious, aesthetic and artistic, and cultural and social syn-
cretism. The Brazilian nation-forming process allowed the mixing and super-
imposition of elements of magic, religious beliefs, musical motifs, tribal and
national symbols, and other cultural elements including dances, foods, archi-
tectural styles, patterns of family inheritance, lifestyles, and many others.
3. Polymorphism of ethnic–racial  groups and regional tr ibal
communities, autochthonous and cultural (Paleczny 2001a, 2004). The variety
of forms of organisation results from the racially, ethnically, and religiously
multicultural heritage of the Brazilian population. Hence local groupings of
varied racial and ethnic mix are adjacent one to another, for example in Rio de
Janeiro the favelas, counted among the lowest categories of social class,
neighbour with the enclaves of skyscraper apartment blocks reserved for the
ethnically non-homogenous, although predominantly “white” in their self-iden-
tification, middle-class. In other places, as in the interior of the Rio Grande do
Sul State, local tribal groupings of Guarani Indians coexist side by side with the
rural ethnic communities composed, for example, of the descendants of Polish
settlers, groupings of gauchos and Caboclos, and the camps of Brazilian peas-
ants gathered in the landless movement and devoid of a sense of ethnic identity.
4. “Glocalism” of the Brazilians’ ethnic and national identity. This
is a syndrome of attitudes and identity being a complex, multi-dimensional system
of global identity with various types of the narrower, local, regional identifica-
tion in versions that might be represented by members of the district or city
“samba schools” or schools of the flamenco or the botafogo or gauchos in the
Dom Feliciano municipal region in Rio Grande do Sul. Global identification of
the Brazilian type, national, ideological–civic is based on various elements of
the sense of identification with the Brazilian nation, and for all the separate
local–and–ethnic and cultural–regional groups. Elements of this identity defi-
nitely include the language, yet the case of religion is not that obvious. Going
further, the symbols of Brazilian unity visible in global identity include, for
example, the Brazilian football team, but in regional and local systems the
person of Pelé, for example, is replaced in the capacity of national hero by
a player of a local football team.
The peculiarity of the Brazilian cultural pluralism boils down to the overlap-
ping of two basic types of cultural identity:
I. Broad, global, national. The process of national integration runs at
a quicker pace, as cultural communities – various in the sense of racial and
ethnic origin and intermingled with one another – seek a broader type of
297TADEUSZ PALECZNY • THE STATE AND NATION-FORMING PROCESSES
identification that all could share. The Brazilian society – young in the sense of
cultural homogeneity – is a natural point of reference that is attractive for
members of various racial, ethnic and denominational groups. The hybrid cul-
tural groups, unique in their ethnic and racial characteristics and encompass-
ing more than half of society, urgently need a broader principle for integration
to legitimise their identity. And the new type of national identity is where they
find it. The globalisation of cultural identity of Brazilians does not wrench them
from the original environment – more narrow ethnically and racially; it only
awards the group identification with the more universal character accepted by
everyone.
II. Narrow, exclusive, particular. This dimension of identification of
Brazilians is encompassed in the variety of regional and local racial and ethnic
communities. Besides prototypes of mixed cultural categories, including the
Mulattoes, Cafuzos, Caboclos and gaucho, there are numerous local tribal
groupings of Indians assuming subcultural characteristic features of tribal–
racial–neighbourhood communities of the favelas environment; religiously and
racially separate groups of Brazilians; and the local ethnic groupings of Brazil-
ians of Polish, Ukrainian, Italian or Japanese origin.
These identities become superimposed and crossed with one another in the
complex processes of national assimilation, racial hybridisation, religious
syncretisation, and ethnic amalgamation, leading to the reinforcement of the
new multicultural society. This multiculturality meets all the basic assumptions
of the theoretical model of pluralism (Zhou 1997).
1. Despite internal racial, ethnic and religious divides, Brazilian society is in-
ternally coherent, culturally integrated, racial ly and ethnical ly
mixed, and religiously tolerant. The cohesion of Brazilian society is
not tantamount to homogeneity. On the contrary, this cohesion means the
crossing of a number of relatively strongly diverse principles of hierarchisation
and structuralisation. At that level of global society, race remains a factor
that barely differentiates and is in fact disappearing. The scope of racial
amalgamation makes the mixed population the dominant category, while
locally an unequal valuation of the individual components of identity can be
observed. There are no permanent structural tensions in the country that
would lead to antagonisms and conflicts despite major disproportions in the
situation of Brazilians that have assumed the form of a dichotomy on the
scale of richness, prestige and power. There are movements and groupings
that question the existing class and social order, yet their very activity has
298 ON THE STATE OF LATIN AMERICAN STATES. APPROACHING THE  BICENTENARY
nothing in common with racial or ethnic belonging. One of the most radical
forms of protest is the social activity of the movement of landless peasants.
This movement is an expression of the social stratification between the ex-
treme social categories, owners of vast estates and landless peasants, esca-
lating into conflicts, which in a great majority of cases are solved by the use
of legal means. Brazilian society contains minorities dissatisfied with their
situation, yet they are of a class or social character, and not of cultural,
racial or ethnic origin. These minorities do not bring down the basic prin-
ciple of pluralism based on acceptance of the rights to cultural separateness
that are honoured by a majority of Brazilians. It is true on the other hand
that the principle of the primacy of “the social good” in Brazil is an ideol-
ogy that is more clearly and strongly articulated then implemented, yet the
federal authorities have not conducted any planned policy towards racial
and ethnic communities for the last several decades.
2. Brazilian society is multi-cultural, and encompasses numerous iden-
tities of various uniform and mixed racial, ethnic, and religious
characteristics. The various types of cultural identities are maintained
and developed without any political or legal barriers, encountering no more
than obstacles of a social and economic nature. Members of various cul-
tural groups have unequal access to education, they participate to various
degrees in the division of power and revenue, yet the principle of free
development is maintained for every racial, ethnic, and religious group.
There is cultural equality in Brazil, which is expressed by the fact that
a variety of communities is maintained with full rights to their own separate-
ness. Social equality and cohesion do not stand in contradiction to cultural
variety.
3. The abundance of cultural identities is expressed in a multicultural,
racial, ethnic and religious mosaic. Cultural pluralism means the
existence of various traditions, lifestyles, and historical traditions
of human groups. Brazilian Multi-culturalism is developing in three di-
mensions:
a) Cultural stratification. On the racial plane this means inequality on the
scale of fortune, education, power, and prestige. Yet these inequalities are
neither common nor dominant, and assume the form of regional class gra-
dation between the black and the white populations in the regions of their
concentration. The extremes of the scale are taken by the poorest and the
most affluent, yet this dichotomy does not fully overlap with the criterion of
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racial divides. Ethnic stratification replaces racial gradation within the white
and mixed population of Brazil and becomes an element of positive
biculturality and bilingualism, and not the negative discrimination or in-
equality. Religious pluralism means a lack of evident correlation of ethnic or
racial structure with division into denominational groups, even though such
dependence without a doubt exists.
b) Cultural regionalisation. Regionalisation is present in the perspective of
global society, in the divisions into “the Black north” and “the White south”,
macro-regional and regional areas of domination of the gaucho or the
Caboclo cultures; and on a local, ethnic, religious, and racial micro-scale:
in religious sects, Polish communes in rural communities in the interior,
metropolitan favelas settled by Indian and Afro-Brazilian population of com-
plex racial and ethnic characteristics including tribal.
c) Variety of cultural communities and space. Various types of local
identities narrower than the Brazilian are situated beyond spatial borders of
both a regional and local type. The presence of racially mixed categories –
Mulattoes, Cafuzos, and Mestizos – is common all over Brazil, much like
different forms of theology of liberation, ethnic exclusivism of Iberians, and
the maintenance of tribal bonds of Indian peoples.
An analysis of the nature of Brazilian society from the point of view of
principles of cohesion, equality, and plurality of equal cultural identities sup-
ports the assertion that this is a complex, pluralistic community assuming the
form of a nation. The notion of the “Brazilian multicultural nation” seems to
verge on paradox, as it contains a basic theoretical and practical contradiction.
On the basis of the known theories, the conviction operates that a nation must
be culturally homogeneous, and internally coherent racially and ethically. Yet
Brazil joins the group of those postcolonial and post-migration countries that
in a highly efficient manner develop the principle of national integration on the
basis of pluralistic ties between various racial, ethnic, and denominational com-
munities.
Brazilians form a highly integrated cultural group that fulfils the qualities of
the nation. It is a group of predominantly the same type of cultural integration
as the Portuguese or Polish nations. Yet it also differs significantly from the
culturally uniform European nations due to its complex racial and ethnic char-
acteristics. The processes of integration in the sense of increased language,
symbolic, and ideological factors are present parallel to the processes of
pluralisation of that society in the racial and religious dimensions. Independent
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of the growth of Brazilian national identity, the processes of “Latin America-
nisation” of Brazilians are progressing. A new type of broader civilisational
identification is emerging. At the same time, it is a fact that in the Spanish-
speaking population of Latin America, the processes of “Latin Americanisation”
are more advanced on the grounds of historical tradition, language identifica-
tion, and racial amalgamation.
Translated by Piotr Krasnowolski
301ALEKSANDER POSERN-ZIELIŃSKI • THE STATE AND THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
ALEKSANDER POSERN-ZIELIŃSKI
The State and the Indigenous Peoples
in Latin America
Introduction
Indians, that is native (nativos) or indigenous (indigenas) peoples, autochthonous
in the ethno-historical sense, are the oldest stratum of population in the New
World. For this reason, they are defined as “pueblos originarios”, a term cor-
responding to the concept of “first peoples” used in North America. They are
therefore the heirs of the people who reached the American continent more
than 10,000 years before its “European discovery” in the fifteenth century.
Following 500 years of conquest, colonisation, extermination, exploitation,
marginalisation, exclusion, deprivation of rights, assimilation (mestizaje), and
extinction resulting mostly from lack of immunity to pandemic illnesses, these
peoples became a minority in the world of the new Latin American societies
and states. In some regions – the Caribbean, for example – they died out
almost entirely, while in others they have survived to this day, albeit only in
small, fairly isolated groups (as in Brazil and Paraguay), and in some areas of
Mesoamerica and in Andean countries, they are still present in fairly large
numbers, both as a percentage of the total population and in absolute terms.
Beginning with the 1980s, a range of native organisations, tendencies, and
restitution actions – usually defined jointly as movements of indigenous revival
– began to appear in autochthonous societies: both small ones, usually inhab-
iting tropical forests and savannas far away from urban centres, and those
living in large gatherings in mountain and highland areas. Their common de-
nominator has been a tendency to reject the postcolonial status assigned to
Indians, defence of their land, territories and natural resources, fight for guar-
antees on deciding their own fate, shaping the strategy of their development
(etnodesarrollo), and finally the struggle to preserve their own identity, includ-
ing language, culture, religion, and legal traditions.
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What began to take shape at the same time was pan-Indian solidarity, possi-
ble mostly thanks to new means of social communication (Internet, cheap and
readily available telephone connections) and more intensive contacts between
Indian leaders from various countries of the continent (through conferences,
workshops, working visits, etc.) First this encompassed socially varied indig-
enous societies of one country, and then spread into the macroregion, and
later throughout the continent. Despite the vast cultural and language differ-
ences that divide indigenous groups, its foundation was a common tragic his-
torical experience, a similar current situation based on the status of a minority
deprived of the civil and native rights, and a joint effort to change this situation
by overcoming the paternalism that brings Indians down to the position of an
“object” of state policy and replacing it with indigenous activism allowing
indigenas to achieve the status of being one of the recognised “subjects” of the
country’s social and political life.
The pan-Indian solidarity mentioned here has one more, far broader di-
mension, namely it fits perfectly the global movement of indigenous peoples,
developing the ideology of the so-called “fourth world”. Its main axis is the
struggle to work out generally accepted rights, principles, and standards which
take into account the specific characteristics of indigenous peoples on all con-
tinents (from Inuits in Greenland to Aborigines in Australia), which on the one
hand would be respected by state authorities in the territories where such
peoples live, and on the other would allow those groups to maintain their
jeopardised identity, its continuation harmonised with development programmes
bringing those people out of poverty and marginalisation. The path to reaching
these goals leads first of all through a network of international connections
linking different indigenous organisations and their leaders, thanks to which
new ideas and experiences of the struggle for human and collective rights for
autochthonous people quickly spread from one country to another. Secondly, it
leads through lobbying at the forums of international organisations, primarily
the United Nations and its main agencies (UNESCO, ILO, WHO), including
working out legal regulations defining clearly and unambiguously the rights of
indigenous peoples, and state authorities’ duties towards them. We should note
that representatives of the indigenous community – from both North and Latin
America – have for years been very active in this global “fourth world” move-
ment. It goes without saying that a number of solutions, proposals and sugges-
tions assumed in the recently passed United Nations Declaration on he Rights
of Indigenous Peoples were borrowed from the Latin American experience,
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which is exceedingly rich and inspirational when it comes to the Indians’ fight
for their rights.
Carrying out the emancipatory postulates of the Indians, a process that has
intensified especially since the 1990s, led to the establishment of a new rela-
tionship between the native people and the external world, including the Cre-
ole–Mestizo majority society, the Latin American and international network of
businesses operating in regions inhabited by indigenous peoples, and also the
state and its administrative apparatus. In each of these social, and at the same
time interethnic relations, conflicts, disputes, confrontations of positions, and
finally pursuits of new solutions took place and still do, so that these relations
become based no longer on racial prejudices but on partnership and tolerance,
and in the course of economic progress ignorance of indigenous vital interests
should be replaced by taking into account their right to own territories and
land. The final goals is to have the paternalistic ethno-politics of state authori-
ties (indigenismo) replaced by such regulations that would allow Indians to
exercise their civic rights in all areas of social and political activity, beginning
with local government and ending with the central administration of the state
(Favre 1998).
In this chapter we shall primarily focus on the relations between the states
and indigenous peoples, as this aspect of the “new” interethnical relations in
Latin America may be considered fundamental. This does not mean, however,
that the importance of economic, social, racial and ethnic, and cultural factors
will be ignored, as without referring to them it would be difficult to understand
the contemporary position of native peoples. Nevertheless, they shall be exam-
ined primarily from the perspective of the highly complex relations shaping the
ethnic politics of the state towards its indigenous citizens and the ethnostrategy
of Indians towards the state in whose territory they have lived for centuries and
its system of power relationship.1
It is no exaggeration to claim that the relations between the states and
Indians were of an antagonistic character since the colonial times. This is how
1 Majority of the reflections and interpretations included in this chapter have been
based on my personal experience of many years of anthropological studies and ethno-
graphical fieldwork carried out since 1993 in Latin America, specially in the Andean
countries, where I have observed the indigenous activism and its social, cultural and
political context. Some of the results of my studies were published mostly in Spanish as
well as in Polish, among other in my book (2005a).
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they were and are still, sadly, perceived by the native peoples. It is hard to find
this phenomenon astounding if one takes into account the fact that structures
of power and administration – in both colonial and republican periods – were
built by European colonisers and New World Creoles on the areas captured by
power and taken from the control of the native people. In this new situation,
the authorities – personified by the state apparatus, usually supported the insti-
tutions, groups, and people responsible for exploitation of Indians and expro-
priation of their land. There is no doubt, that the state was responsible for
social and territorial marginalisation of indigenous people, for pushing them
into the position of those excluded and deprived of rights. Last but not least, it
was perceived as a permanently active factor favouring successive conquests of
indigenous territories in the name of economic (exploitation of natural resources)
and social (settlement of excess population) interests, and promoting civilisational
progress (missions, schools, infrastructure) in line with the visions of develop-
ment of the state yet in most cases contradictory with the interests of Indians
themselves (Maybury-Lewis 1997).
In the colonial period, the authorities of vice-kingdoms, audiencias, and
capitanas generales spread their reign by conquering all the new territories that
had earlier been controlled entirely by Indians, and made sure that their indig-
enous peoples were subjected to exploitation as a cheap labour force. Never-
theless, those new and – for Indians – alien authorities awarded the natives
with limited autonomous status, e.g. in the form of the so-called republicas del
indio or of the missionary reducciones that awarded the indigenous people
with a certain package of rights respecting their local traditions, customs, and
legal norms. In the formative and mature republican times (the nineteenth and
the first half of the twentieth century), that is under the reign of the independ-
ent state shaped by Creole elites following French and North American political
and legal ideas, this special status for Indians was liquidated following lofty
slogans of Enlightenment, preaching formal equality (before the law) for all
citizens, and therefore also for Indians. As a result, their legal situation in fact
deteriorated, while exploitation and expropriation continued with a high inten-
sity despite countless rebellions and uprisings, which were considered the only
active strategy of the indigenous people opposing the pitiful situation.
Until quite recently, the contemporary (i.e. latter half of the twentieth cen-
tury) Latin American state, shaped by Creole, Mestizo, and immigrant (from
Europe and Asia) elites, ignored almost entirely the existence and needs of
autochthonous people. In fact, this state did not represent the interests of
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Indian people, although it would sometimes hide these tendencies away, estab-
lishing a variety of institutions (agencies, bureaus, departments, ministries) that
were formally to take care of the natives. Their primary real task hiding behind
the indigenismo ideology was stepped-up integration of Indians, perceived as
a process of including them in the main current of the dominant society and
depriving them of their ethno-cultural identity on the path of the so-called
mestizaje, i.e. cultural, ethnic, and racial assimilation. An Indian was perceived
as a primarily conservative element, a misfit to the modern, developing society.
The Indian pattern of life was considered “primitive”, and therefore unworthy
of continuation, indigenous legal norms (including the idea of collective prop-
erty) were treated as contradictory to the principles of occidental positive rights,
while indigenous land and territories were considered an area of potential set-
tlement and economic expansion to allow implementation of development pro-
grammes and economic growth of the country. In this way the State–Indian
opposition acquired an additional sense. If, from the point of view of the na-
tives, this relationship was seen as a confrontation between the apparatus of
power and violence (that is the oppressive state) and its victim (the indigenous
people), in the eyes of the dominant society, Indians were perceived as the
representatives of backwardness, lagging behind and standing in opposition to
progress and development, of which the contemporary state was the natural
instigator (Bello 2004).
It goes without saying that, inherited from the time of Spanish and Portu-
guese rule, the attitude of both the dominant society and the state apparatus
towards Indian people was strongly infused with racial prejudice, a sense of
cultural superiority, and civilisational and missionary paternalism – that is ideas
that legitimise perfectly the social and economic dominance of the Creole and
Mestizo population over indigenous world. In this sense, then, Latin American
states are without doubt of a postcolonial character, despite the two centuries
that have passed from their formal liberation from the control of their overseas
metropolises. If one looks closer today at the most significant demands of Indi-
ans, formulated in defence of their rights and also with the intention of improv-
ing their everyday lives, it is clear that they are primarily directed against the
still existing elements of (endo)-colonial relations visible in the economic (ex-
ploitation), social (exclusion), civic (lack of subjectivity), and cultural (accul-
turation) areas (Pueblos 2007).
At the threshold of the twenty-first century, this postcolonial model of rela-
tions between the State and Indians began to be questioned ever more often:
a phenomenon reinforced by the progressing process of democratisation that
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encompassed the whole area of Latin America after the period of the fall of
authoritarian rules, civil wars, and guerrilla activities. One of the most visible
manifestations of the process is formed by the so-called new social movements
encompassing ever new sectors of population, claiming an improvement of
lives, respect for their laws, emancipation, and upholding their jeopardised
identities. This current includes such social and organisational efforts as the
movement of peasants without land standing up to owners of large estates, the
movements of the cocaleros, i.e. growers of coca plants, claiming legalisation
of their family small plantations, the movement of Afro-Latin American people
striving for recognition of their cultural heritage and protesting against racism,
movements of residents of the poor neighbourhoods in large metropolises pro-
testing against the dehumanising conditions of their existence, and also ex-
tremely active emancipatory ethnic movements among the indigenous people.
Numerous newly established indigenous organisations and their leaders, as
well as “friends of Indians” from all over the world – usually gathered in nu-
merous NGOs acting for the benefit of Latin American indigenous people –
formulated and assumed positions of decisive criticism towards the former and
current conditions of the native population. After the great fall in the prestige
of left-wing movements (partially caused by the fall of the Soviet Union and its
allies supporting the world-wide communist movement) often favouring the
indigenous population, a major change took place in the indigenous ideological
orientation and the strategy of their struggle. Indian leaders became aware that
the indigenous question was frequently used only opportunistically by the po-
litical parties for their own goals, and that it had little in common with the
actual interests of the native people. This is why, beginning with the 1990s,
they began to build their own organisational structures, strongly dissociating
themselves from the powerful and direct ties to political and syndicalist organi-
sations of the Creole- Mestizo sector. This is how the phenomenon of institu-
tionalised Indian activism was born, and was manifested in the extremely well
developed network of organisations from the local level to that of national and
supraregional federations, and also the more or less successful attempts at
establishing ethnic political parties, gaining influence at the local level of self-
government and also winning indigenous representatives in parliaments, and
state central administration. All of these actions brought a new, strong, well-
organised, influential actor, namely, indigenous leaders and organisations, aware
of their own objectives, arising on today’s political stage in Latin America.
Their presence can no longer be in any way ignored, and must increasingly be
taken into consideration by the state authorities (Yashar 2005).
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Now it is primarily the state and its administration of all levels that has
become the main counterpart in disputes, negotiations, conflicts, and pres-
sures aimed at the improvement of the position of Indians. The experience of
the past years has proved unequivocally that the former ethnic policy of the
authorities – despite the concessions and gestures made on behalf of Indians –
was in fact contradictory with the actual interests of the indigenous people.
Nevertheless, wherever powerful native gathering Indians sprang up, the situ-
ation began to improve gradually, which was mostly based on the construction
of new platforms for cooperation and dialogue between the governmental and
indigenous parties. Despite that, strong tensions and conflicts along the State–
Indians line are still visible. In many countries and regions of Latin America, the
new Latin American populism – implemented in Bolivia by Evo Morales, in
Venezuela by Hugo Chávez, and in Ecuador by Rafael Correa – strongly em-
phasises its positive attitude towards the native people, yet this has not in fact
broken the strongly established barrier of mistrust among Indians towards the
institutions of what (in their eyes) is the oppressive state. For the state is per-
ceived not as an ally of minority ethnic groups, but primarily as a collaborator
of major national and international corporations employing neoliberal develop-
ment programmes that frequently threaten the vital interests of Indians. Such
modernising projects are recurrently the hotbed of acute conflicts that provoke
Indians to mass protests – frequently of an anarchistic character (blocking
roads, occupying buildings, destroying machines) – resulting in repressions on
the part of the authorities, and penalisation of indigenous activists.
In spite of everything, democratic tendencies acquire ever greater power,
slowly becoming an effective means of conflict solving. That end is served by
various commissions, platforms and forums for debates, gathering Indian lead-
ers and representatives of the local and central administration. What is, how-
ever, a markedly weak element in these encounters – is the fact that they con-
struct ambitious programmes of agreement and protection of Indian interest in
the form of “paper” resolutions that are hardly ever implemented, and even
more rarely end in specific actions being undertaken that visibly liquidate mal-
practices or significantly improve the lives of Indians.
The object of these consultations, debates, mediations, appeals, and pro-
tests addressed to state authorities by Indians – independent of local specific
conditions – always includes similar postulates. These include claims to estab-
lish conditions for preservation of identity, halting the process of degradation
of the natural environment inhabited by indigenous peoples, safeguarding their
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human rights together with their due rights as citizens, hosts, and owners of
land that they have inhabited for centuries, introduction of territorial and cul-
tural autonomy based on the principles of multiculturality, intensification of the
process of restitution of lost lands and/or territories, and finally awarding the
indigenous people with full civic subjectivity so that without any formal obsta-
cles they can become responsible for their own lives. Such ideas can easily be
found in the action programmes of the Chilean Mapuche from Araucanía and
the Bolivian Aymara from Altiplano and in the demands of the Mexican Maya
from Chiapas (Warren 1998).
An important factor supporting the phenomenon of contemporary indig-
enous movements in Latin America is the gradual economic development of the
continent, resulting in the modernisation of the lives of Indians by a break-
through in the isolation they have hitherto experienced, greater professional
activation, huge migrations of indigenous peasantry to cities, an improving
level of education, an increasing level of self-awareness among the indigenas
concerning their political, legal, and economic matters, incipient development
of the indigenous middle-class, and shaping of the new native elites, both mov-
ing freely in the world of own values and knowing well the rules of effective
activity in the realm of Western civilisation. Shaped on the grounds of these
transformations is the idea of ethnic development (etnodesarrollo) strongly ac-
centuated the need for modernisation and civilisational advancement of the
indigenous population, yet with the maintenance of a separate ethnic identity
based on the values of their own culture and tradition inherited from their
ancestors (Jackson, Warren 2005).
One of the significant and objective factors favouring the democratisation
of interethnic relations and the development of the indigenous emancipatory
movement – that is at the same time independent from the Latin American
context – is definitely globalisation, perceived primarily as “mundialisation”
(mundialización), which is not as much an economic process as one embracing
both the social and cultural realm. Quick flow of ideas and easier interpersonal
contacts have allowed the spreading of principles of multiculturality and
intercultural education, promoted knowledge of human rights and of interna-
tional principles for protection of indigenous populations, allowing rapid ex-
change of information about the situation of Indian people, and launching
moral, legal and financial support from international organisations and govern-
ments of those states that support the countries of Latin America, and espe-
cially their native inhabitants (Posern-Zieliński 2005).
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The worldwide debate concerning the rights of indigenous peoples and
promotion of political programmes, accounting for the principles of multi-
culturality, have without doubt become important factors that favour reforms
in the relations between the State and Indians. In this atmosphere of significant
shifts of values in the previous “standards” in interethnic relations, the claim
that native people may no longer be ignored or live on the margin of the
country’s mainstream continued to become an increasingly obvious corollary.
On the other hand, there was a conviction spreading that the state in its inter-
nal policy should account for the vital interests of Indian people and, moreover,
do so with their active participation. At the same time, leaders of indigenous
organisations began to articulate ever more strongly postulates aimed at launching
such mechanisms which would allow them not only to influence matters con-
cerning their compatriots, but also – as citizens – to have an impact on all the
matters significant for the future of the country. In this manner, the new model
of a state, pluralistic in the ethnic sense, began very slowly to take shape in
Latin America. The states would – accepting the principles of multiculturality –
as a consequence have to begin to walk the path of recognising separate cul-
tural traditions (primarily Indian, but also Afro-American, Asian, immigrant),
promoting bilingual education, accepting indigenous languages in the public
realm to a greater extent, respecting autochthonous legal norms, and also
paying more careful attention to developmental programmes for liquidation of
poverty affecting the majority of native people. It goes without saying that this
new model of state has only entered the phase of initial formation, which means
gradual acceptance of a political philosophy different from the former, intro-
duction of the necessary constitutional changes, establishment of special gov-
ernmental–indigenous agencies to act for the improvement of the situation of
native people, the increasing acceptance of Indian partners in the process of
decision-making, and eventually causing mental changes in the entire Creole-
Mestizo society based on overcoming the previous ethnic stereotypes and rac-
ist prejudices. The direction of these changes seems obvious. Their goal is not
only to construct a new model of democratic state respecting the principles of
multiculturality, multiethnicity, and linguistic plurality adequately adjusted to
the ethnocultural and ethnoracial structure of the society, but also to lay the
foundation under the new type of national and political community, which –
by excepting the necessary process of decolonisation – would include Indian
people into the mainstream of the country’s life with equal rights (Dávalos
2005).
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Indigenous people and their position
in the state
When analysing the situation of Indians in Latin America and the attitude of
state authorities to that group, it is necessary to consider the character of the
definition of an Indian, which is of key importance primarily in the praxis of the
assessment of the size of native populations. Let us, therefore, begin with pure
terminology: the term “Indio” is considered throughout Latin America as pejo-
rative and derogatory, strongly imbued with the inheritance of colonialism and
spite towards “the other” in whom the features of “the savage” are perceived,
and who is juxtaposed to the “civilised” majority. This is why the term has been
practically eradicated from official discourse. Similarly, in colloquial language
its use has been marginalised under the pressure of political correctness.
A certain novelty is a revival of this term in the utterances of some Indian
leaders who – within the framework of the movement of ethnic revival – are
trying to bestow it with a new, this time positive, meaning. Although visible,
this reinterpretation is still hardly significant.
The term used to define indigenous people that is neutral and common all
over Latin America is “indigenas”. This encompasses essentially all categories
or groups of Indians, although in some countries – for example in Peru – the
native inhabitants of Amazonia are officially defined as nativos. Beginning with
the 1980s, the term pueblos originarios began to spread under the influence
of debates and legal solutions approved in Bolivia. It emphasises chiefly the
precedence of Indian presence and native character of their culture on the
American continent. Semantically, this proposal is therefore close to the term
“first peoples”, generally used in reference to the Indians of the US and Canada.
The question of using terms that are more or less approved, be it by the
indigenous people or by the state, does not, however, solve the most crucial
problem, namely the definition of clear-cut criteria of who is definitely an In-
dian, and who is definitely not. Faced with the increasingly intensifying process
of assimilation and acculturation in the form of mestizaje, vast migrations from
native villages to towns, popularisation of contemporary mass culture, and
state education focused on elimination of ethnic identities and indigenous lan-
guages, and globalisation processes reaching with large force even to marginal
regions, the “traditional” criteria of Indianness have become ambivalent and
unreliable. The one that has been used most often for ethnodemographic cal-
culations was the number of speakers of native languages. However, faced with
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today’s increasing phenomenon of bilingualism, and especially those forms of
bilingualism that limit the use of mother tongue to home and family, this crite-
rion ceased to be sufficient. Especially due to the fact that it is one that decid-
edly narrows, due to the growing number of the “indigenas”, who speak only
Spanish or Portuguese. On the other hand, there are also reverse situations –
such as in Paraguay – where the native language, Guarani, became simply the
colloquial “speech” of Mestizo countryside people who in no way consider
themselves representatives of the Indian minority. Similarly, racial (morphologi-
cal) features may not serve as a useful marker of Indian identity. They were
certainly significant in colonial times, when there were sharp divisions between
Iberian Creoles, that is “white” Europeans, assuming the position of conquer-
ors, and the “indios” subject to their power. Nevertheless, with the intensifying
processes of miscegenation (i.e. the mixing of races) and syncretisation (the
mixing of cultures), and, what follows, with the formulation of a new social,
racial, and cultural category in the form of Mestizos, this criterion too became
fully unreliable. This is all the more the case of many indigenous (genetically
and culturally) Indians renouncing their native origin today willing in such
a way to accelerate and reinforce their “civilisational” advancement, while on
the other there are the new and opposite phenomenon among some Mestizos
“discovering” their native roots.
Moreover, reference to culture-related traits as the distinguishing factor of
Indianness becomes ever more unreliable. What have until recently been gen-
erally considered “typical” indigenous elements prove to be to a great degree
a product of an amalgamation, going back several centuries, of the indigenous
heritage and Iberian imports. Such a process was in fact noticeable in all areas
of culture: rites, popular religion, cosmovision, costume, social relations, etc.,
and led to a major blurring of the borders between Indian and Mestizo cul-
tures. Should we add today’s dynamic cultural changes, affecting even the
more “traditionally” oriented societies, we see how ambivalent the notion of
“Indian culture” actually is as the distinguishing factor facilitating the identifi-
cation of indigenous people. Due to the modernisation of the life of inhabitants
of rural areas, which includes also Indians, and their migrations to cities, there
is an ever-growing number of native inhabitants of Latin America who in their
everyday lives do not cultivate the “traditional” patterns that they inherited
from the previous generations, although they may refer to them (as a rule,
selectively) along entirely new principles (during holidays, visits to home areas,
or just to prove their identity). Their lifestyle follows a different rhythm than it
would in the “traditional” Indian rural milieu. This is true, for example, of
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indigenous miners, craftsmen, and settlers (colonos) colonising new areas in
tropical forests, as well as about plenty of migrants from villages and towns,
who, living on the urban outskirts, form neighbourhoods of poverty there.
Some of them are try to forget their ethnic origin, and melt as soon as possible
into the Mestizo environment, while others – adjusting to the new conditions
of life – continue to maintain strong ties with of their native region, and try to
rebuild their Indian identity along new lines. Thus, strong or weak connections
to Indian cultural tradition and/or character of lifestyle are, in fact, ever less
reliable distinctive factors of belonging or not belonging to indigenous group.
So if neither language, nor race, nor cultural tradition, nor a lifestyle can
comprise the criteria decisive for ethnic identification, it is reference to legal
status that could be such a powerful parameter, following the principle that an
Indian is one who is considered to be a native due to the place assigned to him/
her in the state’s legal system. Such solutions are used, with certain limitations,
in the United States and Canada, where as a consequence we come across so-
called “status Indians”. That is, those who are legally considered members of
the “first nations”, and those who are treated as “non-status” natives, and
therefore not enjoying the majority of special rights and privileges that the first
group have successfully fought to obtain. The situation is similar in numerous
countries of Latin America. Wherever the authorities recognise the legal status
of native communities, that is “comunidades indígenas” and “comunidades
nativas”, their members are automatically recognised as indigenous inhabitants
of the country. Similar is the situation of indigenous groups that inhabit areas
east of the Andes, covered mostly by tropical rainforest, living in the so-called
“reservas” – that is areas considered by the state authorities as belonging to
indigenous ethnic groups. Legally protected for that reason, those areas are
excluded from privatisation, and from development and economic plans. Be-
sides this “accountable” group of recognised Indians (reconosidos), enjoying
the legal status of indigenous minority, there is, however, another category of
native peoples considered an autochthonous population by the state adminis-
tration. They have by now only just started efforts to have the lands they
inhabit considered as areas under their own dominion along similar lines as the
comunidades and reservas operate. As far as identification of an Indian (in the
legal sense) seems fairly simple in the case of inhabitants of such special zones,
it is much harder to define the ethnic belonging of those natives who have left
their homeland and come to live in cities, in mining centres, or who as settlers
(the so-called colonos) have moved to less populated areas so as to farm land
or raise cattle in an alien environment. Contemporary migration processes
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have greatly changed the former map of Indian residence, at the same time
rendering evaluation of the scale of maintaining indigenous identity outside the
native lands harder. The situation of the Mapuche, the largest group of Chilean
Indians (approximately 900,000) is a clear example of that phenomenon. It is
estimated that two thirds of the Mapuche have left Araucanía, moving primarily
to Santiago metropolitan area. In the last two decades a new phenomenon
arose, namely migrations of Indians from one country to another on a scale not
previously encountered. This includes employment seeking migrations from
Bolivia to Chile and Argentina, and refugees escaping from Nicaragua to Mexico
at the time of the civil war. There is also the ever increasing settlement of Latin
American Indians (from Mexico, Ecuador, Guatemala) in the United States.
Thus it can be said that much like in the USA, where Indians may not be
associated entirely with reservations, in Latin America too they have ceased to
be solely residents of tropical forest villages and peasants communities from the
Andes. This situation justifies the question whether these people should still be
treated as Indians, together with the questions about their status and the method
of defining the size of such populations.
It goes without saying that all the criteria quoted above, used in the process
of “objectivised” identification of Indians and definition of the sizes of the
individual indigenous groups, are either completely mistaken or have to a great
extent lost their cognitive power. In this situation, the only way out from the
impasse is not as much a reference to external criteria that have been applied so
far, but considering as Indians those who identify themselves so and who for
the reasons of cultural, historical, and genealogical ties with the indigenous
milieu have a justified right to manifest their identity independent of their cur-
rent place of residence. Such an inclusive attitude is obviously not the ideal
manner of identification of the sizes of ethnic groups, but it meets two condi-
tions resulting from human right namely the right to cultivate one’s own cul-
ture, language, and religion – that is those factors that result from one’s her-
itage and constitute one’s identity. A reference to the subjective sense of group
identification presents plenty of trouble in defining the actual sizes of indig-
enous groups, which is naturally not without significance both for state au-
thorities responsible for the ethnic policy towards minorities and for the leaders
representing the vital interests of those groups. In the contemporary practice
of Latin American countries, no reference to such declarations was made dur-
ing censuses, which usually provided information on the ethnic language (dif-
ferent from Spanish or Portuguese), used in childhood, in the family or in the
local community. Similarly, survey research carried out on population samples
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that included the aspect of subjective ethnicity had so far been conducted only
occasionally, and therefore could bring no credible data. In this situation, de-
bates continue only on the bases of estimations and extrapolations, which fre-
quently reflect more the ethnopolitical preferences of their authors, keen to
increase or decrease the size of the Indian population, and trying in this way to
limit the so-called Indian question to the role of a minority that has to be taken
into consideration only to a small extent. On the other hand, there are indig-
enous organisations which try to increase the size of ethnic groups beyond
reason to wield powerful arguments in disputes with state authorities on mat-
ters related to the aid to be received, and their potential political role in na-
tional society.
The acceptance of ethnicity as a subjective declaration of identity suits the
contemporary trend which allows us to become liberated from the social roles
that have been assigned by “aliens”. Nevertheless, it renders the matter of
ethnic relations highly delicate and ambiguous at the same time. There are
other problems that we encounter ever more often in Latin America. An Indian
ceases to be an “exotic” or “folkloristic” ethnic species that is admired, like an
Andean condor, or a savage creature brought out by indigenistic “civilisers”
from the “pitiful” primitive world. An Indian is gradually becoming a citizen
aware of his rights and opportunity to choose an appropriate strategy of con-
duct. Hence the frequent and seemingly contradictory ethnic choices made by
people of indigenous heritage, that to a great extent result from the current
social and political context.
The low prestige of the social position of Indians, the inheritance of coloni-
alism and the neo-feudal economic dependence of the indigenous population
in the republican era burdened additionally by racial prejudices, is frequently
the reason that people readily renounce Indian roots so as to enter the Mestizo
group as quickly as possible erasing the traces of their own origin and start the
slow upward climb on the rungs of the local social ladder. During my fieldwork
in Peru, I encountered such attitudes a number of times. They are especially
visible among the young and middle-aged generations of residents of settle-
ments that in the 1970s must still beyond doubt have been Indian. These
people currently dissociated themselves determinedly from the ethnicity of their
ancestors, and strongly accentuated only their Peruvian identity. On the other
hand, tendencies to the contrary are also visible, namely to the “rediscovery”
of Indianness by the people who have quite recently been considered only
Mestizos. This phenomenon is observed both in rural and urban environ-
ments, and is connected not only to the general atmosphere that favours revi-
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talisation of ethnicity, but also to the discovery of opportunities and potential
benefits (economic, developmental, political) that indigenous groups may en-
counter at the time when special legal regulations are set to cover all natives by
special protection, and direct towards them the stream of international aid funds.
In this dynamic process of fluctuation of identity, a considerable role is
played by the state, whose ethnic policy may once favour the reinforcement of
“national unity”, and the weakening of ethnocultural pluralism (for instance in
Peru), and then again tolerate or accept ethnic variety, together with its openly
manifested social and political activity (for example in Bolivia and Ecuador).
The example of Peru is especially significant, as this is the country that until the
1970s had been considered as one with the largest population of Indians, and
due to a variety of legal and statistical manipulations shifted into an ever more
homogeneous state with the ever decreasing number of native people in the
successive decades (Posern-Zieliński 2007). This undertaking was possible due
to, for instance, the redefinition of indigenous communities (comunidades
indigenas) as peasant ones (comunidades campesinas), thanks to which their
inhabitants began to perceive themselves primarily as a Peruvian campesinos or
comuneros and as a result of that change of status they entered gradually to
the cultural category of Mestizo population. At the same time, the Indian
culture of the sierra regions was deprived of ethnic values and considered to
mean regional folklore, indigenous beliefs were treated as a manifestation of
popular religiosity, and the ethnic languages began to be viewed as provincial
dialects (the vernacular speak of the peasant people).
In this way, suddenly a few million Indians inhabiting the Andean regions
disappeared from the ethnic map of Peru. Left on it are primarily the indig-
enous groups inhabiting the eastern areas of Amazon forests, whose marginal
position, territorial dispersal, and small numbers did not cause major trouble –
in a potential sense – for the stability of the state and its internal policy. The
vast migrations from villages to cities connected with the boosted process of
amalgamation of indigenous people into the national mainstream greatly inten-
sified the process of this politically inspired de-Indianisation. As a result, Peru
– seen as a country boasting magnificent pre-Columbian indigenous cultural
heritage – became a state gradually eliminating the contemporary inheritors of
Tawantinsuyu (the Inca state) from its population structure. This attitude of the
state authorities was beyond doubt one of the main reasons behind the exceed-
ingly mysterious absence of a powerful and organised movement of ethnic
revival in the Peru of the 1990s and early twenty-first century, paralleled by
the eruption of social and political activism of Indian people in the neighbour-
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ing countries: Bolivia and Ecuador. Currently, the situation in Peru is beginning
to undergo marked changes: on the one hand being a manifestation of gradual
revitalisation of Indian ethnicity in the country, and on the other a result of the
impact of external indigenous influences, showing to the Peruvian indigenas
the advantages and efficiency of organised activity in the process of combating
postcolonial structures and limitations.
It goes without saying that the character of contemporary Latin American
Indian ethnicity today is undergoing a decided change. The former identity, of
a more primordial nature, rooted in the native culture, lifestyle and traditional
world outlook, and strongly connected to an ethnic territory inhabited by the
native group for a number of generations, is yielding gradually to ethnicity
understood in a constructivist manner. Indianness – although still strongly con-
nected (even though symbolically) with autochthonous culture – is becoming
primarily a question of conscious choice, the search for one’s own (frequently
lost) roots, elimination of minority complexes by building ethnic pride and also
a certain strategy of acquiring assistance from the support groups, and a method
that allows efficient activity for ethnic development and implementation of prin-
ciples of democratic multi-ethnic society.
The situation (defining who is and who is not Indian) is doubtlessly com-
plex, with the state authorities not only dealing with ethnic diversity within the
traditional indigenous population, but also encountering new categories of
indígenas that are different in their character. What this means is that ethnic
policy addressed to this group of people may not be uniform but should ac-
count for the interests and position of each of those categories separately. On
the other hand, such a major break-up of the indigenous milieu causes major
problems for Indian leaders to coordinate and uniform action strategy, and the
develop a joint package of postulates, claims, and reform proposals to the state
administration.
One of the basic divisions of the Indian world in South America is the
coexistence of two groups: the Indians inhabiting the areas of tropical rainfor-
ests and flatlands (savannas, pampas), situated east of the Andes, and the
indigenas from areas of the Andean sierra. The former are primarily small
indigenous communities living far one from another, in relative isolation and
distance from the centres of Latin American “civilisation”. They have been
traditionally self-sufficient economically with their subsistence based on tillage
agriculture, gathering of wild plants, hunting, and fishing. The latter category
are the rural local communities of indigenous origin that in the pre-Columbian
period belonged to the zone of high Andean civilisations, who have lived since
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the time of the conquest in the conditions of economic and cultural (post-)
colonial dependence on the dominant Creole-Mestizo society, supporting them-
selves with extensive high-mountain agriculture, shepherding, and crafts
(artesania). Similar divisions, although not so acute, can be found also in Mid-
dle America, between the Mesoamerican indigenous peoples – the offspring of
the builders of former pre-Columbian civilisations (including Aztec, Maya, Toltec,
and Totonac), who in the colonial period were transformed into a class of
dependent peasantry, maintaining a range of the cultural ethnic traits – and
small groups of Indians from north-western areas of Mexico (Huichol, Cora,
Yaqui, Tarahumara) and the countries of southern part of Central America
(Panama, Nicaragua) that for the last centuries were capable of maintaining
a far-reaching autonomy and conduct lifestyles that have only to a small extent
been subjected to external control.
Today, the basic interests of Indians from both these groups (indigenas
campesinos and nativos selvaticos) are in fact highly different, although they
include a number of convergent elements. The former group have always ac-
knowledged the priority of recognition and guarantee for collective ownership
of agricultural land and pastures, being a part of the comunidad – which for
centuries has been jeopardised by the expansion of large landholder estates,
and today exposed also to deterioration caused by industrial environmental
pollution and the increasing exploitation of water resources. Another impor-
tant postulate of this group is the development of local infrastructure and ter-
mination of poverty that reinforces the low status of the Indian, provoking mass
migration from homelands. For the Indians from the jungle, on the other hand,
the most important question is to obtain legal recognition of the territory that
their ethnic group inhabits and exploits, and later receive a guarantee of their
autonomy within that area, expressed primarily through the right to control
their habitat including its protection from the expansion of industrial compa-
nies (mining and wood industries) and the inflow of settlers. They are also keen
to maintain their contemporary lifestyle, and to be able to exist further – with
the acceptance of selected elements of contemporary technical civilisation (e.g.
motorboat engines, solar panels, etc.) – in the local, relatively isolated commu-
nities, far from external interventions.
This divergence of social, ethnic, and economic context lends a different
character to the relations between the two basic types of indigenous communi-
ties with the state authorities. In many countries and regions the indigenas-
campesinos sector consists of large populations, for which reason they are
potentially significant not only on the local political stage. Their organised
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force, manifested usually in moments of crisis through strikes, road blockades,
and other protest actions, may to a major degree destabilise the situation within
the country, and for that reason the state authorities must very seriously ap-
proach this new civic actor on the remodelled political stage. The groups of
forest Indians, on the other hand, although very small and living seemingly far
from the world of “big politics”, can sometimes extremely efficiently expose the
ever more frequent conflicts with the industrial companies entering their terri-
tories, who usually conduct economic expansion with the concession of the
state and in the so-called interest of “the civilisational development of the coun-
try”. As the native inhabitants of the “virgin” regions, they frequently become
a power that seriously obstructs the implementation of major investment and
development projects in the interior of the country. For that reason, the state
must also consider these groups, lost in the forest, important, and reconcile the
interests of various parties in a balanced manner.
It is important to note here that the official ethnic policies towards Indians
are different in those states which deal with only one category of indigenous
people from those in countries inhabited by native peoples representing both
the types mentioned above. In the latter, such policy must be more flexible,
varied depending on the milieu, and accounting for the specific characteristics
of the various lifestyles, needs and claims. Thus, there is a group of countries
inhabited nearly solely by an indigenous population who are conventionally
termed here as forest Indians (Brazil, Guiana, Surinam, Venezuela), and
a number of states where peasant-type Indian communities are dominant (Mexico,
Guatemala, Chile, Argentina). The situation in the Andean countries whose
territories reach far east beyond the Andes and encompass the lowland areas of
tropical rainforests (Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia) looks quite different.
Those states feature both major clusters of Indian peasants within the sierra,
and scattered small ethnic groups of nativos in the forests of the east. It goes
without saying that in this last case the task of state authorities is made easier by
applying the “divide and rule” principle, the more so as also the indigenous
groups within the state territory are in most cases antagonised. The natural
conflicts of interests are frequently aggravated by disputes between groups of
different political affiliations, additionally competing with each other for assist-
ance funds, and divided by the unbridled ambitions of their leaders. Despite
the powerful organised Indian movements in those countries, all the factors
listed above render them much weaker, and at times lead them astray.
This is what the situation looks like on the macro scale, yet with a certain
narrowing of the perspective, it turns out to be even more complex due to
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further internal radiation within each category. For example, the core of the
“forest” Indians are the local communities, the so-called etnias (formerly with-
out any justification defined as “tribes”), who enjoy the legal status of ethnic
communities recognised by state authorities, living within the area of native
comunidades and reservas. Today they have their own self-government at the
local level, whose representatives enter greater, already inter-ethnic associa-
tions and regional federations that allow negotiations with state authorities.
Nevertheless, during the last decade a new category of Indians have arrived on
the native scene of South America, namely, small indigenous groups that had
before lived in almost perfect isolation from the external world, avoiding until
recently any contacts, with a hostile attitude towards potential intruders enter-
ing their refugial areas. Currently, due to the increasing economic penetration
of Amazonian forests, these groups no longer have much room to withdraw
into ever greater wilderness, as they used to do before. For that reason, some
of them have assumed a new strategy, that is “coming out” from isolation and
establishing contacts with the world they find external, mostly with the neigh-
bouring and ethnically related groups of Indians who have for a long time been
subjected to the processes of acculturation and treat their “new” brethren as
“savages”, “uncivilised” and therefore deprived of any rights. In the official
naming conventions, these groups are today defined as “recently contacted”
(recien contactados), or as communities living in “voluntary isolation”(en
aislamiento voluntario). They are primarily found on the western borderlands
of Brazil as well as in the eastern forested areas of Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia.
Their emergence has posed a major challenge for indigenous organisations,
NGOs operating within this area, and anthropologists and state administration
involved into native matters. The key is primarily to work out as soon as possi-
ble mechanisms thanks to which these groups – with no understanding what-
soever of the rules governing the contemporary world – could acquire their
subjectivity, protection from appropriation of their territories, and the right to
free choice of lifestyle satisfying them within home areas enjoying the status of
reservas.
Besides the groups of “recognised” Indians (reconocidos), and those living
far in isolation (recien contactados) in forest areas, we increasingly often encoun-
ter syncretic ethnic forms, ever more often claiming from the state authorities
recognition of their status as indigenous peoples, and therefore granting of
similar rights, which are currently highly praised and held in high esteem.
These are primarily the so-called “new tribes” that originated from the amalga-
mation of many usually culturally and linguistically close indigenous groups
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that to a great extent have lost their original cultural specificity, while maintain-
ing only a range of elements that originated from indigenous tradition in their
lifestyle, worldview, and economy. A specific category of “new tribes” are the
groupings that originated from the mixing of indigenous people with Blacks or
Mulattos. These are ethno-social communities that we encounter in Venezuela
(Paraujano), Brazil (Xukuru), and in Central America (Garifuna). Besides these
“new” indigenous communities, in the interior of Brazil there have been jungle
people of mixed origin, called Caboclos, at least since the nineteenth century.
This is in fact a category of people close in character to the Canadian Metis,
being almost an intermediate group between Indians and Brazilians from the
eastern provinces. They are perfectly adjusted to life in the Amazon environ-
ment, they know and often cultivate some native customs, move freely between
the two worlds, and often marry women from neighbouring Indian communi-
ties, with whom they maintain close contacts. Moreover, they know well the
local, indigenous languages, and themselves use a dialect that is deeply suf-
fused with indigenous borrowings. Until recently the majority of Caboclos sim-
ply considered themselves Brazilian Mestizos. The situation, however, is also
undergoing change, and much like in the case of “new tribes” there is a grow-
ing conviction among the Caboclos that if they are considered indigenous peo-
ple, they will acquire measurable benefits, privileges, and rights gained in the
long process of the Indians’ effort to have their subjectivity recognised, the
inviolability of their territories respected, and cultural separateness cherished.
It is within the category of those Indians who until recently formed the
native stratum of the rural population that we find today a major distinction
that renders the application of sharp criteria of ethnic identification difficult.
The inhabitants of rural communities that hail from the pre-Columbian (e.g.
the Bolivian ayllus and marcas), colonial (e.g. Peruvian comunidad campesina)
and republican (Mexican ejidos, Chilean comuna) times are in some countries
considered Indians (pueblos originarios in Bolivia, comunidad indigena in Ec-
uador) without any obstacles, while in others – having lost that status – they
are only now regaining it as the result of the process of “rebirth” of autoch-
thonous awareness (Peru). Yet, independent from the degree of maintaining the
indigenous culture and the sense of ethnic separateness, these people belong
to the peasant stratum – in the sense of profession and class – and for that
reason, in many countries and regions, such notions as campesino, comunero
and indigena are superimposed on top of and blur into one another. At the
same time, it must be remembered that not every peasant must be an Indian,
and that not every Indian is in fact a farmer.
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A significant group among the indigenous people are also the so-called
artesanos (craftsmen), who in their home workshops make products defined as
artesania, including fabrics, ceramics, decorations, elements of traditional and
contemporary clothing, sacred objects, paintings, and also – more and more
often – regional souvenirs for tourists. As this field of economic activity is
developing dynamically, and its market has long gone beyond the borders of
a single region or country, the number of indigenous people involved in this
sector continues to grow. Besides small producers who still live in the villages,
we increasingly often meet owners of professional workshops and shops, whole-
salers and travelling salesmen reaching even distant cities and countries with
their “Indian” commodities. In the countries of the Andean and Mesoamerican
zone, this phenomenon is visible with special force, and among its consequences
is the slow establishment of the indigenous middle-class, settling the formerly
little Mestizo towns by Indian peoples, educational advancement of the youth
hailing from artesanos families, and finally also the reinforcement of a new type
of Indian identity (torn from traditional community norms and rural ethos).
In regions abounding with mineral deposits, the majority of miners working
in local mines recruit from among the local Indian population. Many of them
have maintained family and community ties with their indigenous villages, al-
though by living far away from their native places in typical mining settlements
they became a part of the country’s proletariat. In the new environment, some
of them quickly yield to the process of mestizaje, while the others try to main-
tain bonds of solidarity with their Indian background, and it is hard to refuse
them the right to indigenous identity. Due to poverty, lack of land, overpopula-
tion of villages, and also the crisis in the mining industry, a new phenomenon
has appeared of migration from densely populated areas into ones that have so
far been hardly colonised. This wave of settlers is visible especially in Andean
South America, and covers the so-called colonos, to a large extent Indians
from the “sierra” lands, who – desperate because of tough living conditions –
abandon their present settlements, villages, and communities, and go east into
the depths of tropical forests so as to establish small crop-growing and breed-
ing farms (minifundios) on “no man’s land”, or be hired to work in oil, gas, and
wood industries. Some of these Indian settlers devote themselves to growing of
coca plants and as cocaleros they oppose the US-inspired campaign of eradica-
tion the (illegal) plantations, which are their only source of subsistence in an
organised and efficient manner (e.g. in the Bolivian province of Chiapare).
Their efforts for the legalisation of coca plantations, as well as endeavour of
those colonos farming on small plots of land not cultivated by large land own-
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ers to secure their future, forming the new Movement of People without Land
(Movimento sin Tierra), increasingly support the indigenous emancipation
movement. In this manner originally social movement gradually gain an ethnic
colour, whose demands and slogans make it easier to support their particular
economic arguments. The success of the cocaleros movement in Bolivia, which
produced the controversial first Indian president of the country – Evo Morales
– is evident proof of today’s political efficiency of such movement and the
good example of effectiveness of utilising references to indigenous interest and
origin, identity and rights.
Such tendencies are made use of also in the milieu of the so-called Indo-
Mestizos, that is among regional groups that have been formed by people
considered Mestizos for decades who today – despite the lack of cultural con-
tinuation – openly manifest their genealogical ties with Indian groups that his-
torians have officially considered long dead. This phenomenon recalls to
a certain extent similar processes of restitution of the indigenity carried among
the offspring of American Indians from the Atlantic shores of the United States,
who are insistently attempting to be inscribed on the roll of tribes recognised
by the federal administration, and draw from that title certain benefits that they
currently miss. In Latin America, this kind of pursuit of long-gone identity is
known, for example, from the Caribbean and from the Pacific shores of Ecua-
dor. The groups living there declare their Indian identity more on the bases of
their genealogy than cultural continuity, and try not only to change their status
but also to become a part of the great continental pan-Indian movement, and –
acting within it – reinforce their local position as a new, distinctive ethno-social
subject.
As a result of huge and constantly increasing migrations from rural areas to
cities – which pertain to the indigenous people with a particular intensity – we
are dealing today with a new category of native populations, namely with ur-
ban Indians (indigenas urbanos). Some of them maintain ties with their home
region, building a sophisticated network of various regional organisations gath-
ering migrants from a single village, department or province, and supporting
them in combating the painful results of urban alienation. Others manage to
merge immediately into the Mestizo–lumpenproletariat society of marginal
poverty neighbourhoods, trying to forget about their indigenous roots. These
two opposing phenomena may be observed both in the so-called pueblos jóvenes
of Lima and in the poor districts of Mexico (city). A special case may be the
establishment of the entirely new, indigenous city that the one-million-people
El Alto, situated in Bolivian Altiplano just next to La Paz, undoubtedly is. Nearly
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all altenos, that is inhabitants of the city, are Aymara from around Lake Titicaca,
who settled close to the main metropolis of the country hoping to find work
and better lives. During the various bursts of protest among the indigenous
people, which were quite numerous in recent years in Bolivia, the altenos fre-
quently expressed their solidarity with their brethren from rural ayllus and
marcas (traditional communities).
A special transitory category between the indigenous and Mestizo world is
the so-called urban Indo-Mestizos (indo-mestizos urbanos). This group con-
sists of people of Indian origin who in their daily culture and/or awareness have
not fully cut themselves off from their indigenous roots, but who often main-
tain a highly ambivalent attitude: first manifesting their ties to autochthonous
people, and then rejecting such ties. One of these groups are the cholos, best
visible in Bolivia, and especially in La Paz and Oruro, where they form a col-
ourful (thanks to the women’s costumes and holiday traditions) group of resi-
dents of lower middle classes successfully involved in petty trade.
A specific situation may be encountered in the former Inca capital, Cusco,
a city proud of its pre-colonial heritage, where many residents (both those
living there for generations and those hailing from the nearby indigenous set-
tlements) on many occasions (and especially on holidays) without hesitation
emphasise their real or mythical ties with the inhabitants of the ancient
Tawantinsuyu (Inca empire). It is not a coincidence that the first very important
meetings of Indian leaders both from Peru and from the entire Andean region
took place nowhere other than Cusco. The city is not only the symbol of the
former power of the Indian state, but it also fosters a special atmosphere of
acceptance and approval for indigenous cultural heritage (García 2005).
With the ever more visible (although naturally still insufficient) progress of
education covering the Indian communities among the urban population, rep-
resentatives of a new indigenous intelligentsia come into being. Their avant-
garde is made up of ever more numerous students from the provinces, who do
not disown their ethnic origin and who, having graduated, work as teachers,
agronomists, physicians, veterinary doctors, foresters, artists, and lawyers. Ever
more often, indigenous scientists are found in universities, while Indian priests
are increasingly often found in Catholic Church and other Christian denomina-
tions. The most visible group are the many Indian activists and leaders presid-
ing over numerous organisations fighting for the rights of the indigenas. Some
have become leaders thanks to their professional qualifications and education,
while others acquired such a position thanks to self-taught skill and the trove of
experience gained during their many years of social activity.
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As has already been mentioned, major contemporary migrations connected
to social crises, civil wars, and primarily to globalisation are seriously affecting
the indigenous peoples of Latin America. Despite participation in internal mi-
grations within a single country, Indians increasingly often opt for ever more
daring jaunts in search of a better life, work, and pay, crossing borders and
moving to neighbouring countries and frequently even further: to the United
States, Canada, and European Union. These migration processes result in the
establishment of indigenous diasporas, whose status is usually highly vague.
The arriving migrants are in most cases not perceived through their ethnic
affiliation, but identified according to the country of origin and citizenship.
Despite that, the Indian settlements in countries receiving migrants become
more visible: Indians not only maintain ties with their compatriots, but also
initiate a variety of organised actions to reinforce their ethnicity in their new
places of residence. Following a period of failing to notice that Indians too
number among the incoming migrants, the receiving countries gradually began
to consider implementation of special assistance programmes addressed to this
category of immigrants. The most visible transfers take place in the countries of
Central America. Indians from Nicaragua and El Salvador whose native lands
were affected by military activity would look for shelter in Guatemala and Mexico
during civil wars, while the natives from Guatemala move to the more devel-
oped Belize in search of work, gradually changing the ethnic composition of
the country. In South America, the largest migrations cover the Andean zone
and feature the Bolivian Aymaras moving to Chile and Argentina, Ecuadorian
Quechua settling in Colombia, and indigenous Colombians escaping from the
areas threatened by violence to Venezuela. At the same time, from year to year,
the emigration of indigenous people from Latin American countries to the US
intensifies, resulting in a growing number of Latin American Indians in the
United States. There, they are usually treated as “Hispanics” or “Latinos”, that
is without the special rights the native “American Indians” are entitled to.
Thus, having made a definitely incomplete review showing the internal dif-
ferentiation within the indigenous population of Latin America, one may con-
clude that today’s so-called “Indian problem” is no marginal social question
that could be boiled down to actions aimed at the improvement of the life of the
indigenous peasants or “civilising” of the native inhabitants of the jungle. Con-
temporary Indians are a separate ethnic category present in different parts of
the population structure of the country. To an ever greater degree, they cease
to be an “exotic” and peculiar ethnic category becoming instead an active
participant in the current changes. For that reason, wherever they form
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a significant percentage of the country’s population, they become increasingly
visible in public life, and this new position they assume imposes on the state the
duty to treat Indians as a significant factor in the formation of civic community
based on multicultural and pluri-ethnic principles.
It goes without saying today that the so-called Indian America, that is that
part of the Latin American population that originated in the pre-colonial tradi-
tion, is showing no signs of decline or of becoming an ever more marginal
problem; on the contrary, it is increasing in its dynamism, manifesting its new
face, openly claiming respect for due rights and manifesting its presence through-
out the continent in a spectacular manner. Naturally, the power of the indig-
enous voice and vote depends to a great degree on the size of Indian popula-
tion in every country, on the degree of its organisation, and also on the strate-
gic importance of the areas that this population inhabits. Referring only to
demographic data, however, one may claim that the size of indigenous popula-
tion on the continent is highly uneven, both when analysing the problem in
reference to the total number of indigenous people in each of the countries,
and looking into the percentage of the Indians as compared to the entire popu-
lation. From this point of view, four categories of states may be differentiated:
first, where the Indian population is especially large, and for that reason begins
to play an important – also political – role; second, states with a significant
number of Indians often gathered in a few compact regions, where they are
majority inhabitants; third, countries with a small percentage of indigenous
population, who often inhabit territories that are highly attractive from eco-
nomic and settlement points of view; and fourth and finally – countries with
trace numbers of the indigenas, moreover, situated in the refugial regions, and
without major economic significance.
The first group, that is the states whose indigenous population exceeds
50% of the entire population, includes Guatemala, inhabited mostly by Mayan
groups (with an indigenous population of approx. 50 to 66%, i.e. 6 to 7
million) and Bolivia, with very large Aymara and Quechua communities (its
native population approx. 60 to 65%, i.e. approx. 6 million). Both the coun-
tries may be considered Indian—Mestizo, and in both of them the tensions
between the indigenous population and other segments of national society re-
sulted in numerous crises, expressed in the civil war in Guatemala (1960–
1994), which had the hallmarks of a popular uprising, and violent forms of
social protests in Bolivia that began in the 1990s. The well-organised move-
ment of indigenous revival operates with specific power in both countries on all
possible platforms: beginning with the struggle for local governments, and
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ending with presidential campaigns. Symbolic expressions of the contemporary
significance of this movement in the two countries may be the Nobel Peace
Prize for an activist of the Guatemalan Indians, Rigoberta Menchu Tum, and
the election of a representative of the Aymaras, supporter of cocaleros, and
partisan of “Andean socialism” – Evo Morales – as president of Bolivia.
The second group of countries, those of the Mestizo–Indian character, that
is with a major indigenous population yet dominated (not only in percentage)
by the rest of the national society, are the states with an autochthonous popu-
lation within their territories ranging from approx. 10 to 40%. In Central
America this means Mexico, with approx. 10 to 14% of Indians, who after all
make up a population exceeding 12 million, gathered mostly in the south of the
country (Oaxaca, Chiapas, Yucatan), and Belize, with a 10% share held by
autochthonous people, primarily the Maya. In South America this category
includes Ecuador, with approx. 31 to 43% of Indians (approx. 4.1 million)
mostly the Quichua inhabiting central valleys of the Andes, and Peru, with 28
to 46% of indigenas (9.3 million), mostly Quechua and Aymara populated
predominantly the mountainous areas of the central and southern provinces.
The movement for the emancipation of the indigenous peoples assumed special
significance and influential forms in two states that belong to this category:
firstly, the Zapatista movement from Chiapas fighting for regional and ethnic
autonomy, whose repercussions and fame have far exceeded the borders of
Mexico, and the unusually active organisations of Ecuadorian Indians, who
since the 1990s have played a very significant role in national politics.
Quite a number of Latin American countries are inhabited by indigenous
people that account for less than 10% of the entire population. In Central
America, this group of states includes Honduras (5% Indians, i.e. approx.
290,000 people), Nicaragua (4% Indians, i.e. approx. 182,000), El Salvador
(5% Indians, i.e. approx. 330,000), and Panama (5.5% Indians, i.e. approx.
142,000). All these are states covering quite small areas and size of popula-
tion, with a dominant Mestizo sector. The indigenous peoples inhabiting them
form hardly any major groups (besides the Misquito bordering on 180,000,
and the so-called Black Caribs or Garifuna, whose number is estimated at
approximately 100,000. The remaining ethnic groups consist of the size be-
tween several thousand and a few hundred people. In South America, coun-
tries with a similar, fairly small share of indigenous population include Chile
(7 to 9% Indians, mostly Mapuches, altogether approx. 1 million; Argentina,
with 3.2% Indians (approx. 1.1 million), and Guiana (7% Indians, i.e. approx.
50,000 persons). The indigenas of both Chile and Argentina are highly active,
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frequently entering acute disputes with the authorities due to the conflict of
interests related to defence of indigenous lands threatened by the development
of industrial activity.
The last group of countries are those where the indigenous groups are very
small, both in absolute numbers and in the percentage share. In Central America,
this is Costa Rica with 0.5% Indians, i.e. approx. 16,000 people, and in South
America – Colombia, with 1.5 to 2.2% Indians, i.e. approx. 740,000 per-
sons, of which 350,000 are the inhabitants of Amazonia, Argentina, with
3.1% Indians (i.e. approx. 1 million), Venezuela (1.4% Indians, i.e. approx.
300,000 people), Surinam (1.4% Indians, i.e. approx. 6000 persons), Para-
guay with 1.6% Indians, i.e. 90,000 people, French Guiana (2% Indians, i.e.
approx. 3000 people), and Brazil (0.1% Indians, yet in absolute numbers as
many as 260,000 people) (Political database..., 20.01.2009).
The majority of these indigenous groups inhabit lands situated far from
settlement and industrial centres and main communication routes (tropical rain-
forest, savannas). They live there in great dispersion, and the average size of
the ethnic groups ranges from 30/50 thousand to just several thousand. En-
countered in these regions are also many groups that are extremely small,
composed of just a few hundred people, whose further existence is evidently
threatened. Their often tragic lives are today a true challenge for state authori-
ties who are formally bound to go any lengths to protect these smallest indig-
enous minorities. Nevertheless, Indians from this group of states – although
not too numerous – inhabit very large territories in the countries’ interiors.
With the dynamic economic development of such states as Brazil, which is
increasingly more interested in the integration of its interior with the Atlantic
provinces, and the exploitation of natural resources situated within what is now
Indian territory, the vital interests of indigenous people are seriously threat-
ened, even despite the defence mechanisms already applied, which include
establishment of specially protected areas in the form of reservations called
parques indigenas (indigenous parks).
Indigenous peoples and their social
and economic situation
An element of doubtless significance in its influence of the mutual relations
between the state and the indigenous peoples of Latin America is the social and
economic position of the latter, which is not without reason defined as highly
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marginalised, affected by poverty, excluded from mainstream economic life,
and pushed off the path of civilisational development. On the one hand, such
a position must undoubtedly influence the moods of Indians, very easily pro-
voked to revolutionary ferment, and the animated protests, which are actions
that namely destabilise the previous “order” in the state. On the other hand,
meanwhile, the awareness of the pitiful position of the indigenas should incline
the state authorities to promote ethno-developmental programmes and assist-
ance projects to help gradually towards liquidation of the most drastic reasons
that keep the autochthonous people in poverty, and in the manacles of ethnic
and racial prejudices.
The current situation of the indigenous peoples has so far been the result of
the conquering of the continent, a period of over 500 years of continuing
pushing Indians into marginal areas, depriving them of the best lands, and
exploitation of the indigenous manpower and today also of natural resources
existing within their ethnic territories. While analysing the indigenous poverty,
however, we have to refer not only to the indexes and rates characteristic for
individual Indian groups, but also consider the problem from the perspective of
the entire continent. It goes without saying that Latin America belongs to those
areas of the contemporary world that, despite their development, still have
a high degree of population engulfed by poverty. For example, in 2004, ap-
proximately 22% of population were forced to survive on the equivalent of only
two US dollars daily, which – according to approved international standards –
defines the poverty line. Should we look at these data from the point of view of
dispersion of poverty between urban and rural populations, we see that the
people living in extreme poverty (that is surviving on an equivalent of one US
dollar daily) in rural areas encompasses 17.5% of the population, which is
nearly 3 times as much as in urbanised areas (6.2%). These contrasts become
even more visible when data for individual countries are compared. The high-
est percentage of the poor in rural areas are present in Bolivia (72.6% in
2002), Peru (59.8% in 2003), Nicaragua (59.9% in 2001), El Salvador (56.9%
in 2004), Ecuador (47.6% in 2003), Guatemala (44.7% in 2004), and Mexico
(36.8% in 2004) (Hall, Patrinos 2006). If on top of that we consider the fact
that the countries listed above are those with the highest percentage of Indian
population, still inhabiting mostly rural areas, we may assume that the data
quoted refer to a great degree to this category of people. We should note here
that the majority of Indians belong to the poorest category of Latin American
population, and add that poverty in indigenous communities is especially highly
concentrated (i.e. 2.4 times greater than for the rest of the population).
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This does require, however, a number of terminological remarks. First, the
operational concept of poverty is usually based on an arbitrarily determined
level of income (usually very low), which does not after all mean that persons
with, for example, three US dollars at their daily disposal should be counted
among the people with sufficient means of subsistence. Indeed, the same amount
has a different market value for inhabitants of cities, and different for the resi-
dents of villages, who have at their disposal their own products and houses,
and lead more “traditional” lives. It is harder to use these economic factors to
measure the “poverty” among those groups of Indians who still live far away
from “civilisation” and its “market economy”, conducting a symbiotic existence
with their natural environment, which is very characteristic for the simple cul-
tures of the Amazon basin. According to the economic criteria, some repre-
sentatives of this category of Indians would have an income many times lower
than that assumed by specialists, yet this does not mean that they live in a social
environment that is characterised by “poverty”. Besides the income scale, to-
day’s poverty is manifested also through high unemployment, low effectiveness
of farms, low earnings, lack of professional qualifications, problems with access
to education and healthcare, poor infrastructure in the regions, low level of
consumption, lack of access to contemporary technologies, and a high level of
children’s involvement in paid work. In fact, the situation of the majority of
Amazonian Indians taken aside, all these characteristic features of poor socie-
ties affect the native people of Latin America. Poverty and a lack of prospects
are pushing increasing numbers of the indigenas out from their villages and
communities, and the new indigenous settlements that are formed through this
migration as a rule become typical urban neighbourhoods of poverty.
Certain positive changes should, however, be noticed against this back-
ground. These include leaving the poverty zone through advance of profes-
sional activity, education, implementation of aid programmes, development of
petty trade and crafts, and seasonal migrations for work. As the result of this
strategy in some areas a new Indian middle class has been formed, with a good
example being the Ecuadorian region of Otavalo with its highly active artesanos,
hoteleros and comerciantes de artesania. Nevertheless, such places are still too
few to become the harbingers of truly thorough changes in the situation of
Indians. For this reason, the remark made by Gillette Hall, an analyst of the
World Bank and one of the authors of the report by that institution concerning
the situation of the indigenous population in Latin America, seems accurate.
She noticed that “although indigenous people in the region have increased
their political power and representation during the last decade, this has not
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translated into positive results – in terms of poverty reduction” (Hall, Patrinos
2006).
The same report includes information proving that the poverty indicators
concerning indigenous communities decrease far more slowly than for other
categories of the Latin American population. This proves that Indian communi-
ties make use of contemporary changes, major development programmes, and
liquidation of social inequalities to a lesser degree. The data on the poverty of
indigenous people from individual countries, especially those where those
populations are high, are even more alarming. Thus, three quarters of the
autochthonous population of Bolivia and Guatemala live in poverty; in Ecua-
dor, as many as 87% of Indians live in poverty (data from 1998); the same
condition affects 62.8% of indigenas in Peru (as of 2000); while in Mexico this
category extends over 89.7% of the indigenous population. In the light of the
data above, it goes without saying that it is still the autochthonous population
that is touched to the greatest degree by poverty, which in the rural communi-
ties is decidedly of a structural character, that is resulting from lasting social
and economic inequalities. In the years 1994–2004, that is during the period
that the United Nations announced “the decade of the indigenous people”, the
economic position of Indians in Latin America did not undergo major changes,
despite the propaganda slogans promoting civilisational progress in this sector
of the population. Still, a close correlation between Indian ethnicity and pov-
erty is maintained throughout the continent, meaning that this population lives
in far poorer conditions also in many important aspects of daily life.
This phenomenon is also visible in the labour market (that is, outside the
sector of family or community farming). The earnings of Indian worker in most
countries range from 36% (Mexico) to approximately 50% (Bolivia, Peru, Ec-
uador) or 60% (Guatemala) of salaries received by those who are not of indig-
enous origin. These inequalities result from the fact that the majority of the
autochthonous population work in those sectors of the economy that typically
receive lower rates of pay (agriculture, animal husbandry, forestry, non-for-
malised house services), and are the effect of poorer qualifications of indig-
enous labour, also partially reflecting the ethno-racial discrimination that allows
employers to pay an Indian at a far lower level than is the case with a non-
indigenous employee (Minnesota Population..., 20.01.2009).
What favours the strengthening of inequalities in Indians’ condition of life is
the educational system operating in Latin America, for which the state takes
direct responsibility. The rural schools in the regions inhabited by the indigenas
represent the lower level, are poorly furnished and equipped, and lack compe-
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tent teachers. On top of that, educational curricula only to a small degree meet
the actual needs of Indian children. Their home environment (lack of education
among parents, reading habits, books) does not favour the progress of pupils,
who, to make matters worse, often have serious problems with understanding
the lessons due to their poor knowledge of Spanish or Portuguese. Because of
the problems with finding teachers with appropriate competences, there are
few schools with bilingual programs. Thus most schools earmarked for Indian
children in fact operate as institutions facilitating assimilation of the indigenous
population, and very often for that reason are perceived by Indians as an op-
pressive necessity, hardly useful for the lives of their children. Another crucial
factor that debilitates the effectiveness of teaching is the work of children in
their parents’ households, which often draws them away from school duties.
As a result, the efficiency of education is considerably lower, as proved for
example by the situation in Guatemala, where Indian children finish education
after 3.5 years at school. The situation is not much better in Mexico (4.5
years) and in many other countries. This phenomenon is still accompanied by
a high level of illiteracy, especially affecting women. Thus, in Mexico and Ecua-
dor, nearly a quarter of the Indian population has received no education what-
soever. The situation looks even worse if one looks at secondary education and
participation of the indigenous population in it. In Bolivia only 8% of Indian
children attend schools after turning 15, a factor that does not differ greatly
from other countries (Bello 2001).
All these facts clearly demonstrate the character of the educational barriers
that keep the Indian population at the very bottom of the social ladder. Only
very few individuals break through the inefficient system of education and
obtain secondary or higher education. Luckily, in recent years a gradual proc-
ess has been observed whereby the number of Indian students and graduates
has increased, leading them to form very slowly the milieus of indigenous elites
(teachers, priests, physicians, engineers). These are the elites that the Indians
need to participate fully in contemporary modernisation processes as actors of
changes. Unfortunately, the appearance of the first generation of indigenous
“intelligentsia” cannot to a great degree be credited to public education. A far
greater role in this process is played by non-state institutions and initiatives:
schools and universities for Indians established by Catholic church (for exam-
ple, the educative activities of the Salesian Order in Ecuador), scholarship and
support programmes for indigenous youth (organised by foreign foundations),
vocational education courses conducted by NGOs, and finally an entirely new
phenomenon: establishment of educational institutions, including also universi-
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ties, by Indian organisations that rightly see an opportunity to break away from
the state of poverty and exclusion in increasing the level of scholarisation.
Further evidence of the poor situation of Indians is the condition of healthcare
in this segment of the population which, much like education, lags behind the –
still, on average, low – rates characteristic of the entire Latin American society.
The reason for this status quo is the poorly developed public network of
healthcare, which in fact hardly reaches the rural, forest, and highland areas,
which are the ones usually inhabited by the indigenas. Secondly, the availability
of those medical centres is highly limited for Indians, due not only to the dis-
tances involved and the potential hardships on the road, but also to the prices
of medical services and medications that are relatively high for the poor. Thirdly
and finally, awareness and knowledge of the principles of hygiene, illness pre-
vention, and treatment of simple ailment conditions is very low among these
people. Should we add the conditions of life resulting from hard work in agri-
culture, improper nutrition, and also the ever more frequently observed con-
tamination of the Indians’ natural habitat (e.g. of surface waters and rivers),
the fact that the health condition of the indigenous population is far poorer
than in the remaining groups becomes understandable (Posern-Zieliński 2007).
We therefore see twice as high mortality of infants, a few years’ shorter life
expectancy, and far lower immunity to illnesses, which are evidently proved by
the data from, for example, Ecuador and Mexico. The awareness of such
a status quo mobilises numerous charity (religious, aid, and international) or-
ganisations that are trying to assist those in need by opening health centres,
distributing medications, and organising training in conscious motherhood and/
or elementary principles of hygiene. Naturally, these are activities that only
partially supplement the duty of the state administration, whose inefficiency in
healthcare is of a systemic character and pertains not only to the sector serv-
ices for the indigenous population. It is little wonder then that – faced with all
this – people try to cope along the lines they have traditionally tested . This is
what lies at the root of the exceeding popularity of medicine men and healers
(curanderos), who have tuned themselves perfectly to contemporary needs,
opening their own health care centres, advertising their services on notice
boards and the Internet, and also (in Mexico, for instance) legalising their
activity by becoming so-called medicos profesionales specialising in alternative
medicine.
An important factor that makes Indians’ daily life harder is the poorly devel-
oped infrastructure in the regions they inhabit, even though the situation in
this field improved markedly throughout the last 20 years, primarily thanks to
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the intervention of administrative authorities trying to integrate the backward
provinces with the economic centres of the country and promote modernisa-
tion of rural settlement. This type of activity is frequently synchronised either
with election campaigns or with plans for exploiting minerals discovered in
Indian territories. Yet even in spite of these factors, in the areas densely popu-
lated by the indigenas the road grid is poor and their condition unsatisfactory,
with many settlements having no access to electricity, potable water, wastewater
systems, public transportation, and/or a telephone network. Due to the pov-
erty in which most Indians live, also their houses (of a very simple construction)
lack the majority or furnishing and utensils that are in common use in the cities.
Superimposed on the “objective” factors listed above and responsible for
the poverty among Indians in Latin America are important social aspects that
make it harder for the indigenas to leave the state of poverty and exclusion.
These often include racist prejudices, less visible in the official contacts, yet
very strong in daily life, powerful negative ethnic stereotypes, strong paternal-
ism still visible in the policies of state authorities, and also of aid organisations,
foundations, and churches. This kind of perspective of Indian people results on
the one hand in their discrimination, displaying of contempt towards them, and
treating them with frequently manifested superiority. On the other hand, it
reinforces the complex of inferiority among the indigenous population, result-
ing from the low social position devoid of prestige attributed to this ethnic
group. As a result, it is small wonder that among Indians there are powerful
tendencies to hide away their indigenous identity, and also to deny their native
roots so as to enter as quickly as possible the Mestizo world and erase any
traces of their autochthonous origin. This process of assimilation, in the Andes
known as cholificación and in Central America as ladinización, is opposed
today by Indian activists who try to reconstruct the self-confidence and ethnic
pride based on the revived tradition and reinterpreted achievements of their
forefathers.
Indigenous people and their legal situation
The Latin American states established early in the nineteenth century based
their legal systems on concepts borrowed from Napoleonic ideas, according to
which the institution of the state is construed as a powerful and uniform organ-
ism forming, together with all its inhabitants, a uniform nation–state (Estado–
Nación). Formally, in such an entity – today often termed as a political nation –
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all citizens were to be equal before the law applied within its territory. In such
a system, cultural, ethnic, and racial differences – evidently present – could
not provide grounds for any special rights resulting from diversity of individual
groups. After all, the key was to launch the mechanisms favouring quick estab-
lishment of “new” nations within the Latin American space that had before
been controlled by colonial powers.
As a result of that political philosophy, Indian people, although de iure
becoming citizens of the newly established states, de facto lost the special
rights they acquired in the colonial period, resulting from the partial autonomy
that they were awarded within the marked-off administrative (republicas del
indio) or missionary (reducciones) zones. In the new situation, the indigenas
were actually perceived as “savages” (salvajes) inhabiting territories that would
become fully integrated with the state only in future, or as part of the basic
labour force, allowing exploitation of rich natural resources and finally as po-
tential future citizens, who they would become only once they had recognised
the generally accepted norms of the “civilised” society simultaneously rejecting
the burden of “primitive” tradition. Gradual changes in this field did not come
until the 1940s, together with the spreading ideology and practice of
indigenismo, according to which the “backward” and “exploited” Indian, de-
prived of land, and not integrated with the mainstream society, deserved spe-
cial assistance and treatment, also by agencies of the state.
In this way, in fact, began the process of accepting indigenous people as
a special category of citizens – with separate cultural features and different
social needs resulting from the (post)colonial situation. This acceptance even-
tually had to make a major breach in the concept of a unitarian state, and after
many years of debates, discussions, and controversies led to the shaping of
a new model of plural state, based on the principles of multiculturality
(interculturality). Even though initially one-sided, that is involving primarily the
indigenistas trying a variety of methods to influence the “passive” indigenous
masses, with the passage of time the process was increasingly interactive in its
character, triggering the movement of Indian revival, with their leaders putting
forth most crucial postulates of the need for thorough reconstruction of the
state, so that its political system accounted not only for the existence of ethnic
and cultural diversity but would also empower the indigenous people with legal
personality, and the right to co-decide not only on their future but also on the
shape of social and economic reality in the country they live in.
Launching this debate helped also to redefine the ethnic terminology re-
lated to the Indian world. Some words began to have a legal sense attributed,
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others were excluded as a part of the language of political correctness, while
still others were quickly accepted on the power of claims from the interested
parties. Thus finally the pseudo-anthropological notion of calling a specific
indigenous group “a tribe” (tribu) was dispensed with, as in the eyes of Indians
it was a purposeful semantic technique to juxtapose them against the rest of the
“civilised” world. This unfortunate term was initially replaced by a more uni-
versal notion, namely that of an “ethnic group” (etnia), used both for very
small communities lost in the Amazon jungle and groupings of hundreds of
thousands people or even more found in the Andes and Mesoamerica. Never-
theless, this seemingly neutral concept was not approved by the Indians them-
selves, who still saw in it a reflection of the unequal dichotomy dividing the
world into the “nations” enjoying full rights and the “ethnic groups” living on
their verges and subjected to them.
The increase in the ethnic awareness of Indians and their sensitivity to the
language of postcolonial dominance that continued to be used by the non-
Indian party is an evident contribution of the indigenous leaders to the process
of so-called concientizacion, which resulted in numerous changes in geographic
and ethnic names. As part of this process of “cleansing” the language from
colonial influences – present, by the way, also on other continents – a number
of Indian ethnic groups rejected the formerly used exoethnonyms and forced
the outside world – including, quite naturally, the state authorities – to use the
endoethnonyms they approved. This is how the Araucanians from Chile and
Argentina became the Mapuche, the Colorado from Ecuador are today known
as Tsachila, and the Jivaro from the Ecuadorian–Peruvian borderland defined
themselves as Shuar. These are naturally only a handful of examples showing a
far broader and constantly visible phenomenon. This “return” to own ethnic
names is a form of symbolic manifestation of an identity revival. Even in numer-
ous official documents, manifestoes, and declarations of indigenous organisa-
tions, the word “America” is frequently omitted, and replaced by a term bor-
rowed from the Cuna Indians from Panama: “Abya Yala”, meaning more or less
“our land”. In this way, the term became a near synonym of “Indian America”:
the America of its indigenous inhabitants, that is consciously juxtaposed to
Latin America as the continent of Creole and Mestizo population dominated
over the Indians.
The indigenous people also do not accept their groups being called ethnic
minorities (minorias etnicas), for the simple reason that they do not want to be
count into the same category as communities of immigrant origin, such as
those consisting of the descendants of the Japanese, Chinese, Lebanese, Jews,
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Germans, Ukrainians, and Poles. The legal status they enjoy, and which is
accepted in both national and international discourse, is the belonging of Indi-
ans to the category of indigenous peoples (pueblos indigenas), which today –
at the time of global struggle for special protection of autochthonous groups
(their culture, language, identity, property, and territories) – is decidedly more
attractive. The ever broader possibility of acquiring material aid, awarding and
restitution of special collective rights facilitates also a process of creation of
“new” indigenous groups, whose ties to the culture of their forefathers are
very poorly maintained, and who try to formalise their status of indigenous
ethnic units.
Both in international law and in the legal discourse conducted in the indi-
vidual countries of Latin America, acute debates continued concerning the
choice of an adequate term to define properly the indigenous inhabitants. In-
dian leaders and their allies strongly opposed the previous practices of calling
this category of citizens “indigenous population” (poblaciones indigenas) or
“indigenous people” (pueblo indigena). Both these terms were treated as con-
tradictory to reality and as expression damaging the vital interests of Indians,
as they resulted in treatment of them as an amorphous conglomerate of indi-
viduals, deprives of features of ethnic identity, and forming a great collectivity
of native residents of the continent, gradually integrating into the national
society of the countries they inhabit. This is why these terms, considered pe-
jorative and inadequate, began to be replaced by the term “indigenous peo-
ples” (pueblos indigenas) which was introduced into a variety of legal acts
(international conventions, constitutions, declarations, agreements, etc.), al-
beit gradually and against great resistance (Grey, Zamosc 2005).
Seemingly a small semantic difference, the persistent addition of the “–s”,
which focuses on the plural form, has in fact significant consequences. First of
all, it accounts for the legal recognition of each Indian people (pueblo) in the
capacity of a unique socially organised ethnic community, with a distinctive
identity and characteristic cultural features, enjoying special collective rights
(to land, to territory, to protection of its own culture and environment). Sec-
ondly, such recognised group – as a separate people (pueblo) – becomes also
a political subject, which through its representatives should participate in the
public life of the country of their residence, and should be able to influence the
course of affairs, especially those pertaining to indigenous affairs (autodeter-
minacion). Thirdly, each such indigenous “people” could in fact claim establish-
ment of a certain territorial autonomy that would let it undertake decisions
along the lines of traditional legal and property, customary and religious norms.
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This specific point was recently the reason for major political and legal contro-
versies, although in fact it corresponds to the multicultural philosophy declara-
tively accepted in Latin American countries mostly in the form of ideas of
multiethnicity (multietnicidad) and cultural pluralism (pluriculturalidad) (Velasco
Cruz 2003).
It may be claimed that these terminology-related matters do not cover eve-
rything, as there are even more revisionistic postulates put forth by the Indian
party. On the one hand, this may be a testimony to the ambition of groups
marginalised for hundreds of years, while on the other they are a reflection of
a certain new way of thinking about the national structure of the state. In
numerous speeches, documents, and manifestos of Indian organisations, the
word pueblo is replaced by the term nacionalidad, which emphasises that the
indigenous group – although often small in terms of numbers – is in fact an
autonomous community, with not only a separate culture and language but also
its own territory, and within it social structures that follow its own norms inher-
ited from the ancestors. The assumption of the term nacionalidad is in fact
a form of strategy reinforcing the position of the indigenous community within
the multicultural state and give it not only the right to cultivate its own tradition
and promote ethnic development but also ensure its autonomy to allow control
of the territory inhabited by the group and – within that framework – estab-
lishment of a native society following its own laws.
The most radical Indian leaders go even further, and following some North
American “tribes” define their own ethnic communities as nations (naciones),
believing that the term nacionalidad is not adequate to the situation, as by
definition it makes such a group subordinate towards the main Creole-Mestizo
segment of the society, co-forming the “titular” nation–state (estado–nacion).
Acceptance of the status of pueblo or nacionalidad, although showing major
progress on the path to recognition of Indians’ subjectivity, does not eliminate
the subordination of indigenous peoples to the interests of the dominant soci-
ety. Assumption that individual groups of native population form “nations” –
i.e. legal entities that are equal to other “nations”, even the big ones – is to lead
to such a reform of the state political system, which would result not only in
acceptance of the principles of multiethnicity and multiculturality, but also in
“multinationality”, with all the legal consequences of such a step. Such radical
postulates do not, however, find any support in non-Indian society, even among
those people who are favourable towards indigenous groups and support their
struggle for improvement of their current position. The reason of that attitude
is a strong anxiety that this type of ideas may lead to destabilisation of the state,
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even greater social divisions, increased separatist tendencies, and – as a conse-
quence – more intensive ethnic conflicts.
It goes without saying that throughout the twentieth century the legal sta-
tus of Indians (in the sense of their rights as specific ethnic groups of indig-
enous character), was not clearly defined in the legislation of individual coun-
tries of Latin America. Hence both indigenistas and Indian activists sought
support in legal acts of international character, rightly believing that these may
be an efficient weapon in debates on the rights of the indigenous population,
and primarily a support in solving conflicts originating between Indians and the
state administration. In fact, besides a variety of acts and declarations of the
United Nations concerning the condemnation of racial discrimination and the
need to respect human and civil rights, it is hard to find high-ranking docu-
ments that sets down expresis verbis the scope of rights of indigenous people
or peoples. The first such act was the “Convenio (num. 107) sobre Poblaciones
Indigenas y Tribales” of the International Labour Organisation of 1957. Im-
perfect though important, the document was replaced in 1989 by “Convenio
(num 169) sobre Pueblo Indigenas y Tribales”. Interestingly, the latter docu-
ment was worked out in a dispute with the participation of numerous indig-
enous organisations from all over the world, and for the last two decades it has
been an extremely important legal instrument both for the Indians – who can
now refer to the regulations contained therein – and for the state administra-
tion, especially in those countries that ratified Convention No. 169.
The convention leaves no doubt that every indigenous people has the right
to maintain its identity and should have the chance to participate in those
decisions of state and local authorities that pertain to its existence. At the same
time, the document postulates to promote the development of indigenous peo-
ples and eliminate their asymmetric position (social and material) toward the
non-native society. The first Latin American state to ratify the Convention was
Mexico (1990), which was soon followed by other countries. Although for-
mally recognised, this international document was practically often ignored,
not respected or misinterpreted. Nevertheless, its impact on the relations be-
tween Indians and the states they inhabit has been great. For the indigenous
party, the existence of this convention provided an opportunity to refer to
international law in the cases of evident violation of the native rights set out
clearly in the document. At the same time, pressure from Indians, frequently
supported by the international community (NGOs, solidarity organisations, UN
agendas, governments of European states, and eminent religious, artistic and
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political authorities) resulted in important changes in the ethnic policy of states
towards indigenous people, and consequently also in national law (Stavenhagen
2008).
This convention was not a fully satisfactory document due to some disput-
able formulas, failure to account for numerous questions crucial for indigenous
peoples, and its lack of adjustment to the situation of the native population,
which was changing dynamically towards the end of the twentieth century. Nor
was it given a sufficiently high rank, as it was among the legal acts worked out
by one of the UN bodies and not established by the highest organ of the
world’s parliament. For that reason, as early as 1995, following the inspiration
from the “Grupo de Trabajo sobre Poblaciones Indigenas” established earlier
(as soon as 1982) by the United Nations, work on a draft of a UN declaration
defining the rights of indigenous peoples and duties of the state towards them
began. Negotiations were as a matter of fact very difficult and conducted with
the participation of all interested parties, including representatives of indig-
enous peoples (a large share of them being leaders of Indians’ organisations), UN
experts, activists of those NGOs that dealt with assistance for native peoples, and
also governemental delegates of the countries most interested in the question due
to the presence of this category of people within their territories (Anaya 2005).
Following the repeated agreements on almost every sentence and para-
graph, a document of unusual weight was finally constructed as the “Declaracion
de las Naciones Unidas sobre los Derechos de los Pueblo Indigenas”, which
was approved by the General Assembly with the votes of 144 states in 2007.
In this manner, an extremely important international document was passed,
which recognises the collective rights of indigenous peoples. The Declaration
passed after the years of debates is today, beside Convention No. 169, an
extremely important instrument of international law regulating relations be-
tween indigenous peoples (i.e. also Indians) and state authorities. For the in-
digenous party, this document serves as a point of reference that allows identi-
fication of the range of their own rights, while for the state party it should be
a certain touchstone binding to such activity in the legislative and administra-
tive area that would not be contradictory to the provisions of the Declaration.
Interestingly, the Declaration discussed here is constructed in such a way that
most of its articles are divided into two paragraphs, of which the first defines
the rights of indigenous peoples in various realms and spheres of their life,
while the latter identifies the duties and tasks of the state, related to the imple-
mentation and protection of these rights.
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Thus the Declaration should be an inspiration for relations between indig-
enous peoples and state authorities to make it possible to launch a process of
elimination of inequalities resulting from colonial conquest and marginalisation
of autochthonous populations. It should help to respect collective rights of
indigenous groups, prevent actions that bear the traits of forced assimilation,
preclude colonisation of indigenous lands and appropriation of natural resources
contained therein, and support the struggle of indigenous people for reinforce-
ment of their jeopardised identity by letting them live freely within their own
culture. There are two settlements worth noting that are of very special weight,
namely the articles where the Declaration states expresis verbis that the indig-
enous peoples have the right of self-determination of their political status and
their path of social, economic, and cultural development. The state and its
administration, in turn, are obliged to conduct a dialogue with their indigenous
peoples in all the matters that may influence their lives and concern the territo-
ries they occupy. These norms, in fact, go forth to meet the tendencies mani-
fested in many Latin American countries to institutionalised activity of Indians
in the political life of the country, participation of their representatives in local
government administration, and to acquisition and broadening of both cultural
and territorial autonomy.
It goes without saying that the UN Declaration shall be an important inspi-
ration, not only for Indians and their emancipatory activity, but also becoming
an important guideline pointing the direction of the necessary reforms in legis-
lation and ethnic policy in all the countries of Latin America. A number of ideas
contained both in Convention No. 169 and now in the Declaration were taken
into account in the recently reformulated constitutions of many individual states.
To the greatest extent, these changes affected cultural questions, that is the
recognition of the national society’s cultural pluralism, and hence the Indians’
right to cultivation of different customs, languages, and religions. To a lesser
degree, the new constitutions reflect the postulates of native leaders to recog-
nise the rights of the indigenous population as new subjects of social, eco-
nomic, and political life of the country. At most, these documents define that
the state has a multi-ethnic (multietnico) character, and the Indians that inhabit
it have the right to cherish their identity, have their own forms of social organi-
sation, and possibly the right to decide autonomously about their matters at the
local level, due to their specific character resulting from their autochthonous
status. Such guarantees are contained in the constitutions of Argentina (1994),
Bolivia (1994), Brazil (1988), Columbia (1991), Ecuador (1998 and 2007),
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Guatemala (1985), Mexico (1992), Nicaragua (1995), Panama (1994), Para-
guay (1992), and Peru (1993) (Anaya 1998).
The recognition of cultural distinctiveness of Indians and their right to maintain
separate ethnic identity in fact imposes the duty to support the struggle of
indigenous groups to execute these rights in everyday practice on the state.
Three factors pose obstacles here. The first is the lack of legal acts to translate
constitutional guarantees and norms into the language of administrative prac-
tice. Secondly, the lack of will and determination to introduce successful re-
forms that the indigenous people would find satisfactory, and thirdly, the still
profound layers of prejudices and stereotypes against the indigenous popula-
tion, resulting from postcolonial political philosophy, and associated with the
fears for integrity of the state, preservation of social equilibrium, and stability
of economic growth.
Although the clauses in the constitutions of Latin America are still not fully
satisfactory in the eyes of Indian leaders, they are beyond any doubt a manifes-
tation of distinctive evolutionary tendencies gradually transforming the unitary
model of the state with its idea of homogeneous civil nation into a pattern of
a pluricultural and multiethnic state, respecting within its borders the existence
of various ethnic units characterised by distinctive cultural traits. The main
foundations of this new model are:
· recognition of a specific relationship existing between indigenous peoples,
and territories they inhabit and lands they farm;
· recognition of indigenous languages as an important element of Indians’
cultural heritage, worth supporting through bilingual education;
· respect for cultural identity of indigenous groups, including customs, tradi-
tions, and cosmovision;
· recognition of the Indians’ right to preserve their own forms of social life
and administer their local community in accordance with own norms.
Each of these four principles shapes the relations between the state and
Indians in a different field, leading alternatively to confrontation or to a difficult
dialogue in search of a solution satisfactory for both parties. Thus Indians find
the question of “territory and land” a very important tool to protect their
“native fatherlands” against loss, reduction, destruction, industrial infiltration
and expansion of settlers’ colonisation; while for the state such guarantees are
often only a formal (i.e. easy to pass over) barrier standing in the way of the
modernisation programmes they promote. The question of bilingual education,
meanwhile, is an important factor for Indians, as it supports their identity, but
342 ON THE STATE OF LATIN AMERICAN STATES. APPROACHING THE  BICENTENARY
for the administrative authorities it is only a serious logistic problem due to the
lack of expert staff and conviction about the dysfunctionality of native lan-
guages in the public life of the country.
Similarly, the ideas of cultural pluralism are not easy to reconcile within
a single country, especially when confronting entirely different, and at times
even contradictory norms (e.g. religious, medical, social, familial). Yet the greatest
number of controversies is raised by the question of the potential acceptance
for Indians to use their own common law in their indigenous milieus. This is so
because some of its principles concerning inheritance, management of commu-
nity affairs – even though different from those enshrined in legal codes – can
be applied without any hindrances in the form of alternative solutions, while
others (for example those referring to punishment of criminals) are hard to
accept due to the fundamental contradiction with the binding legal doctrine.
It goes without saying that one of the most important questions for those
Indians who still live in the same areas that their ancestors inhabited for centu-
ries is the problem of legal protection of the land (in reference to collective
ownership by local communities) and the guarantee of the inviolability of the
territory of their ethnic habitat in reference to the ethno-local groups inhabit-
ing tropical forests and savannas. We should note here that beyond the obvi-
ous, though in practice hardly respected, protection of the right of ownership,
the notions of “land” and “territory” have in fact different meanings in the
indigenous system of values. According to it, the land of the forefathers may
not be reduced to solely an economic category, as it is treated as the natural
space for the existence of the entire community or native group, hence –
independently from the changing ways of its use by the community, local group,
particular family, or tenants – it may not belong to an individual. It is the entire
group – frequently unified on the bases of blood ties, common origin, tradi-
tions, and experiences of living together in a given area for a longer spell of
time – who are the real owners and managers of the occupied territory. Such
a community considers its land/territory extremely important, as its little home-
land, the real source of identity, and a native area pervaded with sacral ele-
ments and places strongly associated with their worldview (cosmovision). In
fact, it can be said that – within this indigenous philosophy – it is not the local
group who rules over a territory inherited from their ancestors and can for that
reason treat it in any way, but it is the community living within the given area
that belongs to (is an integral part of) this “sacral” land considered as a timeless
and lasting foundation of the order of the native world. For that reason, all and
any designs against the indigenous land/territory are treated by the groups of
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native people as an attack on their very foundations of existence (material,
social, ethnic), and disregard for the rules binding for centuries.
The entirely different treatment of land by the state and the official law
according to which individual property is subject to market operations and by
the indigenous population with its tradition of inalienable community owner-
ship, bearing values of sacral object) has been the source of acute controversies
and tensions for the last two centuries. Both the state and its non-Indian citi-
zens considered respecting the customary rights of Indians as no more than an
obstacle in the acquisition of new lands and areas for economic expansion and
“development”. Hence – with methods that were both seemingly legally and
illegally resorted to – everything was done to attain the assumed economic
goals and bereave the indigenous people of their property. On the other hand,
however, the intensifying protests of the autochthonous groups, the indigenistas
of both left- and right-wing orientation, and also of international organisa-
tions, made Latin American states gradually recognise the specific character of
Indian property. An example of such a change of position were the activities of
national indigenistic institutes (connected into the continental co-operation
network, presided over by Instituto Indigenista Interamericano based in Mexico
Ciudad, and operating under the auspices of Organizacion de los Estados
Americanos), which recommended that governments launch reconocimientos
procedures, that is the re-acknowledgement (after the colonial era) of indig-
enous communities through the verification of their territorial boundaries, award-
ing them with legal personality, and defining their operation in the state as
special self-governing units of the local level. Such practices were introduced,
for example, by Velasco Alvarado’s government in Peru in the 1970s.
It must also be stated that changes in this direction were introduced in the
majority of the new constitutions of Latin American states. Without doubt,
these amendments accounted for the statements of Convention No. 169 of the
International Labour Organisation, whose ideological impact had been visible
in the preceding two decades. Thus such clauses of the highest ranking, being
for Indians – naturally, only those who have managed to survive to this day in
their traditional areas – a special guarantee of a right to land, made their way
into numerous constitutions. In Bolivia, these lands are defined as “tierras
comunitarias de origen”, while in Colombia they are known as “tierras comunales
de grupos etnicos” and “tierras de resguardo”, and in Nicaragua they are
termed “formas comunales de propiedad de las tierras de las comunidades”.
Nevertheless, in the legal discourse that continues today, among on the one
hand politicians, lawyers, and “friends of Indians” (neo-indigenistas from NGOs),
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and on the other indigenous leaders, a decidedly greater importance is as-
signed not as much to the notion of “community property”, which no longer
raises any major controversies, but to the concept of the “indigenous territory”
and autonomous rights of their native inhabitants. Such indigenous territories
in the areas situated east of the Andes are most often defined as reserva: a term
strongly criticised by Indians, who believe it to be pejorative, suffused with
postcolonial connotations, and bringing to mind the idea of “enclosing” an
area. In its traditional meaning, a reserve (reserva) is in fact an area excluded
from economic and development plans, legally protected as a territory that
belongs to the indigenous group, who inhabit it and exploit it in the traditional
manner. This kind of concept of the reserva, however, though aimed at the
protection of small and scattered Indian groups from loss of land, invasion of
settlers, decomposition of culture, and destruction of their natural environ-
ment, was frequently and strongly criticised also by many anthropologists and
human rights activists who believed this type of solution to be an attempt at
introducing a certain type of a “human (ethnic) zoo”, aimed at conservation of
“primitive societies” through artificial isolation, just like elephants and pandas
threatened with extinction. It was believed that the guarantees of the states,
safeguarding the rights of Indians to life in dignity in the land of their ances-
tors, should not be a barrier isolating the local autochthonous groups from the
contemporary world, and development opportunities – in short, from the un-
encumbered choice of lifestyle made by the interested party themselves. Natu-
rally, reconciliation of these two attitudes, each of which refers to a different
area of rights – the right to decide about one’s life, and the right to maintain an
ethnic territory under special protection – is exceedingly difficult, although the
two can definitely be applied partially depending on the local situation (Gómez
Parra, Martínez Miguélez 1992).
Despite these reservations, the Indian territories enjoying the status of reserva
(Peru) or similar (parque indígena, terra indígena in Brazil) operate in the coun-
tries lying within the Amazon basin (i.e. Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, Columbia, Bo-
livia), and indigenous organisations are trying hard to establish additional areas
of that type. This is the only efficient legal way of protecting the indigenous
groups inhabiting those territories from aggressive economic colonisation and
from the degradation of the natural environment. The process of awarding
such rights to indigenous groups, considering the areas they inhabit and ex-
ploit as protected territories, and staking out the borders of such areas, leaves
much to be desired and is conducted at a highly unsatisfactory pace. In the
countries of the Amazon basin, there are still numerous indigenous groups
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awaiting such decisions, which means that they have no sufficient guarantees
to allow them to oppose the theft of land, exploitation of natural resources,
major developmental investments (roads, dams, and oil and gas pipelines) and
the new wave of settlement.
Brazil, a state where since 1988 Indians have been awarded a range of
important rights that afford them special status, including guarantees pertain-
ing to the territories they inhabit, may provide an interesting case of such
delays. The native lands were defined as indigenous, referring to the concept
of “primordial rights”, acquired by Indians as a result of inhabiting the territory
of Brazil, even before the state was established and before the period of Euro-
pean colonisation. Thus defined, the terras indígenas were encompassed by the
state’s legal protection, which means a ban on trading this land or removing its
traditional inhabitants, albeit with the exception of such cases when an impor-
tant public interest is at stake. Brazilian Indians therefore on the one hand
acquired legal ownership of the “traditional” territories, yet on the other did
not acquire property rights to it. Legalisation procedures in Brazil, much like in
other countries, are highly complicated, although it is notable that the number
of fully or partially recognised indigenous territories reached the level of 71%
in 2007, which marks an increase of nearly 8% as compared to 2003.
The contemporary debate on indigenous territories, and especially the pos-
tulates of Indian organisations, shifts decisively from the fairly narrowly con-
ceived field of protection of property towards working out a model of function-
ing of an autonomous area. It is therefore argued that such an area (conceived
geographically) should have clearly defined borders, and require legal recogni-
tion within them. Such a territory, treated as a habitat, i.e. together with its
natural riches (land, forests, animals, water resources and mineral deposits)
should be considered an environment that is inalienable and necessary for
indigenous group to live. Its biodiversity (biodiversidad) and knowledge per-
taining to it acquired by Indians during the hundreds of years in this environ-
ment should be legally protected along lines similar to intellectual property and
environmental protection standards. Understood in this way, the indigenous
territory (etno-territorio) should be considered an area of special symbolic,
historical, social, and cultural meaning for the Indians inhabiting it, who see it
as an area that shapes their identity. Finally, this is an Indian territory that, quite
naturally, remains a part of the state, yet with a special status, and as such
should be covered by the right to autonomy, meaning the possibility of nomi-
nating an own local administration (self-government), free determination of
own matters, cultivation of ethnic customs and norms appropriate for the given
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group, including also the implementation of principles resulting from tradi-
tional law.
The debate concerning indigenous autonomy and its various forms became
increasingly powerful especially following the so-called San Andrés Accords
(Acuerdos de San Andres) signed in 1996 by the Mexican government and
leaders of the Zapatista movement (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional).
The settlement of the document, which were of great significance for the struggle
of Mexican Indians for their rights, resounded with a powerful echo all through
the continent, and became a part of the agenda for numerous indigenous eman-
cipatory movements. That is why it is worth quoting significant passage of this
agreement, which assumes that la autonomia es la expresion concreta del ejercicio
del derecho a la libre determinacion, expresada como un marco que se conforma
como parte del Estado nacional. Los Pueblos indigenas podran, en consecuencia,
decidir su forma interna de gobierno y sus maneras de organizarse politica,
social, economica y culturalmente [...] El ejercicio de la autonomia de los pueblos
indigenas contribuira a la unidad y democratizacion de la vida nacional
y fortalecera la soberania del pais. (Sierra, 21). Appropriate changes in the
constitutions, which partially (in reference to the recognition of legal autonomy
– autonomia jurisdiccional) were embodied in the new constitutions of Mexico,
Colombia, and Ecuador, were to be a guarantee of autonomy defined in this
way. Yet the right of the Indians to refer to their traditional usos y costumbres
was included only in a limited scope, that is only to the extent they are not
contradictory to the basic legal norms defined in codes.
Today, another important aspect pertaining to norms, principles, and prac-
tice of autonomy is indigenous political autonomy, which means that Indians
should make use of their civic right to have their own local authorities that
decide on all matters crucial for the indigenous community. In many countries
of Latin America, and especially those where democratisation processes have
become highly advanced (Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Mexico), such indig-
enous local authorities are now a fact. One controversy that – as always –
remains is the scope of such an autonomy and its relationship towards the
authorities of a higher administrative level (province, state, central govern-
ment). Mexico can again serve here as an example, as on the one hand it
covers hundreds of municipios (for example in Oaxaca) run by indigenous
authorities appointed in accordance with the principles of traditional rights and
recognised by state authorities, while on the other there are Indian initiatives
(for example in Chiapas) to establish autonomous regions in spite of lacking the
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governmental approval and in no way subjected to any control from the state
administration (Assies, Van der Haar, Hoekema 1999).
Actually, that permanent tendency towards an ever broader and more gen-
erally accepted Indian autonomy can be observed today, even though in each
of the countries it is differently construed and defined, ranging from cultural
and territorial to legal and political. The conviction that indigenous autonomy
is not a threat to the state and its integrity in a political sense is becoming
increasingly popular, even though the question of limitations imposed on such
form of autonomy continues to raise serious objections. One of these is limiting
or depriving Indians’ rights to their natural riches situated within their terri-
tory, which is especially true in the case of resources of strategic importance for
the state (mineral deposits, gas, oil, and water). In such cases, the law at most
provides the requirement (for authorities, firms) to conduct consultations with
representatives of local Indians concerning potential compensations for the lost
land and damaged environment. Little wonder, therefore, that these questions
– difficult to solve in a manner satisfactory for both the parties – are today the
most frequent reason for conflicts between Indians, and the state authorities
and investors who – with the approval of the state administration – conduct
major development projects on indigenous territories. It goes without saying
that these conflicts are also an expression of the expansion of a neo-liberal
economy that ignores “indigenous rights”, and the power of globalisation proc-
esses that today reach the furthest regions and encroach without hesitation on
the territories that have so been the domains of the indigenas (Assies,
Gundermann 2007).
Indigenous organisations and their
political strategies
The movements of Indian revival, the visible effect of which today are numer-
ous indigenous organisations, were originally of a fairly narrow range and
elitist character. It was only with the passage of time that they gradually broad-
ened the scope of their impact, while also acquiring increasing numbers of
participants. In this gradual process of consolidation of the movement, fre-
quently simply called Indianism, there are three factors that seem to be of
significant importance. These are, in fact, the same elements that played a key
role in the establishment of social and religious movements of a millenarian and
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messianic character. The first important question that is to be considered is the
social and political context – favourable or unfavourable (as until recently in
Peru) for the development of indigenous revival movements. It is shaped both
by the factors that determine the political, social, and economic reality of the
country (for example processes of democratisation after the fall of authoritar-
ian governments, possibilities for organised actions of indigenous people due
to their social and spatial situation, the impact of armed conflicts, such as those
resulting from the activity of the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) in Peru,
leftist guerrillas and cocaine mafias in Colombia, and civil war in Guatemala),
as well as the totality of the international situation in reference to the positions
of individual states of Latin America (for example, the general approval of
Indians’ struggle for their own rights, financial and moral support awarded to
such actions, conventions and legal regulations implemented by international
organisations favouring changes in the situation of the indigenous population,
and the increasingly powerful impact of the new political philosophy referring
to the ideology and policy of multiculturalism).
The second significant factor in the process of consolidation of these move-
ments is beyond doubt the ideology that allows formulation of attractive pro-
grammes and – with their help – the acquisition of followers among both
Indians and non-Indians. Speaking about ideology, two elements are crucial.
First – the pace at which the idea of ethnic activism is spread, the increasing
tendency to respect the rights of indigenous people, the concept of establish-
ing ethnic autonomy springing up here and there, ever more solidified convic-
tions about the need to build a civic society based on the principles of
multiculturality and multiethnicity. Transformation of the state system towards
one respecting its multinational character, and the popularity of slogans advo-
cating the implementation of intercultural and bilingual education, legal plural-
ism, and improvement of the legal status of indigenous religions are of course
very important elements present in the current discourse.
Secondly, this ideology contains elements both of the social programmes
inherited from the postulates of the indigenists (improving the civilisational
level of Indians’ life, of their education and healthcare, and modernisation of
regional infrastructure), and of those of left-wing political groups (liquidation
of socially unjust relations based on domination and subordination system re-
sulting from the endo-colonial praxis, elimination of the marginalised position
of Indians, the fight against expropriation and exploitation of native people,
and opposing the relics of racial prejudices).
349ALEKSANDER POSERN-ZIELIŃSKI • THE STATE AND THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
Finally, the third important element in the process of consolidation of Indian
revival movements is the so-called human factor. Besides the internal (social,
ethnic, regional, cultural, religious) differentiation) of the Indian people where
these movements are active, it encompasses the actions of Indian leaders and
the establishment of indigenous elites, including the “intelligentsia” (originat-
ing from the education of Indian youth) and middle classes (established as the
result of economic advancement), i.e. the social groups that naturally pursue
changes. It is the leaders who in a very skilful and successful manner often
make use of the crisis situation in the country to conduct revindicative activi-
ties; it is the leaders who – knowing perfectly well the needs and mentality of
their compatriots – translate universal ethnic ideas into their language (and
cognitive system); it is they who more or less successfully connect these ideas
with specific programmes of social and legal reforms; it is they who are the
initiators of various protest actions; it is also they who shape the public opinion
(of the indigenous community, national, and often international), efficiently
building lobbyist pressures on the legislative process and the ethnic and social
policy of the government.
Beginning in the 1990s, the Indian revival movement in Latin America
began to assume an especially powerful dimension, manifested primarily in the
earnest struggle of the indigenous people to become subjectivised, i.e. to as-
sume such a position in the gradually democratising states of the area that
would let them go beyond the current social and economic marginalisation and
be liberated from the political paternalism, at the same time opening to them
the path towards co-deciding on their legal, economic, educational, and cul-
tural condition. To achieve this goal, Indians began to organise themselves into
local, regional, provincial, and country-wide organisations, that slowly became
actual partners of state authorities treated by them as legally recognised repre-
sentations of the indigenous peoples. As a result, former ethnic, tribal and
territorial divisions moved to a far more distant plane, yielding their place to
a variety of associations, societies, unions, and even Indian parties, frequently
gathering under joint leadership of different ethnic groups (Bengoa 2000).
This is how a new alternative towards the former structure of ethnic divi-
sions developed: a network of new indigenous organisations, trying to become
a part of the political reality of the countries. Especially this last aspect has
recently assumed significant importance, primarily due to the increasing im-
portance of the Indian population, organisation, and leaders in the political life
of Latin American countries. Examples which clearly point to this aspect of
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ethno-politics might be on the one hand Ecuador, with its powerful federation
of indigenous organisations that is frequently decisive for the fall or election of
new central government in the country, and on the other– Bolivia, since 2006
ruled for the first time in its history by an Indian leader, Evo Morales. In other
words, today’s indigenous organisations in many countries of the American
continent are an important political actor, which has to be taken into serious
consideration on the local and regional scene, but also in the state and even
international space. These organisations have systematically expanded the space
of their impact, and on the Indian side have gradually monopolised the rela-
tions connecting indigenous people with the state administration. In this way
the scattered protests and barely heard voices of Indian people are taken over
by increasingly strong indigenous associations, while the state must negotiate
with organisations making official statements in the capacity of representatives
of the autochthonous milieu and not the amorphous or poorly structured masses
of indigenous residents.
These organisations are the ones that organise and manage Indian matters
within the indigenous world; they try to gain increased control over the space
and resources of the indigenous acumen, it is they who represent the interests
of indigenous population in contacts with authorities, administration, NGOs;
and it is they, finally (apart from local communes of community character), who
have legal personality, and for that reason may be (and are) a legal political
partner and the party taking over and distributing financial assets earmarked
for assistance and modernisation of Indians’ lives. Briefly speaking, Indian or-
ganisations decide today on the majority of questions concerning the fate of
the indigenous population, and their leaders are treated as a representative
section of the society, who should and must be negotiated with.
We can therefore say that today these organisations are led by “the new
Indians”. They no longer are the chiefs, the medicine men, the caciques, but
representatives of new indigenous elites: people experienced in social, political,
and organisational work, ever more frequently educated at secondary schools
and universities, knowing the rules of contemporary life in the Mestizo world,
usually aware of the import of their ethnic mission, and clearly distinguished
with their privileged position in their own society. They draw their authority –
and often also their charisma – not from tradition and family genealogy, but
primarily from the social capital, whose resources let them play the function of
efficient mediators between their own indigenous milieu and the (Mestizos–
Creole) world that is external towards it. Contemporary indigenous organisa-
tions are, in fact, not as much a transformation or adaptation of structures
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operating earlier, but an entirely new element of Indian social life. The patterns
of such associations were introduced from the outside world, but adjusted to
the current needs of the indigenous struggle for rights, now indeed greatly
facilitated thanks to their own, legally operating ethnic representation (Posern-
Zieliński 2002).
The arrival of Indian organisations on the political, self-government, and
ethnic stage was especially evident in the last decade of the twentieth century,
and was primarily connected with the discovery of the new democratic space
by indigenous leaders. This space let them build from square one associations
that represented the vital interests of indigenous people. In such favourable
conditions, taking shape in Latin America after the fall of numerous authoritar-
ian regimes and the gradual disappearance of local armed conflicts, an organ-
ised Indian movement appeared. Its key was the subjectivisation of Indians who
– having discovered their new identity, their unfulfilled rights, and their poten-
tial power of protest – turned, through their increasingly well educated lead-
ers, towards self-organisation of their own society. Thanks to this new move-
ment transforming the indigenous marginalised population, deprived of strong
leaders, and decentralised to the level of local communities into an increasingly
well-organised network of indigenous associations of various levels – the native
people began to perceive themselves in a new light: a supra-ethnic community
having special rights thanks to the status of “first peoples” on the American
continent. They began to discover gradually that despite the major differentia-
tions of cultures, languages, and territories, all Indians share common inter-
ests, which on local, regional, ethnic, and state stage should be expressed by
indigenous organisations characteristic of the democratic order. In this manner,
the “new Indian tribes” appeared on the map of the social life of the numerous
countries of Latin America, assuming the form of indigenous associations that
are usually recognised through the acronyms of their very long official names
(e.g. CONAIE from Ecuador, ONPIA from Argentina CONACAMI from Peru,
and CONAMAQ from Bolivia).
The newly developed organisations do not do much displace the traditional
organisational structures as rather move them to a further plane of importance,
while including them into their own network of associations. In this way, self-
governmental organisations managing local indigenous communities (village
councils, community councils) ceased to be lonely “islands” wielding rights that
applied solely to their own ethnolocal matters. In the new system, they became
a part of the ethnoregional or ethnoprovincial associations, as the lowest or-
ganisational level within them. In this manner, two systems of organisational
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networks for indigenous associations were built: the horizontal one connecting
all the basic units (local communities) within a single administrative area, and
the vertical system consolidating hierarchically organisations from the lowest
level (communities and their regional groups) to ethnoprovincial and
ethnonational associations, and even interethnic federations of such organisa-
tions operating within a single state, and recently also to confederations coor-
dinating the activity and ambitions of indigenous leaders at the level of groups
of states (e.g. the Andean, the Amazon, the South American, and the Latin
American zones).
Thanks to such a developed organisational structure, frequently addition-
ally augmented by associations of a specialist character (women’s, professional,
environmental, religious, etc.) these organisations have become official repre-
sentations of ethnic groups, in whose name they struggle for the improvement
of indigenous lives. The governmental or administrative party (so far most
often in Creole–Mestizo hands) now meets on its way a new and very difficult
partner, with whom – like it or not – agreements must be signed, compromises
negotiated, and – in extreme cases – sharp conflicts entered into (Langer,
Muñoz 2003).
These new Indian associations play at least three important functions that
give the indigenous population an opportunity to restitute the rights lost due to
(endo-)colonial rule. First, they have a very important integrative function,
uniting the dispersed and uncoordinated emancipative activities, and also rein-
forcing the barely visible links between individual local Indian communities.
Thanks to this function, indigenous associations become “new tribes”, whose
existence reinforces the sense of ethnic identity and an Indian solidarity. Sec-
ondly, worth emphasising is their participatory function, which turns indig-
enous associations into important pressure groups, acting in the defence of the
interests of native people. This is manifested through organisation of acts of
civic disobedience (strikes, occupations, marches, demonstrations, petitions,
road blockades, etc.), intervention into the political mechanisms of establishing
laws in conformity with Indians’ interest, and finally the monitoring and criti-
cism of actions of the state administration and international corporations that
enter into conflict with indigenous communities. Being vested with legal per-
sonality, these associations may conduct a variety of modernisation undertak-
ings, receive assistance funds from national and foreign sources, and – thanks
to their influence in the world of politics – struggle (increasingly efficiently) to
place their representatives in state administration, legislative, political, and trade
union bodies.
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The Indians’ discovery of the efficiency of their newly established organisa-
tion (new tribes), and the leaders who preside over them (new chiefs) brought
about an unusual eruption of various associations, whose network closely cov-
ers nearly all the important areas of the lives of the indigenous population.
Some of these organisations are exceedingly stable and powerful through their
spectacular actions and actual popularity in their own ethnic environment, while
others turn out to be ephemeral, have a low impact and hardly any support in
the field. Some of them are focused on “work at the grassroots” and concen-
trate on the implementation of programmes of ethnic development, while oth-
ers have great political ambitions and struggle to conduct spectacular actions
on the national arena. We may describe this as a true hypertrophy of various
associations, federations, forums, groupings, factions, etc., who often devote
a share of their energy to maintain the life of their own organisational struc-
tures, which requires from them primarily concentration on acquiring funds
from a variety of non-governmental and international organisations.
Such a great diversity of Indian organisations allows to propose their clas-
sification based on criteria that may naturally follow a great variety of lines,
including ideological orientation (e.g. left-wing, liberal, conservative), atti-
tude to a mythologised past (e.g. nativist, restitutional, traditional) or the
strategy of action practised (revolutionary, reformative, modernisational), and
may also be divided according to the organisational form (basic, regional,
federational, national level), and finally to the type of leaders (traditional,
political, charismatic).
With full awareness of the arbitrary character of the division proposed
below, these associations may be divided into at least a number of basic group-
ings. The first of them consists of organisations gathering Indians who belong
to the same ethnocultural or ethnoregional group living within the same state
(e.g. the association of the Shuar from Ecuador or the Aymara from Peru). The
second category of indigenous organisations unite various ethnic communities
living together in the same territory, usually within the area of one of the
department. Despite marked cultural and language differences, they decide to
act jointly to improve their lives, which are conditioned by the same context
that is characteristic for the territory they inhabit. In this manner, they become
a major partner for state authorities at the regional level, as in the case of the
association of Peruvian Indians of the department of the Madre de Dios. An-
other group of organisations are the multiethnic federations that unite Indians
of a single, clearly defined environmental and cultural area situated within
a specific country, as is the case of the organisation of the Indians from Peru-
354 ON THE STATE OF LATIN AMERICAN STATES. APPROACHING THE  BICENTENARY
vian Amazonia and the natives of Bolivian lowlands, and the indigenous peo-
ples of the Pacific shores of Ecuador.
Another type of federative organisations are associations which are
monoethnic yet of an international character, representing members of one
group that lives within a few neighbouring states (e.g. the associations of the
Quechua Indians from Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru, of the Aymara from Peru and
Bolivia, and of the Mapuche from Chile and Argentina). An interesting cat-
egory is made up by those associations whose ambition it is to become the main
or the only representative of an entire indigenous population within one coun-
try with the aim that all Indians might – through their representatives – speak
in one, very powerful voice. Such a situation, although highly desired for stra-
tegic reasons, is not often found in South America. In fact, the only example of
such an association is CONAIE from Ecuador, which in that country is a true
confederation built on the developed hierarchy of various ethnic, regional, and
departmental associations. Another important category is pan-Indian organi-
sations, representing the interests of all Indians, independently of their ethnic
affiliations but inhabiting a single major cultural and geographic area, covering
usually a number of states of the continent, such as the association of Indians
of the Amazonia, the Andean countries, or the whole of South America. Re-
cently, even broader organisational structures have come about, whose ambitions
encompass the entire American continent. In most cases, these are committees
that consist of major representatives (leaders) of main indigenous organisa-
tions, which organise continental Indian meetings to debate and work out uni-
fied postulates on the threat to indigenous identity, violation of native rights
and developmental projects contradictory to the vital interests of indigenous
people. One such meeting was organised early in 2007 in Guatemala, namely
the 3rd Continental Summit of Indigenous Peoples, with participation of lead-
ers of Indian organisations from Canada to Chile.
Last but not least, a mention is due for a range of specialised organisations
that primarily support the interests of specific (e.g. professional) groups, that
in fact are composed primarily of Indian people (e.g. indigenous peasants,
Andean miners, coca farmers, artisans, shepherds, teachers, members of rural
communities affected by mining damages, etc.). Included in this category may
be the indigenous associations built on different ties: ethnoreligious (for exam-
ple organisations uniting only Protestant Indians in Ecuador) or gender (indig-
enous women’s organisations), for instance. Parallel to their increasingly active
operation, some of them are adding new issues to this agenda, often becoming an
important representation of majority of Indians within the area of their activity.
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New indigenous organisations and the state
If, following previous considerations, we assume that Indian organisations
are in fact new ethnic groupings – a certain type of “new tribes”, changing the
amorphous indigenous masses deprived of subjectivity into civic society com-
posed of indigenous people increasingly aware of their rights, goals, and ambi-
tions – it is worth considering the relations that connect the world of Indians
with the internal policy of Latin American states. The pattern that dominated
nearly to the end of the twentieth century was definitely the conservative, neo-
colonial and national project of Mestizo–Creole elites excluding Indians from
the decision-making space, preferring their accelerated assimilation (mestizaje),
and pushing away those indigenas who kept to their identity in the margins of
the country’s life. The dominant conviction that native people are in fact
a handy object for exploitation, both as cheap labour and in terms of the
expropriation of the easily accessible areas they previously occupied, was an
inheritance of the colonial period. Indians were also treated as a convenient
object of political manipulation, especially when they were by force “activated”
for the time of elections so that they voted for the parties and politicians who in
fact did not care for the interests, when the so-called “friends of Indians”,
known as indigenistas made free use of elements of their culture and historical
heritage to reinforce the Mestizo–Creole national ideology, when revolution-
ary ferment was kindled among indigenous people to increase the power of
left-wing movements and guerrilla groups, or finally when they were enlisted in
the army, where they often accounted for a decided majority of military troops
like in Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Guatemala.
The answer of Indians to such treatment was a strategy of going into isola-
tion, limiting contacts with the apparatus of exploitation and violence to
a minimum, growing mistrust towards the external world that as a rule they
found hostile, and also – at the moment of local crises – starting rebellions that
were usually quenched with blood. The psychological consequence of this situ-
ation was also rapid assimilation (mestizaje), considered the only way that led
to social advance through simultaneous obliteration of traces of indigenous
cultural heritage. The character of these relations was decidedly based on un-
equal rights, paternalism, exclusion of the indigenous population from civic
space, and on top of that forceful and rapid integration of indigenous people
into the main current of the Mestizo–Creole nation.
The long years of marginalisation and non-participation of Indians in the
political life of the country, and their treatment by the Mestizo–Creole domi-
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nant society from neo-colonial positions, had a profound influence on the cur-
rent relations that connect indigenous population to the state. This is mani-
fested frequently in mutual mistrust, further aggravated by stereotypes and
prejudices that make it impossible to find rational solutions acceptable for both
parties. It goes without saying that Indians still treat the state as a force that is
decidedly “alien”: as the main instrument of their oppression and power at-
tempting to stop or minimise the revindicative ambitions of the indigenous
population. This is why, on the one hand, they try to use democratic mecha-
nisms so as to influence the state authorities efficiently, while on the other –
dissatisfied with the frequently meagre results of such efforts – they resort to
populist, if not anarchistic or even destructive, strategies, introducing chaos
and paralysis to the political and economic life of the country by initiating
violent forms of protest, an example of which may be found in numerous ac-
tions of the type known from Ecuador and Bolivia. Mistrust towards the state
administration also results in the fact that Indian organisations frequently pre-
fer to refer their cases directly to international and non-governmental organi-
sations, seeking allies there. In search of profitable strategic alliances with other
powers, indigenous organisations also join in the activity of different political
groups (for example, anarcho-syndicalist, anti- and alterglobalist, nationalistic,
and anti-American), which in fact spread anti-modernisation ideology and form
opposition against industrialisation of the country, exploitation of its natural
resources, development of free trade and restrictions on commercial coca plan-
tations producing raw material for global illegal drug market.
Against this background, one could try to present basic patterns illustrating
the relations between the organised Indian movements and the state. It is obvi-
ous that these relations must to a great extent depend on the size of indigenous
population and its percentage share in the national society of every state. Wher-
ever this share –– is significant, one should naturally expect a greater impact of
the indigenous people on the course of current affairs. Nevertheless, it is im-
portant also to realise that it is not only ethno-demographic relations that are
responsible for the character of relations between the state authorities and
native groups. The example of Peru, a country with significant Indian popula-
tion but characterised for many years by a very low level of native organisation,
is evidence which also points to other important factors that may strengthen or
weaken the indigenous activism.
It seems that we can present here three basic model situations. The first is
that where we deal with a very strong state of centralist character, which moreover
pursues a strong “integrational” policy. This in fact hides assimilative strategies
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that are to incorporate the Indians into the mainstream of national society
without respect for their ethnic identity. Such a situation evidently does not
favour the establishment of powerful indigenous organisations, and those that
exist there are of ephemeral character and little potential impact. Cases illus-
trating such a system are Argentina, and primarily Peru, as mentioned earlier,
where attempts to activate Indians from mountain areas – officially considered
by the authorities as “peasant” population (campesinado) living in traditional
“rural communities” (comunidades campesinas) – have for years found little
response.
The second case is a situation where the state and its structures are not too
efficient, yet they try to enable the Indian population to take advantage, though
in a limited scope, of the approved indigenous rights. The states may afford this
type of strategy, as the question of indigenous people is not a priority in those
countries, while the most important problem is leaving out of internal crises
countries, while the most important problem is leaving out of internal crises
situations caused by civil war (as in Colombia) or departing from the authori-
tarian regime (as in Chile). In those countries, Indian organisations acquire
a certain influence on the course of things, yet primarily on the local plane and
as a part of efforts for the restitution of the lost land, and acquisition of ethnic
autonomy (e.g. of a territorial, legal, or cultural nature).
Finally, the third option, concerns the permanently very weak state (both in
an economic sense and in its actual potential of implementing civil rights and
obligations), which, moreover, is inhabited by very large groups of Indians. In
this case (for example in Bolivia and Ecuador), indigenous organisations quickly
gain power, and their ambitions reach not only the questions related directly to
the fate of Indians, but encompass all the problems significant for the entire
country. For this reason, it is small wonder that they enter eagerly into the
political struggle and become an important actor on that stage, frequently
deciding about the trajectory of development of the entire country and the
character of its international relations.
The emergence of new Indian organisations of various levels on the social
and political stage of Latin America was, on the one hand, an obvious result of
“discovery” of the values of a democratic system by the indigenous population,
and on the other it fit well the traditions of self-organisation and self-govern-
ment of the commune, so typical of local native communities that have man-
aged to survive. In this way, we may interpret the phenomenon of the high level
of organisation among the Indian population as a successful result of the adap-
tation to Occidental models, yet with the preservation of certain elements typi-
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cal of indigenous cultures. It seems that Indian organisations oscillate in fact
between these two basic models, first coming closer to one role model, and
then preferring the other. In one case, they deal with the Western type of
democracy based on the representational majority and pluralist system, while in
the other they refer to the principles of direct democracy, making reference to
Indian solutions respecting the autonomy of decision of individual communes,
the principle of regular rotation of positions, and the path of agreeing binding
decisions by seeking consensus through very long debates and consultations.
Side by side with this pair of opposing positions in the understanding and
practising of democracy, we can point to another module – this time diversify-
ing types of leadership in indigenous organisations. On the one hand, this is
the Latin American model of strong authority of the leader (caudillo), usually
aiming at total subjugation of institutions and representative bodies that are
subordinate to him. On the other stand models based on traditional authority in
the person of the “chief”, “cacique” or similar, whose position – although
strong and respected by the majority – is controlled by a variety of collective
bodies, councils, and gatherings. We should point out here that this model of
executing power was very important in the Andes until the end of the eight-
eenth century, as it was incorporated into the system of indirect governance of
Spanish colonial administration. Its rudiments – present primarily at the local
level – successfully survived to present times, and reached new organisations
from the local governments of the communes.
An analysis of the strategies, division of competences, and manner of mak-
ing key decisions by Indian organisations points in fact to the presence of all the
four models listed above. The frequent controversies that originate within these
organisations are often the result of clashes between the approaches described
above, sometimes referring to Mestizo–Creole models, and sometimes prefer-
ring solutions that are more strongly based on the indigenous tradition. It goes
without saying, however, that the organisations that to a greater degree refer
to the decisions of their basic units in the field (community councils, local self-
governments) are likely to prefer patterns of direct democracy. As a result, they
reach consistent decisions with great effort that requires consultation in all the
“basic” units of the entire association. This feature of their activity is in fact its
weak point, and for that reason the effectiveness of decisions made is as a rule
fairly low, as most of the members’ energy burns out during all the meetings,
gatherings, and internal discussions, not during the activity on the interethnic
state arena. In turn, those organisations that are to a greater extent based on
Latin American and Western patterns are usually constructed in more central-
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ised manner, and consequently the decisions and conclusions binding on mem-
bers follow usually from top to bottom. Characteristic of these associations is
powerful leadership, often of a charismatic character, capable of making quick
decisions and establishing more efficient dialogue with the government and its
agendas.
Organisations of the first type, that is of the more traditionalist attitude, are
keener on the question of maintaining ethnic culture, preserving identity, and
bilingual education, at the same time strongly emphasising the benefits that
result from the promotion of the idea of Indian autonomy. The other associa-
tions – those that are to a greater extent adapted to the Mestizo–Creole pat-
terns, are primarily oriented to the introduction of social reforms, improve-
ment of the economic situation, and achievement of significant political goals,
pushing the cultural and ethnic postulates to a further plane.
Should we look at the strategies developed by Indian organisations accord-
ing to levels of their basic activity, we should also notice certain regularities or
dominant tendencies that may refer to Western patterns or to indigenous expe-
riences in self-government. It goes without saying that among the basic organi-
sations, that is mostly among those that operate at the level of local populations,
the principles of direct democracy are preferred, with a strong emphasis on
achieving consensus, while agreeing positions. In associations of the middle
level, coordinating the work of numerous lesser organisations operating in the
same region or province, domination of leader attitudes is noticeable, yet it is
combined with consultations with representatives (leaders) of units that belong
to lower structures.
Organisations of the high level, that is those that for example unite within
a single country all Indians association of the Amazon or Andean region, de-
cidedly prefer the Latin American pattern of a powerful leader of the caudillo
type with the deciding vote, who, moreover, strongly competes for primacy
with other leaders presiding over similar associations. Finally at the highest,
that is federational, level, usually believed to be the main representation of “all”
Indians in the given state, there is a tendency to have a powerful leader, em-
powered with great authority, who, however, due to the complex structure of
the organisation and the high independence of its members, must often resort
to consultations with leaders of associations from the lower level of this hierar-
chical structure.
The observations presented above refer only to the basic tendencies, which
nevertheless assume a variety of forms in the reality of today’s Indian move-
ment, depending on the context of their activity and on the power of personali-
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ties of the new indigenous leaders. It may be noticed, though, that referring to
cultural orientation we are dealing with at least three basic attitudes. The first
of them is the “nativist” one manifested in the fact that the associations that
represent it try to negate openly the mechanisms and principles of Western
democracy, attempting to maintain in their structures at all levels patterns strongly
based on indigenous traditions of political and social life. Without doubt, an
example of this is CONAMAQ from Bolivia – association of different commu-
nity councils (ayllus and markas).
The second position is represented by the “modernists”, who believe that
the high efficiency of indigenous activity can only be assured by applying Latin
American organisational patterns, including powerful leadership, supported by
local members, being the form best “adjusted” to the current political and
social situation in the given country. Certainly, a good illustration of this ten-
dency used to be the organisation known as CSUTCB, i.e. Confederación Sindical
Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (Unique Syndicated Confedera-
tion of Rural Labourers of Bolivia), presided over by the charismatic Felipe
Quispe, as well as the movement of the cocaleros competing with it, under Evo
Morales, which finally was transformed into a broad interethnic political move-
ment known as MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo), and succeeded in 2006 elec-
tion forming the new Bolivian government with the first indigenous president
in the history of the country.
Lastly there is the third attitude, which should be defined as “syncretic” due
to the fact that it is trying to combine modernist and nativist elements, some-
times allowing primacy to one and then to the other type of strategy. This cat-
egory, in fact, harbours the great majority of contemporary Indian organisations,
which at the lower levels make use of the traditional mechanisms of executing
power, while at the higher – that is operating mostly in a non-Indian environment
– they adjust themselves to Mestizo–Creole standards of making politics.
Contemporary Indian organisations try to achieve their goals through the
continuous conquest of social and political space, which until recently was
entirely inaccessible for them. In states respecting even rudimentary principles
of democracy, using these mechanisms for the improvement of Indians’ lives
and recognising their representation as an important partner who can no longer
be ignored, this becomes a common strategy of conduct. Indigenous associa-
tions, depending on the situation and power of their arguments, refer to the
existing democratic mechanisms, and only if they believe these to have failed
resort to the strategy of so-called street democracy that upsets social order
(Posern-Zieliński 2008).
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The indigenous organisations in Latin America are extremely diversified
when it comes to the programmes and strategies of operation they follow. The
orientations identified within this movement can be generally divided into
a number of basic currents, although in daily practice some of them intertwine
with others and evolve, making the analysed reality quite impenetrable. Thus
the typology proposed here is only of a preliminary and ordering character,
and serves only to point to the main tendencies present in the indigenous
movement.
First, what we are dealing with here – mostly in Bolivia and to a lesser
extent in Peru – is an ethno-syndicalist orientation quite strongly instilled with
leftist (generally Trotskyist) influence grown from the tradition of Marxist per-
ception of the problem of Indians, being the question of exploitation, enslave-
ment, and marginalisation of the Andean peasant. For this reason, this current
strongly emphasises the improvement of living conditions of the indígenas,
modernisation of the country, development of fairer social and economic rela-
tions, and also the reclaiming of the lost land. The questions related to the
solution of burning social problems come to the fore, as these are the ones
treated as the most basic, while anything referring to the defence of ethnic
culture or the need to maintain identity comes on a further plane.
Of a somewhat similar character is the second orientation – the ethno-
political one – based on the development of indigenous party groupings. Thanks
to this strategy Indians may come onto the national or regional political scene
to formulate programmes of major social reforms, conclude favourable but
short-lived alliances with greater factions representing non-Indian milieus, in-
troduce own representatives in administration, government, and Parliament,
and also operate as one of the opposing powers with an influence on the
course of decision-making and legislative processes. In this stream, too, ethnic
culture is treated as an element of the further plane, yet in an instrumental
manner, which is expressed through frequent use of ethnic symbols to legiti-
mise the Indianness of party activists, and testify to their involvement in the
matters of native peoples. This orientation was especially present in Bolivia as
of the 1980s and 1990s, and is currently substantial in Ecuador and becom-
ing gradually visible also in Peru.
Of decisively different character is ethno-cultural orientation, which strug-
gles primarily to subjectivise the Indian people, to turn them into citizens of
a multiethnic and multicultural state, aware of their rights, who will, however –
entering the mainstream of the country’s life – maintain their ethnic identity
and cherish what they believe to be the most crucial elements of their heritage.
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Followers of this current believe that the solution of social problems that affect
Indians may be achieved only on the path of social advance of indigenous
people, who have to look out for their future themselves, having access to
power at all levels. Such an attitude shapes a powerful sense of indigenous –
solidarity, and is situated in strong opposition to the previously and currently
dominant world of Blanco-Mestizos. Attitudes of this type are most present in
the movements of Ecuadorian and Chilean Indians.
Another orientation is the ethno-communitarian current that builds both
the horizontal and vertical network of organisations representing local com-
munities in the region, province, and country, yet falling back on tested local
authorities. This orientation is of a decidedly traditionalist character, as it reaches
for mechanisms of the indigenous system of cargos, and tries to shift it from
the community level to higher organisational rungs. It rejects the principles of
Western democracy accepting power of elected representatives and replaces
them with a system of multiple consultations, a variety of mechanisms aimed at
working out the consensus, and negation of a powerful central leadership,
which it replaces with various councils and bodies composed of recognised
traditional authorities. Very important in this current is the maintenance of
constant communication with the local communities, at the same time fairly
coherently, combining programmes of social transformation and modernisation
with attention to the preservation of ethnic identity and respect for the jeopard-
ised cultural heritage. This orientation is present in Guatemala and Bolivia, where
it competes in its daily life with the far stronger ethno-syndicalist movement.
Of major importance too is the ethno-autonomist tendency that primarily
requires that indigenous people be awarded in the regions they densely inhabit
the right to local autonomy, thanks to which many elements of social, legal, and
religious life resulting from the ancestral tradition can still be followed within
an ethnic territory controlled by indigenous local authorities, with the simulta-
neous possibility of implementing ethno-developmental projects in a manner
coherent with the real needs of the local population. The autonomous areas
should be legally protected from the expropriation of land, exploitation of natural
resources, and invasions of settlers. Such ideas are popular among the indig-
enous peoples of Amazon regions but also in the south of Mexico, Guatemala,
and Panama.
Finally, the last orientation is the ethno–self-government current, which is
based on gaining influence and power at local and regional level, wherever –
thanks to the rules of democracy – the demographically dominant Indian ma-
jority may win seats (through elections) that are crucial in local administration,
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and fill the posts of mayors, councillors and other elected officers. It is natural
that this current is stronger in the provinces than at the national level. It strongly
focuses on social and economic problems, and only to a lesser extent on ethnic
issues. Nevertheless, it allows Indians to win new spaces of civic responsibility.
It is especially visible in Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Mexico, and Guatemala
(Bartolomé, Barabas 1998).
It is also worth having a closer look against this background at the manner
in which Indian organisations enter the mechanism of democratic action. First,
they try to utilise existing legal instruments in order to negotiate solutions that
are advantageous for the indigenous people. The most frequently used mode of
such action is the tendency to execute the rights formally acquired by the indig-
enous people primarily concerning the property titles to the community land,
territory inhabited, local water resources, and obtaining compensations for illegal
expropriation and/or environmental pollution caused by industrial investments.
A further important strategy of conduct is the effort aimed at defining new
legal regulations to replace those that did not take into account the interests of
Indians and permitted their unequal treatment. These legislative efforts are
aimed primarily at acquiring new guarantees protecting property rights for
indígenas to the land they use and territory they inhabit, so that the subjectivity
of indigenous groups could be legally recognised, and also to accept – as
a part of increasingly popular principles of multiculturalism – the Indians’ right
to regulate their own matters within their autonomous social life according to
native and traditional legal norms.
The step that certainly goes furthest on the path to making use of the legal
instruments is the attempts of Indian organisations, and especially those of the
highest level, to change the state constitution to permit it to reflect the guaran-
tees that are important for indigenous peoples. Hence frequent postulates (which
have brought the effects desired by Indians in a few states of the Latin America)
to break away finally from the old concept of unitary nation-state and replace
it with a clause about the pluralistic character of national society composed not
only of the ethnoracial Mestizo–Creole dominant group, but also of internally
diversified indigenous peoples and post-slavery Afro-Latin-American commu-
nities. These proposals in most cases assume the form of a clause stating that
the idea of the postulated pluralistic society should be expressed through con-
stitutional guarantees of principles of multiethnicity and multiculturality (Almeida,
Arrobo Rodes 1998).
Where these positions have been taken into consideration, further postu-
lates of indigenous associations go towards another expansion, namely to rec-
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ognising the multinational (plurinacionalidad) character of South American states.
So far this postulate has not, however, gained approval, primarily as anxiety is
expressed that such a clause in the constitution could inspire some indigenous
elements to separatist actions threatening the territorial integrity of the conti-
nent’s states.
It should be mentioned here that an important field of operation of indig-
enous organisations is law-giving initiatives conducted on the international stage,
primarily in the United Nations, and in the Organisation of American States. It
is there that the debates have continued for years, conducted with the partici-
pation of representatives of those Indian associations and representatives of
authorities of individual countries of the continent and striving to work out
a uniform and generally binding document defining the rights and principles of
protecting the indigenous population. Such a document would be the first to
replace the imperfect and dated Convention No. 169 of the International La-
bour Organisation of 1989 defining the basic principles of treating indigenous
groups, which has, moreover, failed to be ratified by all states. In fact, this work
led to the successful approval of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 2007.
Undoubtedly the second most important method of operation of Indian
organisations is the increasingly popular tendency to make use of democratic
elections and delegate their representatives to a variety of decision-making
bodies and assemblies. The presence of the new elected Indians – that is those
who are aware of their rights, frequently well-educated, and politically experi-
enced – in these bodies is to provide a guarantee that the questions that the
indigenous associations finds important will not be solved without the consid-
eration of the indigenous party, even though they were in the decided minority.
This tendency is also visible in the Indians’ ambition to have their own
representatives in administrative institutions, beginning at the local level and
ending, of course, at that of central government. Examples of such a strategy
of operation are Bolivia, with its 1994 reform guaranteeing participation in
local authorities to Indians (Ley de participación popular), and Ecuador, where
from year to year an increasing number of mayors (alcaldes), and councillors
(consejeros) are elected from among indigenous candidates, and – interest-
ingly – frequently also by the votes of ethnic competitors: Mestizos and Cre-
oles. Thanks to the slow but systematic changes in the system of political pow-
ers, representatives of Indian communities also feature in ministries, holding
important posts in central offices of the state, and in parliaments (Ecuador,
Bolivia, Peru, Colombia) (Singh 2002).
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At the same time, the last institutions of the indigenistic type (that is agen-
cies for Indian affairs established, and managed by specialists representing the
Mestizo–Creole society) were liquidated and replaced by offices of the new
type aimed at focusing on the important problems of the indigenous population
(beginning with education and ending with the questions of health, infrastruc-
ture and law). In some countries, these are separate central offices in the form
of ministries, vice-ministries or departments such as the Bolivian “Ministerio de
Asuntos Campesinos, Pueblos Indígenas y Originarios” (Ministry of Peasant,
Indigenous and Native Peoples’ Affairs) operating in the first years of the twenty-
first century), while in others (for example in Peru), these can be specialised
boards or commissions operating under the patronage of the government to
support the ethnodevelopment of Indians, for example the Peruvian INDEPA,
i.e. Instituto Nacional de los Pueblos Andinos, Amazonicos y Afroperuanos
(National Institute for the Development of Andean, Amazon and Afro-Peru-
vian Peoples), established in 2005. In both cases, they consist of joint repre-
sentation of indigenous population and governmental specialists in different
fields who are supposed to assist the indigenous population in solving eco-
nomic, legal, and educational questions they find important. Institutions of this
type, however, have not always enjoyed the recognition of Indians. An example
here is Ecuador, where there is no such agency, despite the considerable politi-
cal power of national indigenous organisations. The situation was also similar
in Bolivia after the coming to power of MAS and Evo Morales. This was the
case because Indians themselves considered that such institutions were a con-
firmation of the special, exceptional status of the indigenous people, which that
population rejects as a relic of the time when the indigenist ideology domi-
nated. In return, they want to be treated on equal terms resulting from their
constitutional and civil rights, so they also claim an equal participation of their
representatives in all local, regional, and naturally also central authorities, be-
ginning with the ministry of defence (due to the high percentage of Indians in
the Armed Forces), and ending with the ministries of agriculture and health
(Rosenberger, Pajuelo Teves 2007).
Finally, we must mention an important tendency, defined as ethnopoliticisation
of the Indian movement, and expressed primarily in the establishment of ethnic
political parties, whose goal it is to support indigenous interests during the
electoral struggle, and – through efficient presence on this stage – to intro-
duce their own representatives to local and central authorities. This phenom-
enon is relatively new, and it is notable for its dynamic development, proving its
high efficiency, especially in those countries where such parties may count on
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the high support of indigenous masses (related to the demographic power of
Indian populations participating in elections along the lines of administrative
obligation). In such states as Bolivia and Ecuador, Indian political groupings
may (and do) win a large number of votes and try to become in this way an
important partner on the political stage, both during the electoral campaign
(by building alliances and blocks, usually with groupings of a left-wing and
populist character), and also during the post-election division of power.
The third important strategy of use of democratic rules is Indian organisa-
tions’ appealing to the international community in the hope that its impact –
through the various specialised agencies – might help to provide indigenous
questions with appropriate publicity. Such a strategy allows a variety of some-
times highly local conflicts to be awarded with an disproportionately high stand-
ing, permanently turning the attention of public opinion to the problem of
violation of rights of indigenous peoples and the need to defend Indian inter-
ests, and finally allowing efficient “omission” of national information barriers,
controlled by authorities unfriendly to Indians and exerting influence upon
these authorities through foreign or international organisations.
An important goal of such strategies is thus the struggle to obtain increas-
ingly greater recognition on the international stage, as corroborated by the
fact that indigenous peoples are considered an actual subject of international
law. This is why the activity of Indian associations encompasses primarily im-
pact on the most important international organisations. They also turn to the
governments of the countries whose political and economic interests are strongly
connected to the countries inhabited by the indigenous groups. Moreover,
these organisations maintain lively contacts with international organisations
operating for the benefit of environmental protection (e.g. the rainforests of
Amazonia), connecting in this way the universal questions of ecology to par-
ticular needs of Indians and their claims to control their ethnic territories. They
establish contacts with associations and institutions promoting respecting hu-
man rights, trying to expand these postulates by recognition of the collective
rights of indigenous peoples. Nor do they shy away from contacts with anti-
and alterglobalist organisations, seeing in them an ally in their struggle against
economic neoliberalism and great international corporations perceived as
a threat to the lively interests of the indigenous population. Finally, they also
seek assistance and support from international political organisations gathering
socialist, social-democratic, and Christian parties. It must be admitted that,
in this international space, the new Indian leaders move with high efficiency,
achieving in this manner great successes, which – thanks to positive feedback
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– are quickly transformed into modernising solutions that satisfy the indig-
enous population.
Besides international recognition and receiving publicity for their needs and
harm to indigenous population, an important form of activity of their repre-
sentatives is also efforts for the acquisition of assistance funds necessary for
those organisations to operate and manage ethnodevelopmental projects con-
ducted in various fields of indigenous life. In this scope, the main partner for
Indians is primarily non-governmental organisations (ONG), of which most are
of an international character or come from abroad. They are in fact countless
in Latin America, and – despite heavy criticism directed against them both
from the left wing (accusing them of pacification of revolutionary spirit among
Indians), and the right (seeing in them a threat to the state monopoly in internal
ethnic policy) – they are the main source of support for the new organisations.
Besides direct financial aid, they also provide logistical support, organise train-
ing of leaders and courses of professional mobilisation, conduct research in
applied social engineering, in this way potentially influencing the improvement
of life standards and condition of Indian communities, provide legal counsel-
ling, organise intervention and lobbying actions for Indians, and finally – to
a major extent – shape public opinion (primarily in Europe) feeding it with
information concerning the lives of the indigenous population through publi-
cations, online news, exhibitions, conferences, and appeals.
The principles of democracy are still poorly grounded in the countries of
Latin America, both among the governing elites and in the opposition milieu.
From this stems the tendency, for intertwining of democratic principles – which,
as a rule, provide a certain smokescreen legitimising power – with brutal con-
travention of these principles both by the governmental and civic partners. In
crisis situations, Indian organisations frequently make use of the “street democ-
racy”, organising rallies and demonstrations, conducting protest marches, oc-
cupying important buildings of public administration, and, in extreme cases,
blocking roads of strategic importance. It is interesting that, during such acts
of protest, violence is as a rule refrained from, which does not mean that it
never occurs; it happens most often when the state authorities send security
forces to disperse the protesters.
Considering the reasons for the passage from “classical” democracy to forms
of “street democracy”, so easy in Latin American reality, a number of basic
reasons for this phenomenon can be identified. One of them, certainly, is the
observation that normal methods of negotiation cannot ensure the reforms
that are important for the Indian population, as the apparatus of power shall
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always be an obstruction against them. An important reason for leading people
out into the street is the frequent acts of protest against the introduction of
arbitrary price rises for basic products or new legal regulations not accepted
by the indigenous people. Thus such protest actions are a non-democratic
form of reacting to pseudo-democratic steps taken by the authorities and aimed
against the interests of the minority. A circumstance that also favours such
forms of protest, certainly, is in many cases the “weakness” of Latin American
(non-authoritarian) governments that are relatively easily put up against the
wall and force to make the concession or even abolish the ruling team. In the
process of rallying the society, not without significance are the populist slogans
preached by Indian leaders, their strategies of acquiring support among indig-
enous people, and their ability to build their own authority (Stavenhagen 2005).
Also worthy of note are other forms of activities, alternative to democratic
rules, which aim to maintain order within the indigenous society, especially in
the situations when the state apparatus cannot cope with the task of protecting
its citizens. When it comes to this, Indian peasants take matters into their hands
and try to introduce their own justice within their area, falling back on tradi-
tional strategies of conduct that have been well tested in the past.
Just to illustrate this, we may cite here two examples that are highly charac-
teristic of contemporary indigenous inhabitants of the Andes. One of them is
the so-called rondas campesinas, that is units of peasant self-defence, com-
posed of volunteers who protect the settlements and pastures from cattle rus-
tlers. The criminals caught are immediately punished by the authorities of local
communities, and sometimes killed on the spot by the ronderos. In this way we
reach the second example, namely the question of so-called indigenous justice,
which in many regions of the Andes begins to replace the institutions of the
democratic state of law. Indians increasingly often refer to indigenous rules of
conduct, toward the perpetrators of crimes introducing within the territory
they inhabit their own system of executing punishment. Such practices fre-
quently result in acute conflict with the administration, as the state as a rule
considers such actions a blatant violation of legal norms binding all citizens.
Attempts are sometimes made to eliminate these contradictions through de-
bates and endeavours to accept the legal pluralism, that is a system that –
considering the real existence of indigenous law – should limit it to a size
closely controlled by the state.
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Contemporary indigenous leaders
as a “new Indians”
An important factor in contemporary ethnic changes, taking place in the area
of relations between the indigenous peoples and the organisations representing
them and the state administration, is the emerging of new indigenous elites,
from among which the leaders and activists hail. Their appearance on the civic
stage was of major impact, as to a great extent they replaced the traditional
leaders, who have no opportunity to act efficiently under the new conditions,
and far beyond the matters of the local community. It is worth mentioning here
that following the colonial repressions, the former indigenous elites (in the
areas where they were present, as that is in the Andes and Mesoamerica) were
eliminated, either physically or through assimilation. As a result, in these re-
gions Indians became the typical ethnoclass, that is the ethno-racial group
composed of exploited and marginalised peasants.
A certain role in this rural milieu was also played by the representatives of
community authorities, who managed all the matters of daily and holiday life of
the comunidad indigena and/or comunidad campesina, taking care of all the
affairs of the local society, from the organisation of public works, via distribu-
tion of water in irrigation canals, to the resolution of disputes and organisation
of main festivities. An important element of the tradition was the hierarchy of
offices (cargos) held by the members of the community as a result of elections
that were usually conducted every year. This kind of system, however, made it
impossible to establish a powerful and permanent leadership, although it made
everyone responsible for the good of the community and awarded great social
recognition to those persons who played their roles properly. Nevertheless, in
the latter half of the twentieth century, the prestige of the traditional cargos
was greatly debilitated by the introduction of a new system of local offices
being a part of the state administration in peasant and indigenous communities.
Although the people holding these duties were also elected, their responsibility
was not before the community, but rather before their supervising bodies,
controlled by Mestizo people usually unwilling to represent Indian interests.
Noticeable with the passage of time is a significant shift of the centre of real
power in the communities from traditional village authorities towards officers
of local administration.
Thus the indigenous community had neither an organisational structure
nor leaders capable of playing the role of contemporary representatives of
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Indians, both in matters concerning the social and economic improvement of
the conditions of their life and in the area of ethnic programmes important for
maintaining identity. It is small wonder, therefore, that throughout the majority
of the twentieth century it was the indigenistas – that is people from outside
the indigenous milieu – who spoke about matters related to the condition of the
lives of Indians. Frequently noble in intention, they established paternalistic
agendas, missions, programmes, and centres focused on giving direct aid, pro-
motion of basic education, modernising activities, and finally the integration of
Indian people with the national society. Although this orientation turned the
attention of the dominant society to the lives of the indigenous population,
indigenistas were still a part of the current that primarily perceives Indians as
a marginalised category of population, who must be brought out from their
backwardness for the good of the harmonious development of the entire “na-
tion–state”. Beyond doubt, however, in many regions it contributed not only to
the modernisation of indigenous life but also to a major activisation of Indian
society, where native leaders of the new type began to emerge slowly, aware not
only of their responsibility for the future of the local communities but also of all
Indians living in the entire region or country.
We should note, however, that a far more important fact was the process of
dilution of the Indian identity, which was favoured by civilisational changes in
the life of indigenous peasantry, migrations from villages to cities, obtaining of
education, and also by certain limited economic success among better edu-
cated Indians. Today, it is observed that assimilation-oriented attitudes are dis-
placed by a growing ethnic self awareness, being a combination of the sense of
own identity, ethnic pride in the heritage, and conviction about the necessity to
change not only the individual social condition, but also the civilisational posi-
tion of the entire group by its inclusion in the nascent civic society.
Thanks to the continuously growing level of education, being the result of
initiatives of the state, NGOs, different foundations, and religious organisa-
tions, the first group of indigenous intellectuals have taken shape: teachers,
lawyers, scientists, social and political activists, officers of lower ranks, artists,
etc., who provide a natural environment for the new ethnic leadership. Si-
multaneously, the indigenous middle-class is developing to a limited scale in
certain places, wherever artisan production (artesanía) and trade and tourism
have developed. Thanks to all these, the formation of the “new Indians” –
natives discarding their complexes, aware of their heritage, and fairly freely
moving in the contemporary world – is also taking shape. There is no doubt,
that also many new indigenous leaders belong to this category.
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They are people originating from a variety of indigenous and social groups.
It would be hard, therefore, to describe their joint characteristics, as of a uni-
form group with similar experiences and comparable goals. This is why it is
best to characterise them by focusing on same basic types of indigenous lead-
ers. At the very bottom, there are the leaders of peasant (indigenous) commu-
nities, who are in fact representatives of village self-government elected regu-
larly by members of those settlements (comuneros), but representing simulta-
neously state administration at the lowest level. For that reason, in Peru they
were often treated as agents of the regime by guerrilla fighters from the Shin-
ing Path, and frequently cruelly persecuted and even killed. There are regions
where they displaced nearly altogether the traditional authorities, and where
the latter still exist they are dominated and marginalised by these people. While
holding their posts, presidents of the communities (presidentes de las
comunidades) represent their villages externally and deal with the daily matters
of their residents, as well as manage modernisation programmes within the
area of their jurisdiction. It is on their efficiency, their local social capital, and
entrepreneurial spirit that the pace of changes taking place in the life of the
village often depends, as they are usually responsible for the obtaining of aid
funds and external assistance to direct developmental programmes.
This group of official local authorities increasingly often encounters within
its area of operation powerful competition from the “self-proclaimed” leaders,
who are in fact generated through the NGOs, which – operating within the
area of the communities and implementing their modernisation projects there –
must have support in local people. These indigenous collaborators of usually
foreign agencies quickly obtain major prestige, mostly thanks to their direct
contacts with NGOs agents, the considerable possibility of deciding on the
ways of spending assistance funds, and the material benefits they personally
enjoy.
In some situations, “neo-traditional” leaders too come to the stage. They
still operate within the system of cargo, openly opposing attempts at being
marginalised. They try to rebuild their threatened authority, on the one hand
falling back on the self-governmental indigenous tradition, and on the other
presenting themselves as the only truly representatives of the native world ca-
pable of introducing modernising changes that do not pose a threat of loss of
identity. To reinforce their position externally, they sometimes build regional
and supraregional associations (as in the case of the CONAMAQ in Bolivia),
gradually developing a new hierarchy of leaders capable of negotiating impor-
tant questions with the local administration and central government.
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A separate category of indigenous leaders is made up of peasant union
activists of various levels, who represent the interests of Indian farmers in these
organisations. In those regions of the Andes where a decided majority of Indi-
ans make a living working in the fields within communities or as owners of small
family farms (minifundios), peasant unions have quite naturally been of a strictly
ethnic character, and combine in their programmes social and economical ele-
ments with the ideas of defending native culture, tradition, and preservation of
identity. This is a situation we encounter primarily in Bolivia, where such or-
ganisations are most powerful, but also in Peru, where the organisations of
peasants fight against environmental threats, try to legalise their coca planta-
tions, and organise village self-defence squads (rondas campesinas).
An important category of leaders of ever growing importance are those
with clearly political ambitions, who struggle to form parties and associations
that are to represent the interests of indigenous population at all levels of
authority, and primarily in central administration, as well as in the opposition to
the government. These people usually come from the former Indian students
and university graduates. Having learned very well the mechanisms behind the
operation of power, they try to enter the system by establishing their own
Indian parties or ethnic organisations of a lobbyist character. These initiatives
are as a rule undertaken from top to bottom without any strong support from
the indigenous masses, who – due to their lower level of education and poor
knowledge of the rules that govern politics – are more likely to follow populist
or leftist slogans of Creole-Mestizo demagogues rather than the ambiguous
and sometimes utopian ideas of the new Indian leaders, who are frequently
perceived as people alienated from their rural support base. The towering am-
bitions of these leaders frequently make it impossible to introduce a uniform
strategy of conduct and finally result in the multiplication of small groups with
contradictory interests within the already weak indigenous political milieu.
A case illustrating this phenomenon is, for example, the Indianist movement of
the Kataristas from Bolivia (whose name derives from their historical hero –
Tupac Katari – an eighteenth-century leader of a major anti-Spanish uprising
in Upper Peru), a representative of which was even the vice-president of the
country in the 1990s. Currently, this formation is scattered and yielding to
other, far more efficient Indian initiatives (Van Cott 2005).
A highly interesting category of leaders consists of civil, self-governmental,
and political activists who come from the newly developing indigenous elites.
They are people who, before they became leaders, acquired an education,
a good professional position, and an above-average material status – to devote
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themselves later to organisational work for the benefit of their own society.
They represent, for example, merchants and artisans, who acquired their civic
competence as presidents of local professional associations, as well as clerks,
teachers, lawyers, and scientists. As people of success, they can operate per-
fectly well in a world that so far has been alien to Indians, and as people with
strong bonds of their native society they are considered good candidates to
represent the indigenous people or even more broadly, the regional population
in all its multicultural complexity in, municipal, or provincial administration.
For this reason, they may ever more often be found holding posts of city
mayors (e.g. Otavalo and Cotacachi in Imbabura Province, Ecuador), city coun-
cillors, and even chiefs of local police departments (Posern-Zieliński 1999).
Finally, the last group of Indian authorities are usually the young leaders of
native groups from Amazonia and other areas situated east of the Andes, who
– thanks to the education they have obtained (mostly in Catholic or Protestant
missionary schools) and certain experience in the external environment, have
become in the areas of their operation something akin to “bigmen” (if this
universal anthropological concept borrowed from New Guinea social context
may be used here), i.e. people of exceptional influence and importance based
on their charisma, experience and achievements. The authority of these leaders
is almost solely built on their skilful competence and knowledge of the world
they find external, for which reason they quickly become ideal representatives
and mediators between the relatively isolated groups inhabiting the interior of
the forest and the nation-state society with its administrative centres. Assuming
the leadership of ethnolocal, and later interethnic regional indigenous organi-
sations, these people in a natural way became promoters of changes in their
villages, supporters of the interests of their compatriots, managers seeking
financial support and political allies, and sometimes also organisers of great
protest actions (e.g. marches to the capital of the province or the state). People
of this type may be found in all the countries lying in the Amazon Basin, and
the efficiency of their operation in the local, national and international forum
frequently raises true envy among the leaders of far more numerous and in fact
politically stronger indigenous organisations from the of the Andean zone.
As this brief review of types of Indian leaders proves, they acquired their
privileged position in a great variety of manners. In the majority of cases, they
are fairly young people representing the first generation of educated persons
and/or with certain experience in organisational work. They situate their ambi-
tions both at the local level – where they still sometimes have to compete
against the hierarchy of authorities of the traditional kind – and primarily at the
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regional and higher levels, where they have acquired entirely monopolistic po-
sitions. The abundance of various indigenous associations and organisations,
unions, and federations of various sorts means that the group of new leaders
has grown continuously. It is this group of people that is becoming the main
power behind the movement of Indian revival and struggle for the improve-
ment of their social and economic position, who attempts to modernise native
life and makes efforts aimed at turning the indigenous people into citizens.
However this leadership elite does have a weakness, though: namely, the inces-
sant internal strife and backbiting conducted within it, which frequently divide
individual organisations, widen splits, and often render any concerted actions
impossible, thus contributing to a weakening of the Indian position. Such bick-
ering results from ideological differences between organisations (some are more
loyal towards the authorities while others are decidedly of oppositionist or re-
bellious character; some are tied to left-wing organisations, and others with
religious ones; some emphasise political neutrality, while others conclude politi-
cal alliances; some are class-oriented, while others are very attached to ideas of
maintaining and emphasising ethnic identity) and also from belonging among
the different competing ethnic and regional groupings (e.g. the Quechua and
Aymara in Bolivia, Saraguro, Cotopaxi and Otavalo in Ecuador, and Indians of
the Andean sierra vs. the indigenous people from Amazonia), as well as for
reasons of pure ambition and benefits (competition for access to prestigious
titles, profitable posts, and attractive cargos sinecures).
It goes without saying that contemporary indigenous leaders are decidedly
different from traditional ones. This is true also of that group which directly
hails from the former system of community authorities. Both these groups have
made major efforts to adjust to the requirements of the contemporary world,
and understood perfectly that isolation and remaining locked within their own
environment is a path that leads nowhere. They have discovered a new princi-
ple according to which one should actively tune into the current political and
social system and skilfully use its principles so as to fight in this way for the civic
space due to the Indian people and their right to equal treatment resulting from
democratic principles, as well as their rights to follow their civil aspirations and
co-decide on the shape of the multicultural national society. It is on this long
path of transformation that the new Indian elite took shape, struggling for
changes and seeking its own identity without denying its ethnic roots. Of major
importance in the forming of this group is education, which has for the first
time became accessible too for indigenous youth at higher than primary level.
On the other hand, not-for-profit work for the benefit of indigenous organisa-
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tions is also an important place of education for Indian activists, who are in-
creasingly more conscious of their roles and responsibility towards the ethnic
milieu they represent.
In real life, however, these principles are not always respected. We may note
that in many cases leaders of higher-level organisations are clearly discon-
nected from their members and follow policies that are not always understand-
able and adequate to the current needs of the indigenous society. Against this
background emerges the phenomenon known as caudillismo, typical of Latin
American tradition, which means the establishment of a leader whose strong
authority quickly becomes unchallengeable. These tendencies are nevertheless
much obstructed by the traditions of discussion and consultation with leaders
of a lower level and members of councils and commissions to acquire a consen-
sus, a factor very strongly rooted in indigenous tradition (Montoya 2008).
A major problem in the contemporary indigenous movement is the ambitions
of individual leaders, which render understanding and rapport difficult, pose
barriers that obstruct uniting of efforts, and provoke fights between factions.
Another important feature is the marked tendencies to conduct operations of
a spectacular character which are essentially hardly constructive but reinforce
the position of the leader. It goes without saying that the eruption of new
Indian organisational initiatives is strongly connected to the gradual shaping of
the indigenous elites, which – liberated from the bonds of traditional relations
of subordination – make conscious use of their competence in the field of
knowledge of the rules of civil society. As the result they make a significant
qualitative change, in the lives not only of Indian people but of entire Latin
American nations.
The road to recognition of multiculturalism
Beginning with the 1990s, changes significant for the promotion of multi-
culturalism have more and more often been introduced into the legislation of
Latin American states. As a result of this process, many constitutions define the
character of the state as respecting the principle of cultural pluralism (pluri-
culturalidad). Put very briefly, this means two things: 1) confirmation of the
parallel existence of various cultural traditions, and 2) guarantees of rights for
every ethnic group to cultivate its own culture, religion, language, and a dis-
tinctive lifestyle.
376 ON THE STATE OF LATIN AMERICAN STATES. APPROACHING THE  BICENTENARY
In this context, one should consider what this principle of cultural pluralism
means for the current dominant society, that is the Creole-Mestizo mainstream
of the national society. Firstly, it results in the obligation to consider all other
cultures (native, immigrant, Afro-Latin-American) as equal to the currently
hegemonic tradition, treated hitherto as a standard culture pattern to be fol-
lowed by Indians in this way subjected to acculturation. Secondly, the new
ethnic philosophy not only enforces the need to tolerate the multiplicity of
cultures, but also postulates developing good conditions for their develop-
ment. Thirdly, a consequence of this assumption must be permission to follow
other cultural patterns in public life. Fourthly, what results from this principle is
resigning with acculturation programmes, usually disguised under the vestiges
of modernisation and civilisational progress. Fifthly and finally, there is a need
for profound reformulation of the Mestizo-Creole own vision of culture, which
suddenly – when confronted with other accepted cultures – turned out to be
a not-too-attractive cultural hybrid (cultura hibrida), composed of syncretically
mixed traits, including many elements borrowed also from the indigenous
tradition.
The principle of cultural pluralism also introduces significant changes for
the indigenous population. First of all, it reinforces tendencies that favour the
development and invention of an own ethnic tradition. Secondly, it allows them
to revalue and revitalise their own cultural heritage, partially appropriated by
the Mestizos who on one side incorporated many of the civilisational achieve-
ments of the pre-Columbian time to their own tradition and on the other de-
preciated contemporary indigenous folk culture, due to its peasant origin and
very low status of Indians. Thirdly, it allows for a de-folklorisation of their own
tradition, which – frequently has been transformed to the rank of a tourist or
regional attraction – should now become a recovered and important value for
the Indian people. This process includes, for example, the revalorisation of folk
costume and other ethnic symbols, such as the traditional hairstyle (long hair
plaited among the men from the Otavalo group). There is also an increasing
awareness of the fact that the rebirth of “authentic” Indian folklore may give
many local indigenous communities an opportunity for tourist development.
Fourthly, it also provides the Indians with an opportunity to restructure their
own vision of the past (recuperación del pasado) necessary for the ethnic edu-
cation of the younger generation and for the liquidation of the endocolonial
deprivation (that is the elimination of the still strong sense of inferiority and
conviction about the low value of own culture and history). Fifthly, it allows
them to reinforce the impact of the indigenous vision of the world (cosmovisi-
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ón) on their own people as a native alternative to the dominant Iberian–Chris-
tian worldview, alien to the indigenous tradition. In this current of changes,
such phenomena as the formation of a neo-shamanistic movement, revival of
indigenous religions, efforts aimed at the development of native theology, and
popularity of folk medicine based on the experiences of autochthonous medi-
cine men (curanderos) must be mentioned. Sixthly, it makes it possible – and in
a much broader scope than currently executed – to promote bilingual and
bicultural education, and opening indigenous means of mass communication
(newspapers, radio stations, TV channels, and websites) to facilitate and spread
ethnic ideas.
The principle of cultural pluralism also has its weak sides in its practical,
social and legal implementation. First, this principle is still more visible within
the realm of verbal declarations than in implementation in daily life. Secondly,
these declarations usually assume the form of discourse keeping to the princi-
ples of political correctness, and actually provide a kind of smokescreen for the
still maintained domination of the Creole–Mestizo culture. Thirdly, the ideas of
cultural pluralism still reverberates weakly among indigenous milieus, primarily
due to the fact that indigenous elites are too narrow, especially in the field of
culture, as majority of influential Indians are political activists. Fourthly and
lastly, these principles are introduced to a greater extent at the local level,
especially in areas where the percentage share of indigenous population is high,
rather than in national forum.
The philosophy of cultural pluralism preaches a principle that may be boiled
down to the claim that a new civil community is to be built in the form of
a political nation developing within the one state, but composed of numerous
ethnic cultures. In this system, the Mestizo culture, which – being dominant –
has so far reserved the right to the status of national culture (together with its
regional variations ) quite naturally becomes degraded to the position of one of
many cultures co-forming the cultural mosaic of the plural society. At the same
time, indigenous cultures, until recently marginalised and submitted to inevita-
ble acculturation, or rather to deculturation, have become a significant element
in the formation of a new pluralistic reality, giving to it its precious flavour and
contribution (because rooted in native tradition).
The second innovative principle, besides cultural pluralism, introduced in
a number of Latin American constitutions is the declaration to recognise the
multiethnic character of the state. This defines that 1) the nation-state is the
homeland of numerous ethnic groups and for that reason is of multiethnic
character, and 2) it sanctions this status quo by acceptance of the right of every
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ethnic group to develop its identity, and recognition of ethnic representation
put forth by each of the group (Posern-Zieliński 1992).
Much as we did before, let us now consider what principle of cultural
pluralism may in fact mean for either party. For the main stream of the society
it means first the need to relinquish their previously held idea of a unitary (that
is Mestizo–Creole) nation as one dominant over the marginalised ndigenous)
groups that have no influence on the course of matters in the state. The second
question that results is the need to accept the actual and legal existence of
other ethnic groups in the state, which together form a new plural civic society
within one nation-state. Thirdly, this principle generates the need to synchro-
nise all national or state interests with those of individual ethnic groups, which
was previously not necessary and therefore not done. Fourthly, the idea of
multiethnicity favours the acceptance of such legal solutions that not only re-
spect the positive law (that is derived from the European legislative tradition
with certain Latin American peculiarities) but also account for local traditional
(ethnic) norms considered by individual groups as important tool for keeping
social order, in a scope that would allow elimination of basic contradictions
between both legal systems, with the simultaneous respect of indigenous tradi-
tion in solving local disputes and conflicts. Fifthly and finally, this principle for
the first time provides an opportunity to look at the Creole–Mestizo group
from a somewhat different perspective, namely as an important ethnic segment of
the national society – but only one of many – co-forming the qualitatively new,
pluralistic nation forced to agree and negotiate with the remaining partners of
one and the same state community, and to begin anew the pursuit of its identity.
For Indians, meanwhile, the principle of multiethnicity means the follow-
ing: 1) Inclusion of indigenous groups into the life of the country and recog-
nition of their civic subjectivity, i.e. abolishing of the status of a marginal group
attributed to them, deprived of equal rights and treated paternalistically to this
moment. 2) This principle makes it possible for indigenous groups to claim
their rights legally and help them to organise protest actions against the con-
tinuing inequality and injustice. 3) Indigenous groups through their organisa-
tions and leaders may now represent their vital interests at the local, regional,
national, and even international level. 4) They acquire de iure the right to
establish their own self-government (autogobernación), including own forms
of local administration and legal norms according to the cultural tradition of
the group. 5) They are awarded the right to recognition of the collective own-
ership of community land (comunidades indigenas) and – in forest areas – to
protected native territories. 6) These groups are also awarded the right to
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continue their lifestyle without external intervention into questions of tradi-
tions, culture, and customs. 7) It is considered appropriate to award them with
assistance supporting ethno-development, through modernisation of life, de-
velopment of infrastructure, reinforcement of education, and promotion of
indigenous economic activities.
Multiethnicity, understood in this way and legally confirmed, is naturally
still primarily a collection of postulates which are not very well introduced in
practice, yet this set of guidelines can serve as a certain reference for ideal
interethnic relations, to which Indians may always refer so as to fulfil their
rights step by step. In this manner, the principle of multiethnicity is slowly
changing the model of Latin American societies (especially those with a large
number of Indians) reshaping them potentially into modern (political) nations
composed of numerous smaller and larger ethnic groups. Each of these ethnic
segments maintains its ethnic and cultural traits, and all together are connected
by the common administrative, political and educational institutions, and the
all-national economic system (Warren, Jackson 2002). Thanks to this, this pat-
tern begins to recall slightly the solutions known from the United States, where
the level of existence of numerous ethnic groups that manage their own space
of expression is subjected to state and federal institutions guarding the territo-
rial cohesion and unity of the country with the simultaneous broad acceptance
of the idea of pluralistic nation that is gathered around the supra-ethnic Ameri-
can values that everybody shares.
The third principle – so far only postulated by the indigenous population of
Latin America – is the claim to introduce to the constitutions a declaration
confirming the multinational character of the state. As far as the two principles
discussed earlier (cultural pluralism and multiethnicity) were quite easily ac-
cepted by Creole-Mestizo society and legislation, the third postulate put forth
by the indigenous leaders encountered the decided opposition of nearly all
social milieus of the current mainstream, including politicians, social scientists
lawyers, and indigenistas and supporters of multiculturality. As a result of these
obstructions, the constitutions of Latin American states only include formulas
on the acceptance of cultural pluralism, multiethnicity, and recognition of the
existence of numerous ethnic languages. Meanwhile the basic point of the
programme of proposed political reforms in the country put forth by indig-
enous leaders is the postulate to complement those formulas with the principle
confirming the multinational character of the state (plurinacionalidad), which
clearly goes furthest in the legal sense, and for that reason is treated by its
opponents as the source of a potential threat to the unity of the state.
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Rejecting the third postulate, the Mestizo–Creole sector put forth the ar-
gument that its acceptance would lead to the formulation of a federalist state.
This would put an end to national unity in the political sense for the benefit of
the “one state – many nations or nationalities” formula. Today, the greatest
value is to maintain – as the opponents of the concept of multi-nationality claim
– the unity of the nation–state, which would be seriously threatened by the
introduction of a pattern of estado plurinacional. This is why the majority of
official (governmental) documents do not refer to indigenous groups with the
terms “nation” – (nación) or “nationality” – (nacionalidad), but define them
only as “indigenous peoples” (pueblos indígenas), treating them as ethnic groups
of a minority type, who form legally sanctioned segments of the multiethnic
state.
A different proposal is put forth by Indian activists, who repeatedly resort
to the term “Indian nationalities” (nacionalidades indios). They believe that the
introduction of the principle of cultural pluralism and multiethnicity did not
change the situation of Indians much, and that these ideas are something akin
to a convenient cover for the dominant Creole–Mestizo sector to continue
keeping the indigenous population on the margin of the country’s mainstream.
This is why the native leaders propose acceptance of the idea of multinational
state, as a sine qua non condition for further in-depth reforms. They believe
that the elevation of the legal and political status of the “ethnic group” to the
category of “nationality” or even “nation” will be of cardinal importance for the
improvement of the situation of Indians, and primarily for the better operation
of indigenous self-government and organisations within the area they control.
In other words, these postulates aim at territorial autonomy, indigenous control
of natural resources within these areas, and political self-determination of eth-
nic units (autodeterminación política i autogobierno). At the same time, the
Indian leaders disclaim certain fears of the Mestizo–Creole society concerning
the potential threat to state integrity, emphasising their eagerness to further
coexistence within the republic, and clearly disassociating themselves from the
idea of building “a state within the state”. To confirm these arguments, they
frequently refer to the Spanish model, in which the autonomy of regions and
nations (the cases of Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque Country) fulfils simul-
taneously the principle of territorial unity of the state.
Finishing these reflections, it is worth devoting some space to reflecting on
the evolution of the pattern of the nation-state and interethnic relations in the
context of the multicultural projects introduced and postulated in Latin America.
Let us first dwell on the current pattern, which may be defined as assimilating
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and excluding. Its foundation is the political nation with the social core com-
posed by the Creole–Mestizo population, believing itself to be the emanation
of the “republican” nation that maintains its dominant position thanks to its
situation in the upper and middle classes. Oscillating around this core are in-
digenous communities of a peasant character subjected to social marginalisation,
native groups from forest areas fairly isolated in territorial sense, and the popu-
lation of African origin submitted to social, and racial marginalisation. All these
groups from the periphery gradually have yielded to absorption by the main
stream due to the progressing processes of acculturation and assimilation ac-
celerated with the development of education, migrations, and civilisational ad-
vance of the poorest strata. This model is partially a continuation of colonial
patterns, in which particular ethno-racial groups assumed clearly defined places
in the highly stratified society, whose durability was maintained by the strong
racial stereotypes, and social prejudices.
Today, this pattern is slowly being rejected and replaced by a pattern that
we may call integralistic and pluralistic. Its main features are the limitation of
the dominance of the Creole–Mestizo sector, acquisition of new space in the
social, administrative, intellectual, economic, and political life of the country by
the marginalised groups, gradual liquidation of asymmetry in interethnic rela-
tions, and the struggle for elimination of the of the long-term impact of minor-
ity groups marginalisation. Attempts are made for the ethnoracial divisions to
cease to be the markers of social position, according to which an Indian is
perceived as a poor and primitive villain or uncivilised savage. The growing
struggle against these stereotypes is conducted by showing their one-sidedness
and harmfulness. At the same time we see a gradual process of subjectivisation
of the groups formerly dominated and legally incapacitated, which now begin
to speak in their own voice and in their own name, rejecting the intermediary
services of the (neo-)indigenistas. Consequently, attempts are made for the
society to become a political nation composed of different ethno-cultural seg-
ments enjoying equal rights, whose mutual coexistence would be regulated by
the principles of multiculturality and multiethnicity. Its continued harmonious
existence would be possible thanks to each group maintaining and cherishing
ethnic identity and cultural distinctiveness being enforced with simultaneous
full participation in the life of the country, including programmes of ethno-
development promoting modernisation and civilisational advance of each of
the ethnic groups. In this way, the pattern of a uniform state–nation – though
composed of a number of ethnocultural and ethno-racial groups – would
form.
382 ON THE STATE OF LATIN AMERICAN STATES. APPROACHING THE  BICENTENARY
The third pattern to be listed here is a model – postulated by the Indian
leaders – of a decided multicultural–autonomous character. It is based on the
idea of a state respecting the principle of political pluralism, and expressed in
the political and territorial autonomy of individual ethnic groups, elevated to
the status of “nations” or “nationalities”. In this case, multiculturality would
directly intertwine with the multinational coexistence of all the groupings en-
joying a high level of autonomy in the realm of local government and control of
their natural resources, with a major impact on the shape of the policies of the
central government, who would need to take care to maintain a balance be-
tween the particular aspirations of the individual “nations” and the interests of
the state as a whole.
Discussion concerning the place of indigenous people in the structure of
the state and civic nation continues, and is frequently subjected to new trials,
especially at moments of crises and political turning points. Ever more clearly
visible in such situations is the key role of native people and their political
representations. In this manner, the dialogue between the state administration
and society, which usually deals with economic questions, more often than not
intertwines with discourse about the future of the political nation and the place
of indigenous people within it. This process is continuously in statu nascendi,
and its further course is hard to forecast, as attested to by the unexpected
developments in Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Guatemala, and Mexico. One thing is
certain, though: namely, that the process of emancipation of the indigenous
peoples and their politicisation, once initiated, shall not decline soon, and will
continue to be increasingly visible.
Final reflections
The processes that were indicated in this chapter are dynamic, changing from
year to year the social and political, ethnic and racial configurations in many
countries of Latin America. This is why they require permanent monitoring,
current interpretation, and critical revision of earlier findings. Each stage of the
transformation brings changes that are significant for the situation of the indig-
enous people. Some of them, as it turns out, were fairly relatively easy to
forecast, while others are quite unexpected for the observer. A couple of years
ago, hardly anyone would have envisaged a Bolivian government led by an
Indian president defending coca plantations. Similarly, it was hard to foresee
that the influential Indian federation from Ecuador (CONAIE) would suddenly
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wane due to its involvement in unfortunate political alliances, or to predict that
Peru – after a long period with hardly any organised Indian movement (in the
Andes) – would slowly begin to form and reinforce such forms of indigenous
associations.
Today, new indigenous organisations are certainly enjoying their heyday.
They are conquering ever new spaces, beginning with local communities and
ending with a true pan-Indian movement trying to coordinate activities be-
tween individual countries of Latin America or even more broadly, of the entire
American continent. The successes of these Indian groups in some countries
quickly becomes a model to follow in other states, even where the tendencies to
self-organisation of the indigenous people have so far been weak due to the
scattering of native groups, their small number, or the nearly total loss of auto-
chthonous culture and, identity. This is why it is hard to be surprised today,
even when information comes from the Caribbean that there too – that is in an
area that for centuries the existence of Indian people has officially been denied
– initiative groups are suddenly arising and claiming their indigenous origin,
frequently in spite of their real racial and cultural features, which prove
a strong Afro-American contribution.
Former ethnic divisions based on language and cultural differences, usually
respected by anthropologists and state authorities, are today clearly giving way
to new distinctions that are defined by the structure of Indian organisation
networks. In the contemporary legal and political space, of significant impor-
tance are primarily the legally operating indigenous associations, and not the
fact that a given community or local group belongs to a specific ethnic and
language unit. The first dimension is of a practical, legal, and political charac-
ter – significant in relations with the outside world, while the latter maintains
primarily its cultural values and identity orientation that are important for Indi-
ans themselves. In this way, two codependent structures took shape in parallel
to each other: the cluster of all indigenous communities and groups of a single
country as a collective ethno-racial category of population, and a network of
Indian associations, federations and confederations, representing an organised
avant-garde of indigenous peoples, conscious of their goals. It is these organi-
sations, and not some amorphous ethnic groups, that are a real partner for
state authorities, NGOs, and international agencies. Their rising activity on the
local, national, and continental stages is on the one hand a result of skilful
application of the rules of democracy, and on the other a effective use of the
mechanisms of globalisation (cultural, communicational, legal) for the benefit
of own people. Comparing the situation of the indigenous population of Latin
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America to that of the native communities on other continents, one could
conclude with the following observation: whereas in many other parts of the
world, where until recently tribal structures were very strong, now they are
adjusting to contemporary requirements, frequently hiding away their tradi-
tional, tribal character under a variety of new organisational forms, in Latin
America – that is in areas with hardly any classical tribal structures – the situ-
ation assumed quite the opposite character. The newly established associations,
with structures borrowed from Western patterns, both operate as legal repre-
sentations of indigenous peoples, and function for themselves as “new tribes”
deciding on all the most important questions of daily, social, cultural, and po-
litical life, and moreover significantly kindling, reinforcing, and strengthening
the indigenous identity within the regional and ethnic groups, and moreover
increasingly often in the pan-Indian dimension as well.
Translated by Piotr Krasnowolski
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States and Political Cultures
in Latin America
In this text I am trying to point at the opportunity opening before the research-
ers of the state by the possibility of explaining it further through discussions of
political culture or, to be more precise: its various concepts and their links to
the notion of the state. Thus it is not the political culture; indeed it is the state
as an organisation (and simultaneously, an institution) that is the basic subject
of my interest. After all, the condition of the state is not only the subject of my
essay, but also of the entire volume. And yet, what is discussed here most
extensively is the political culture, as I refer to the pertaining literature as if I
treated the collection of the works listed below and the concepts discussed in
them as a toolbox with measuring instruments and results of such measure-
ments performed on the state. Therefore I begin with my own definition of the
notion of political culture, and later use it while making a concise review of
literature on that concept to grasp such aspects of the connection between the
state and the political culture as public discourse, policy-making, democratisation,
and collective (national) identity in the state. Yet as the road to a theory is still
long, I prefer to use “states” and “political cultures” in plural to emphasise the
diversity of the processes and phenomena involved. Such discussions – not
always brought to a definite conclusion – are to provide some more food for
thought about the nation-states in Latin America.
I thank for insightful and constructive comments on the first version of this
work Professor Ewa Nowicka, Dr. Zofia Stemplowska, and Professor Jan
Szemiński.
The concept of political culture
Political culture is the union (not a unity) of culture and politics, but it is a special
relationship. Its content must be sought in the cultural and the political.
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I use the notion of the cultural, to define the capacities of an individual and
a collective to build their identities as an individual and as a community. This
process begins at the level of a family and goes on up to the level of the
community in which a person defines her/his position owing to the individua-
tion of her/his identity. It was so in the earliest history of social mankind, and it
is so now. Quite naturally, the individual always defines himself or herself in
social relations, that is in interactions with other individuals. Yet not only indi-
viduals. Also with other groups i.e. communities. The existence of these com-
munities, on the other hand, is the result of the organisation of individuals. The
propensity to such a self-organisation is what I define as the political, if the
composition of the group goes beyond the family, even a multigenerational
one. Currently, the highest organisational form of the group – of a community
or society – is the state. Yet as the state undergoes transformations as well, one
has the liberty to consider that, like the cultural is permanently present in the
continuous process of shaping and transformation of individual and collective
identity, the political is a permanent feature of human social existence.
The collective identity of a society organised within a state assumes various
forms as a civic society and political nation. It is, however, especially connected
to the political through norms and ideologies. A certain particular set of such
norms builds the institution of the state. A certain particular type of ideology is
patriotism and nationalism. These norms and ideologies operate in the con-
sciousness of citizens of the state. This means that the notion of the state is to
embrace both the institution and also its elements being the population with its
collective identity and the territory of the state. For this reason, the state is only
partially available to sensory perception. What is available and created intellec-
tually – and includes norms and ideologies – assumes among other forms that
of political culture.
Political culture is a set of forms of social consciousness, that is widespread
and respected beliefs, operating with relative stability (also as new elements yet
equipped with the features of potential stability) in the process of political self-
organisation of a society as defined by the cultural. As the institution of the
state is a specific result of this self-organisation, and such self-organisation may
also mean reforming an existing state, therefore, the political culture of
a society in a given state and time is the set of widespread and
relatively stable and respected beliefs (a) related to the identity of
the society as a political nation that is the constitutionally defined
sovereign, (b) expressed in public discourse, and (c) referring to
the state as the institutional correlate of that identity, and espe-
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cially to the constitutional system of policy-making. This refers muta-
tis mutandis to the community, which had the state externally imposed.
If the ethnical structure of the political nation is complex, its political cul-
ture is to a degree a function of that structure. Characteristic for the political
nation is also the class and layer structure, and that is why the political culture
of such a nation is composed to a certain extent of the cultures of individual
social groups. A strong nation state exists when the cultural and the political
are already such a state of political culture (a set of widespread and relatively
stable forms of social consciousness), where the national identity of the whole
population of the given state includes also fundamental acceptance of the exist-
ing statehood of the nation. Statehood requires an appropriate collective iden-
tity, yet in turn such a fundamental acceptance of statehood reinforces the
collective identity of the political nation (society in the state). Potential propos-
als of state reforms lie within this political culture. The revolutionary project
assumes a radical change of the political culture, as in itself it is a manifestation
of the inconsistencies that came to being at the level of the connections be-
tween the identity of the revolutionary group and the identity of the majority of
the society.
Such a concept of political culture will be helpful for me in reading litera-
ture referring to the various definitions of notions of political culture. Here
I am looking for information referring to the components listed in my defini-
tion. Yet I primarily want to note down the variety of concepts present in the
literature concerned.
The matter is highly complex and there are plenty of definitions of political
culture. Before I embark on the diverse contemporary and most widespread
varieties of the notion, I want to point at the origin of the very concept of
political culture in European literature, where it appeared first. For it may be
worthwhile to make references to earlier discussions that are hardly known
today.
The term “political culture” itself we owe most probably to Herder. In this
way, we use this nineteenth-century term, even though until the end of 1960s,
“any mention of its genesis in subject literature” was lacking (Barnard 1969:
392). Possibly because the term had not become widespread until the twenti-
eth century. Those who visit Galleria d’Arte Moderna in the Milanese Villa
Reale may see “Il quatro stato”, a painting by Giuseppe Pelizza da Volpedo. It
presents “the fourth estate”: workers on strike. Twenty-five years later, the title
of the painting from 1901 became the title of a periodical: “Il quatro stato.
Rivista socialista di cultura politica”. It is immaterial for us how much of the
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inspiration of the revolutionaries of the earlier period, representing the third
state, there is in the stance of Italian socialists and republicans. It is important
that socialists referred the notion of political culture to social consciousness.
And to democracy, should we note that they wrote about it already after
Mussolini’s March on Rome (Marcia su Roma). Yet they were politicians. The
researchers of political culture are inspired by crises. “Research on political
culture is practised predominantly in the periods of rapid social change; they
may be termed as a phenomenon accompanying social and political crises”
(Bevc 2007: 94–95). The source of the interest in the political culture of Latin
America may be similar. It is connected to the politically worrying image of a
weak state, not only – and not even predominantly – in Latin America. The key
is the cultural studies-related explanation of this state of such a State.
That in the twentieth century Max Weber worked on the application of the
notion of culture in a research, is a known fact. Yet, if I am not mistaken, the
first extensive concept of political culture in twentieth century literature is found
not earlier than in the work of Józef Siemieński dating to 1930 (Siemieński
1932), i.e. it was actually written in a crisis period. Even though the text itself
is devoted not to Latin America but to the Polish political culture of the six-
teenth century, that is of a society with complex and yet relatively harmonised
ethnical and political structure of what at the time was one of the largest Euro-
pean states. Professor of the Jagiellonian University, Siemieński was almost cer-
tainly familiar with the writings of Herder and Weber. He could be inspired with
them in Kraków, but he never quoted the formal definition of the notion he
used. We may, however, construct – or, rather, reconstruct – it to the scope
that Siemieński’s text allows such a practice by (a) skipping the elements per-
taining specifically to sixteenth century society, yet (b) using the language of
the author:
Political culture is produced by the nation (entire society or its specific
stratum) and its most important and most characteristic expression is the form
of government (the system of the state). The system may be endured with
submission (passivity or yielding to force) or may be developed (activity in
building the state; modernisation) through democracy.
Siemieński uses the following indicators of democratisation:
(1) political consciousness of the constructor of political culture (awareness
of one’s own power and understanding of public matters.);
(2) percentage of population sharing power by participating in the establish-
ment and operation of representative bodies (organs of power), and car-
rying out direct democracy by participation in local general assemblies
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(Siemieński referred to the sejmiki szlacheckie: dietines, or regional par-
liaments of the nobility in the sixteenth century);
(3) equality of citizens before law and equal access to offices (positions);
(4) political liberalism, that is guaranties of civil freedoms;
(5) the degree of exercising civil rights, especially the guarantee of freedom;
(6) education in legal matters; using political literature, production of such
literature, publication of statute books;
(7) discipline that is civil discipline hinging on the ability to achieve political
compromise;
(8) rule of law in relations between the organs of state authority and citizen,
and between citizens;
(9) efficiency of the organs of the state (state apparatus);
(10) modernisation that is increasing the efficiency of own institutions (as bet-
ter than the slavish imitation of the foreigners);
(11) quality of political law (In Siemieński’s Poland, the term was considered
more appropriate than the German Staatsrecht or the French droit
constitutionnel);
(12) significance of eminent individuals eager to lead in a politically unorganised
society, capable of managing the crowd; great significance of talented
demagogues;
(13) high level of political rhetoric;
(14) political culture as the foundation of stability of the state, which may yield
only to external violence;
(15) research of political culture.
It is easy to notice that some indicators of political culture may be helpful in
grasping the characteristic features of our contemporary culture in Latin America.
Yet the historiosophic concept of Siemieński seems a category of rather intui-
tive and descriptive than explanatory and theoretical nature, despite the rela-
tively high level of coherence that emerged in the process of its reconstruction.
Some indicators used by Siemieński were precursors of later concepts. What
deserves emphasising is the fact that, even though in the development of his
concept Siemieński accounted for the international comparative perspective,
he referred the notion of political culture to a specific state, one state, and,
moreover, focused on the nobility (identified with a particular understanding of
the nation) in the capacity of the producer or constructor of political culture
characteristic for the system of the researched state, that is the social group the
political (a term unknown to Siemieński) of which is decisive for the state’s
system. This is why Siemieński comes to identifying the political culture with
390 ON THE STATE OF LATIN AMERICAN STATES. APPROACHING THE  BICENTENARY
“the culture of political life” and “the culture of the state”. What is, however,
striking here is Siemieński’s belief that the Polish state was lost towards the end
of the eighteenth century (partitioned by the neighbouring powers) mostly –
or only – as a result of external force, as the system of the Polish state –
according to him – favoured its stability.
We know that Ernst Cassirer, contemporary to the Polish researcher, a bit
later pondered over the union or joint interface of culture and politics. Not as
a historian but as a philosopher, he tied political culture to freedom, preaching
the opinion that freedom is “given as a task” and not just given (aufgegeben,
nicht gegeben). For this reason, culture may develop only in a pluralistic soci-
ety, and the human being is responsible for building this culture. It is not
difficult to notice that a pluralistic society may develop only as a result of
democratisation, while the notion of freedom is connected to the notion of the
guarantee of freedom. The position taken by Cassirer was close to that of
Siemieński’s, yet he most probably did not know the work of the Polish re-
searcher.
I want to notice the position taken by the theoreticians of the Frankfurt
School (Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno), being after all a current that
originated while Siemieński and Cassirer were active. These theoreticians knew
the Germany of the 1930s and the USA of the 1940s from the personal
experience, much like Cassirer. They defined the political culture of such
a society (both German national socialism and American capitalism) as a system
of subjugation that needed abolishing, and preached the idea that a human
being may be free, that is live without fear as the “other” (i.e., somebody who
is individually defined, living his or her separate life, the alien, someone think-
ing differently) only in a pluralistic society. Such a society is the expression of
the political culture they postulated, while the political culture itself refers to
the social and economic system (capitalism) and is not limited to the conditions
of the single state. What we deal here with are the requirements for pluralism,
i.e. democracy, and with the postulate of freedom, as in the case of the other
authors, only that these theoreticians formed their theses on political culture in
the context of analysing the capitalist system, which was distinctive for them at
the time.
Following Siemieński, Cassirer, and the Frankfurt School, a new attempt to
make the theoretical view of political culture by European authors could be
expected from the “Dizionario di cultura politica”, edited by Antonio Basso
connected with the anti-fascist movement, and published by Autori Asociati in
Milan in 1946; a book with contributions by approximately 50 authors. Yet the
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dictionary does not contain the entry “political culture”, and individual authors
treat this category as a synonymous to the category of “politics”.
The Latin American use of the notion of political culture appeared during
the second world war in Brazil. Fifty issues of the magazine “Cultura Politica –
Revista mensal de estudos brasileiros” were edited by Almir de Andrade and
published in Rio de Janeiro from March 1941 to May 1945. At that time it
was the platform for the Estado Novo financed by the government. In 124
articles by 73 authors of this magazine – cheap and widely available in its days,
and easily accessible via Internet today – apologetic analyses of the political
ideology of Vargas’s government (1937–1945) were included side by side
with an array of materials from the realms of historiography, economy, law, art,
information on current activity of the government, Brazil-related bibliogra-
phies, etc. The term “political culture” is not used even once in the editorial. Its
use in the title of the magazine seems to be a gentle – and, in its concept,
attractive, i.e. at least not repulsing the reader – all-encompassing definition of
the policies of the head of the government. Yet the content of the magazine is
a source for studies of political culture, and so is the article by the editor-in-
chief in the last issue, where on the occasion of the birthday of the leader,
President Vargas is defined as “ao constructor da mais brilhante época de nossa
história” (“Cultura Politica”, No. 5, p. 6). The term political culture itself played
an important social function, yet its content remained undefined in the maga-
zine. This, however, might be due to my only perfunctory reading, while sys-
tematic research may yet lead to the reconstruction of the content of the title
notion...
Since the latter half of the 1940s, works heralding the cultural-studies
related approach to politics began to emerge, yet they operated with the cat-
egories to the like of “style of action”, “operating code”, “national character”,
etc. It was only in 1955 that Gabriel Almond announced his concept of politi-
cal culture in the USA: “Every political system is embedded in a particular pattern
of orientations to political action. I have found it useful to refer to this as the
political culture.” (Almond 1956: 396). Beer and Ulam soon used “political
culture” as the central category in their comparative studies of politics (Beer and
Ulam 1958), and Lucian W. Pye quoted its following definition: “Political culture
is the set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments which give order and meaning to
a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that
govern behavior in the political system. It encompasses both the political ideals
and the operating norms of polity. Political culture is thus the manifestation in
aggregate form of the psychological and subjective dimension of politics” (Pye,
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International Encyclopaedia of Social Science, 1961). We shall return to Pye’s
definition.
Two years later, Almond, together with Sidney Verba, used the concept of
“civic culture”, defining it as “specifically political orientations – attitudes to-
wards the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of
the self in the system” (Almond, Verba 1963: 17) and listing its three kinds, or
rather ideal varieties, whose mix in different proportions the actual political
cultures are composed of:
• parochial culture, with a political orientations are not separated from reli-
gious and social, and citizen realise the operation of the central power only
to a minor degree, and conduct their lives within an enclosed sphere, inde-
pendent of the decisions undertaken by the state. Example: Ottoman Empire.
• Subject culture, whether citizens are as a rule oriented on the political
system, they are aware of the operation of the central power and clearly
subjected to its decisions, with little potential for taking a very own (differ-
ent) stands/position. Example: German Empire.
• Participant culture, which citizens can influence the central authorities, in
a number of ways, which in turn has an impact on them (Almond, Verba
1963: 17–19).
Generally, therefore, this culture is manifested in orientations, and more
specifically – in civic attitudes, and the research of those is the research of the
“civic culture” mentioned above. This is all about civic culture – studying indi-
vidual citizens and groups of people forming the family or school (considered
by the authors the main institutions transferring culture). We are allowed to
treat “civic culture” as political culture, yet do the denotational ranges of these
notions fully overlap? After all, the authors knew the notion of political culture,
and yet preferred “civic culture”. Much later, they would treat these notions as
synonyms, which may be considered the answer to the question asked above.
They turned their attention to the fact that appropriate set of attitudes of the
citizens of a given state favours stable democracy in the state. Even if the
subjects are citizens of various states, the frame of reference for a specific
citizen is his or her specific state. This tripartite division of “civic culture”,
refers to a specific state at all cases. Almond and Verba’s method was based on
confronting the technique of individual questionnaires with the cultural macro
scale, which entailed the need to juxtapose the value of the individual human
with the operation of the state system (the political system) in a cause and effect
relationship, which means that it is easier in this case to point at correlations
than at cause and effect relationships.
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Writing, somewhat earlier (in 1959) about the functional approach to com-
parative studies of politics, Almond used the notion of political culture only
marginally, and did not use the notion of “civic culture” at all, nonetheless
putting forth a claim, which he referred also to Latin America, namely, that
political culture (much like the entire political system, political structure) is
dualist due to the mutual interpenetration of the modern and the pre-modern
(earlier, primitive, non-Western).
He continued the application of Kenneth Jovitt’s concept of modernisation
in the research of the political culture of “Marxist–Leninist systems”, putting
forth a thesis that the relation present between the political structure and the
political culture is similar to the relation between the formal and informal
organisation of a production plant. As the system being the object of research
made inducing a change in the political culture of the society its objective, this
particular modernisation pertains to the informal organisation of the political
structure that is the state. “Political culture refers to set of informal, adaptive
postures – behavioral and attitudinal – that emerge in response to and interact
with the set of formal definitions – ideological, policy, and institutional – that
characterize a given level of society” (Jowitt 1974: 173). Such an approach
limits the scope of the notion of “political culture” to the area not regulated by
law, or possibly even by the customs related to the implementation of law (for
example, the regulatory significance of the procedural precedents in the op-
eration of the parliament). This is akin to the representation of the civil society
by a collection of non-governmental organisations, thus being a decisively too
narrow a perspective.
Embarking on an analysis of these systems (also in reference to Cuba),
Almond wrote about the political culture in a manner that allowed treating his
statement as the final version of his concept of political culture (Almond 1983:
127–128). What results from this is the fact that Almond not only no longer
limited himself to the postulate of researching attitudes and their classification but
he also paid specific attention to the degree of rooting of the forms of political
culture, that is to the degree of its stability and resistance to the change as such.
Pye, already quoted above, modified his own definition and wrote in 1993:
“Involving both the ideals and the operating norms of political system, political
culture includes subjective attitudes and sentiments as well as objective symbols
and creeds that together govern political behavior and give structure and order
to the political process. Nations generally have both elite and mass political
cultures, along with further subcultures that are rooted in regional, occupa-
tional, class, ethnic, and other differences” (Pye 1993).
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There is no entry for “political culture” in The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of
Political Thought of 1989, revised in 1991 and frequently republished later,
edited by Oxford philosophers of politics: David Miller and Janet Coleman,
William Connolly, Alan Ryan (Miller 1994).
It is interesting that the second edition of the “Dictionnaire de la science
politique et des institutions politiques” (1996), a very important publication as
it is does not bring up the definition of political culture even though it provides
the characteristics of politics and culture. Nevertheless, French sociology has
known the view that the political culture “est constitue d’un ensemble de
connaissances et de croyances permettent aux individus de donner sens
a l’expérience routinière de leur rapports au povoir qui les gouverne et aux
groupes qui leur servent de références identitaires. Elle permet donc a chacun
de se situer dans l’espace complexe du politique en moibilisant un minimum de
repères, conscients ou non, pour leur guider dans ses comportments: ceux de
citoyen par exemple ou ceux d’electeur, de constribuable etc.” (Braud 1998:
212). At the same time the French manual for students and candidates for civil
servants approaches political culture most pragmatically, implying by the way
a definition of the state that is hard to accept: “La culture politique vise le
phénomène politique dont le centre aujourd’hui est la relation entre l’Etat ou
les gouvernants et les gouvernes” (Lageot, Pavegeau 2008: 8).
In turn, the new (2006) and popular German manual, whose authors de-
clare their acceptance for the concept of Almond and Verba’s, is built on the
claim that “Ziel der vergleichenden politischen Kulturforschung war und ist die
Erklaerung der Stabilität oder besser des Ueberlebens von Demokratien” (Pickel,
Pickel 2006: 144).
I have found a multifaceted discussion of the notion of the ties between
politics and culture in the second edition of Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson’s
“Culture and Politics: A Comparative Approach” (2005). The authors account
for such analytical categories as social structure, ethnicity, historical heritage,
religion, civil attitude (including values) and use these categories not only to
examine the conscience of a human being, but also – political processes at
regional and state levels. Despite such efforts, the authors are not capable of
giving the rule governing the link between culture and politics besides stating
that culture has a significance, which they however define in reference to indi-
vidual societies and nation-states. These, however, differ from one another
with their cultures, and this is how the circle closes.
In no other language but English so many articles devoted to the concept of
political culture have been published. This is mostly thanks to the political
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scientists and historians working in the USA. The critical review of positions –
as of the year 2000 – is given by Formisano in “The Blackwell Dictionary of
Twentieth-Century Thought”, where he defines the study of political culture as
a ”’degenerative research program’ – unproductive, unclear, and tautological”
(Formisano 2001: 404). I have found no polemical statement on this claim.
Turning now in the chronological order only towards the works of Latin-
Americanists, I shall now for order’s sake note the pioneering article by Daniel
H. Levine on “Issues in the Study of Culture and Politics: A View from Latin
America” (Levine 1974), yet I would like to turn the attention especially to the
Latin American criticism of Almond and Verba’s approach. After all, the two
authors included in their book – by now a classic – also the analysis of the civic
culture of Mexico, “with a thought”, as Almond would write 20 years later,
“that a developing, non-European country with mixed democratic-authoritar-
ian features might furnish some interesting contrasts with the European and
American cases” (Almond, Verba 1980: 22).
“The Civic Culture Revisited”, a collection of studies quoted here that Al-
mond and Verba edited includes a work by Ann L. Craig and Wayne A. Cornelius
that refers to the political analysis and culture (and not to civic culture) of
Mexico mentioned above. Craig and Cornelius carried out a systematic criti-
cism of that analysis (including the opinion survey methodology followed) and
formulated a number of guidelines suggesting that the researchers in political
culture of Mexico: (1) research the perception of attitudes of individuals and
groups by political decision-makers (rather than focus on researching these
attitudes), (2) account for subcultures that is the cultures of individual social
and cultural groups, with appropriately constructed samples and with special
consideration of regional differences, (3) award greater significance to the au-
thoritarian aspect of the political system of Mexico, (4) turn special attention to
the conditions and functions of participation in political activity in connection
with interests (Craig and Wayne 1980). I believe that the guidelines mentioned
above may also apply to studying the remaining countries of Latin America.
Would it yet be Latin America as a whole? The question whether Latin
America exists rises again.
The affirmative answer comes in a three-volume synthesis of the history of
Latin America from the decline of the colonial period until the contemporary
times, published over 25 years ago in Poland. The main author and editor of
the work, who I know not to have read Almond and Verba’s works, claimed in
the closing essay (“Cywilizacja latynoamerykańska” – lit.: “Latin American
civilisation”) that political culture is “public life organising the community: state
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and power; law, and political structures and customs; the governing and the
governed, their conflicts: the relations between the organised groups and of
the state to the external world: cooperation, coexistence, war and making war”
(Łepkowski 1980: 599–600). Moreover, the author notices at that “huge
convergences in state structures and political culture of Latin America and the
USA: republicanism, well-rooted presidential system, parliaments usually oper-
ating under the name of Congress, and the federal system that is often binding,
yet in the recent decades [written in the latter half of the 1970s, – R.S.] often
in retreat. Nevertheless, in practice, the North American standard does not
function, or, rather, functions in a limited scope if not as a sheer formality. State
tradition and political culture of Anglo-America and Ibero-America are quite
different qualities.” [...] The army [...] popularised a particular model of politi-
cal culture: the standard for behaviours that assume with silent approval that it
is primarily the pistol that makes decisions in politics, especially that – following
the idea of the colonial tradition – “la ley se acata pero no se cumple” (the law
is respected, but it is not followed).” Still, the author distinguishes the state and
political culture (Łepkowski 1980: 618–619). He also points at European
influence, believing that what belongs to the specifically Latin American politi-
cal culture are “personalism, militarism, populist phraseology” (Łepkowski 1980:
623). Łepkowski refers to Latin America as a whole, and in his understanding
political culture is a correlate of Latin American civilisation. It is a concept of
Latin American political culture in the singular.
The positive answer to the question about the existence of Latin America is
given also by Howard Wiarda, who treats this region as a whole, as a civiliza-
tion, as a culture area, as he is writing about the philosophically envisaged
“soul” of Latin America, justifying it through political sciences rather than
historiography, and writing about revolutions, positivism, nationalism, Marx-
ism, and corporationism, that is indirectly about the potential and actual pre-
mises of political culture (Wiarda 2003). Wiarda emphasises that while the
founding fathers of the USA were the people running away from European
absolutism and feudalism, the Ibero-American colonies functioned thanks to
the people who were recreating European systems within them. Americans in
the North valued freedom and individualism, and together created a new state,
while the Americans in the South were breaking away from the centre of power
in Europe, but did not question the European social order – initially not even
the monarchy. They preferred group privileges, and built separate states, in
which they would resort to extremism and violence in internal struggle. Wiarda
turns the attention to such features as militarism, religious orthodoxy, and hier-
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archical structure built on social inequalities as well – which may be surprising
for readers used to thinking in the categories of Latin American individualism –
as a particular collectivism (organised groups, corporation style). The author
points to the importance of the heritage of social philosophy. Yet if Spain and
Portugal themselves changed so strongly in the twentieth century, cultural heri-
tage requires an insight that is absent in Wiarda, which in turn weakens the
statement on Latin America as a whole.
Similarly, Harry E. Vanden and Gary Prevost are convinced – much like
Łepkowski and Wiarda – that there is the certain specific variety of political
culture that is Latin American, ergo common for the entire Latin America, in
which they make reference to the first book by Almond and Verba, stating that
“political culture is defined as those attitudes and beliefs that affect the way we
think about, engage in, and evaluate politics and political events” (Vanden,
Prevost 2006: 175).
Of different opinion is Peter H. Smith, who uses Larry Diamond’s defini-
tion and says that political culture may be defined as “a people’s predominant
beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments and evaluations about the political
system of their country and the role of the self in the system” (Smith 2005:
286). Naturally, democracy and values condition each other mutually, yet the
notion of political culture refers here to a specific state and not to the entire
Latin America.
The author of probably the best manual for studies of politics in Latin
America, Gavin O’Toole, defines political culture by referring culture to indi-
viduals, and tying it to the specific qualities of the system of a specific state,
differing from the system of another state: “Political culture: a unique combi-
nation of beliefs, attitudes and values held by individuals in any given society
about how political system and economic life should be conducted that to-
gether help to shape a political system’s distinctive character” (O’Toole 2007:
518).
An anthropological concept (“model”) of political culture is proposed by
Larissa Adler Lomnitz and Ana Melnick, who establish it on the “structure of
social networks (1), connected to power and (2), being a system of symbols
legitimising, feeding, and supporting this power” (Adler, Melnick 2000: 2).
These networks may function as either vertical or horizontal, while the system
of symbols may be manifested in discourse, political rituals, language, architec-
ture, myths of political cosmology, insignia, way of treating time and space:
factors that often provide a part of the nationalist ideology. The authors applied
the concept to the examination of political parties – considered the representa-
398 ON THE STATE OF LATIN AMERICAN STATES. APPROACHING THE  BICENTENARY
tion of the middle classes – using source material in the form of historiographi-
cal works, press, and interviews and data from participant observation. They
identified the type of network and diverse cultures and subcultures of the par-
ties examined, entered into what they call “the grammar of domination, subju-
gation, and cooperation relations, that is the grammar of power” (Adler, Melnick
2000: 141).
A highly sophisticated and at the same time complex approach can be per-
ceived in the collection of texts devoted to Mexico, Costa Rica, and Chile
edited by Roderic Ai Camp (Camp 2001). The authors founded their reason-
ing on the results of a study of individuals, and the individuals’ evaluation of
politics and the type of politics that they postulate. At the same time, they
construct the common scope of political culture of the people examined and
put forward the question how political culture – assured in this way – influ-
ences the behaviours of the people examined and the development of specific
institutions, and also how democratic operation of these institutions shapes the
attitudes of the persons examined within this political culture that they share.
The research proves (a) the need of differentiating political cultures viz. na-
tionality of those examined and at the same time (b) the presence of certain
aspects of individual attitude at the supranational (supra-state) level. While
the first is not surprising, the latter is unusual, as one should be expecting that
the attitude to democracy must depend on the position assumed by the given
person in the social structure (status is measured by income, education, and
the type of work performed, as well as by the age of the person in question).
It is interesting where these differences become manifested. In the group of
older citizens, the tendency to be satisfied with electoral democracy pre-
dominates, while the people of the younger generation conceptualise democ-
racy in a more sophisticated manner (including into it, for example, the protec-
tion of minorities) and they simply expect more. In all the age groups, the
understanding of politics is positively correlated to education. Nonetheless,
also in the case of this very interesting book, discretion requires that we con-
sider the implications of the method applied (opinion survey), as it is known
that the media aspect of the public discourse is not always taken into consider-
ation while interpreting the respondents’ answers, a racially-biased person is
not always eager to disclose his or her attitude to the pollster, an authoritarian
personality does not have to be manifested by the public questioning of democ-
racy, the vast majority of people do not use general categories (“the political
system”) and think rather about specific government or political party, and so
forth. Should we take into consideration a similar list of the countries – Mexico,
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Chile, and Uruguay – we may put forward a hypotheses that the political cul-
tures operating today are connected to the phenomenon of a very high growth
of employment in the public sector. It would be extraordinary if such a process
did not favour acceptance of the state that developed this employment. This is
how a variety of norms became mingled, which helps in the understanding why
the military juntas of Uruguay and Chile could resort to torture with fair ap-
proval of many employees of public administration. They must have clearly
accepted the principle of very broad application of brute force in the process of
executing power even earlier.
The line of reasoning presented above is easier to understand, should one
know that before 1930 the state employed in Latin America less than 1% of
population, which means that at that time there were fewer than 500 000 civil
servants. During the three following decades, that share grew only to 1.2%,
yet with the parallel increase in population the change meant that the number
of employed in the state sector grew by the factor of five (a number that does
not account for the state-owned economic entities). The largest increase oc-
curred in education, yet of the three countries listed here, it was only in Mexico
that education came first in the ranking by the number of employees. The high
rate of employment growth in administration was noted in Uruguay: from 1.6%
of the country’s population (30 000 civil servants) in 1930 to 2.9% (52 200)
within two years, and by 1966 – to as much as 22.5%! Chile also proved
a major growth of employment in the administration in 1930–1970, as the
numbers rose nearly 5 times. The rate for Mexico was 0.93% in 1930, yet in
1986 – with state corporations left aside – it was already 7.5%, and paralleled
by the very high rate of demographic growth mentioned above. While in 1930,
two in every three state employees worked in the states’ and municipal admin-
istration of Mexico, in 1980 it was already only one in four (Whitehead 1998,
passim). It is the central government that employs people today. The reasons
behind the growth of employment in the administration of the countries listed
above include anti-crisis policies (absorption of the unemployed from the middle
class in Chile and Uruguay), and the development of state functions. The dete-
rioration (1930–1970) of the quality of administration in Chile and Uruguay,
with its simultaneous improvement in Mexico, brought the levels of administra-
tion in these countries close. Wherever reforms were recorded, it was not
public administration that generated their programmes, corruption rendered
implementation of law difficult, and clientelism was blossoming. As neither
military governments nor the current phase of democracy changed the ten-
dency to increase employment in administration, although the growth is now
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minor in absolute numbers, political cultures in these social groups most prob-
ably favour retaining the bureaucratic status quo, with the unavoidable oscilla-
tions of the circumstances related to political orientations of the president,
ministers, governors.
Let us, however, draw the attention also to the fact that in the concepts of
Peter Smith and many other authors, it is significant that political culture is
something that is present among “people”. They do not focus on specific groups:
politicians or civil servants. Smith’s notion of political culture refers to the
statistically basic, greater part of the society (population). Moreover, he be-
lieves that political culture is the result of the impact of politics, and not its
source or reason, devoting little attention to the feedback between politics and
political culture, which might have been manifested as the result of examining
the connection between the increase of employment in public administration
and political culture in these social groups.
Authors from the Universidad Nacional de Colombia make reference to
various understandings of political culture, beginning with Almond and Verba’s
classical concept and ending with Spanish political science. The team working
under Oscar Mejía Quintana published (in 2006) a volume of studies edited by
Gina Paola Rodríguez, relating the connections between culture and politics to
the state, nation, and globalisation in the long process of Colombian
modernisation. For all considerations of greatest importance is the closing es-
say by the editor of the volume, entitled Los estudios sobre la cultura política
en America Latina (Rodríguez 2006: 269–293). She primarily asks the famil-
iar question whether we deal with the political culture that is common for Latin
America as a whole, or, rather, with political culture of the individual countries.
In her analysis, Rodríguez refers to several Latin American works. These do
not include the results of clearly empirical research. The author makes the
reservation that it is impossible to build a comprehensive perspective, because
– and here she quotes Jose Joaquin Brunner – “las culturas de América latina
en su desarrollo contemporáneo no expresan un orden – ni de nación, ni de
clase, ni religioso, ni estatal, ni de carisam, ni tradicional ni de ningun otro tipo
– sino que se reflejan en su organización los procesos contradictorios
y heterogéneos de conformación de una modernidad tardía, construida en
condiciones de acelerada internacionalización de los mercados simbólicos en el
ambito mundial” (Rodríguez 2006: 291–292). She goes on to add that “con
esto, el campo de la cultura política latinoamericana se nos presenta como
plural e indeterminado, pero además móvil y cambiante, de tal suerte que frente
a la ausencia de una historia unificadora, emergen un sinnumero de relatos
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e identidades fluctuantes que, no obstante su condición, logran dar cuenta de
nuestra caracteristicas en determinados tiempos y espacios. Así, la cultura política
latinoamericana puede ser definida como la suma de las matrices culturales que
componen el collage de la actividad política de nustras sociedades en un momento
dado. Esto hace que, así como podemos hablar de una cultura política
democrática, puede resultar justificado hablar, en otro contexto, de una cultura
política autoritaria, cuando predominan ciertos actores, actitudes y formas de
acción que bien favorecen la instalación o el mantenimiento de regímenes
políticos autocráticos” (Rodriguez, 292). The cognitive pessimism of the au-
thor seems to me exaggerated, however, though doing this she points quite
appropriately to the limitations of the “demo-liberal” model as the only or basic
measure of political culture in Latin America.
An extremely interesting attempt at applying the notion of political culture,
I found in “Political Cultures in the Andes, 1750–1950”, a collection of works
edited by Nils Jacobsen and Cristóbal Aljovín de Losada (2005). It is extraor-
dinary in the sense that – as far as I would like to use considerations of political
culture to reach the lesser-known aspects of the state – the authors of the book
apply considerations of the history of the nation-state to portray political cul-
ture and the histories of historical polities. As the research of the history of the
state in Latin America (in this case: of the Andean states) is more advanced
than the research of the political culture of the societies of the Andean region,
one is free to believe that the political change known from history will help the
authors to point at a change in the scope of political culture that has not been
known as yet. In the meantime, such changes are always difficult to be specifi-
cally identified. The result is in most cases, a suggestion, if not only an allusion,
but not a statement about a change documented in the sources. Moreover, the
content of what undergoes change is not always clear either. Yet the authors list
here three important features typical in the twentieth century for the political
culture of the region of the Andes, and at the same time specific against the
background of Latin America.
I perceive these features in the following manner: first and foremost, there
are representations of the former local civilisations, representations building
the mythological foundation (for state- and nation-forming processes). Sec-
ond, beginning with the great rebellions of the latter half of the eighteenth
century, a phenomenon has been observed in the region, namely, that the local
actions are conducted in mutual communication despite the great natural ob-
stacles, while after the fall of such efforts, the local ties – being the ones that
oppose the centralist tendency of the state – are reinforced. Third, the stale-
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mate between the main political forces is more clearly and lastingly visible here
than elsewhere in Latin America. The basic factions of the elite have failed to
work out consensual cooperation and are incapable of building a lasting coali-
tion, at the same time, they all apply the principle of excluding everyone from
outside the elite (discrimination is a means of control), while other social (and
ethnical!) groups efficiently resist the attempts at suppressing the local cultures
by centrally imposed ideologies. Although capable of inter-communal commu-
nication, they are, on the other hand, unable to develop their joint political
strategy.
It goes without saying that the three features–phenomena are the features
or manifestations of political culture, even though in his chapter of the book in
question, Alan Knight (Knight 2005: 25–57) expresses plenty of justified doubts
on the usefulness of the notion of political culture, the editors of the volume,
on the other hand, emphasise that there is no political culture of the Andean
region even despite the presence of these three features shared. I shall not be
able to refer to each book on political culture of Latin America and/or its
specific countries. The catalogue of the Library of Congress alone lists 45
titles. I can say however that most authors accept the known concept of civic
culture; others offer no definition of the political culture, as Mansilla in his
pioneer study of political culture of the authoritarian rule in Bolivia, applying
the term “political culture” as a synonym of the state performance (Mansilla
1987).
Political culture and the public discourse
My concept of political culture requires that the set of widespread and rela-
tively stable and respected beliefs connected to the identity of the society as
a political nation, that is the constitutionally defined sovereign, were expressed,
among others, in the public discourse.
In the public discourse, citizens and institutions of the civic society – in
a democratic state – conduct a debate on the raison d’état and the socially
important goals of policy-making. This is how the public hierarchy of the shap-
ing policy factors is continuously updated, including the ideologies transform-
ing into political doctrines and programmes of political parties. What we deal
here with is the formation of a certain “public raison d’êtat” within a pluralist
society. With the lack of democracy, the public discourse looks somewhat dif-
ferent, yet also plays an important function.
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Going beyond the face-value understanding of the discourse, as a debate in
the mass media and through education and publication, I use this notion to
define – under the influence of Faucault – the “public debate of operating
subjects – actors (also institutional), working out the generally accepted under-
standing of the given question, resulting from the shared history and culture of
social communication, and manifested in a variety of ways, yet, finally, repre-
sented in language” (Stemplowski 2007: 325).
Does the criterion of the language not exclude registering forms of con-
sciousness and resultant behaviours if they are not expressed directly in
verbalisation? To illustrate the problem let me ask whether the phenomenon of
the mass failure to observe the principles of road traffic is a manifestation of
political culture. Peter Waldmann described the vehicular traffic over the river
in the Bolivian city of Santa Cruz, where one of the bridges has only one lane
and requires alternating one-direction traffic. The increased weekend traffic
loads (as the route leads to attractive suburban areas) is obstructed by the
drivers who – ignoring the queue of the cars that have arrived earlier – attempt
to force their way into the head of the column from a side (from outside the
only lane), which results in the situation reminding of “shepherding of a flock
of rams disturbing one another into a pen” (Waldmann 2006: 204). Neither
a pedestrian nor a driver produces any written statements on such an occasion.
Even though not every crossing the street by a pedestrian on a red light in
a Latin American city will find its description in a work by a learned democrat
in the European Rechtsstaat, such behaviours have their correlate not only in
the drivers’ mentality but also in the form of police descriptions of the situation
that can be considered representative (language) for research in political cul-
ture. It is only the public emergence of the description of the attitude (intro-
duction of the results of the research into public domain) that allows using such
a secondary source of information: and it is this very information that is
a component of the discourse recognizable through language, also – if not
predominantly – accounting for the colloquial language, which may “disclose”
to the researcher the actual state of consciousness present in large numbers of
individuals. Having identified the source of information, we may consider the
conceptualisation involving the language in a deeper sense.
Continuing considerations on the language as a manifestation of culture,
we notice that the phenomenon of the populist leader communicating with the
masses is typical for the Latin American cultura verbalista. “Give me a balcony,
and I will become the president,” José María Velasco Ibarra, five times the
President of Ecuador (winner in the elections of 1933, 1943, 1951, 1959
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and 1967), used to say. Similarly known was the balconazo practised by the
President of Peru, Alan García, during his first presidency: he would leave the
place behind his desk, grab the microphone ready for such a circumstance, run
out to the balcony and announce his decisions “in dialogue with people”. In
this, he might have followed Perón, yet the latter began from using the micro-
phone thrust at him by a journalist by name of Evita, and did so in the street
(which, after all, made their joint way to the balcony of Casa Rosada easier).
The “living” language is not only the carrier of information about the programmes
or resolutions, but also a more broadly conceived component of the political,
and of organisation of the political power in a Latin American state. Neither
television nor the Internet could fully replace the balcony. Is this connected
with the cult of the hero so widespread in Latin America? Possibly only of
those, who have earned their special status in their lifetime, and usually on an
exposed position (Brunk and Fallaw 2006). The attitude towards the hero is
hard to be distinguished from the one towards the caudillo, should one disre-
gard the manner such leadership is created. Balconazo could, however, be
explained in the categories of symbolism and communication in politics (Dittmer
1977), that is, as one of the manifestations of political culture, moreover: one
that is very old and enjoys Independence traditions (cabildo abierto).
Quoted above, the criterion of the “generally accepted understanding of
the given question”, significant for the evaluation of the public discourse, does
not cover – I believe – the totality of citizens in any country of Latin America.
It definitely does not encompass those who do not realise that their homeland
lies within a territory that others (aliens) believe to be within something that
those aliens refer to as the state. From time to time groups of such original
inhabitants of South American jungles are found, especially in Brazil and around
its north-western borders. These descendants of the original inhabitants who
are aware of being subjected to the state’s central power, on the other hand,
are not a uniform group. Present here is the dualism of political culture. Be-
sides the norms of traditional organisation – present here are the norms of the
imposed state; side by side with the precolonial political culture – there are the
norms connected to the new culture of the conquerors, especially among the
persons passively or – the more so: actively – accepting the new state. A great
portion of the autochthonous population of Latin America does not participate
in the construction of the “generally accepted understanding of the given is-
sue” that is to be the result of the “shared history and culture of social commu-
nication” in the given state. For this reason, in a country with such an autoch-
thonous population, it is impossible to find such an “understanding of the
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issue” that would be produced by all the citizens. Political culture of the au-
tochthonous population mentioned above is related to the political that con-
nects their civic consciousness with precolonial forms of social self-organisation,
and with these forms of collective life that originated in the process of these
people’s adaptation to the colonial and postcolonial order. The twentieth cen-
tury Indigenism and even Indianism served that adaptation. Only those who
had gone through the process of acculturation were capable – to a certain
extent – of winning through the dualism, although the question about the
content of citizenship in consciousness (political culture) of these people – or,
to be more precise, about the scope of acceptance of statehood as a factor co-
constituting national identity – still comes up. There is probably the phenom-
enon of two levels of identity in the local social space, where one can be
a member of both the local community and one that is broader, yet in a differ-
ent manner than the bien acomodados politicians from the capital.
Black slaves and their progeny did not participate in the process at all. By
paradox, the black was “invisible” (Bryan and Serbin 1996: 40–41), although
the Blacks’ blood “flows in a majority of Brazilians” (Burns 1970: 356) and in
many other inhabitants of Latin America. Yet our knowledge of the political
culture of non-European population – also about the political cultures (the
plural use intended) originates from the analysis of secondary sources, that is
published results of anthropological, archaeological, ethnological, historical,
political, and sociological studies.
Social movements, as for example the Zapatista in the Mexican state of
Chiapas, favour the development of these forms of political culture that are
connected to the political of the local Indian communities and can make use of
modern means of communication (Internet). The participation of the leaders of
such a movement in public discourse favours the development of our (observ-
ers’) knowledge about this political culture. They participate in the public dis-
course also in the forms that attract the attention of the media.
Turning attention to the importance of the criterion of the generally ac-
cepted understanding of the given issue, we perceive that the convergence of
the condition of the communities listed below with the condition of the com-
munities of the Andean region described in the book edited by Jacobson and
Aljovín de Losada referred to above. The inability to produce a national collec-
tive identity of the population in such states signals the poorer advancement of
the cultural, and – the more so – of the political. Or, in other words, of such
widespread and stable forms of social consciousness, where the joint identity of
the political nation and acceptance of common statehood exist. I cannot dwell
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here upon the historical example of Paraguay from before the Guerra de la
Triple Alianza (1864–1870), when most probably the country featured a pro-
cess of nation-building that was most advanced in the entire Latin America,
and a situation to which the statements about identity and statehood made
above could possibly not apply.
Reflected in the public discourse, the poor advancement of the cultural and
the political is present also in reference to the social inequality in the position of
the woman and the man. The extreme demographic imbalance (overwhelming
numerical overrepresentation of women) in Paraguay after the mentioned Guerra
de la Triple Alianza weakened the state, yet such a problem does not exist in
today’s Latin America. There is, however, an inequality of a different type. The
participation of women in the public discourse is smaller than that of man, yet
even the overrepresentation of women over men in the parliament does not
naturally have to be a mark of actual democracy (see Rwanda). There are at
least three factors that influence the status of the woman measured in her
impact in the discourse and especially her impact in elections: (1) the tension
between the religious and lay orders connected with the economic conditioning
of the status, (2) the level of institutionalisation of the state, (3) mindset or the
attitudes within specific party elites – which is at least how I understand the
thesis formulated by Fiona Macaulay (Macaulay 2006). There are at least two
models of equalising the status, Brazilian and Chilean. The first is based on
a huge political party, Partido Trabalhista, being the promoter of women’s rights,
while the centralised Chilean system developed the Office for Women (Servicio
Nacional de la Mujer). Visible clearly in both the countries is the progress in
equalising the status of the woman and man. It continues faster in Brazil,
possibly due to the starting point being lower, greater differentiation of the
country, and flexibility that accompanies it in the realm of social advancement.
The division into urban and non-urban population causes the inequality of
participation in the discourse, because the non-urban population is poorly edu-
cated and organised, which is especially visible wherever this division as a cri-
terion is superimposed on the criteria of ethnicity and sex. I have been unable
to ascertain how much the two sections of the population differ regarding their
examination by the social sciences; I suppose only a small share of the popula-
tion has at all been covered by research. Which is why we have to confine
ourselves to making hypotheses through application of deduction and extrapola-
tion of the results contained in secondary sources. Mentioned above, Craig and
Cornelius verify the classical work by Almond and Verba and turn the attention to
the methodological implication of such a state-of-the-art in the domain.
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The urban population participates in the public discourse intensively, yet to
the manual labourers of production and services sectors do it mainly through
their trade unions, direct actions, union and party manifestations, participation
in elections, and organised crime. Information about political culture is to a great
extent expressed in the language of trade union activists, politicians and media,
police, persecutors and judges, and to a lesser degree in the language of other
secondary sources, that is works of social scientists. The research of the con-
nection between identity, work (labour) and forms of protest is now only begin-
ning to discover the political culture of people remaining outside trade unions
and other organisations (Peloso 2008) or forming entirely new movements.
A manifestation of civic movement that creates something that is really of
an alternative character, were the gatherings that originated in Argentina as
a spontaneous answer to the suddenly developed deep atrophy of state power
and banking institutions in December 2001. These movements were “not de-
manding something new, but creating it” (Sitrin 2006: 10). Consensus (and
not the method of reaching decisions by majority vote) led these people to
organise themselves around the basic functions related to employment and
sustenance. It is hard not to notice that this bears a resemblance to some
premises for the actions of organisations of autochthonous communities, the
Argentinian “piqueteros” (Escudé 2005: 67–100), and even the guerrilla
movements, corruption cliques, etc.
Similarly, political culture is influenced by religious organisations that at the
same time are to a certain extent a manifestation of that culture; a fact that can
be attested by the common presence of such institutions among the Latin Ameri-
can migrants in the USA and Europe: it is a presence with no serious institu-
tional competition, should one disregard the ethnical organisations focused on
the commercial services for migrants (as e.g. the media). Transfer of religious
institutions from the native country to the target country is a manifestation of
the cultural (a function of the identity) of the migrants that took shape before
the migration. The research of a similar – yet much earlier phenomenon –
among immigrants from Europe in Argentina and Brazil proved that émigré
religious institutions promoted maintaining contact with the country of origin,
i.e., with the country or the institution of the state, with all its implications for
the political culture, yet this was true mainly about Catholicism. In the case of
Latin America, the most active religious organisations among immigrants are
not Roman-Catholic. Besides this, what is visible here is a religious syncretism,
a phenomenon known in Latin America (and the Caribbean) yet rather from
the colonial period. Local religions that are now born that are theologically
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universal and of transnational character. For that reason, their impact on politi-
cal culture must differ from the one we know from the history of Atlantic
migrations from mid-nineteenth century to 1930s.
The importance of religious organisations in Latin America for the public
discourse requires a systematic research. Important are the unorthodox ele-
ments of religious activity, among whose number I count the liberation theol-
ogy and the activity of North American evangelising missions. On the other
hand, systematic religious practices in the churches and religious associations
recognised by the state apply to a tiny share of population, and for that reason
the social teaching of the most popular church – the Roman Catholic Church –
including the personal impact of priests, monks, and nuns – seems to me some-
thing of secondary importance immersed in the syncretism of local cultures.
Such an opinion is in no way denied by the fact that some grass-root guerrilla
movements opposing the European intervention in Mexico in mid-nineteenth
century used the imported Catholic icon of Mother of God, i.e., the image of
Our Lady of Guadalupe.
Worth attention is the function of the system of education in the public dis-
course. The role of primary and secondary education is obvious, especially in
those areas where educación cívica was persistently promoted, yet its results are
visible after the students have left school. The university is of greater importance.
Unlike in the British colonies in the Caribbean, in the colonial America,
later referred to as Latin, the establishment of universities preceded the devel-
opment of general education of the primary and secondary levels. The univer-
sity reinforced the culture of colonial metropolises, opening in the period since
the Independence to the more-broadly-understood European culture yet re-
taining its elitist character. Where the European presence made its strongest
mark due to mass European immigration in the latter half of the nineteenth and
in the first decade of the twentieth centuries, this model of university was
questioned. The implications of the Argentinian Reforma Universitaria (Cordoba,
1918) went beyond the university, influencing the broader political culture in
a manner unequalled also outside Latin America.
The reformers put forward three groups of ideas and demands: (1) they
defined the university as a republic of the intellectuals, managed like a demo-
cratic state, with the participation of citizens i.e. students, claiming the partici-
pation of students in managing bodies. (2) They opposed what they defined as
dogmatism, demanding discourse showing opposing points of view, wanted to
abolish the system of “catedráticos” i.e. lifelong professorships (with fixed number
of tenures): they wanted these posts to be staffed through competitions, and
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later regularly verified (here, postulates were confined to generalities); they
demanded that the prerogatives of the rector and dean in their brief of defining
the curriculum be abolished, imposing and entrusting the same to the lecturer
(here the postulates varied); demanded abolishing compulsory attendance at
the lectures, and improvement of relations between the teaching and the taught.
(3) They wanted to develop a new type of a link between the university and the
society: (a) Universities were to embark on the most important problems of the
country, but they were to be autonomous, and the state authority was not to
influence the operation. (b) Universities were to be accessible also for the youth
without the financial support of the family, and were also to run certain branches
in the form of people’s universities. (c) The Manifesto includes the notion of
“scientific liberalism”. It may be believed that it led its the authors to postulat-
ing the university as “a tool of social impact” so as to transform the “high
culture” into “scientific disciplines” given into the service of the society. The
reformers rejected the “colonial mentality” and the university perceived as
a “monastery”, demanding “a university being a laboratory”.
Implications of these postulates for the considerations on political culture
are obvious. Nevertheless, the movement of university reform did not, how-
ever, aim at the creation of the alternative university, even if it helped to estab-
lish people’s universities. Additionally, it must be remembered that thanks to its
instigation of establishment of a national student associations (a political cul-
ture factor in and of itself), the reform movement helped democratisation by
the reinforcement of parties representing the middle class. After many years,
the socially radical tradition of the reform reinforced the factors politicising
academic milieux in Latin America. One may even consider whether and to
what degree the reform of 1918 could be treated a few decades later as the
historic legitimisation of the social role of the reformer and even the reform-
ism-despising revolutionary of the 1960s and 1970s (Stemplowski 2008).
The contemporary political discourse encompasses even wider problem ranges
that connect the concepts and postulates of justice with those pertaining to the
attitude to the natural environment. There are plenty of suggestions that it is
the very platform where the people of various ethnicities, nationalities, social
classes, sexes, etc may co-operate. The recognition of forms of consciousness
in this scope requires a new sensitivity to the questions of the natural environ-
ment. Such a recognition runs into elementary difficulties with access to data
on the natural environment, especially ones that refer to this environment indi-
rectly, as e.g. the data on the health status. Such data, where they actually
exist, are indeed testimony to exposing people to the dangers resulting from
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the changes (more precisely: destruction) of the natural environment, that is to
environmental hazards.
In some cases, the purpose of seeking the link between the environment
and justice – and indirectly, the political culture – will seemingly concern only
the autochthonous people, the indígenas, pueblos originarios. What is most
visible is the fact that these people fall victim to the most blatant social inequali-
ties. This, however, pertains also to the descendants of the slaves and – gener-
ally – the poor as such. Indeed, some of the poor invade the lands of other
poor, albeit belonging to the indígenas, in which case the victim is everyone on
both sides of the conflict, for which someone else is responsible.
Although passing legislation on natural environment has continued in Latin
America for over 20 years, its execution is partial because this is how law
operates there and also because the laws are copied from highly industrialised
states (the US, EU countries), where these norms operate in a different social
context. Let us take a note of what access to water looks like – a case that I treat
as an illustration of the problem discussed – and there are few needs as basic
for existence as the satisfaction of the human need for drinking and watering
the cultivated lands. The more so, as both the notion and the physical sub-
stance of water have different significance in some cultures than in the culture
of the West. Let us remember that for example the subterranean resources of
Acuífero Guaraní (covering the hydrographical conditions within a basin around
the borders of Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina, and Uruguay) are one of the larg-
est prospected body of fresh water in the world in its type (Schmidt, Vassolo,
Assolo 2007).
Even though it is only 5% of the world’s potable water that is privately
managed, the revenues from this title are nearly twice as large as those pro-
duced by the entire global oil industry. Major foreign investors, not to mention
Latin American governments, must be interested in local political cultures, not
only those that take up huge areas and speak mostly the Guaraní. “Sophisti-
cated infrastructure and management regimes for irrigation were developed by
communities in the Andes well before the Incas flexed their imperial muscle
[...]. In some places in Mexico, communities managed water autonomously and
cooperatively. In arid regions, water management was ‘heavily dependent on
terraces, diversion dams, aqueducts, and canal networks within valley-limited
drainages which were knit together by expanding empires’ [...]. Mexico City
was a marvel of water engineering when Hernán Cortés and his forces arrived
to conquer the Aztec empire [...]. Indigenous values and political cultures and
the complex systems of rights and responsibilities where they have any status at
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all have been reduced [...]. States and market systems of water-resource man-
agement ‘ignore or deny the existence or importance of common-law norma-
tive frameworks regarding local indigenous rights and uses and water resource
management’ [...]” (Wickstrom 2008: 287–289). Local people fight back not
only major foreign investors but also the new settler (colono). Moreover, the
more local the water management, the more efficient it is, which may be at
odds with the culture of a major corporate investor.
The presidency of Evo Morales favours the introduction of new property
relations in Bolivia concerning water distribution, a change that the people of
the poor urban districts began struggling for earlier. Social organisations in
Chile also work hard for a new regulation in this scope. In Mexico, operating
within NAFTA “[...] elites have attempted to deconstruct the corporatist politi-
cal culture of the Mexican Revolution, but have yet to replace it with a new
political culture” of free trade in water (Wickstrom, 310).
The language of talks about water may be a problem in itself, if a foreign
investor considers it among physical resources or means of labour in the enter-
prise constructed, while the local community treats water as something that has
its identity in the system combining all the elements and including the river, the
forest, people, air, mountains, etc, with each of the components being treated
in a similar way. Political cultures of the investor and the local people belong to
different worlds. Even though all the participants of the communication pro-
cess may speak one language in the philological sense, there is a need for an
interpreter being a cultural broker.
The problem of language is also present when speaking in Latin America
about one of the most important questions, namely the redistribution of the
domestic product, in the language of the societies of highly developed Europe
with its social structure different from Latin American. It is rather the “style of
former leftist rhetoric” of social democratic and/or liberal origin – not ad-
equate to today’s EU or the US – that is to be used in Latin America: the
language of David Lloyd George, Franklin Roosevelt, and William Beveridge
treating these issues in the categories of “social patriotism” and aimed at the
“average citizen” (Jackson 2009), i.e. according to the principles of class soli-
darity. Here, political culture is immediately connected with the forms of ideo-
logical thinking about the nation and major groups in social structure.
I would also like to point to the significance of the Aesopian language and
the public discourse. It is present when the words uttered in an explicit literary
and historical context acquire a different meaning with the listener, because he
or she refers it to his or her contemporary political reality. We know this phe-
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nomenon from the practice of autocratic systems not only in Latin America.
Any mention of a “Fall” may be associated with the expected fall of the military
junta, the “Spring” is the harbinger of changes, and in Chile the “earthquake”
(after the actual earthquake in 1985) was associated quite unambiguously:
cases of Chilean and not only theatres operating under censorship that sought
for the language of political resistance are quite well known. This is how also
objects–signs may speak out, for example, I saw a small electric resistor pinned
into the lapel that signalled the attitude of opposition against the dominant
system. The political joke is close to such behaviours. In the language of Aesop
and in the language of signs, political culture finds it manifestation.
Examining the public discourse, we prefer searching for utterances that are
the result of existing convictions and beliefs: widespread and typical in the
statistical sense, predominant in the given set. The set may be the entire society,
or, at another time – a group singled out along with defined criteria. This,
however, does not exclude examining the beliefs of individuals, which is dis-
cussed below. Methodology-wise, it is more difficult to decide whether a given
belief is respected. One might assume that “the given individual respects the
given belief, if in a systematic manner (at an appropriate time) the individual
undertakes the appropriate activity regularly as if the individual accepted that
belief as a subjective and rational premise of that activity” (Kmita 1985: 25).
The individual may in fact accept such a belief in this manner, yet the accep-
tance itself may nevertheless be gradable. On the other hand, not every regular
action must be the result of acceptance, as what we deal with may be a reflex
and not an action resulting from acceptance (conscious action).
To the considerations about the participation of individuals and social groups
and organisations in the discourse, I would like to add a comment on the
media. They participate in the shaping of the discourse, yet it is risky to deduce
political culture on the grounds of their message. We have in memory the
impressive spread of the printed word in Argentina and Uruguay in the first
half of the twentieth century, with the long terms of office of very different
governments in these countries. Together with education at the secondary and
higher level, the printed word increases the level of orientation in education,
yet the radio and especially the television must be even more important. Televi-
sion seems to be the national carrier of political culture mostly in the sense that
it emphasises the central executive power and the national symbols. The Euro-
pean viewer in Latin America is stricken by the name of the state being the most
frequently repeated word in the president’s speech. This has also lost the sem-
blances of novelty to Latin Americans, and they hardly notice it. They have
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been accustomed to frequent references to the state by the school with its
everyday ritual of singing the national anthem and raising the flag. It is possible
that the term “nacionalismo” has lesser importance in Latin America than in
Europe. I mean here especially the immigrant countries. Nevertheless, these
were the governments of Latin America that in the 1930s rejected the Euro-
pean concept of national minority as Latin American elites found it conflictogenic.
It seems, however, that there is still room for such a form of conscience, where
a descendant of European immigrants ideologically finds the indigenous popu-
lation a minority, even though it may constitute the statistical majority there.
The significance of the elite is obvious, and often these are the family ties
that play a decisive role in its formation (Lindhal 1962), yet what is the signifi-
cance of the so-called authorities or individuals of high standing? Individuals as
public or moral authorities in Latin America are a rarity, while authorities built
on the position held in the halls of the academy are an extreme rarity. Such
a position of the authority may be acquired by a writer, but one must first gain
recognition abroad – best in Europe. A musician or a singer should acquire
fame in the United States. Naturally, a footballer always remains a highly popu-
lar and possibly the best recognised celebrity, a fact that politicians know how
to use, yet how is this it connected to the construction of civic society? It
definitely may play a socially compensating function, as it shows a specific path
of social advancement and makes the acceptance of external world easier. (Yet
even in the United States it took 61 years from the moment the first black
basketball player was selected for a league team to the election of Barack Obama
the President.) Of interest is the fact that Latin Americans are primarily highly
successful in team games, which rebuffs the stereotype of their excessive indi-
vidualism. Does it prove that the ability of closely regulated cooperation – in
their culture – comes to them with ease? Such a cooperation is also a form of
public discourse with media reinforcement. NB: Neither General Powell nor
President Obama would be considered Blacks in Latin America.
With full acceptance of the special significance of the mass media and spo-
ken word, and also of the Internet – especially in Chile, Argentina, Uruguay,
and Mexico (Riedinger 2008: 185; Gascó Hernandez 2008) – one may not
forget the fact that bodies of state authorities and persons involved in public
administration participate in the public discourse, speaking mostly through of-
ficial acts and the normative acts published. Moreover, these bodies express
themselves also in a particular manner by implementing laws and carrying out
political directives. They conduct a certain discourse with citizens and the (non-
governmental) organisations along the rules of the dominant political culture.
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Closing, we need to answer the question whether considering the ties be-
tween the widespread and stable forms of social consciousness with the public
discourse, we examine beliefs as a manifestation of the consciousness of an
individual or an organ of public authority, and in this we deem that having
examined a certain (large) number of persons, also members of a collective
body, we are allowed to make binding statements on social consciousness, which
means that we believe that a social phenomenon is determined by individual
phenomena... Or maybe it is otherwise, namely that the individual conscious-
ness (ergo also individual beliefs) are determined by the social consciousness?
Answering yes to the last question, we would have to assume that social con-
sciousness is something more than just an averaged collection of individual
beliefs; it is a manifestation of social practice, an aspect of the social existence
that is a set of beliefs that are both commonly respected in the examined soci-
ety, and defined by the functioning of that society. Such a statement should
reinforce our assumption of the connection between the cultural and the politi-
cal with the language of political culture. Nevertheless, neither this language
nor the language of analysing political culture may be adequate provided
a resident of the country, a citizen, a social group or the analyst do not believe
themselves to be a part of the whole they belong to together with the subject of
the analysis: “the language has its inertia and is used also when it has long
ceased to adhere to the world that it is to describe”, says Leszek Kołakowski
(Kołakowski & Mentzel 2009: 126).
Policy-making and political culture
It results from the definition assumed initially that political culture is a set of
widespread and relatively stable beliefs referring among other questions to the
constitutional system of policy-making. It would therefore seem that the obvi-
ous direction of considerations should be connected with the examination of
the content of the legislation and its implementation, and the widespread and
reinforced forms of consciousness, opinions, attitudes, and behaviours of citi-
zens to identify the forms carried out in social practice – both formal (law) and
informal ones – jointly providing a testimony to the beliefs that together build
political culture. I, however, embark on my discussion in this chapter from
a point that is removed a step further, immediately borrowing a well-known
assertion of the lack of democracy and assuming that the generally binding law
was implemented throughout the most of the twentieth century to a degree
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insufficient (the actual function, not the assumed one) for the emergence of
a lasting operation of this set of systemic (constitutional) functions assumed by
a democratic republic. This shortage was quite naturally present to a varying
degree and in diverse periods in different countries, and also in various institu-
tional circumstances (e.g. democracy existing in a local community but lacking
within a group of similar size in a latifundist hacienda), but it did not pass any of
the countries, even Costa Rica. (Yet a hundred years ago, the turn-up at the polls
in Latin America did not diverge significantly from the European average.)
Beginning from recording the phenomena most broadly known and present
throughout entire Latin America, it would be impossible to fail to mention the
numerous coup d’état. Of not lesser importance is the fact of widespread fail-
ure to execute tax law and other forms of financial law. Added to that must be
the inefficiency of the policing services in ensuring safety and security for
citizens, especially outside metropolises, and even outside some of its districts.
Connected to this is the insufficiency of the judiciary and abuse of the principle
of the free discretion of the judge. Imposed on all these is also the disregard of
the law by the officers of public administration. Contempt for the law and
being unpunished. There is also the fact that the diplomatic and civil staff, with
the exception of few executive positions, remains in the ministries independent
of systemic changes. This is no Civil Service whatsoever. These are rather
obedient conformists. When General Onganía made his coup d’état in Argen-
tina in 1966, only one diplomat resigned. When President Díaz Ordaz brutally
suppressed the student demonstrations of 1968, only one ambassador of Mexico
handed in his resignation. The prevalent political culture evidently did not suf-
fer from these. At the same time there is no shortage of people among the
administration who adjust to the new order, whether authoritarian or demo-
cratic, and use the language of the new power, yet award individual terms with
contents different from ones assumed in programmes. Demoralisation engulfed
also the judiciary. In Argentina, for instance, many of the judges initially ac-
cepted the dictatorship, and – after its fall – took to sabotaging the proceed-
ings against torturers and their accomplices by delaying them. “Thus, within
a single country we can observe both notable experiences of authentic
democratisation of public life as well as the worst authoritarian fictions, both
supported by the same language and by the same legal and institutional foun-
dations” (Olvera 2008: 115).
Another characteristic phenomenon is that – while corruption of civil ser-
vants, judges and politicians in a state ruled by law is a rarity and entails in-
fringement of law – in Latin America it is frequent and is often connected to
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the effort to implement (and adjudicate) law, as this law promises to the citizen
more than the state as personified by policeman, judge, ministerial or municipal
officer is able or actually wants to provide for him. Corruption is an additional
transaction cost in the unfriendly environment of public authorities, and fre-
quently a manifestation of solidarity being a reaction to the unbearable public
administration. It is a manifestation of political culture, amending the unac-
cepted law, a form that sanctions parallel redistribution of the GDP. It may be
more enduring than the political circumstances that gave birth to it. Moreover,
a bureaucrat usually accumulates as a bribe-taker.
Studies of contemporary political corruption in Brazil, Mexico, Paraguay,
and Venezuela show a variety of corruptive phenomena in Latin America and
the level to which countering them is becoming the central problem in the
consolidation of political reform in Latin America (Little and Posada-Carbó
1996: 13, 195–285).
The government frequently runs a policy of privileging some at the expense
of others, as in the case of foreign financial operations of natural persons and
private businesses, which receive tax breaks and amnesties to the detriment of
public funding in education, healthcare, social aid, and law enforcement. Effi-
cient evasion of taxation can most evidently be reconciled with other forms of
political culture, related to the beliefs – and expectations – of other citizen viz.
the policies of the government that require budget expenditure.
It is a paradox, yet one may say that even though these states are weak, they
are at the same time perversely stable and foreseeable. It is so as their weak-
nesses are visible. At least it was so until the recent years. A criticism more
comprehensive and acute than mine; in fact truly devastating for the Latin
American state; was given by Waldmann, who defined it as el estado anómico
(Waldmann 2006). Nevertheless, now Latin America – entering that stage of
its development when it enjoys the highest pace of economic growth in the last
three decades, the current economic crisis notwithstanding – is slowly becom-
ing increasingly democratic and changing its vast social inequalities (still high
throughout the Latin America, yet with the decreasing Gini coefficient) step-
by-step, even though at the same time it is becoming more politically torn.
With the passage of time, this will influence the system of policy-making and
political culture. To a certain extent, these phenomena represent also the for-
eign influence as democratisation is the requirement of foreign and interna-
tional institutions, whose cooperation Latin Americans may want or be forced
to use. This, in turn, favours the façade character of administrative actions in
support of democratisation.
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Embarking on a more systematic analysis of the connection between social
consciousness and the systemic way of policy-making, I would like to emphasise
that the frame of reference (institutional model) here is a democratic state. The
notion of policy-making refers here to policy-making in the comprehensive
sense of “policy”, unless the term “foreign policy” is used. Policy-making en-
compasses everything that may refer to actors (including agents), without limi-
tation of the notion of the actor to the notion of a subject of international
public law. Special attention will be paid to the operation of the federal system,
executive power, the notion of raison d’état, the presidential decision-making
process, efficiency of policy-making, existential security, and potential change
in policy-making resulting from the existence of autocratic government. Demo-
cratic transformation will be discussed in the following chapter.
1 . Majority of Latin American states are unitary, and hardly differ one from
another. The only federal Latin American states are Argentina, Brazil, Mexico,
and Venezuela, but most people in Latin America live in a federal state. There
are some 46 federational states in today’s world, yet it is difficult to find two
that would be the same. The following concepts of federalism, carried out in
different states of Latin America in different proportions, are decisive for dis-
cussion of political culture:
a) All three types of power – legislative, executive, and judiciary – must be
present at both institutional levels: institutions of the federal state and insti-
tutions of the member of the Federation.
b) The functional division of power is based on the fact that defined functions
(tasks, permanent goals) of the state are conducted independently on either
level.
c) The characteristic features of culture, economy, etc. of the individual re-
gions, whose borders usually coincide with the borders of members of the
federation, are maintained.
d) The principle of subsidiarity, in reference to the institutions of public au-
thorities, and to the voluntary civic associations, is respected in the society
of the federal state.
Federal character is always manifested in the consciousness of citizens,
depending on the legal awareness, yet it may also be so to the extent to which:
(1) The colonial “territorialism” (Carmagnani 1984) of the economic interests
of local elites was finally overcome, and they were fully included into the
supraregional market, with the simultaneous maintenance of the regional spe-
cific character, also cultural, and (2) the above is allowed by the centralist
presidential system of policy-making and the system of elections – also in the
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scope of its abuse. The situation where the problem of territorialism does not
refer solely to the elite is not a typical one (Jan Szemiński told me how, on
Sunday, in the market square of Cusco first the Peruvian flag is hoisted to the
mast to the accompaniment of the Peruvian anthem, but immediately thereafter
the Himno al Cusco is heard and the flag of Tawantinsuyu is hoisted).
The so-called intervenciones, i.e. the cases of assuming control over a province
by the president of the federal republic in the place of the authorities of the
province (a member of the federation) are a common phenomenon. Of specific
importance is also the system of electing governors (of states, provinces, de-
partments, territories, autonomous regions) in the non-federal states. In some
of them, governors are elected in popular election (Nicaragua, Colombia, Peru,
Paraguay, Uruguay) just like in the federal states. Moreover, in Paraguay, Peru,
Ecuador, and Colombia – that is in unitary states – the departmental/regional/
provincial legislative authorities are elected.
2 . Policy-making is the operation of the state’s executive power, that is
carrying out the competencies on the basis and within the scope of law by the
policy-making body. The principle of state policy-making by the executive power
pertains to all the states, whatever their system, even though there have been
systems where the decision-making body was the “party” group, governing
under its “secretary”, while the organ of state authority, not only of executive
character, just rubber-stamped those decisions. The position of the policy-
making body within the structure of executive power depends only on the
constitutionally defined system of policy-making. In Latin American states, there
is only one such organ, and this is the head of the state – the president, and as
a rule she/he is elected in popular election. Rooted in the political culture is the
authority of the leader (jefe de Estado, jefe político, caudillo, líder) that rein-
forces the legitimisation of the highest organ of executive power. The president
holds the key power. This principle is similar for entire Latin America but varia-
tions do exist as to the powers accorded to the president and the kind of parties
and party system (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997). There is no place here for
the conflict between the president and the Cabinet, that is the team of minis-
ters, and it used to be so even in those states where the traditional leading role
of the Minister of Home Affairs was for some time replaced by that of the First
Minister. In a democratic state in Latin America, however, there emerges the
tension between the President and the Parliament. Both these organs or bodies
of state power come from popular election, and this is the mandate that they
fall back on in their disputes.
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The parliamentary scrutiny covers only ministers, and not the president,
with the exception of the impeachment procedure meaning accusation of the
president before the parliament, considering him guilty and his removal from
the post by the parliament. In some countries, the parliamentary majority may
not be tantamount to the presidential party, yet in divided parliaments this
ensures the president with a relatively broad freedom to act. At the same time,
the parliament participates in the process of ratification of treaties concluded
by the executive power, and history knows a long list of treaties that have never
been ratified. Tolerating such a status quo signals the condition of legal aware-
ness that is present in political culture which sanctions such politics of the
president, who may refrain from ratifying a treaty, even should it be one his
representative previously signed. Worth emphasising is the fact that in most
cases it is the president who is the active subject, while the parliament remains
the reactive one, which finds reflection in the construction of the legislative
agenda (Cox and Morgenstern 2002: 446–468). One is allowed to believe
that the functioning of organs of public authority may not continue clearly and
for a long time against the political culture of the president, members of the
parliament, and the staff involved. To quote Sondrol “De jure, but more impor-
tantly, de facto political arrangements in Latin America reflect a unique, corpo-
ratist and centralist tradition dating back to Spain’s Philip V and before. The
coexistence of de jure republicanism and de facto authoritarianism in the re-
gion reflects a clash of values [...]. Dictatorship constitutionally disguised re-
flects the blending of institutions and attitudes inherited from Iberia of the
fifteenth century and the United States of the eighteenth century. Cultural and
institutional predispositions have fostered authoritarian leanings in the Latin
American presidency. At the same time, the aspirational qualities of Latin Ameri-
can constitutions (no reelection provisions, legislative impeachment procedures,
judicial review) reflects an equally powerful predilection for some mode of
pluralistic politics.” Sondrol suggests that the Latin American presidential sys-
tem may be “a different breed, mixing the primordial corporatist centrism of
the region with the more modern tenets of pluralistic liberalism to produce
a facade polyarchy that masks a civilian authoritarian system dominated, as
always, by a strong executive. [...] Historically and presently, the influence of
tradition and of prevailing conditions combine to expand Latin American presi-
dential authority. The executive provides a rallying, unifying symbol, enhances
respect for the autocratic state, and overpowers regional or factional challeng-
ers to the developmental goals of the regime. [...] This developmental model
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does not correspond to those usually employed by Northern Europeans and
North American modernisationists, who seem to view their own developmental
process and socio-cultural values as exportable in a condensed version. Through
an examination of the writings by Latin American pensadores reacting to their
own caudillistic, personalistic and elitist cultural heritage, the present study of
the Latin American presidency seeks to convey the idea that the institution
represents a culturally congruent alternative to the United States prototype,
not an aberration” (Sondrol 1990: 431–433). This argumentation may be
reinforced by turning the attention to the importance of the machismo as
a factor that is as characteristic for Latin American cultures as reinforcing
various shades of authoritarianism, both in their predominantly “male” political
elite and, more broadly, in the society. Relevant and widespread, the stable and
respected beliefs are part and parcel of political culture.
3 . Theoretically speaking, making policy, the president uses categories that
analysts may see as part of the concept of raison d’état. It seems, however, that
in the political vocabulary of Latin America, the notion of the “raison d’état”
has acquired somewhat perverse connotations and it is rather the notion of
“the national interest” that is used, even though it is quite rare. It has become
a custom to present the goals of politics in a manner as descriptive as obscure,
and aligned with nationalistic and populist rhetoric. This is most clearly re-
quired by political culture, independent of the differences between the states
(Coniff 1999). Yet in the research of policy-making, a concept of the raison
d’état or of the national interest is worth using. The content of such a concept
may be the rationally justified requirement of policy-making based on a certain
hierarchy of goals; in a democratic state – on the primacy of goals that are:
a) stably connected with (1) the national identity (expressed in political con-
cepts of the common good, fundamental liberties, existential security, justice,
peace, and human rights), (2) basic functions of the state in law-making and
law-implementation (including law-adjudication), (3) cooperation of organs of
state power, and b) combining change with continuation, c) tested in continu-
ous public discourse, d), non negotiable in relations with foreign subjects. (Stemp-
lowski 2007: 207–216). What we discuss here is an ideal criterion. Whoever
has analysed the speeches by Latin American presidents knows that reconstruc-
tion of the raison d’état on such grounds may border on the impossible.
The notion of a political concept of justice, much like of the fundamental
liberties and existential security refer solely to the basic institutions of the state,
which only partially connects these notions with the stable forms of conscious-
ness, worldviews, ideologies, doctrines, philosophies of morality, religions, etc.
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widespread in a pluralistic society; hence – with the political culture of people
who are not a part of the broadly perceived composition of the bodies in ques-
tion. (Yet we distinguish the political culture of individuals, only insomuch as
the political culture of such persons differs from the political culture related to
the institutional bodies involved.)
Under military governments and civilian authoritarian presidencies, the rules
of functioning of executive power quoted above apply with the following as-
sumptions:
a) a non-democratic type of presidency implies the concept of the national
interest being the reflection of the objectives of the individual involved or
group wielding power; present here may be different political cultures, in-
cluding racist stereotypes and specific beliefs about the relationship be-
tween the given nation and other nations, and even nationalistic ideologies
accompanying the formation of the concept autonomising “the nation” in
the definition of the content of the national interest;
b) political instability requires a politically exposed citizen to continuously
monitor the legal state, including the information related to the implemen-
tation of the law being made by the incumbent president (with the limitation
or liquidation of the legislative power, and the limitation of the judiciary),
especially in the scope of human rights, respect for civil and legal contracts,
and the property status; such an updating is performed in relation to the
dominant political culture;
c) the public discourse is controlled directly by the president, a fact also re-
lated to political culture;
d) there is no effective parliamentary scrutiny; present here again is either
contradiction or harmony with the political culture;
e) responsibility of the president is decided along the rules established by the
ruling group, which can be characterised in the categories of political culture;
f) the awareness of the democrats that the values the ruling few are suppress-
ing, are of significance for their opposition is becoming more and more
acute; the connection between the policy-making and political culture of
these people is obvious.
4 . The policy-making: president makes decisions – as a politically rational
decision maker – falling back on the identification of resources and frames of
reference (even though it were only the position of his group or political party),
operating in uncertain circumstances.
The process of policy-making is a set of feedbacks between the objectives of
the stated policy with the goals in progress and the goals actually achieved, and
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the process of policy-making by the president in a finite (defined) time is the
grand total of such feedbacks. Construed in such a way, this process holds the
potential of permanent updating of the objective and sequencing of the deci-
sion-making acts. Yet the inaccessibility of data on the decision-making pro-
cess, even worse – the colossal obstacles in accessing the archives, if not the
downright lack of documents in the archives – make it difficult to investigate
the motivations and consequently the connection between the decisions made
with the stable beliefs of decision-makers and other citizens, that is their politi-
cal culture. Therefore, it will be difficult to use the knowledge of that culture in
an examination of the state.
Political rationality is connected primarily to the identity of the president
and – to a certain extent – personalities (including emotional profiles) of the
president’s staff and advisors, and also with their groups of reference, and
finally: with the political consensus concerning the national interest. Political
rationality allows the president to reinforce of his hold on power. The recognised
forms of political culture should be obviously useful here, as the president’s
decisions are to a great extent connected to his tactics. Documentation of the
decision-making process conducted rarely bears traces of political rationality,
even though such a rationality is obviously present. An insight into such
a process could rather be provided in the form of published biographies, dia-
ries or memoirs of its participants, yet such sources are scarce in Latin America.
The internal frame of reference includes the state’s unitary or federal char-
acter. The president may “intervene” and subjugate the federational subjects
(members of the federation), yet a democratically oriented president may
strengthen his position towards the federal subjects even without an “interven-
tion”, by using instruments related to his unquestioned competences in foreign
policy, and command over the Armed Forces. President’s social radicalism may
lead to the questioning of his position by federal subjects under control of the
conservative forces opposing him. See Bolivia under the government of Evo
Morales, and compare with what can be said on the federal system and the
contemporary society in general (Schulte 1990; Reissert 1995).
The external frame of reference may be less complicated emotionally for the
decision maker, yet highly differentiated. It is easier to observe the environment
which is composed primarily by: the political situation, the global system, the
self-evaluation of the position of the state within the system, international law,
and the binding treaties. The assessment of the situation of the state should be
performed, among others, with the internationally recognised indices and cri-
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teria. Part and parcel of such a practice should be the evaluation of the effi-
ciency of policy-making.
It seems that the political practice is based on the application of a vision of
international relations, if not even a few at the same time. For an analyst and
other people interested in world politics, the most important element in the
frame of reference valid for every state may be the global system construed as
the accumulated result of the feedback between subjects and processes, present
since the end of the nineteenth century as a universal, procesual, multi-subject,
functional, self-regulating system (Stemplowski 2007: 99–102). There are
also other, varying concepts of the global system: the world system in Frank’s
model, and world-systems in Wallerstein’s model. The explanation of these
concepts lies, however, beyond the frameworks of this text. Worth noting is
also the fact that even quite recently the notions of the periphery and the Third
World were not familiar to everyone in Latin America, and among those who
knew them, there were in some countries quite a few, whose political culture
required the rejection of these notions when referring to their country, a fact
that was especially true of the notion of “the Third World”.
5 . Policy-making is strongly efficient if maintaining the stability of the con-
stitutional system of policy-making leads to the improvement of the state’s
position in the global system. It is the optimum one when maintaining the
stability, the state reaches a record improvement. Supportive criteria may in-
clude: the efficiency of Mercosur and other regional cooperation agreements
in Latin America, and in the future – of the Unasur system. A yardstick of this
efficiency may be the political culture of those who operate at this level of
consciousness, which though a small group is yet unresearched for its political
culture.
6 . The respect for the (real) property and the principles of justice belongs
to the category of existential security (an ingredient of the notion of raison
d’état), and the postulate of justice in Latin America must refer primarily to the
distribution of wealth. One may risk the statement that the postulate of existen-
tial security is rooted – though differently formulated – in the political culture
of every society, and the better we get to learn this culture, the more precisely
we will understand that postulate. Yet, let us ask to what degree the concepts
worked out in the prosperous societies apply to Latin American states? Is it the
volume of assets that is the criterion, or is it rather its perception? How strong
is the impact of relative deprivation? The scope of existential security entails
also personal security. How does a residential district of a metropolis compare
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here to the favelas? Going further, what is the position taken by Latin American
governments viz. such blatant manifestations of the “inequality and the rule of
law” that are found in the “police killings” (Brinks 2008), lawless intimidation
and killing suspects and witnesses by the police in cities including Salvador, São
Paulo, Buenos Aires, and Córdoba?
7 . A specific aspect of the relationship between the state and the political
culture results from policy-making defined as counterinsurgency, and being in
its essence, state terrorism. This is how the state redefines the constitutionally
declared institution of the rule of law, putting the citizen not only before the
authority which is autocratic but also applies double legal standards. This is
based primarily on the fact that the most repressive actions are concealed and
publicly presented as apparent abuse of the apparatus of power, while in fact,
they result directly from the policy-making of the government; they are con-
ducted on the basis of governmental decisions and decisions of the bodies,
services, and offices dependent on the government. Such a policy was present
in the operations of the so-called “death squadrons” and even in the Operation
Condor initiated during the cold war by the government of Chile and con-
ducted jointly on the power of an agreement between the governments of
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay, and in a certain scope
also of Ecuador and Peru, by the special services of those states, with the
knowledge and approval of the US government, and with the support of the
CIA (McSherry 2007). It is hard to expect that the political culture of people
from outside the government machinery or groups supporting it could develop
the culture of civic identification with the state under such conditions.
Democratisation and political culture
The stability of certain features of colonial, metropolitan political culture in
Latin America went hand in hand with the Latin American constitutional re-
publicanism, that is something systematically – ergo also culturally – different
from European (ex-)colonial metropolises throughout the nineteenth century
and the first decades of the twentieth century. Hence the idealistically formu-
lated Latin American constitutions include the principles of the sovereignty of
the people, division of powers, representational bodies, principles of equality
of rights, electoral law, etc. with the simultaneous rejection of slavery, inquisi-
tion, aristocratic titles, privileges of catholic clergy, limitations of liberties, limi-
tations of private ownership, etc. Nevertheless, this republican constitutional
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order was contradictory not only with the (post)colonial order of the metropo-
lis, but also with the practice of Latin American governments – authoritarian
and rather akin to the colonial. Obviously, contemporary political cultures of
those societies were related rather to the ancien regime and may be said to
have posed barriers for the new order. The democratic Latin American repub-
licanism drew on European doctrines and US federalism to excel over Euro-
pean monarchism (which is not contradicted by the fact that for a time Mexico
and Brazil were monarchies), yet it never managed to transform into the prac-
tice of governing in Latin American states. This is why the economic and politi-
cal development in the United States and Western Europe made the systems of
Latin American states of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries mea-
sured with the model of the democratic state ruled by law outside Latin America,
in the United States and Western Europe of the latter half of the twentieth
century. It is mostly on this model that the typical conceptualisation of
democratisation of Latin American states is based, with all the limitations of the
Eurocentric approach. Hitherto, any new approach is still in statu nascendi.
There are features of political culture that favour democratisation, and yet
some features of this culture result from the existence of democracy. In the
process of democratisation – being a transformation of the systemic kind –
there are processes that to a certain extent depend on the system from which
one goes to democracy.
In the case of every state under transformation in Latin America: (a) the
social grounds for wielding state power (legitimisation) changes, which is fol-
lowed by the legalisation of the previously existing party system, provided there
had been one; (b) the implementation of a democratic constitution is restored,
institutions of the democratic state are built by the restitution of the system for
law-making and establishment of representative bodies of state power (presi-
dent, parliament) through democratic elections; (c) the functioning of the judi-
ciary is returned; which, however, does not automatically mean the automatic
implementation of all the binding legal norms (with the saying la ley se acata
pero no se cumple, retaining its validity to an extent). The state undergoing
systemic transformation is potentially strong, if the success of transformation is
assumed, yet the transformation runs from the level of a week state under the
conditions of weakness. (The transformation itself does not make the state,
strong.) What is obviously discussed here is the transformation of autocracy
into democracy, and not vice versa.
As I mentioned above, the weakness of a Latin American state is stable,
which makes it foreseeable. Now, however, I would like to discard this semi-
426 ON THE STATE OF LATIN AMERICAN STATES. APPROACHING THE  BICENTENARY
ironic use of the notion of stability, for the benefit of the defined concept.
I refer the notion of the stability of a constitutional system to human activity
and legal institutions. The basic criterion for the stability of a constitutional
system is not the change as such or the lack of changes, not even a defined
single change; this is the combination of (a) two defined equivalent states of
balance, (b) two defined changes, and (c) time, that is the combination of
(1) the state of original balance, (2) the disruptions that originated in this state
of balance, and (3) the return to the state of balance equivalent to the original
state, with (4) the return taking place in a finite time. The “return” used in the
definition does not mean only the process of returning, but the process ending
up in the return. The constitutional system is strongly stable, if after the cessation
of the disruption that originated in an existing state of balance, it returns to
a condition that corresponds to the original state of balance. The lower levels of
stability are a function of the partial process of returning. The empirical discovery
of the equivalents of the state of balance assumes the existence of adequate
knowledge, which may require historical research of the original condition.
The problem lies in how we define the disruption. It may be defined nar-
rowly, as a change that renders the working out or carrying out the raison
d’état or national interest impossible. Or it may be defined broadly, as the rule
of authoritarian government. In a strongly instable system, to differentiate be-
tween balance and disruption may be impossible even in a longer period.
Let us, however, first consider the problem of the duration of the disrup-
tion. If the period when the disruptive circumstances last is very long, the
question arises whether something that in its initial phase might be considered
a disruption has not later transformed into a stable change in the system?
Should the duration of the period of the disruption be immaterial for the appli-
cation of the definition of stability quoted here, the returning of the electoral
democracy in Chile in 1999 removes the disruption initiated with Pinochet’s
coup in 1973. Would, however, also a potential change of the system in Castro’s
Cuba end the period of the thus defined disruptions, if it were to return the
democratic government from before the Batista dictatorship, introduced after
a short lived period of democracy? In this case, it would rather be the democ-
racy that would be a certain disruption in the authoritarian rule. The political
culture of Cuba has been shaped under the influence of authoritarian or auto-
cratic government throughout nearly its entire history. This is what happened
before the revolution, this is how revolution functioned. “Revolutionary justice
is based not on legal precepts, but on moral conviction” – Castro (quoted after
Pérez 1995: 316). Yet culture is also shaped by the social welfare policies
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initiated in 1959. “Since then the Cuban Revolution under Fidel Castro has
scored some notable achievements, especially in the areas of health care, edu-
cation and race relations” (Smith 2005: 24). Could achievements of this kind
remain without influence on beliefs – even under authoritarian rule – and not
contribute to the understanding of – for example – egalitarianism or speaking
more broadly – of justice – if their impact went even beyond the borders of
Cuba, and even Latin America? This, however, must be a selective influence, if
one does not hear much about the eagerness to follow the Cuban family code
with its prerequisite for the men to participate in the housework with the woman
in full-time employment. Possibly because it does not work in Cuba either.
The fact of the repeated character of the disruptions, even should they be
present for decades, is not a complication that would be insurmountable in the
application of the definition quoted above – Argentina experienced in the twen-
tieth century the following: electoral democracy in 1916–1930, a military
coup in 1930, returning of the electoral democracy with limitations in 1932,
a military coup in 1943, returning of the electoral democracy in 1958 – yet
with the limitation of the operation of the Perón party, a military coup in 1966,
returning the electoral democracy in 1973, a military coup in 1976, and
returning of the electoral democracy in 1983 – yet during the financial crisis
(caused by the servicing of the foreign debt) Argentina had five presidents in
two weeks (without any coup d’état) in 2001.
The number of military coups in Latin America in the twentieth century,
ranged from 15 in Bolivia to 1 in Uruguay, with the average of 8 per state. The
high instability in nearly all the countries of the region influences the political
culture, but definitely also partially results from it – both in the realm of the
private and of the public. Naturally, one must account for the external condi-
tioning of the period discussed (the Great Depression, the cold war). If the
technological and economic development continues parallel to that, and the
state is active as the owner of businesses and allows foreign investments, the
more do the borders between the mentioned above realms of private and public
blur, and so do those between the democratic and the partially democratic,
while the political culture acquires a greater significance. Similar discussions
may be conducted about the connection between political culture with distri-
butional justice and stability (Uruguay and Costa Rica have the lowest Gini
coefficient).
With the narrow definition of the disruption, one might point at stable
systems only in the case of Costa Rica, Mexico, and Uruguay, and at the sys-
tems stable at the medium-range – in the case of the states that experienced no
428 ON THE STATE OF LATIN AMERICAN STATES. APPROACHING THE  BICENTENARY
more than half of the average number of coups d’état. With the application of
the broad definition, no state is stable. Due to the high instability of the system
measured in this way, and automatically resultant instability of the relationship
between the state and political culture, the question arises whether it is not the
concept of crisis management that should be used in the analysis of the relation-
ship between the state and political culture? Yet does such a concept of crisis not
come from the same political culture as the concepts of balance and disruption?
I have already made reference to the known fact that the research of Latin
American states frequently reflects the opinion about superiority of highly
industrialised societies of the centre of the global system over the peripheral
societies. Some of the complications result from the fact that the analytical
categories applied are value-laden. The classification of societies, political cul-
tures, and states in the global system is predominantly based on comparing
everything and everyone to the condition of the societies in the centre of the
system. The touchstone here is the democratic state functioning in the centre
of the global system, any other state is classified depending on the degree of
similarity to such a central state. Developed thus is a hierarchy with the demo-
cratic state (at its top) and ones defined with notions pointing to the lack of
certain qualities of the democratic state. The extreme illustration of that are the
notions of “failed state” and “rogue state”, and the claim of the lack of civil
society, or at least about its underdevelopment, in states outside the centre of
the global system. In literature concerning the Latin American state, special
attention is drawn to the concepts of: modernisation, dependence, imperialism,
authoritarianism, military dictatorship, democratisation (democratic transfor-
mation), low intensity democracy, defekte Demokratie, and state antinomies
(Estado anómico).
It is impossible to point at a lastingly democratic state ruled by law (i.e.
a liberal democracy) in Latin America, and for that reason a disruption – e.g.
caused by a military coup – refers only to such an electoral democracy. For
that reason, one may even ask whether the system of electoral democracy
should not be treated as a disruption of the system of liberal democracy. Treat-
ing liberal democracy as the final criterion leads therefore actually to the openly
Eurocentric, or rather corecentric measurement of political culture. At the
same time, it remains a fact that the international debate on democratisation
makes use primarily of the European model, and partially also of the federalist
model of the USA.
Nevertheless, even a positive answer to the question about the legitimacy of
applying a European measure (democracy) does not rule out examination of an
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alternative solution. It could be the hypotheses that political cultures (including
the institution of the state) in the societies of Latin America are not to be
treated as reflections of European culture, yet the use of certain categories
worked out in the culture could be allowed. Accordingly, one should assume
that each Latin American state combines authoritarian institutions with demo-
cratic ones; and each state does it in a proportion it believes proper. This
Creole republicanism would therefore be characterised by the advantage of
one-man executive in the system of power that aligns – through the system of
personal loyalties – the interests of groups with the greatest economic power
with the interests of those best organised sectors of the state apparatus (at the
same time having at their disposal the means of direct physical force). A citizen
who is not a part of any of these groups aspires to build for himself beneficial
relations with the people who are a part of such a group, accepting the
authoritarianism of one-man power, the priority of personal relations, hierar-
chy, voluntary character, and arbitrariness at each level of political power and
administration. Relations of this type are reflected commonly outside the sys-
tem of relations with the people of power. Such a political culture encompasses
everyone and everything. In result, the operation of the society is based on
such principles, both within the realms of politics and outside it. Yet the social
dynamism is also subject to the impulses of economic globalisation and cultural
diffusion of systemic models. This is why the Creole republicanism evolves,
although not in a linear manner, towards the systems prevalent in the states
remaining in the centre of the global system.
Thus, finally, using the model of European democracy makes sense, yet not
because it is “better” but because it is the system of the stronger which influ-
ences the weaker, and to a certain extent transforms the weak to its own image.
It renders the systems similar – and – to a lesser extent, the scientists who
research them.
Thus, political culture in Latin America, including the institution of the
state, should not be considered in an Eurocentric or corecentric manner, as
a system that is immature because it lacks something (democracy), etc, but as
one well rooted in historical social processes, and developing at the same time.
This development is to be examined not only or primarily as an imitation of
European culture but rather as participation and cultural diffusion – through
the globalisation mentioned earlier – covering political cultures in the scale of
the global system. At the same time, one must notice the evolution of political
culture in the countries of the centre. In these states, we encounter the long-
term drop in the consequence of increasing dysfunction of the representative
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institutions (the turnout at the polls fluctuates strongly, the capacity of effective
parliamentary scrutiny of the government’s activities is falling, the EU integra-
tion processes require quick action that is unattainable in large parliamentary
bodies), increase of the role of private financing and economic organisation
(also in producing and communication of information), weakening of the state
exclusive functions (see private provision of military services) and reinforce-
ments of the institutions of civic society (also in suprastate relations),
instrumentalisation of religion and weakening of the educational function of the
school, production of ever more efficient means of killing people, growth of
uncontrolled degradation of the natural environment... It was in no other place,
but in Europe that Nazism was born and the German State operated under
martial law for 12 years, it was in European cities of Russia that the Soviet
system was born, and in Central and Eastern Europe there were states with
authoritarian governments between the two world wars, and the autocratic
governments after the second world war: regimes of the state socialism. Mod-
ern colonialism was born in Europe. The indigenous inhabitants of America
were subjugated by Europeans. When constitutional republics were established
in Latin America, European monarchies were still to reign for another 100
years. Plenty of nondemocratic phenomena in various periods belong to the
historical origins of the democratic state ruled by law, treated as the main – if
not the only – model in the analysis of any political culture. Currently, political
culture undergoes a sped-up globalisation, and even if we want democracy to
become ever more encompassing, democratic culture is changing as well and
ever more often it functions as the resultant – which does not mean average –
of various states of political culture. Even Europe within the EU is not uniform
as a democracy.
Turning the attention to the differences between systems and similarities
between them can turn out to be useful, while explaining the institutional (le-
gal) and sociological characteristics of the state, should we use one of the
comparative studies methodologies: (1) “the most similar systems design” and
(2) “the most different systems design”, which Adam Przeworski and Henry
Teune defined in the following manner: “The most similar systems design is
based on a belief that a number of theoretically significant differences will be
fund among similar systems and that these differences can be used as explana-
tion. The alternative design, which seeks maximal heterogeneity in the sample
of systems, is based on a belief that in spite of intersystem differentiation, the
populations will differ with regard to only a limited number of variables or
relationships” (Przeworski and Teune 1982: 39, quoted after Merkel, Puhle,
431RYSZARD STEMPLOWSKI • STATES AND POLITICAL CULTURES
Croissant, Thiery 2006: 10). In this methodology, one may account for the
perception of the state through political culture, unless one takes the position
represented by the author of the most developed application of this methodol-
ogy to analyse democracy in Latin America (Peru, Mexico, Argentina), Peter
Thiery, who finds no significant importance in the category of political culture
(Thiery 2006: 54).
Political culture and collective identity
Like state in the political, political culture is rooted in the cultural, i.e. the
capacity as well as propensity to build and express individual and collective
identity and other forms of social consciousness. Collective identity comes first
as the propensity of individuals and families to build a multi-family and multi-
generational group (community). Based on the fundamental values shared by
all the members of the group and functioning in direct contact. Nationality, in
turn, is the propensity to build a community of a specific type, the nation: the
largest community based on the belief in joint origin and of the decisive impor-
tance of this origin for the identity. Which is how it is allowed to be interpreted
in European experience and, to a certain extent, in an analysis of the Latin
American state. Of special importance in this community is the shared lan-
guage, the shared tradition (including religion), and the shared economic space.
The institution of the state turns up as the most important institutional corre-
late of these phenomena and processes. Many European states, with their his-
tory uninterrupted since the early Middle Ages, operated in harmony with the
processes of cultural development of thus construed national identity; the Eu-
ropean states without such a continuity – if the lack of their statehood oc-
curred in the period of the quickest forming of the modern nations, that is from
the eighteenth to the nineteenth century (the situation of e.g. Poland) – were
reborn in the result of the existence of (a) some external premises and (b) of
a modern nation formed for a number of generations without their own state.
(In such a country, social consciousness form appear which allows the nation to
be juxtaposed to the state as if an autonomous entity.)
Compared to Europe, a different variation is present in Latin America, where
the precolonial rule was destroyed but some institutions persisted. In colonies,
with the passage of time, collective consciousnesses of dual character began to
take shape, connecting what came from Europe, with what was being built
already in America. Later, the divorce from the metropolises led to the formu-
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lation of collective identities that though autonomous, were yet with immedi-
ately notable cultural and economic mechanism that separated the descendants
of the indigenous American people and slaves from Africa from the population
of European origin. Although mestizaje was present, yet not everywhere with
the same impact on statistics, though everywhere with similar impact on the
social structure. Autonomous towards the metropolises, these collectives as-
sumed key positions in the new states. These were these new states that became
the basic institutional material for the construction of the new nationality. The
descendants of people of the non-European origin had to wait long for formal
civic rights in the acts of law, yet in practice this inequality has not yet been
fully eradicated, and its source has been not only ethnical. Both a black and
a white inhabitant of the Brazilian Bahia state, both typically poor, see that the
black “African tourists” from the USA, frequently met there, live in the five-star
Hilton hotel.
Yet both these observers are to consider themselves Brazilians, following
the ius soli principle (the birthright citizenship: where citizenship depends on
the place of birth). In Latin America, citizenship has been identified with na-
tionality. This was made easier by the language, as nacionalidad was identified
with cuidadanía, which was reinforced by legal formulas, thus la nación is not
only the nation but also the state as a specific type of organisation of the society
(e.g. “La Constitución de la Nación Argentina” of 1949).
In the 1930s, the ideologists of Deutschtum went the opposite way, as they
treated all the German speaking individuals, regardless of their origin and na-
tionality, as a community that is extended world-wide and united in their Ger-
manic loyalty also beyond the Latin American nations and borders (Stemplowski
1975: 80–112). Similar was the action of the contemporary Italian fascists,
who reinforced the ties and connections of the immigrants and their descen-
dants to the old homeland of the forefathers. A similar direction, although
without any aggressive purposes and to much a smaller scale, was followed at
that time by the Polish teachers sent the to support the Polish “national sub-
stance” to Argentinean Misiones and Brazilian Paraná. These activities with
quite a moderate result reinforced, however, certain elements of political cul-
ture in the milieu of people aware of their national origin: elements of political
culture of their countries of origin (Stemplowski 1991: 33–38).
Similar direction was followed by some catholic priests, despite the gener-
ally integrative function of the Roman Catholic Church in Latin America (even
the relatively recent “liberation theology” did not challenge the idea of the
nation, although it accentuated social justice, and rejected nationalism in an
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orthodox manner). The integrative function of the church favoured the politi-
cal culture of accepting every state. Although bishops blessing military dicta-
torship as the bulwark against – quite imaginary – communism were not few,
there were some others who stood openly on the side of the excluded, irre-
spective of the beliefs of those simple people. “When I give bread to the poor,
they call me saint; and when I ask why the poor have no bread, they say I’m
a Communist” (Archbishop Helder Cámara, from Olinda-Recife Archbishopric).
Despite the fall of the USSR, in the case of a bishop, “communism” cannot be
replaced with “Islamism”, yet the use of the term “terrorism” is still not fully
ruled out.
The themes of the crisis of identity developed in the twentieth century
belles lettres and political journalism concern the middle-class and predomi-
nantly the immigrant states. It is there that “el hombre está solo y espera”
(Leopoldo Lugones). In such circumstances, characteristic for the political cul-
ture is the uncertainty of its routine, and this is why the state-building messages
that it sends out may be ambiguous.
The comment made above concerns also political parties. Parties of all colour
develop their activity in Latin America, being more of election platforms than
mass organizations. The radical left has criticised local communist parties at
least since the 1960s, dissociated themselves from the practices of East Euro-
pean state socialism, and took to arms in the romantic efforts of young intelli-
gentsia ineffectively seeking allies among the underprivileged classes. Official
experts bickered in the USA whether that “communism” was the result of the
poverty omnipresent in Latin America, or of Soviet agents. Just in case, the
governments of the United States supported, or at least tolerated, Latin Ameri-
can dictatorships, possibly even inspiring some of the coups, as the lesser evil
and realistic alternative to the ideals like “alliance for progress” or Allende’s
socialism. That built a political culture where a political party seeks an ally in
the army and not in the civil society. Officers, in their turn, correctly perceiving
the military as the best-organised institution in a weak state, were becoming
used to the political culture of modelling missions of armed forces as a quasi-
political party, if not a quasi-social class (Stemplowski 1998). Attempts were
made to introduce into the society the belief that the border between what is
safe and unsafe for the state runs through the consciousness of a citizen, for
which reason the military must intervene within the realm of thought, and if
the military ideology of national security is insufficient, more radical means
must be applied. Inefficiency of the state in ensuring justice and security, with
the simultaneous application of the direct measures, and at times even physical
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extermination, on behalf of the state – by the military, president, local dignitar-
ies, or even a latifundist invoking “the order” – must reinforce a political culture
that believes that sometimes one must take justice into own hands. Illegitimate
violence may be condemned, yet violence as such may be a value accepted by the
society. This ambivalence is strongly visible in political culture and, as a feedback,
debilitates the impact of the principles of the formally binding constitution.
The sense of national identity may impact the question that is currently
most important in bilateral Inter-American relations, namely the regulation of
migration. Who demands respect for the identity of the incoming immigrants,
assumes stability of some scope of their political culture, and at the same time
assumes that their political cultures will impact the system of their new country
of residence. The “ethnic” media in the United States consist of hundreds of
newspapers, and radio and TV stations. Majority of them are in Spanish. There
are also such schools. On the other hand, religious institutions in the new
places of residence are rather multiethnic. Migrants in Latin America are not
organised. They may vote in Latin American elections to local authorities, yet
for understandable reasons, integration develops initially mostly through the
market. At the lowest levels of skill political culture plays no significant role.
Especially in migrations between the countries of Latin America, there are few
people with higher education, and still their ability to adapt to different condi-
tions is higher than average.
In reference to Latin American states, a special role is played by migration
of people with higher education between Latin America, and the United States
and Europe; migrations caused by the repressions of military governments and
changed circumstances after their fall. During forced exile in highly developed
countries, numerous immigrants acquire new professional qualifications. More-
over, they learn to live in a different political culture, which they later transfer,
to a certain extent, to their native countries. They return physically to the
community that they never deserted, but onto which they have a direct impact
after their return, as people with slightly different set of beliefs, and with some-
what changed political culture. The most important groups among those are
economists and lawyers, men of letters and journalists. Many of them are par-
tisans of neoliberalism. These are usually people with anti-military attitude,
pro-democratic stance, and pro-statist orientation; they are the partisans of the
broadest possible application of human rights. In most cases they hail from
outside the traditional “old” elite; an elite that they displace from public life.
They are the carriers of professionalised political culture correlated with the
group interest of the potentially new machinery of efficient executive branch of
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power as the outward manifestation of the national state. This is an idealism of
a new kind. These people probably reinforce all major political forces.
Seeking for further factors binding the institution of the state to collective,
national consciousness, we should ask about the importance of presidential and
parliamentary elections. Political culture is manifested in all its components,
beginning with the elections statute and ending with elections behaviours. Point-
ing at specific connections requires further research.
The specific characteristics of each national identity, the distinctiveness of
each nation and each political culture are related also to the differences in the
institution of a national state in Latin America. In Latin America, combined
effects of the cultural and the political developed forms similar to the European
nation-state, and the differences are connected mostly to the scope and level of
social integration. High cultural heterogeneity is at the same time diversifica-
tion in the field of political culture, and discussions of it facilitate examining the
state from various perspectives.
Should we follow Whitehead and other authors believing that the states of
the Southern Cone were the ones best organised at the end of the twentieth
century, and the states of central America (apart from Costa Rica) – worst,
then Mexico and Brazil may qualified to the medium level of state organisation.
Following Whitehead, Mexico and Brazil, at the beginning of the financial
crisis (the previous one, that is, in 1982), “possessed perhaps the most sophis-
ticated and effective, certainly the most ambitious and self-confident, state au-
tocracies of the region. By contrast, at either of the two extremes, we witness
far less in the way of positive change, and also much less growth in self-confi-
dence. Since 1982 the impression of relentless advance has been reversed,
through the region, by the debt crisis and the consequent near bankruptcy of
most states...” (Whitehead 1998: 385). One is allowed to believe that “ambi-
tion”, “self-confidence”, and “relentlessness” are connected to political cul-
ture. This is how culture keeps influencing the organisation of the state and is
undergoing a change as induced by that organisation.
Closing remarks
The deliberations above underpin my presumption that the cultural and the
political of Latin American societies have led to the development of political
culture, wherein the ancient Creole republicanism connects with autocracy and
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democracy in different proportions for different states (and even for the ethni-
cally differentiated groups and regions in individual countries), the states as
organisations with significant pueblos originarios being still divided along the
cultural line. In fact, in Latin America, the state as an organisation is not (yet?)
a fully integrated national state, and the cultural and the political have (as yet?)
hardly anywhere brought about the establishment of a society organised as
a political nation that is functioning with the use of institutions of the state that
is actually and generally accepted in the political culture of a given society, and
different states feature different levels of such an integration. In the currently
operating states, there are visible – although not everywhere the same – cul-
tural variations, also in the sense of political culture. In the light of the existing
literature of the subject, including also my own research, the very notion of
political culture remains ambiguous for being to general.
The question why the systemic principles of Latin American states for nearly
200 years did not manage to take a permanent, deep and widespread root
beyond the text of the constitution, cannot be fully answered by portraying the
limitations of Eurocentrism in system models. One should rather point to the
importance of the norms reinforced in the period preceding the earliest stages
of building independent statehood. It may be worthwhile to consider the hy-
pothesis that where the cultural will not lead to the establishment of a group
with collective identity, with characteristic feature being the capability to man-
age other groups (from outside the realm covered by its collective identity), the
political of such a group does not result in the establishment of a state capable
of surviving in the original institutional shape. All in all, making use of litera-
ture devoted to political culture is walking on quicksand, even if one is aided by
a relatively operational definition. The state view from the angle of political
culture, discloses many of its aspects, yet its image does not in this way become
much clearer, gaining rather depth and shades. The connection between the
state and the political culture naturally exists, yet the results of seeking a spe-
cific cause-and-effect connection allow speaking of no more than probability.
The more so, as the dearth of Latin Americanist studies of state and political
culture combines here with shortage of such research in Latin America. Finally,
the parallelism between thinking about the cultural and the political is mani-
fested – on the one hand – in their inconsistently controlled Eurocentrism,
which in turn is accompanied on the other hand by the eagerness to accentuate
the non-European uniqueness and supposition that if the European observer
does not understand something in Latin America, it is because this “some-
thing” carries within itself ex definitione a deepness of meanings. Despite all
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these, discussion of these ties helps us in thinking about the state – both as an
institution and as the specific type of organisation of the society, functioning
thanks to the systemic connection of norms (building material for institutions)
with the population living in a natural environment within a specific territory
and developing in the cultural and the political, that is about the nation state.
Stabilisation of democracy in Latin American states and the increased prosper-
ity of the population will favour the depreciation of the political significance of
satisfying basic needs, appreciating the importance of institution- and culture-
related problems of the state (Ingelhart 1989; Pye 1993). Yet before one will
be able to say something more revealing about such a State from the point of
view of political culture, accounting both for continuity and social change,
before one will actually be able to clarify the issues and questions of the state
through discussion of political culture, there is a huge work to be performed in
research.
Translated by Piotr Krasnowolski
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439CARLOS ESCUDÉ  • LA CIVILIZACIÓN IBEROAMERICANA Y SUS RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES
CARLOS ESCUDÉ
La civilización iberoamericana
y sus relaciones internacionales
Introducción metodológica
Este ensayo parte de la premisa de que el verdadero actor de las relaciones
“internacionales” no es el Estado, sino lo que el norteamericano Robert Cox
llamó el “complejo Estado/sociedad civil”. Este concepto, inspirado a su vez en
el pensamiento de Antonio Gramsci, nos recuerda que desde la perspectiva de
un tiempo mediano o largo, la política exterior es menos el producto de la
voluntad de gobernantes que de profundas fuerzas económicas, sociales y cul-
turales, muchas de ellas internas, que condicionan a los gobernantes.
Por eso, más que catalogar hechos y tratados, este trabajo procura diluci-
dar las causas que explican (hipotéticamente) el peculiar lugar que América
latina ocupa en las relaciones internacionales del mundo actual. Para ello,
y porque el pasado es prólogo, penetrará en algunos procesos históricos, prin-
cipalmente relacionados con la formación de estos Estados.
Por cierto, la dialéctica propia del “complejo Estado/sociedad civil”, que
supone un condicionamiento recíproco y permanente entre ambos términos de
esta ecuación, conduce a la premisa complementaria de una fuerte path
dependence. Partimos del supuesto de que la posición de los países latinoame-
ricanos, en y frente al mundo, no puede comprenderse cabalmente si no nos
remitimos a algunas peculiaridades provenientes de su mismo nacimiento
y origen.
Por otra parte, este enfoque tiene sus costos y beneficios. Debido a limita-
ciones de espacio, la mayor profundidad de la explicación causal obliga a redu-
cir el número de asuntos analizados. Lejos estaremos de describir las
características específicas de (por caso) cada acuerdo de libre comercio con
países ajenos a la región. En su lugar, analizaremos los atributos de las socieda-
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des propensas a tales acuerdos, en contraste con los de aquellas que parecen
renuentes a los mismos. En otras palabras, privilegiaremos la comprensión del
tipo de fenómeno sobre la descripción de los casos individuales.
Finalmente, en este estudio se prioriza el análisis de los fenómenos autén-
ticamente “internacionales” sobre aquellos que son meramente “interestata-
les”. Por ejemplo: debido a que involucra pulsiones contradictorias entre Esta-
do y sociedad, que cruzan de país a país de manera muy compleja, el fenómeno
del narcotráfico interesa más que un bloque comercial como el MERCOSUR,
que parece más un ejercicio de retórica de políticos y gobernantes, que un
auténtico boceto de integración supranacional.
Similarmente, nos importa más el análisis de las consecuencias transnacionales
del incipiente carácter fallido de algunos Estados, que la crónica de proyectos
como la Alternativa Bolivariana para las Américas (ALBA), lanzada por Vene-
zuela en La Habana en diciembre de 2004; el Banco del Sur, creado también
por dicho país en 2007; el Tratado Constitutivo de la Unión de Naciones
Sudamericanas (Unasur), firmado en Brasilia en mayo de 2008, o la aún nonata
propuesta brasileña de fundar un Consejo Sudamericano de Defensa.
El mencionado Tratado de Unasur busca emular a la Unión Europea. ALBA
pretende ser una alternativa al fracasado ALCA (el Acuerdo de Libre Comercio
para las Américas, que propusiera Estados Unidos en 1994). El Consejo
Sudamericano de Defensa aspira a reemplazar la estéril Junta Interamericana
de Defensa, que funciona en Washington. El Banco del Sur se presenta como
alternativa al Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, el Banco Mundial y el Fon-
do Monetario Internacional.
Es verdad que tales ejercicios no deben ser ignorados por los cronistas de
las relaciones interestatales. Sin embargo, son de interés menor para este tra-
bajo porque (en vista de las experiencias previas de la región) por el momento
parecen pertenecer más al ámbito de los rituales de la diplomacia (estilo latino-
americano), que al de los procesos que realmente moldean el futuro de las
sociedades. Téngase por caso el lanzamiento en 2006, con bombos y platillos,
del Gasoducto del Sur, que habría de haber atravesado escollos geográficos
colosales para llegar desde Venezuela hasta Argentina, pero ya estaba olvidado
en 2008.
Por cierto, aunque “ninguna otra región del mundo tiene tantos tratados,
cartas, documentos, convenciones y resoluciones multilaterales y bilaterales”,
en la práctica la mayoría de estos acuerdos no se cumple, y el concierto latino-
americano resuelve sus problemas puntuales a través de negociaciones
diplomáticas ad hoc (Arie Kacowicz, 2005: capítulo 3).
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No obstante, detrás de la actual proliferación de propuestas de integración,
muchas de ellas inspiradas en sentimientos anti norteamericanos, subyace un
hecho muy significativo. Más allá de que tales proyectos fructifiquen o se esfu-
men, su número y diversidad ilustra el eclipse relativo de Estados Unidos como
potencia hegemónica en la región.
Por cierto, el margen de maniobra externo de los Estados latinoamericanos
se ha ampliado significativamente debido a:
· la relativa disminución de la capacidad de sanción de los Estados Unidos,
cuyos recursos están drenados por los conflictos mundiales en que están
comprometidos,
· el desprestigio de su diplomacia debido a los engaños y fracasos que
acompañaron a la guerra de Irak; y
· la crisis económica que asoma en la propia economía estadounidense, que
parece indicar que Washington tampoco es la mejor consejera en materia
económica.
Esta ampliación del margen de maniobra externa es una variable contextual
que deberá mantenerse in mente a lo largo de nuestro análisis.
Parte I – El iberoamericano:
una paradoja agridulce
Las variables dependientes
Dos epifenómenos especialmente relevantes caracterizan a la región latinoa-
mericana. No sólo distinguen a estos países de manera singularísima, sino que
parecen vinculados entre sí por una relación causal, indirecta y paradójica:
1. La relativa ausencia de guerra internacional y genocidio masivo durante
toda su historia, aunque más significativamente en el siglo XX, y
2. La concentración del ingreso, que es la más alta entre todas las regiones del
mundo.
Si agregamos un elemento valorativo, el primer fenómeno resulta “benig-
no” y el segundo, “perverso”. Cómo se verá, el vínculo causal indirecto entre
ambos proviene, conjeturalmente, de las particularidades de la formación del
Estado en las antiguas provincias americanas de los imperios ibéricos.
El primero de los rasgos anotados remite a la hipótesis formulada por Mi-
guel Ángel Centeno, acerca de la excepción representada por América latina
frente al “modelo belicista” de formación del Estado, de amplia difusión en la
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sociología política. Éste fue formulado, entre otros, por Charles Tilly y Samuel
E. Finer, sobre la base de aportes precursores de Max Weber y Otto Hintze. En
verdad, el aforismo de Tilly, “la guerra hizo al Estado y el Estado hizo la gue-
rra”, convertido en cliché, es uno de los de mayor circulación de todos los
tiempos en las ciencias sociales.
Esta dialéctica funcionó de manera imperfecta en América latina, porque allí
casi no hubo guerras totales que obligaran a movilizar las sociedades de una
manera absoluta, so pena de sufrir la extinción del propio Estado. Las guerras
totales exigen la extracción de ingentes recursos humanos y materiales, y sólo
pueden ser libradas por Estados institucionalmente capaces de imponer tales
exacciones. La guerra consolida esa capacidad, y superado el conflicto, deja
una herencia institucional positiva y duradera:
The building of a successful military machine imposed a heavy burden on
the population involved: taxes, conscription, requisition, and more. The very
act of building it – when it worked – produced arrangements which could
deliver resources to the government for other purposes. (Thus almost all the
major European taxes began as ‘extraordinary levies’ earmarked for particular
wars, and became routine sources of governmental revenue). It produced the
means of enforcing the government’s will over stiff resistance: the army. It
tended, indeed, to promote territorial consolidation, centralization, differen-
tiation of the instruments of government and monopolization of the means of
coercion, all the fundamental state-making processes. War made the state, and
the state made war (Tilly 1975: 42).
Este mecanismo estuvo en gran medida ausente en América latina y este
señalamiento es la principal contribución de Centeno en el estudio de esta
cuestión. Antes había sido escuetamente anunciado por el mismo Tilly, en pala-
bras que a su vez remiten al concepto de “tiempo mundial” difundido por
Immanuel Wallerstein: “The European state-building experiences will not repeat
themselves in new states. The connections of the new states to the rest of the
world have changed too much” (Tilly 1975: 81).
Ciertamente, la experiencia latinoamericana no fue ni podía ser similar a la
de Estados del “viejo mundo”. Por el contrario, a diferencia de los europeos, la
mayoría de los Estados de América latina nacieron súbitamente, como conse-
cuencia de la crisis generada en la Península Ibérica por las guerras napoleónicas.
Los procesos que culminaron con su fundación no se originaron en su interior
(como ocurrió con las trece colonias angloamericanas), sino en acontecimien-
tos de ultramar. Su verdadero libertador fue Bonaparte (Cisneros y Escudé
1998; Tomo 1). Muy lejos estaban las ciudades-estado hispanoamericanas,
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que adquirieron autonomía gracias a la invasión napoleónica de España, de
poder imponer a sus poblaciones la movilización masiva requerida para la gue-
rra total. A partir de entonces, las guerras latinoamericanas fueron casi siem-
pre limitadas. Y paradójicamente, este carácter limitado de la guerra resultó
disfuncional para la formación de instituciones estatales verdaderamente fuer-
tes (Centeno 2002: 21–24).
Este razonamiento nos planta ante una bella paradoja. Por una parte, es
verdad que no hay mayor bendición que la de no padecer guerras totales. Pero
por la otra, hay pocas maldiciones peores que la de ser súbdito de un Estado
incapaz de hacerse obedecer. Tal Estado es fácilmente capturado por elites
depredadoras (Escudé 2006: 125–147). Carece de la autonomía necesaria
para oficiar de mediador en las disputas de la sociedad civil. Al convertirse en
el instrumento de una elite, puede llegar a ser despótico, pero sigue siendo
institucionalmente débil: no es autónomo. Jamás se convirtió en un movilizador
totalitario de recursos, como lo fueron tanto Estados Unidos y Gran Bretaña
como Alemania y Rusia en tiempos de guerra total. Y precisamente porque no
atravesó esos episodios de totalitarismo (a veces) pasajero, no desarrolló las
instituciones necesarias para superar un autoritarismo (frecuentemente) crónico.
La guerra y la paz
No obstante, la afirmación de que la región latinoamericana se caracteriza por
la relativa ausencia de guerra internacional no está libre de controversias en la
bibliografía académica. En su Violent Peace, por ejemplo, David Mares aplica
una metodología cuantitativa para sostener que:
In terms of international wars since 1816 (the start date for quantitative
studies of war) Latin America is not exceptionally peaceful. Europe (30) is by
far the most warlike, followed by Asia (22) and Latin America (20) [...]. Latin
America’s ranking is not entirely different when we just examine the twentieth
century. [...] The frequency of Latin American wars (6) in that century keeps
the region in the middle of the group (Mares 2001: 27).
En contraste, otros especialistas como A. Kacowicz (1998) y M. Desch
(1998: 245–265) consideran que, en términos comparativos, América latina
ha disfrutado de una “larga paz”. Y en Blood and Debt, Centeno afirma:
There have been very few international wars involving (Latin American
states) in almost two centuries of independence. [...] Even if we include civil
wars, Latin America has enjoyed relative peace. [...] Worldwide, Latin America
stands out for the general absence of organized slaughter. [...] Nowhere is the
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general peace of the continent more clearly seen than on a map. Examine
a map of Latin America in 1840 and the general borders [...] look surprisingly
like today’s. While early units such as Gran Colombia have vanished [...], no
politically recognized state has disappeared through conquest. In almost two
hundred years of independent history Latin America has yet to lose a Poland,
a Burgundy, a Saxony, or a Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (Centeno 2002: 9).
Quizás esta diferencia de percepciones académicas esté condicionada por
las divergentes deformaciones profesionales de sociólogos y politólogos. Por lo
menos parte del desacuerdo proviene de la metodología cuantitativa de Mares,
que equipara las guerras mundiales con la de Malvinas, un episodio que, con
menos de mil muertos, ni siquiera alcanza el requisito convencional de la cien-
cia política para ser considerada “guerra”.
En cualquier caso, las cifras y tablas sobre muertos en batalla presentadas
en Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816–1980, el estudio ya
clásico de Small y Singer (1982), le dan ampliamente la razón a Centeno. Y no
es menor el dato que éste apunta arriba: nunca ha desaparecido un país ibero-
americano debido a su conquista por un vecino. En el concierto europeo, en
cambio, ha ocurrido en múltiple ocasiones. Polonia, por ejemplo, fue repartida
entre sus vecinos más poderosos en 1772, 1793 y 1795, y no volvió a ser
independiente hasta 1918. El Reino de las Dos Sicilias fue anexado a Italia por
conquista en 1861, para nunca más volver. Hay cientos de casos similares,
perdidos en la amnesia colectiva, cuyo nombre no sería reconocido por el
lector medio excepto como provincia del país que lo conquistó. En el concierto
latinoamericano, tales desenlaces serían culturalmente inaceptables para pue-
blos y gobiernos.
En verdad, por más que el escudo de Chile incluya un lema belicoso, “Por la
razón o la fuerza”, en sus casi dos siglos de independencia jamás libró una
guerra contra Argentina. En contraste, en ese período Francia y Alemania
libraron tres guerras, en 1870, 1914–1918 y 1939–1945. Las últimas dos
fueron las mayores catástrofes bélicas de toda la historia humana registrada.
Algo similar se registra en la historia de las relaciones entre Argentina
y Brasil. En toda su vida independiente libraron una sola guerra, muy limitada
por cierto, que pueda definirse como auténticamente interestatal: la de 1825–
1828. Es la única registrada como tal por la historiografía argentina. La versión
brasileña agrega una segunda instancia, la del derrocamiento del dictador Juan
Manuel de Rosas en 1852, cuando los mini-estados argentinos de Entre Ríos
y Corrientes, en alianza con Brasil, derrotaron al mini-estado argentino de
Buenos Aires. En cualquier caso, la situación es bien distinta a la de los grandes
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Estados contiguos de Europa: desde bastante antes de la unificación italiana
(1870) y alemana (1871), no ha habido conflictos bélicos entre Argentina
y Brasil.
También es significativo que, aunque tanto Brasil como Argentina poseen
más tecnología nuclear que cualquier país del Medio Oriente excepto Israel,
estos vecinos sudamericanos están en las antípodas de la India y Pakistán, en
términos de su amistad y cooperación nuclear. Brasil desarrolla un submarino
nuclear. Argentina exporta reactores – su cliente más reciente es Australia, un
país avanzado. Aunque hasta 1979, año de la firma del Tratado de Corpus-
Itaipú, hubo competencia entre ambos en el ámbito del desarrollo atómico,
desde entonces rige una cooperación activa en este delicado campo.
Por cierto, abonando la tesis de la propensión latinoamericana a la paz, con
el acceso al Tratado de No Proliferación Nuclear de Argentina en 1994 y de
Brasil en 1998, América latina se convirtió en la mayor región del planeta libre
de amenazas nucleares. Y en febrero de 2008, ambos países firmaron un
acuerdo para el establecimiento de una planta binacional para enriquecer ura-
nio con fines comerciales, bajo el sistema de salvaguardias de la Agencia Inter-
nacional de Energía Atómica.
A pesar de la controversia, parece claro que la región es la más pacífica del
orbe en términos de guerras interestatales. América del Norte la supera en
términos intra-regionales, pero exporta violencia masiva. A lo largo de los dos-
cientos años de independencia latinoamericana, los Estados de Europa y América
del Norte han tenido casi cuatro veces más hombres alistados y mataron
a decenas de millones más que los de América latina. Además, con el tiempo
ésta se volvió más pacífica, siendo el siglo XX menos violento que el XIX en
términos de guerras, tanto interestatales como civiles (Centeno 2002: 37).
Obviamente, esto no significa que en ella no haya violencia a raudales. Pero
incluso en el ámbito del conflicto interno, América latina no ha sido partícipe
de ninguno de los holocaustos globales del siglo XX. Sin ánimo apologético,
resulta claro que ni Pinochet ni Videla son comparables con Hitler o Pol Pot.
Como señala Centeno, ni la religión secular del nacionalismo, ni el odio étnico,
ni el fanatismo religioso, ni el fervor ideológico, condujeron en ella a genocidios
de la magnitud de los protagonizados por Estados europeos, asiáticos y africa-
nos. No hubo, en los doscientos años de vida independiente de la región, el
equivalente de una guerra civil española, una limpieza étnica como la de la ex
Yugoslavia, una tragedia análoga al genocidio armenio, o masacres como las
protagonizadas en Ruanda entre hutus y tutsis. Incluso los guerrilleros de la
región son incomparablemente menos peligrosos que Al Qaeda, Hamas
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o Hezbolá, a la vez que hasta ahora no se ha dado en ella un caso de terroris-
mo secesionista exitoso como el del IRA original, que diera nacimiento a la
República de Irlanda en pleno siglo XX.
Por cierto, incluso en este delicado tema del separatismo, América latina
registra una historia peculiar. La secesión de Panamá (que era parte de Colom-
bia), único acontecimiento de este tipo en el siglo XX, fue perpetrada en 1903
con la instigación y apoyo de una potencia extraregional, Estados Unidos, que
estaba interesada en la construcción y dominio de un canal transoceánico en
ese territorio.
Es verdad que resulta difícil realizar una contabilidad de secesiones latinoa-
mericanas en el siglo XIX, porque la región está signada por un común origen
ibérico que le legó muchas ambigüedades, en términos de qué territorio co-
rresponde a qué jurisdicción. En el pasado, ese legado se prestó a que lo que
desde un país se consideraba secesión, fuera percibido desde otro como un
desenlace acorde con la doctrina del uti possidetis juris (“poseerás lo que
poseías”), convenida en el siglo XIX por el concierto regional.
No obstante, es evidente que la actitud latinoamericana actual hacia el se-
paratismo es marcadamente diferente a la del concierto europeo. Esto se veri-
fica en el momento de entrega de este trabajo al editor, cuando Bolivia corre el
peligro de sufrir la secesión de cuatro de sus departamentos. Uno de ellos es
Santa Cruz de la Sierra, que produce el 50 por ciento del PBI boliviano
y posee el 10 por ciento de sus recursos de hidrocarburos. Otro es Tarija, con
el 85 por ciento de las reservas de gas natural de ese país. El primero linda con
Brasil y el segundo con Argentina.
Si este escenario se presentara en Europa, Asia o África, las maniobras de los
Estados circundantes probablemente estarían enderezadas a competir por estos
bocados de cardenal. Pero no en Iberoamérica, cuya civilización rechaza esa
rapiña a la vez que condena de plano la conquista. En cambio, Estados Unidos
instaló como embajador en Bolivia a un experto en secesiones, Philip Goldberg,
cuyo puesto anterior había sido en Kosovo. Alentó el separatismo de Santa Cruz
hasta que fue expulsado por el gobierno boliviano, en septiembre de 2008.
El contraste entre este idealismo iberoamericano y la cruel realpolitik prac-
ticada por europeos y estadounidenses no podría ser más agudo. En la ex
Yugoslavia, por ejemplo, violando los Acuerdos Dayton de 1995, la OTAN
instigó la separación de la provincia serbia de Kosovo, cuya independencia fue
reconocida por la mayoría de sus miembros en febrero de 2008. Como res-
puesta a este acto que consideró inamistoso, en agosto Rusia reconoció la
independencia de Osetia del Sur y Abjasia, provincias pro-rusas de Georgia.
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Estas maniobras de inspiración geopolítica se llevaron a cabo a pesar de que
sientan precedentes peligrosos, tanto para Rusia como para algunos miembros
de la OTAN. Por cierto, en el bloque occidental, España padece el separatismo
de los vascos. Y la Federación Rusa es un imperio multiétnico que no sólo
enfrenta enemigos secesionistas en Chechenia, Ingushetia y Daguestán. Varias
otras repúblicas de mayoría islámica, menos agitadas que éstas, permanecen en
la Federación sólo por la permanente presencia militar rusa, a la vez que en
Kaliningrado, exclave ruso entre Polonia y Lituania, son muchos los rusos étnicos
que preferirían formar parte de la Unión Europea antes que de la Federación.
Por lo tanto, no se puede argüir que esta diferencia entre Europa y América
latina surja del temor de países como Argentina y Brasil de sufrir sus propias
mutilaciones territoriales, si cayeran en la tentación de instigar el secesionismo
de territorios ajenos, como Tarija y Santa Cruz. Argentina y Brasil no enfren-
tan desafíos separatistas en el presente. En cambio, el hecho de que Rusia
y algún país de la OTAN lidien con enemigos secesionistas muy peligrosos
y actuales, no impide que tanto Moscú como la Alianza Atlántica agiten esos
demonios en otras latitudes. Hay algo en la cultura política y ética del concierto
latinoamericano que prohíbe a sus Estados especular con secesiones ventajo-
sas, impidiendo la vigencia, entre ellos, de la cabal realpolitik que salvajemente
practican europeos y angloamericanos.
En verdad, para la cultura iberoamericana el territorio de un Estado es
inmutable, y las disputas emergen de desacuerdos respecto de qué territorio
pertenece, casi ontológicamente, a cada una de las partes de un conflicto. Los
europeos, en cambio, están mucho más acostumbrados al cambio violento de
los límites fronterizos.
Este contraste en términos de la significación del modelo del Estado belicista,
que se proyecta también al ámbito de la magnitud de la violencia interna, re-
presenta cabalmente lo que Robert King Merton llamó un “dato serendipity”:
un inesperado trozo de realidad, capaz de modificar paradigmas teóricos. Como
lo sugirieran anteriormente Juan Carlos Puig, Arie Kacowicz y Mary K. Meyer,
en América latina parece haber emergido una singular cultura diplomática, que
constituye una vía alternativa, altamente civilizada, para la resolución de con-
flictos.
Es como si, a lo largo de doscientos años de vida independiente signados
por Estados débiles que no tienen el poder interno necesario para librar gue-
rras externas totales, hubiera surgido una cultura política acorde con esa reali-
dad. Una singularidad de origen estructural, común a toda la región, parece
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haber engendrado una conciencia colectiva que forja imperativos categóricos
relativamente pacifistas. Uno de ellos sería el precepto “no bombardearás ciu-
dades”: obsérvese que las ciudades iberoamericanas jamás sufrieron bombar-
deos como los que sepultaron a urbes enteras de Europa y Asia, frecuentemen-
te perpetrados por otros europeos y asiáticos.
Quizás en este ámbito acotado, antes de formular la típica pregunta del
paternalismo neoimperialista, “what is wrong with Latin America?”, debiéramos
investigar “what is right with Latin America” y “what is wrong with the rest of
the World”.
La relativa impotencia fiscal del Estado
No obstante, no todas son luces en Iberoamérica. Como señalamos al princi-
pio, hay un epifenómeno perverso que no es menos importante que la relativa
virtud de la región en el ámbito de la guerra y la paz. Como sabemos, padece
la mayor concentración del ingreso de todas las grandes regiones del mundo.
Este segundo rasgo de nuestro modelo también parece haber trascendido
su origen estructural, para convertirse en parte de la cultura. En América lati-
na, las grandes desigualdades sociales se toman con naturalidad. En materia
social, la región se caracteriza por la ausencia de un imperativo categórico que
está muy presente en la cultura de las democracias capitalistas avanzadas, aun-
que se cumplimente siempre de manera limitada e imperfecta. Ese precepto
reza: “no explotarás en demasía a tu propio pueblo”. Muy lejos de ese ideal, en
la América latina profunda la pobreza extrema es incluso parte de la pervertida
estética local.
Como en el caso de la ausencia de guerra total, este rasgo también parece
vinculado causalmente a la debilidad del Estado. Quien no tiene poder interno
para movilizar, para la guerra, los recursos humanos y económicos de una
sociedad, tampoco puede cobrar los impuestos sin los cuales no hay educación
adecuada, buenos niveles de salubridad ni un régimen humanitario de jubila-
ciones y pensiones. En otras palabras:
· si es verdad, como se dijo al principio, que en Europa y Estados Unidos “la
guerra hizo al Estado y el Estado hizo la guerra”;
· si como sugiere la sociología histórica, es cierto que la capacidad de
recaudación surgió con las movilizaciones militares;
· si la documentación estudiada por eruditos como Tilly no miente, y los
impuestos que permitieron reducir la injusticia social fueron prohijados por
mecanismos de recaudación instalados en tiempos en guerra,
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entonces viene de suyo que una región que desde su independencia no ha
sufrido la guerra total, será también menos capaz de cobrar tributos y más
injusta socialmente, que una en la cual sucesivas guerras devastadoras fueron
engendrando impuestos que, transformados, sobrevivieron al conflicto mismo
para convertirse en el cimiento de la justicia social.
Esta hipótesis, a su vez un corolario del hecho de que el modelo belicista de
formación del Estado poco sirve para comprender la gestación de los Estados
latinoamericanos, se verifica en forma cabal. Mientras a comienzos del siglo
XXI, en promedio, los países del G-7 recaudaban impuestos equivalentes al
37% del PBI, los de América latina llegaban apenas al 13% (Centeno 2002: 6).
Si algunos Estados de la región intentaran alcanzar los niveles de imposición de
las democracias avanzadas, seguramente enfrentarían una rebelión fiscal gene-
ralizada que no podrían reprimir. Esto es particularmente cierto del impuesto al
ingreso o a la riqueza. El equilibrio fiscal, cuando se consigue, proviene de
mecanismos regresivos y distorsivos, como el impuesto al valor agregado, que
profundiza la concentración del ingreso.
La mención de una rebelión fiscal no es mera conjetura. Es lo que ocurrió
en Argentina entre marzo y julio de 2008, cuando el gobierno aplicó un
sistema de retenciones móviles a las exportaciones de soja. El tributo se cobra-
ba al momento de exportar, porque ese mecanismo es muy difícil de evadir. Los
objetivos de la medida no se limitaban a la recaudación, sino que (por lo menos
en teoría) apuntaban también a desalentar el avance de la soja, un cultivo que
destruye la fertilidad de la tierra pero que está reemplazando a otras produc-
ciones debido a su altísimo precio internacional actual.
El aumento del impuesto movilizó a las cuatro principales organizaciones
del sector agrícola-ganadero, representativas de los productores grandes
y chicos del campo argentino, aunque no sembraran soja. Las organizaciones
convocaron a un paro para desabastecer el mercado. Simultáneamente, corta-
ron las rutas con piquetes, para impedir que productores desobedientes envia-
sen sus mercaderías a las ciudades. Mientras tanto, intermitentemente, el cen-
tro de Buenos Aires se vio atiborrado de manifestaciones, algunas en contra
y otras a favor del gobierno. Cuando después de meses, el conflicto amenaza-
ba la gobernabilidad, el impuesto fue sometido a consideración del Congreso.
La Cámara de Diputados lo aprobó, pero en el Senado se registró un empate.
Entonces el vicepresidente desempató, votando en contra de su propio gobier-
no y cerrando la cuestión.
Más allá de las imputaciones de corrupción en el uso de fondos públicos,
y de las discusiones técnicas acerca de la pertinencia y constitucionalidad de
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este tipo de impuesto, la rebelión fiscal argentina de 2008 puso de manifiesto
que ese Estado no es suficientemente fuerte como para privar a la burguesía de
lo que los norteamericanos llaman un “windfall profit” (ganancias en vendaval
que no son el producto del esfuerzo productivo sino de circunstancias excep-
cionales del mercado internacional). Sin arriesgar una rebelión que puede de-
rrocar al gobierno, el Estado argentino no puede implantar el tipo de tributo
que Jimmy Carter impuso a las empresas petroleras de su país en 1980, y que
Ronald Reagan no derogó hasta 1987.
Aunque la coalición de productores rurales acusó al gobierno de Cristina
Fernández de Kirchner de despotismo, lo que la historia de los últimos treinta
años demuestra es que el Estado argentino sólo puede ser despótico cuando
sirve a los intereses de las burguesías prebendarias que frecuentemente lo cap-
turan. Reiteradamente en las últimas décadas, por ejemplo, se estatizaron enormes
deudas privadas, usando el poder del Estado para transferir riqueza masiva de
los pobres a los ricos (Escudé 2006). Lo que ese Estado no puede hacer sino
circunstancialmente es transferir ingresos en el sentido opuesto. No puede
implantar una política fiscal progresiva que afecte la renta de aquellas burguesías.
No puede ejecutar medidas como la que, en fecha tan temprana como 1794,
tomó el presidente norteamericano George Washington, cuando despachó quince
mil soldados para reprimir a los granjeros de Pensilvania, que se habían rebela-
do contra un impuesto al whisky sancionado por el gobierno central.
Por cierto, en cuestiones fiscales los contrastes entre América latina y las
democracias avanzadas son notorios. En las grandes crisis norteamericanas,
tanto bélicas como económicas, se impusieron tributos a las “ganancias excesi-
vas” que hubieran sido tildados de “comunistas” en Iberoamérica. Como nos
recuerda W. Elliot Brownlee en Federal Taxation in America, el presidente Franklin
D. Roosevelt llegó a decir al Congreso en 1943 que, en una emergencia na-
cional, “ningún ciudadano debe tener un ingreso anual post-impuestos de más
de 25.000 dólares”. El resultado de esa política fue que, hacia 1945, el uno
por ciento más rico de los hogares estadounidenses ya aportaba el 35 por
ciento de los impuestos a los ingresos personales, a la vez que éstos represen-
taban el 40 por ciento de la recaudación total del fisco, correspondiendo otro
33 por ciento al impuesto a los ingresos corporativos (p. 116). Por cierto, la
república norteamericana debe parte de sus éxitos a que, pese a la permanente
oposición de fuerzas conservadoras, sus padres fundadores se inclinaron por
un principio sentado por Adam Smith en La Riqueza de las Naciones, que
postula que “no es muy irrazonable que los ricos contribuyan a los gastos
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públicos, no sólo en proporción a sus ingresos, sino en una relación algo ma-
yor” (Smith 2004; Libro V, Capítulo II).
Políticas progresistas de este tipo, que explican la vigencia de una equidad
relativa en las democracias capitalistas desarrolladas, jamás estuvieron al alcan-
ce de los Estados latinoamericanos. Y la diferencia entre ambos no puede justi-
ficarse con el argumento de la falta de transparencia en el uso de fondos públicos
en América latina, porque las formidables maquinarias de recaudación de Eu-
ropa y Estados Unidos es instituyeron antes de que se alcanzara la relativa
transparencia que conocemos hoy. El poder estatal para imponer tributos vino
antes que la virtud republicana.
Por todo esto, puede afirmarse que el reciente episodio argentino no hizo
más que poner de relieve, una vez más, el contraste entre la debilidad de estos
Estados y la fortaleza de aquéllos. Contribuye a explicar por qué la recaudación
fiscal ha sido históricamente insatisfactoria en toda la región. La consecuencia
inevitable es que, en América latina, ni las más elementales funciones sociales
del Estado moderno sean adecuadamente provistas.
El Estado cautivo
No obstante, la mitología neoliberal da por supuesto que el Estado latinoame-
ricano es un gigante tributariamente opresivo, y las elites que frecuentemente
manipulan al mismo adoctrinan a las multitudes con esa noción. Un eslogan
típico, ampliamente difundido en algunos de estos países, proclama que “achi-
car el Estado es agrandar la Nación”.
Por otra parte, el único ámbito en que el Estado latinoamericano ha ocupa-
do un lugar importante en el siglo XX ha sido la economía. Por cierto, hasta
muy recientemente, la mayoría de estos Estados producía una sorprendente
gama de bienes y servicios, casi siempre caros y de mala calidad. A su vez, esas
empresas estatales eran y siguen siendo abastecidas por proveedores privados
que se enriquecen con sobrefacturaciones sistemáticas. Con este y otros meca-
nismos, se benefician las burguesías prebendarias que capturan a ese Estado.
En el caso argentino, investigaciones conducidas desde la Universidad de
Harvard han documentado que las privatizaciones de las empresas estatales
fueron salvajemente resistidas por los poderosos contratistas privados hasta
que, durante la década de 1990, el negocio de participar en la privatización se
planteó en términos aún más provechosos, para los intereses privados, que las
sobrefacturaciones crónicas con que éstos se habían beneficiado durante las
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décadas previas (Corrales 1998: 24–51). Los otrora contratistas privados de
las empresas estatales privatizadas pudieron convertirse en copropietarios de
las mismas a precios gruesamente subsidiados. Así como en fases previas del
ciclo de vaciamiento se estatizó la deuda privada, en esta etapa se regalaron
activos públicos (Escudé 2006).
Es el colmo de la paradoja: las empresas del Estado canalizan riquezas hacia
la burguesía prebendaria, pero su privatización concentra aún más riqueza en
ese sector. No se trata de simple corrupción. Porque el Estado no tiene el poder
de abolir las prebendas de las empresas privadas que operan como proveedo-
ras de las empresas públicas, sólo se puede privatizar si el negocio, para aquellas
empresas privadas, es aún más lucrativo que el anterior. De lo contrario, el go-
bierno que intenta privatizar es desestabilizado por estos poderosos intereses.
A través de mecanismos como el descrito, la debilidad institucional ha
retroalimentado las desigualdades sociales. En algunos países, a las étnicas
también. En toda la región, hizo más ricos a los ricos y más pobres a los pobres
(Escudé 2006). Y por lógica, tampoco pudo generarse en América latina la
integración étnica y social sin la cual la movilización masiva de la guerra total
sólo engendra revueltas (recordemos la Rusia de 1917). Aunque las constitu-
ciones formales digan lo contrario, en América latina el sujeto nunca se convirtió
en verdadero ciudadano (Centeno 2002: 4).
Por lo tanto, la misma debilidad del Estado que postulamos, que se mani-
fiesta benignamente en la ausencia relativa de guerra internacional, sería la
causa eficiente de la singularidad más perversa de la región: su alta concentración
del ingreso y sus astronómicos porcentajes de pobres e indigentes, con muy
bajos niveles educativos.
Democracia y populismo sistémico
La dinámica postulada por nuestro modelo explicativo de la singularidad de
América latina estuvo vigente desde tiempos fundacionales. No obstante, hubo
una modificación importante cuando, a partir de las últimas dos décadas del
siglo XX, al son de un nuevo consenso interno y externo respecto de la
inaceptabilidad de los gobiernos militares en la región, se generalizó la democra-
cia electoral. A partir de entonces, las grandes mayorías pauperizadas adquirie-
ron cierto tipo de poder. Así, aumentó la propensión al populismo, porque al
momento de los comicios la satisfacción de algunas necesidades inmediatas de
las masas pasó a tener un premio electoral superior al de cualquier otro pro-
grama de gobierno.
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Esto no significa que se haya interrumpido la transferencia de ingresos de
abajo hacia arriba, ni que se haya eliminado el poder de veto de la burguesía
prebendaria frente a las políticas fiscales progresivas. Lo que se instaló es un
ciclo al que he llamado “populismo sistémico”. Mientras los pobres son mani-
pulados con propósitos electoralistas a través de las dádivas típicas del “populismo
clásico”, una vez capturado el poder político invariablemente se practica un
“populismo de derecha”, transfiriendo riqueza a la burguesía amiga del go-
bierno. Antes de la democratización, los regímenes militares podían saltear la
fase clásica y pasar directamente al populismo de derecha, pero esencialmente
tanto los gobiernos democráticos como los militares se dedicaron a concentrar
riqueza en segmentos diversos de la burguesía. El funcionamiento de esta
dinámica ha sido oscurecido por la comprensible obsesión de los cientistas
sociales con las transiciones latinoamericanas a la democracia.
Ambas fases del populismo son parte del mismo todo sistémico. Siguiendo
una lógica olsoniana, los intereses y comportamientos de firmas privadas que
se benefician de sinacuras del gobierno son análogos a los de los trabajadores
y desempleados subsidiados que transitoriamente mejoran su suerte gracias a la
demagogia electoral. Las clases subordinadas recompensan a los políticos con
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su voto y apoyo en manifestaciones. La burguesía prebendaria los recompensa
con fondos electorales y sobornos. Las clases subordinadas castigan a los políticos
con huelgas, cortes de ruta, empresas tomadas y edificios ocupados. La
burguesía prebendaria, que es más poderosa, ha llegado a despedir operarios
innecesariamente, y a financiar huelgas y manifestaciones populares contra el
gobierno, para castigar y desestabilizar a políticos no cooperativos encarama-
dos en el poder (Escudé 2006).
Por cierto, en vigencia del sufragio universal, cuanto mayor sea la población
por debajo de la línea de pobreza, mayor será la proclividad a esta dinámica
populista. La gente sin esperanzas y escasa educación no suele apostar al futu-
ro, especialmente cuando ha sido sistemáticamente traicionada. Razonará que
es mejor pan para hoy y hambre para mañana, que hambre para hoy y para
mañana también. Por eso, su voto puede ser comprado por modestas dádivas,
devolviendo el poder a quienes ejercen el populismo de derecha.
Conclusiones a la Parte I – Disminución
de la gobernabilidad y ocaso de la política exterior
Sin embargo, a medida que aumenta la pobreza se deterioran las instituciones
y la gobernabilidad. Esto significa que, en el largo plazo, el poder del Estado
disminuye aún más. Y junto con esta regresión, emerge una tendencia a adop-
tar políticas exteriores que, más que la expresión de alguna concepción (aun-
que fuera elitista) del interés colectivo de largo plazo, son una proyección de
necesidades urgentes de política interna, que muchas veces sacrifica el futuro
en aras del presente.
Aunque este fenómeno no es común a todos los Estados latinoamericanos,
su presencia parece haberse incrementado con el brote populista emergido de
la conjunción de la pobreza masiva con la democracia electoral. Además, como
se documentará después, en aras de la preservación de su orden interno, inclu-
so países con estrategias geopolíticas consolidadas y de largo plazo, como
Brasil, a veces se ven obligados a hacer concesiones sorprendentes frente
a organizaciones criminales o subversivas, propias y ajenas.
En verdad, en la próxima sección veremos de qué manera las singulares
características del origen e independencia de los países iberoamericanos, hicie-
ron que el vínculo entre lo interno y lo externo fuera más fuerte en ellos que en
otras comunidades de naciones. No me refiero al consabido cliché de los efec-
tos del imperialismo, sino por el contrario, al fuerte impacto de las políticas
domésticas sobre las externas. Como es lógico, en tiempos fundacionales la
construcción del Estado primó sobre cualquier otro objetivo. Esta limitación
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inicial nunca se remontó por completo. Y en los tiempos actuales, la imperiosa
necesidad de conservar una gobernabilidad amenazada, distrae energías sobre
el planeamiento estratégico frente al mundo.
Por lo tanto, como se arguyó al principio, existe un vínculo causal entre los
epifenómenos “virtuoso” y “vicioso” de la América ibérica. La debilidad relati-
va del Estado, nunca totalmente superada, ha contribuido a forjar una civilización
que es, simultáneamente, la menos violenta y la más injusta del mundo entero.
Como lo demuestra la situación boliviana de septiembre de 2008, sin embar-
go, esta ecuación es inestable, y un estallido de violencia en gran escala en la
región no es descartable.
Parte II – El pasado es prólogo
La contigüidad lingüística de mayor extensión del planeta
Las singularidades de Iberoamérica no se agotan con la relativa ausencia de
guerra y genocidio, y la aberrante concentración del ingreso. Un hecho obvio
en el que casi nadie repara es que desde la Baja California hasta Tierra del
Fuego se habla una misma lengua, y que el portugués está tan emparentado
con el castellano que no es necesario un aprendizaje especial para que los
hispano y luso-parlantes de la región se comuniquen entre sí.
No sólo eso. Un chileno y un madrileño se entienden casi como si pertene-
cieran a la misma nación, pero lo mismo no ocurre entre un castellano y un
aldeano catalán, que pertenecen a un mismo Estado. Entre Tijuana, en el norte
de México, y Ushuaia, en el sur de Argentina, existen 10.776 Km. de territo-
rio contiguo donde se habla castellano. En cambio, los apenas 505 Km. que
separan a Madrid de Barcelona han sido suficientes para la erección de una
barrera lingüística significativa. Y la distancia entre mundos tan diferentes como
los de Moscú y Washington DC es de apenas 7827 Km., cifra bastante inferior
a los 10.055 Km. que separan a Ciudad Juárez, en el estado mexicano de
Chihuahua, de Punta Arenas, puerto chileno en el Estrecho de Magallanes.
Los orígenes de esta peculiaridad, que distingue a América latina de cual-
quiera de los “viejos mundos”, no son menos importantes que los de la relativa
“paz larga” de la región. Aunque desde el nacimiento de los Estados latinoa-
mericanos hubo una importante diferencia entre el Brasil lusoparlante y las
provincias hispanoparlantes del Imperio español, tales distingos son pequeños
en comparación a los que separan entre si a la mayoría de los Estados euro-
peos. En el caso más acotado de los Estados hispanoamericanos, los rasgos
456 ON THE STATE OF LATIN AMERICAN STATES. APPROACHING THE  BICENTENARY
compartidos eran tantos y tan relevantes que, por lo menos en el momento
fundacional, el concepto de “nación” no resultaba aplicable para ellos, en el
sentido en que lo fue en Europa a partir de la emergencia de las proto-naciona-
lidades lingüísticas.
Aunque el origen de esta diferencia es de fácil comprensión, vale la pena
registrarlo porque ilustra la excepcionalidad de América latina. Como sabemos,
al caer el Imperio romano, en la Europa romanizada el latín se transformó en
forma acelerada, dando lugar a lenguas vernáculas diferenciadas a lo largo
y ancho de ese territorio. La quiebra de las instituciones imperiales y la anarquía
propia de la temprana Edad Media produjeron una segmentación cada vez
mayor de estos romances, de modo que llegó un momento en que casi en cada
valle se hablaba un dialecto diferente.
Esto comenzó a cambiar cuando hacia 1450 Johannes Gutenberg introdu-
jo la imprenta de caracteres móviles en Europa. La emergencia del libro impre-
so representó una revolución político-cultural. Aunque en un primer momento
se imprimió en latín para un mercado paneuropeo, ese negocio pronto se agotó
y se comenzó a publicar en lenguas vernáculas, para mercados geográficamente
acotados. La contingencia de que en una ciudad emergiera una imprenta im-
portante y en otra no, determinó que un idioma lugareño pasara a dominar su
región circundante, en que se empleaban dialectos distintos pero afines entre
sí. Unos vernáculos se convirtieron así en lenguas literarias, mientras otros
pasaron a ser dialectos vulgares. De este modo comenzó un proceso inverso al
que había tenido lugar con la caída de Roma. Las lenguas vernáculas tendieron
a aglutinarse. Siguiendo el conocido planteo de Benedict Anderson, así surgie-
ron las identidades lingüísticas modernas en Europa.
En otras palabras, fue porque la imprenta no existía que, cuando cayeron
las instituciones políticas romanas, el latín se diversificó en romances diversos.
Pero fue precisamente porque la imprenta ya existía que, cuando desaparecie-
ron las instituciones políticas que unían a toda la América española, el castella-
no no se dividió en dialectos diferentes, sino que se consolidó a pesar de la
segmentación política del otrora Imperio español americano (Cisneros y Escudé
1998: 1:56–64). Esta particularidad dio lugar a la contigüidad lingüística más
extensa del planeta, vigente al día de hoy.
La protonacionalidad panhispanoamericana originaria
Puede discutirse si los orígenes comunes de los Estados de la región ayudan
o no a explicar tanto la abundancia de litigios territoriales como su resolución,
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casi siempre pacífica. Después de todo, ni los orígenes germánicos comunes
a Alemania e Inglaterra, ni los compartidos orígenes romanos de Francia
y España, alcanzaron para prevenir pavorosas guerras entre ellas. Como en
otras dimensiones de la vida latinoamericana, la comprensión de estas cuestio-
nes referidas a la guerra y la paz requiere una mirada retrospectiva que nos
remonta a tiempos fundacionales.
Las disputas territoriales iberoamericanas, que a entendimientos extranje-
ros pueden parecer nimias, tienen una considerable proyección sobre el pre-
sente. Recuérdese la guerra de Malvinas de 1982, desencadenada por la invasión
argentina de un territorio ocupado o usurpado por Gran Bretaña en fecha tan
lejana como 1833. O considérese el derrocamiento del presidente boliviano
Gonzalo Sánchez de Losada en octubre de 2003, perpetrado por multitudes
enardecidas debido a su decisión de exportar gas natural a través de Chile, país
que hasta hoy es considerado archienemigo por los bolivianos a raíz de la
guerra del Pacífico de 1879–1884. La comprensión de estas cuestiones ac-
tuales exige, una vez más, que nos remontemos al pasado con imaginación
sociológica.
Como se verá, y en medida no menor que la relativa ausencia de guerra, en
Hispanoamérica las disputas territoriales están más vinculadas a lo que sus
Estados tienen en común que a lo que los separa. Por cierto, la identidad pan-
hispanoamericana que prevaleciera antes de la crisis de la Independencia
representó un factor de debilidad para los Estados incipientes, ya que impuso
límites a los hombres y tributos que éstos podían movilizar contra vecinos que
competían por territorios, pero que compartían casi todo lo demás.
El Brasil lusitano, en cambio, fue diferente porque en su caso la Indepen-
dencia no trajo consigo una división del territorio en múltiples Estados de una
misma comunidad lingüística. Los Estados hispanoamericanos estaban necesi-
tados de identidades “nacionales” diferenciadas, a pesar del idioma comparti-
do, que por momentos se convirtió en una suerte de maldición, dificultando la
separación de las identidades.
No así Brasil. Éste se expandió, pero como Estados Unidos, poseía una
identidad clara antes de expandirse. Los litigios territoriales en que se involucró
emergieron de luchas convencionales por recursos o posesiones de valor
estratégico. No formaron parte del proceso de organización de su Estado,
aunque hayan podido contribuir a fortalecerlo. Con la posible excepción de la
lucha con Argentina por la perdida Provincia Cisplatina (el actual Uruguay),
esos conflictos no estuvieron relacionados con la delicada cuestión de quiénes
son los brasileños, que tiende a agravar la típica competencia por recursos.
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Fueron todos litigios librados contra Estados pertenecientes a otra comunidad
lingüística.
Por cierto, a pesar del largo período en que Portugal y su imperio fueron
parte de la Corona española, la diferenciación que emergió a partir de la rebelión
del duque de Braganza en 1640 fue sustancial. Llegada la crisis napoleónica,
la experiencia histórica de portugueses americanos y españoles americanos era
suficientemente diferente como para constituir identidades claramente separa-
das, incluso más allá de las diferencias lingüísticas. Por motivos varios, la
oligarquía brasileña estaba mucho más unida a su metrópoli que en el caso de
Hispanoamérica, a la vez que el temor a una rebelión de esclavos en Brasil,
mucho más numerosos que en la América española, generó actitudes muy
diferentes de parte de las elites (Bethell: vol. 3).
Pero en el caso de la América hispana, la experiencia histórica común po-
tenciaba los vínculos generados por el idioma compartido. Por cierto, más allá
de éste, desde tiempos fundacionales hubo allí una multitud de características
comunes de orden cultural, económico y social. Ayudaron a cimentar una iden-
tidad a través de un contexto social y una experiencia histórica compartidas.
Entre esos elementos en común se cuentan:
1. La omnipresencia de la Iglesia, cuyo poder era cultural, político, social
y económico.
2. Un ámbito cultural homogéneo en el que durante siglos fue preponderante
la influencia de pensadores españoles. La gente instruida leía lo mismo en
toda Hispanoamérica. Además, las restricciones a la entrada de libros afec-
taron a todo el Imperio americano. Desde California hasta Buenos Aires, se
compartía no sólo lo que se leía sino también lo que no se podía leer.
3. El carácter y la evolución de los mercados de la región. El monopolio co-
mercial establecía una única vía de entrada, uniformando los productos con
que toda Hispanoamérica se abastecía. Sólo por el contrabando se diferencia-
ban los mercados de las diversas jurisdicciones administrativas del Imperio.
4. La sobreexplotación de la población indígena, que produjo la catástrofe
demográfica del siglo XVII, compartida por toda la región.
5. El carácter forzado del trabajo. Aun donde era nominalmente libre, las
deudas de los peones anulaban la libertad. El verdadero trabajo asalariado
requirió siglos para desarrollarse.
6. La diferenciación social en términos de casta. Hasta la crisis de la Indepen-
dencia, el acceso a la administración, al ejército y a la Iglesia del estrato
urbano más bajo estuvo vedado, a la vez que el ascenso económico conse-
guido a través de otros medios carecía de relevancia social.
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7. El resentimiento de los blancos criollos (“españoles americanos”) hacia los
“españoles peninsulares”. Este sentimiento brotó después de las reformas
borbónicas de 1778, que tendieron a desplazar a los criollos blancos y a los
mestizos de las posiciones más codiciadas. (Halperin Donghi 1969: 11–73;
Cisneros y Escudé 1998: 1:27–28).
Sin embargo, más allá de estas similitudes, el territorio en que se asentaba
Hispanoamérica padecía una fisura esencial que separaba a los núcleos
hispanizados de las inmensas extensiones que aún estaban bajo la hegemonía
de alguna cultura indígena. Esta distinción no tiene paralelos en la Europa
medieval ni en la moderna. Apelando a una metáfora de Tulio Halperin Donghi,
la América española era una suerte de archipiélago de islas hispanizadas, sito
en un océano indígena.
A la vez, estas “islas” y su “océano” eran incomparables entre sí por la
homogeneidad de las primeras y la diversidad del segundo. La identidad hispa-
noamericana era la misma en todas las islas: por caso, en Ciudad de México
y en Buenos Aires. Pero los indígenas vecinos a Ciudad de México no tenían
nada en común con los que eran próximos a Buenos Aires. El océano indígena
era un mosaico heterogéneo de numerosas piezas. Por el contrario, las islas
hispanizadas (y también las portuguesas) eran muy similares entre sí. Había
una identidad hispanoamericana (y otra, lusoamericana). Pero había multitud
de identidades indígenas. Y las islas hispanizadas estaban separadas entre sí
cual cabales ínsulas del mar: por caso, no había contigüidad entre los territo-
rios (hoy provincias argentinas) de Buenos Aires, Santa Fe y Córdoba. Enor-
mes extensiones de territorio indígena escasamente poblado las separaban.
Por esta razón, son falaces los esfuerzos por separar y distinguir las nacio-
nalidades hispanoamericanas entre sí, al momento de la crisis de la Indepen-
dencia. Para el hispanizado, el indígena era el otro absoluto, de manera que los
lazos entre los primeros eran muy fuertes aunque miles de kilómetros los sepa-
raran. Como sugiere R.N. Burr en By Reason or Force: Chile and the Balancing
of Power in South America, 1830–1905, si no fuera porque el tiempo mun-
dial condicionaba otro desenlace, en Hispanoamérica pudo haber surgido un
sistema de encadenamientos de mando al estilo de la Europa feudal. En lugar
de ello, emergió un sistema interestatal similar al de la Europa post-Westfalia,
no porque fuera el más adecuado para aquellas circunstancias sino porque era
el único compatible con la cultura eurocéntrica de las elites locales, que nunca
pudieron imaginar otra cosa.
Estos fuertes lazos entre hispanoamericanos muy distantes entre sí hicieron
posible que hombres públicos oriundos de un Estado incipiente fueran funcio-
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narios importantes en otro. Andrés Bello, nacido en Venezuela, representó
primero al grupo revolucionario de Caracas en Londres, luego al gobierno
independiente de Venezuela en Inglaterra, más tarde a otros gobiernos hispa-
noamericanos y finalmente se mudó a Chile. Allí le tocó ser el arquitecto de la
primera política exterior estable de ese Estado. Hoy el instituto formador de los
diplomáticos chilenos porta su nombre.
Casos análogos (entre muchos) fueron el presidente de la Primera Junta de
gobierno en Buenos Aires, Cornelio Saavedra, que era boliviano; el Director
Supremo interino de las Provincias Unidas del Río de la Plata, Ignacio Álvarez
Thomas, que era un peruano de Arequipa; el primer embajador de Bolivia en
Buenos Aires, Deán Gregorio Funes, que era oriundo de la provincia argentina
de Córdoba, y el fundador del Colegio Militar boliviano, que no fue sino el
futuro presidente argentino Bartolomé Mitre, por los tiempos en que otro
futuro presidente de ese país, Domingo F. Sarmiento, era funcionario chileno.
Por cierto, como demostró J.C. Chiaramonte, durante las primeras décadas
de independencia, hombres como el caraqueño Andrés Bello o el arequipeño
Ignacio Álvarez Thomas podían ser forasteros en Santiago de Chile o Buenos
Aires, sus ciudades adoptivas, pero no eran extranjeros en ninguna parte de
Hispanoamérica. Las islas hispanizadas, desde México hasta Buenos Aires, tenían
en común todo lo que en Europa se hubiera requerido para definir una nacio-
nalidad: lengua, religión, cultura, historia y en medida variable (según el grado
de mestización) también raza. Existía una proto-nacionalidad pan-hispanoame-
ricana (Cisneros y Escudé, 1998: 1:19–22).
Las disputas territoriales como antídoto al problema
de la protonacionalidad compartida
Pero cuando gracias a Napoleón Bonaparte, la metrópoli sufrió un colapso
absoluto, el archipiélago hispanizado debió desmembrarse en soberanías dife-
renciadas, porque ningún centro hispanoamericano tenía el poder necesario
para mantener unido un territorio contiguo tan vasto, con intereses económicos
contrapuestos y centrífugos. Esos intereses en conflicto alimentarían numero-
sas contiendas.
Por otra parte, a medida que la hispanización avanzó, el archipiélago de
islas hispanizadas se fue convirtiendo en un océano de cultura hispanoamerica-
na, a la vez que el otrora océano indígena devino en archipiélago de ínsulas
nativas muy diferentes entre sí. Al disminuir la amenaza del “otro absoluto”
que antaño había representado el aborigen, la cultura hispana compartida por
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gentes que habitaban ciudades distantes entre sí perdió, por lo menos en parte,
su carácter de cemento identitario.
Este nuevo potencial para el conflicto entre españoles americanos se nutrió,
además, por el hecho de que las delimitaciones territoriales entre las diversas
jurisdicciones del colapsado Imperio eran ambiguas. Los Estados incipientes
rápidamente acordaron que se respetarían los límites fronterizos vigentes en
1810, pero éstos no eran nada claros. El acuerdo, conocido como el uti possidetis
de 1810, podía funcionar respecto de las tierras que habían sido bien explora-
das y en alguna medida ocupadas, pero no respecto de aquellas que jamás
habían estado bajo el control efectivo de conquistador alguno.
Tal como argüimos en el primer volumen de Cisneros y Escudé, ello es
comprensible. Los reyes españoles tenían el interés de asegurarse contra las
pretensiones de otras potencias europeas. Para hacerlo debían alentar a suce-
sivos conquistadores a explorar vastas regiones. Adjudicaban incentivos terri-
toriales sucesivos a conquistadores sucesivos. Una jurisdicción grande daba al
conquistador amplia libertad para moverse y elegir la tierra en que debería
establecerse y fundar sus ciudades. Pero los resultados eran siempre parciales:
ningún conquistador podía conquistar todo el vasto territorio que estaba auto-
rizado a conquistar y que en teoría le correspondía gobernar. Por eso, las
sucesivas concesiones, emitidas a través de capitulaciones y cédulas reales,
incluyeron enormes superposiciones y contradicciones.
El monarca buscaba asegurar sus derechos expandiendo la conquista efec-
tiva del territorio a través de una práctica administrativa que jamás pretendió
establecer los derechos soberanos de Estados sucesores de la Corona. Colapsado
el Imperio, los Estados incipientes competirían por los territorios cuyos títulos
eran ambiguos. Eso conduciría a la guerra.
Y en tales circunstancias, la falta de diferenciación entre las poblaciones de
los diversos Estados embrionarios representó un grave problema, siendo a la
vez una fuente adicional de debilidad. Como ya se sugirió, para movilizar
grandes contingentes de hombres a una muerte probable o para cobrar los
tributos necesarios para costear tales movilizaciones, cada centro de poder
debía intentar generar una legitimidad que otorgara cierto grado de obligato-
riedad moral a los sacrificios impuestos por la nueva “patria” local.
Dicha legitimidad requería la generación de una identidad propia y diferen-
ciada para la población bajo la jurisdicción de cada ciudad-estado. Y como
existía un exceso de elementos en común entre los elementos hispanizados de
estos diversos centros de poder, uno de los principales problemas que debieron
enfrentar los Estados incipientes fue el de construir diferencias.
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A partir del colapso del Imperio y el establecimiento de gobiernos autónomos
que competían entre sí, la proto nacionalidad pan-hispanoamericana se convirtió
en disfuncional para los intereses de los Estados incipientes. El marco identitario
previo, por el cual un caraqueño era forastero pero no extranjero en Santiago
de Chile, dejó de ser funcional para Estados incipientes que debían convencer
a sus súbditos que los habitantes de los territorios de un Estado incipiente
contiguo eran enemigos potenciales, cuando no actuales.
Por eso, la construcción de identidades “nacionales” pasó, en la América
española, por esta construcción de diferencias, en un universo cultural donde
lo que sobresalía era lo mucho que se compartía. Había que convencer a la
gente local de que el habitante de la jurisdicción contigua era diferente. ¿Pero
como hacerlo si hablaba la misma lengua, profesaba la misma religión y compartía
una misma historia? La única alternativa disponible era adoctrinar sobre el
carácter naturalmente codicioso, desleal, violento y expansionista de ese o aquel
argentino, chileno, paraguayo o boliviano, en apariencia tan similar a uno,
pero moralmente tan abyecto.
Así surgieron los mitos de pérdidas territoriales de los países hispanoparlantes
de la América meridional. Por cierto, si emprendemos el estudio de los manua-
les escolares de geografía de estos países, al llegar a los capítulos de “geografía
histórica” comprobamos que casi todos ellos registran enormes pérdidas te-
rritoriales a lo largo de su historia. Si nuestra curiosidad nos llevara a comparar
y sumar las pérdidas de cada uno, nos enfrentaríamos a un descubrimiento
asombroso, digno de una novela de Gabriel García Márquez: que dicha suma
es mucho mayor que la masa continental de la América del Sur (Escudé 1992).
Es así como, alimentando la rivalidad territorial que ha caracterizado a la
Argentina y Chile durante toda su historia, los mapas de pérdidas territoriales
con que se adoctrina a los niños de uno y otro país son el reflejo de versiones
opuestas de la historia. Como puede observarse en los mapas que publicamos
en el primer volumen de Cisneros y Escudé (a los que también puede accederse
por Internet), Chile presume de haber perdido la Patagonia argentina y la Ar-
gentina de haber perdido el sur de Chile. Este fenómeno se originó en la nece-
sidad funcional de los Estados incipientes de destruir la protonacionalidad común
que había hecho posible, en otros tiempos, que un futuro presidente argentino
como Sarmiento fuera funcionario en Chile.
Aquel amplio sentido de identidad correspondiente a los “españoles ameri-
canos” no era compatible con las realidades políticas emergidas con la Inde-
pendencia. Como la competencia por territorios surgió en forma automática, la
mutua acusación de expansionismo entre vecinos contiguos se lanzó
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espontáneamente. Luego se convirtió en parte de la política educativa. Así
comenzó el proceso de construcción de diferencias, que culminaría con la
destrucción de la protonacionalidad común y con el lento surgimiento de iden-
tidades “nacionales” diferenciadas para cada uno de los Estados que consiguie-
ron consolidarse.
Las guerras hicieron el resto. En la actualidad, queda como testimonio el
resentimiento que aún subsiste entre bolivianos, chilenos, peruanos y ecuato-
rianos. El mapa de las pérdidas territoriales bolivianas usado en las escuelas del
Altiplano es esencial para comprender procesos políticos recientes como el
derrocamiento civil de Sánchez de Losada. Allí comprobamos que los bolivia-
nos sólo presumen de haber perdido las dos terceras partes de su territorio
original, pasando de aproximadamente tres millones de kilómetros cuadrados
a un millón, como consecuencia de la presunta iniquidad de todos sus vecinos,
cada uno de los cuales habría llevado a cabo una artera y sistemática tarea de
despojo.
Entre los Estados contiguos a Bolivia, el país retratado de manera particu-
larmente vil es Chile. Los textos escolares bolivianos prácticamente azuzan a su
pueblo a lanzarse al ataque sobre ese país. El siguiente párrafo, extraído de un
texto oficial de la enseñanza secundaria que porta el significativo título de El
Mar Boliviano, ilustra la virulencia de los sentimientos que el Estado intenta
sembrar en los ciudadanos:
Este libro está destinado a los estudiantes y busca hacer comprender con
facilidad toda la magnitud de nuestra tragedia, los recursos vedados que utilizó
Chile para llevar adelante su guerra de despojo, y la incapacidad de nuestros
gobernantes para frenar las maniobras del enemigo, la felonía de éste y el uso
y abuso que hizo de la fuerza para extender su territorio aprovechándose del
vecino, para usufructuar sus riquezas y crecer gracias a ellas (Sanabria G., F.,
1988; El Mar Boliviano, Proinsa, La Paz, p. 3).
Probablemente no sea coincidencia que el Estado latinoamericano que más
odio instila en sus habitantes contra los nacionales de países contiguos, sea uno
donde más del sesenta por ciento de la población habla quechua o aymará,
y donde aún otro segmento amazónico se comunica en otras lenguas indígenas.
Se requiere un cemento muy especial para mantener unido ese mosaico étnico
con las poblaciones criollas de Tarija y Santa Cruz, en torno de un mismo
Estado cada vez menos hispanizado. Hasta ahora han permanecido unidas no
por el amor, sino por temores y resentimientos alimentados por un Estado que,
entre otros mecanismos, usa el odio a Chile como aglutinante. Y a la fecha de
entrega de este trabajo, no se saben si permanecerán unidos.
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Algo similar, aunque de mucha menor gravedad, ocurre en el Perú frente
a Chile, y en Ecuador frente al Perú. Los mapas de pérdidas territoriales de
Perú y Paraguay son los que registran las “pérdidas” más importantes. En algu-
nos textos paraguayos se dice que el nombre original de su país fue “Provincia
Gigante de Indias”, apareciendo bañado por el “Mar del Paraguay”, nombre
sui generis del Atlántico (Cisneros y Escudé 2008: 1:78).
Pero aunque el adoctrinamiento sobre sus pérdidas históricas incluye todo el
territorio hoy argentino, el principal blanco del odio que se alienta en los estu-
diantes peruanos es otra vez Chile. La proyección de este adoctrinamiento sobre
la opinión pública está ilustrada por la edición del 4 de enero de 2006 de El Men
(sic), un tabloide de Lima. El gran titular de tapa informa: “Nuestras Fuerzas
Armadas revelan Plan de Defensa. Bombas peruanas más poderosas que chile-
nas. Soberanía nacional está garantizada”. Y en la página 5 se incluye una lista de
las bombas peruanas, con el subtítulo: “Conozca las bombas que usan nuestras
Fuerzas Armadas. Y las que estamos produciendo meten miedo a Chile”.
La gerencia del tabloide, que está dirigido a estratos escasamente educados
pero alfabetos, sabe que su público es sensible a estas cuestiones. Se diseña
esta tapa porque se sabe que venderá, y al venderse contribuye a consolidar
este adoctrinamiento escolar, que se convierte en auto-perpetuante.
Procesos similares se observan en varios países, entre ellos Argentina,
a pesar de su nivel educativo relativamente mayor. Como lo señalara Charles
E. Merriam en su precursora serie The Making of Citizens, que data de la ya
lejana década de 1930, en estas cuestiones lo relevante no es tanto el alcance
cuantitativo de la educación sino su contenido (en un país nazi, el ciudadano
“bien educado” suele ser un “buen” nazi). Cuando (como en el caso claro de
Malvinas) los contenidos alimentan conflictos interestatales, el mayor alcance
de la educación agrava el problema.
En verdad, el caso de Argentina frente a las Malvinas es uno de los más
extremos, en tanto el adoctrinamiento de la población no fue considerado su-
ficiente y se buscó maniatar a los gobiernos. La Constitución actual, vigente
desde 1994, posee una “cláusula transitoria” que establece:
“La Nación Argentina ratifica su legítima e imprescriptible soberanía sobre
las Islas Malvinas, Georgias del Sur y Sandwich del Sur y los espacios marítimos
e insulares correspondientes, por ser parte integrante del territorio nacional.
La recuperación de dichos territorios y el ejercicio pleno de la soberanía, respe-
tando el modo de vida de sus habitantes, y conforme a los principios del dere-
cho internacional, constituyen un objetivo permanente e irrenunciable del pue-
blo argentino.”
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La cláusula es “transitoria” porque dejará de tener vigencia cuando estos
territorios hayan sido recuperados. Mientras tanto, toda negociación con el
Reino Unido, por ventajosa que fuere, sería anticonstitucional si renunciara
a alguna de esas aguas y tierras.
Obviamente, la transitoriedad de la cláusula es imaginaria. Pero esto no
debiera sorprender, ya que a veces estos fenómenos vienen acompañados por
un adoctrinamiento acerca de territorios imaginarios. Los detectamos en la
enseñanza y en los organismos de difusión ecuatorianos hasta la firma del
Acuerdo de Brasilia (con Perú) en 1998, y en la educación argentina y chilena
hasta el presente.
Por cierto, en los mapas escolares de ambos países australes se incluyen los
territorios antárticos superpuestos que sus diplomacias reclaman. Parte de ese
segmento disputado de la Antártica está también reclamado por Londres, que
sin embargo no lo incluye como parte del Reino Unido en sus mapas escolares.
Además, los reclamos de soberanía están congelados por el Tratado Antártico,
que fue firmado por todas las partes interesadas. Más allá de cómo se renegocie
el régimen antártico una vez que dicho congelamiento venza en 2009, es
sumamente improbable que Argentina o Chile alguna vez consoliden su domi-
nio sobre todo el territorio que reclaman.
No obstante, ambos Estados alientan a sus ciudadanos a vivir en la irreali-
dad. Mientras las fuentes internacionales adjudican a la Argentina una superfi-
cie de 2.792.810 Km2, la Presidencia de la Nación Argentina dice en su sitio
web que:
En el extremo Sur del continente americano se encuentra la República Ar-
gentina [...]. Con una superficie de 3.761.274 Km˛, (su) territorio posee un
paisaje variado [...]. Por su extensión – que corresponde al continente ameri-
cano, al continente antártico [...] y a las islas australes – ocupa el cuarto lugar
entre los países americanos [...] y el séptimo a nivel mundial.
Consecuentemente con esta fantasía, según algunos textos escolares, las
sureñas ciudades de Ushuaia (Argentina) y Punta Arenas (Chile) se encuentran
en el centro mismo de sus respectivos países, medidos de norte a sur. Es lo que
resulta si los confines de Argentina son La Quiaca y el Polo Sur, y si Chile es un
“país tricontinental”, tal como afirma un lema oficial.
En verdad, la Presidencia de Chile anuncia en su sitio web oficial que:
Chile, país tricontinental, asienta su territorio en América, Antártica
y Oceanía.
Y mientras las fuentes internacionales nos dicen que ese país posee 755.838
Km2, desde su sitio web la Presidencia de la República pontifica que:
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La superficie de Chile americano, antártico e insular, es de 2.006.096 km
2 , sin considerar su mar territorial, la Zona Económica Exclusiva y la pertinen-
te plataforma continental. [...] Chile limita al norte con el Perú a través de la
Línea de la Concordia (y) al [...] al sur con el Polo Sur.
El territorio que su Estado se adjudica más que duplica el territorio que
domina y que el mundo reconoce como suyo. Más de la mitad de estos dos
millones de kilómetros cuadrados son territorio imaginario. Tanto como cual-
quiera de sus vecinos, el exitoso país andino demuestra, con sus políticas edu-
cativas y de difusión pública, que el realismo mágico no es solamente una
escuela literaria. A la vez, gasta sumas gigantescas en el equipamiento de sus
fuerzas armadas: según el Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI), en 2006 invirtió en ello 4858 millones de dólares. Estos son recursos
de los que su pueblo es privado. Es un consumo sustraído a su desarrollo
económico y social, que resulta inteligible a la luz de este discurso: un país
tricontinental requiere grandes inversiones en armas de guerra.
¿Puede haber indicador más elocuente de su debilidad?
Parte III – Pobreza, populismo
y política exterior
La diversidad de las izquierdas gobernantes
Como se dijo en la sección anterior, la debilidad de los Estados latinoamerica-
nos contribuye a explicar la alta concentración del ingreso en la región. Es lo
que hace posible que poderosos intereses capturen al Estado y lo pongan a su
servicio, incluso a través de mecanismos formalmente legales. Las frecuentes
depreciaciones y estatizaciones de deudas privadas llevadas a cabo en Argenti-
na entre 1975 y 2002, ya mencionadas, se instrumentaron desde la legalidad
y sirvieron para enriquecer a los más ricos a costa de los más pobres, durante
regímenes tanto constitucionales como militares, e independientemente de qué
partido gobernara. El uso de las empresas del Estado para transferir recursos
a contratistas privados dedicados a la sobrefacturación sistemática, y la limitada
capacidad de estos Estados para cobrar impuestos, obedecen a las mismas
causas y tienen las mismas consecuencias en toda la región. Y en países relati-
vamente pobres como los latinoamericanos, concentrar el ingreso significa en-
gendrar pobreza.
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En efecto, según la Corporación de Desarrollo Andino, en 2005 la
proporción de la población que vivía con menos de dos dólares diarios equivalía
al 37% en Brasil, el 39% en México, el 45% en Argentina, el 48% en Venezue-
la, el 50% en Colombia, el 54% en Perú y el 62% en Bolivia. Entre las conse-
cuencias de este cuadro se cuentan la proliferación de la protesta social, la
difusión de ideologías contestatarias, y la elección de gobiernos que dicen re-
presentar a los desposeídos y se encuadran en algún tipo de “izquierda”.
Siguiendo a K. Roberts, podemos definir ampliamente a la izquierda actual
como una praxis y un pensamiento caracterizados por:
1. Una disposición a usar el poder del Estado para estimular el crecimiento
económico y corregir las distorsiones producidas por el mercado;
2. Una disposición a usar el poder del Estado y/o las organizaciones sociales
para reducir las desigualdades sociales y enfrentar los déficit sociales, y
3. Un compromiso con la profundización de la democracia, a través de diver-
sas formas de movilización social y de participación en el proceso político
(Arnson, p. 10).
Puesto en estos términos, a principios de 2008 podemos afirmar que sólo
México, Colombia y Perú tienen gobiernos electos que no se encuadran en
algún tipo de izquierda. Por cierto, aproximadamente el 60% de los 540 millo-
nes de habitantes que pueblan América latina han optado por gobiernos de ese
signo (Arnson, p. 3).
Sin embargo, en cuanto examinamos las políticas concretas ensayadas por
los diversos gobiernos comprendidos dentro de nuestra definición de izquier-
da, encontramos diferencias importantes. Venezuela, Ecuador, Nicaragua y, en
menor medida, Argentina y Bolivia, se encuadran en una izquierda “populis-
ta”. Este populismo generalmente está caracterizado por una movilización de
masas desde arriba hacia abajo. A menudo pero no siempre, es personalista.
Suele venir de la mano de un hombre fuerte que desafía a la política tradicional
y a las elites económicas. El caso arquetípico de este líder carismático en la
izquierda es, en la actualidad, Hugo Chávez.
No obstante, el populismo de izquierda (que se diferencia del de derecha,
ejemplificado por el ex presidente peruano Alberto Fujimori) no siempre es
encabezado por un hombre fuerte. En la Argentina actual, por ejemplo, no hay
un líder carismático sino un gobierno emergente de un partido populista tradi-
cional, el peronismo, que en una etapa previa, la de Carlos Menem (1989–
1999), había representado un populismo de derecha, y ahora se regenera con
un populismo de izquierda moderada.
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También es diferente el caso de Evo Morales en Bolivia, ya que representa
una movilización social que fluye en dirección opuesta a la que es habitual en el
populismo: de abajo hacia arriba. Además, como sabemos, en el caso boliviano
los conflictos étnicos son un componente crucial que condiciona la política
interna y externa.
Vemos entonces cuán diversa es la textura del populismo latinoamericano:
puede incluir o no un líder carismático; en algunos casos tiene componentes
étnicos; a veces emerge de un partido populista histórico. La movilización
social casi siempre se alienta de arriba hacia abajo, aunque en algún caso el
flujo de energía se produce en sentido inverso. Lo que todas las variantes
tienen en común, sin embargo, es la ausencia de énfasis en la institucionalización
democrática, que queda eclipsada por el líder carismático o por la estructura
partidaria “movimientista” o indigenista.
Es precisamente en este rasgo donde yace la diferencia fundamental entre la
izquierda populista latinoamericana y su contraparte socialdemócrata, que en
términos generales caracteriza a los gobiernos y opciones electorales de Chile,
Uruguay y en medida menor, Brasil. En Chile, cuya centroizquierda es la que
más se parece al sector homónimo en Europa, gobierna la Concertación de
Partidos para la Democracia. Esta coalición está liderada por el Partido Socia-
lista, una agrupación institucionalizada y neomarxista que sobrevivió a la dicta-
dura de Augusto Pinochet (1973–1990). Los cambios en el mundo, princi-
palmente el colapso de la Unión Soviética, contribuyeron a renovar
ideológicamente al partido, a la vez que a moderarlo. Y cómo señala Roberts,
esta moderación surge en parte porque compite con rivales en un sistema
institucionalizado de partidos (Arnson, p. 13).
Populismo vs. socialdemocracia:
comparando Argentina con Chile
Este anclaje del centroizquierda chileno es diametralmente diferente al de la
izquierda populista latinoamericana. Tomemos por caso al partido del gobierno
en la Argentina, el justicialismo (o peronismo). No sólo no es neomarxista: no
representa filosofía política alguna, excepto el pragmatismo descarnado de ser
efectivo en la captura del poder.
En efecto, a diferencia de Chile, en Argentina los grandes partidos han sido
movimientistas. En el caso del peronismo, los presidentes engendrados fueron:
· Juan Domingo Perón (1946–1955 y 1973–1974), un militar carismático
que manipuló al movimiento obrero desde la cúpula de una dictadura mili-
tar y luego fue elegido democráticamente en tres ocasiones;
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· Héctor J. Cámpora (1973), que fue una suerte de bisagra entre el líder
carismático exiliado y una juventud peronista revolucionaria que desafiaba
al ala derechista del partido;
· María Estela (Isabel) Martínez de Perón (1974–1976), una bailarina que
llegó a la presidencia a través de la alcoba y fue cómplice de intereses de
ultra derecha, a su vez afines a la dictadura militar que le derrocó;
· Carlos S. Menem (1989–1999), un populista de derecha neoliberal que se
dedicó principalmente a construir su poder, sirviendo a los intereses de una
burguesía prebendaria y concentrando el ingreso nacional;
· Eduardo Duhalde (2002–2003), cuya devaluación de principios de su gesti-
ón redujo en un 70% las deudas de las grandes empresas, contribuyendo
a concentrar aún más el ingreso y a engendrar la consiguiente pobreza; y
· Néstor Kirchner (2003–2007), un populista de centro-izquierda que, en
medida modesta, consiguió revertir este proceso de concentración del
ingreso.
· Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2008–presente), ex legisladora y populis-
ta de centro-izquierda sin carisma alguno, más moderada que su cónyuge,
que le precedió en la presidencia.
En otras palabras, la filosofía política del peronismo no existe. El suyo es un
aparato para conquistar el poder. Sus afiliados frecuentemente reconocen que
su partido es un “proyecto de poder”. Y es por eso que en él han convivido
siempre un ala de derecha y otra de izquierda. En alguna medida, lo mismo se
puede decir de la alicaída Unión Cívica Radical, el otro gran partido tradicional
argentino. Siempre tuvo una rama conservadora y otra de centroizquierda.
Aunque legalmente estas organizaciones “movimientistas” son partidos
políticos, en realidad son mecanismos que permiten sortear el sistema político
constitucional, cual un cabal “by pass”. La verdadera competencia política se
produce en su interior, y no es democrática. Disfrazados de partidos, en el
fondo son clubes cuyos dirigentes se alternan en la presidencia del país. Su
longevo poder proviene de una red subterránea de facilitadores, conocida como
el “aparato”.
En el caso del peronismo, el aparato es una trama de punteros que incluso
pudo sobrevivir dieciocho años de proscripción de su partido. Sus vínculos con
el crimen organizado de barrio le permiten obtener fondos modestos prove-
nientes del juego clandestino, la prostitución y el narcotráfico pequeño. Su
longeva supervivencia es el fruto de su duradera inserción en los estamentos
inferiores de las burocracias estatales, de nivel nacional, provincial y municipal.
Durante décadas este aparato ha seducido a vecinos humildes en numerosas
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localidades y vecindarios, facilitando trámites difíciles, desde entierros hasta la
habilitación de pequeños negocios, a la vez que ha contado con los fondos
necesarios para costear movilizaciones populares. Tiene el poder de repartir
favores incluso cuando sus dirigentes no están en el poder. Por eso, engendra
lealtades duraderas entre las masas pauperizadas. Es una de las “instituciones
subterráneas” emergidas del fracaso de las instituciones formales.
En contraste, los partidos políticos chilenos de izquierda y de derecha tie-
nen una filosofía política identitaria, y ese rasgo de la política chilena sobrevivió
a la dictadura. Con o sin aparato, no han degenerado en estructuras
movimientistas. En esta dimensión, aunque no en otras, Chile es constitutivamente
diferente de la mayor parte de los países de América latina y tiene fuertes
rasgos en común sólo con Uruguay. Como veremos más adelante – y esta es
una nueva paradoja – la ausencia de un crudo pragmatismo en los partidos
políticos de Chile contribuye a que el Estado chileno se comporte pragmáti-
camente frente al mundo, velando por los intereses chilenos, mientras los “pro-
yectos de poder” de los partidos políticos argentinos han tendido a anularse
recíprocamente, impidiendo la defensa pragmática de los intereses nacionales
en el largo plazo.
Por cierto, el pragmatismo de los “partidos” argentinos deviene en, a lo
sumo, partido-céntrico. Una vez instalado el juego de suma cero, todo político
que privilegie el interés colectivo sobre el de su facción particular pierde frente
a los demagogos. Como se verá en sucesivos acápites, este intríngulis de difícil
solución es especialmente visible en el análisis de las políticas exteriores.
La política exterior del populismo
vs. la de la socialdemocracia: comparando
a Venezuela con Chile
Las divergentes políticas exteriores producidas por la matriz socialdemócrata
y la de la izquierda populista son particularmente visibles cuando se comparan
casos extremos como el chileno y el venezolano. Ambos países se han benefi-
ciado enormemente de los precios favorables de las commodities que exportan:
Chile, con el cobre, y Venezuela con el petróleo. Pero mientras Ricardo Lagos
(2000–2006) ha sido frecuentemente señalado como el estadista latinoameri-
cano que más hizo por combatir la pobreza en la historia reciente, acred-
itándosele el buen uso de esos importantes recursos, muy otro es el caso de
Hugo Chávez. Además, mientras la infraestructura chilena se ha desarrollado
con paso sostenido, la venezolana se ha deteriorado fuertemente en años re-
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cientes. Y mientras Chile se ha abierto al mundo, inteligentemente aprovechan-
do oportunidades comerciales, Venezuela ha caído en un dirigismo estatal ex-
tremo, adoptando un rígido control de cambios. Asimismo, mientras Venezue-
la desafía permanentemente a Estados Unidos, Chile mantiene una relación
buena pero no servil con esa potencia.
Si estudiamos a Chile, comprobaremos que no es por amor a los Estados
Unidos sino por un cálculo de conveniencia que su gobierno socialista adhiere
a principios de libre comercio. Por cierto, según la consultora Latinobarómetro,
los países latinoamericanos donde el presidente George W. Bush goza de me-
nor aprobación son Chile, Uruguay y Argentina. Pero ocurre también que los
países donde Fidel Castro tiene menor aprobación son Chile y Costa Rica,
y aquel en qué Hugo Chávez tiene menor aprobación es Chile. En otras pala-
bras, la animadversión chilena por Bush y la propensión de su gente al
centroizquierda, no alcanzan para neutralizar el rechazo hacia caudillos
personalistas y dictadores de izquierda, que son enemigos de Bush. La actitud
parece europea y permite al Estado chileno mantener relaciones satisfactorias
con los tres, Bush, Chávez y Castro, a pesar de que sus ciudadanos no simpa-
tizan con ninguno de ellos.
Las políticas chilenas son el producto de esta disposición pragmática de
parte de pueblo y gobierno, y eso se ve sobre todo en su apertura comercial.
Hasta la fecha Chile ha firmado tratados de libre comercio con 37 gobiernos
y bloques, entre ellos Estados Unidos, Canadá, la Unión Europea, la Asociaci-
ón Europea de Libre Comercio, China, México, Japón, Corea del Sur y América
Central. Junto con México e Israel, es uno de los tres países con mayor canti-
dad de acuerdos de libre comercio del mundo entero.
Esta política le ha deparado resultados extraordinarios. Para poner un ejem-
plo, en los cuatro primeros años de vigencia del Acuerdo de Asociación, el
intercambio comercial chileno con los países de la Unión Europea aumentó de
7.426,7 millones de dólares en 2002, a 21.128,3 millones en 2006, es
decir, 2,8 veces. Similarmente, desde que entró en efecto a comienzos de
2004, el tratado de libre comercio entre Chile y Estados Unidos produjo un
aumento del 154% en el comercio bilateral entre ambos. Chile prospera, y no
sólo por el aumento del precio internacional del cobre.
En cambio, Venezuela se nos presenta como un violento contraste. Los
petrodólares de ese país, incomparablemente más abundantes que las divisas
del Estado chileno, han sido usados principalmente para comprar protagonismo
internacional para su caudillo, Hugo Chávez. Y si bien es verdad que tanto
Chile como Venezuela gastan mucho dinero en armamentos, las adquisiciones
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de Santiago se realizan sin ostentación, como discreta política de Estado, mien-
tras las de Caracas vienen junto a cotidianos alardes y amenazas.
Las aventuras geopolíticas venezolanas
La Venezuela de Chávez usa sus gigantescos recursos para subsidiar las
economías de varios países de la región, sobre los que aspira a ejercer influen-
cia. A Nicaragua le suministra petróleo barato a la vez que la coopta para su
alianza con Irán, mientras en Argentina financia organizaciones de protesta
que le son afines. Desde hace varios años se ha convertido en el principal
sostén del régimen comunista de Cuba. Azuza al mandatario boliviano Evo
Morales para que acelere procesos de nacionalización, ofreciendo financiar
bases militares en las provincias petroleras de ese país. En su fallido intento de
2007 por conseguir un asiento no permanente en el Consejo de Seguridad de
la ONU, y con la esperanza de captar el voto africano, Chávez prometió com-
prar todo el excedente exportable de las cosechas de algodón de Benin y Malí.
Llevó su amistad con Irán al punto de apoyar los intentos de penetración chiíta
en la región, e incluso concurrió a la conversión al islam de indígenas de la
Guajira, en su propio país. También se plegó a la retórica anti-israelí del régimen
de Teherán.
Gracias a los coqueteos geopolíticos de Chávez, la milicia libanesa Hezbolá
tiene en Venezuela una importante puerta de entrada a América latina. Se trata
de una trama doble por la que se contribuye a financiar operaciones del Hezbolá
en Medio Oriente, a la vez que se avanza en la penetración chiíta de organiza-
ciones populares latinoamericanas. Esta penetración es efectiva porque Hezbolá
brinda servicios sociales a los miembros de las organizaciones populares en
que asienta su presencia, duplicando el modelo de su operatoria en el Líbano.
En este contexto, Ghazi Nasr al Din, diplomático venezolano de origen
libanés, ha sido acusado por el Departamento de Estado de los Estados Unidos
de usar las embajadas de su país para proveer de fondos al Hezbolá y facilitar
“cursos de entrenamiento”, en Irán, de miembros venezolanos de dicha
organización terrorista. Estas operaciones se realizan en connivencia con agen-
cias de viajes de Caracas, manejadas también por libaneses. A su vez, el consu-
lado de Venezuela en Maicao, Colombia, ha sido denunciado como proveedor
de cédulas y pasaportes venezolanos a radicales islámicos. Un punto neurálgico
del vínculo entre Venezuela y el Hezbolá se encuentra en la Isla Margarita,
donde opera un banco que financia actividades en el Medio Oriente de la
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milicia chiíta, facilitando flujos de dinero provenientes del tráfico de drogas, la
venta de armas, el contrabando de personas y otras actividades.
Es por medio de estos y otros mecanismos que prosperan las actividades de
“Hezbolá Venezuela”, una organización de filiación política chavista que se
auto-publicita en Internet y que opera principalmente en la zona de la Guajira
y la sierra del Perija, con indígenas de las etnias guajira y wayuu. Según infor-
mes norteamericanos, estas actividades cuentan con el apoyo de la Dirección
de los Servicios de Inteligencia y Prevención (DSIP) del gobierno venezolano.
Pero Chávez no sólo flirtea con los islámicos. La proximidad de maniobras
ruso-venezolanas en noviembre, con la anunciada presencia del moderno cru-
cero Pedro el Grande, y el reciente aterrizaje de dos poderosos bombarderos
Tu-160 en Caracas, han advertido a los analistas y a la comunidad de inteligen-
cia acerca del advenimiento de una nueva fase en la competencia geopolítica
ruso-norteamericana, complementaria de la inaugurada con los sucesos de
Georgia de 2008. Y esta nueva era viene a caballo de la oportunidad que tanto
Chávez como el presidente nicaragüense Daniel Ortega le dan a los rusos.
Nicaragua, digno es de destacarse, es el único país aparte de Rusia que ha
reconocido la independencia de Osetia del Sur y de Abjazia. Cuba, en cambio,
deseosa de alentar una política norteamericana menos dañina para sus intere-
ses, ha adoptado una actitud más ambigua.
Mirando al futuro, también existe la posibilidad de que Rusia use su influen-
cia política en Venezuela para anclar submarinos en sus aguas. Durante toda la
Guerra Fría (aún después de la crisis de los misiles) hubo presencia de subma-
rinos rusos en Cuba, y ese escenario puede recrearse ahora en el país de
Chávez. Moscú está muy activa produciendo nuevos y más modernos sumergi-
bles, y en pocos años tendrá la disponibilidad necesaria para ubicar algunos en
esas latitudes en forma permanente. Eso obligará a Washington a invertir aún
más en defensa, para mantener su amplia superioridad, o a trasladar recursos
del ejército a la marina, lo que implicaría reducir aún más su capacidad para
librar guerras terrestres en frentes como el afgano o el iraquí.
Pero la mayor amenaza radica en la posibilidad de que Rusia, con su recu-
perada liquidez financiera, reanude su táctica de guerra fría de armar organi-
zaciones insurgentes enemigas de los Estados Unidos en América latina. El
móvil ya no sería ideológico sino crudamente geopolítico. Las Fuerzas Arma-
das Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) colombianas podrían ser beneficia-
rias. También los cárteles mexicanos. Y en el caso de las FARC, la connivencia
de Venezuela sería el mejor canal de acceso.
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Aunque es improbable que Moscú acuda a estos extremos en lo inmediato,
el mensaje que envía a Estados Unidos es que esas opciones están abiertas.
Y entregando a Venezuela, llave en mano, una fábrica de fusiles Kalashnikov,
diluye su responsabilidad directa en cualquier aumento de la capacidad de
combate de los enemigos de los intereses norteamericanos.
Téngase en cuenta que el mandatario “bolivariano” es amigo cercano de la
guerrilla narcotraficante de Colombia. Entre muchas evidencias de larga data,
puede mencionarse que en 2004 ofreció ciudadanía venezolana a dirigentes
de las FARC como Rodrigo Granda Escobar, un representante para-diplomático
de los insurgentes, para protegerles de la persecución del gobierno colombia-
no. Cuando en enero de 2005 Granda fue secuestrado por mercenarios co-
lombianos cerca de su casa en Caracas, Chávez acusó a Bogotá de violar soberanía
venezolana.
Más grave es el hecho de que la localidad venezolana de El Nula, sita en las
inmediaciones de la frontera con Colombia, esté en manos de las FARC, según
informaran El Heraldo de Miami el 3 de octubre de 2008, y La Nación de
Buenos Aires siete días más tarde. Allí la guerrilla colombiana, incluido también
el Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), ejerce acciones de gobierno y de
justicia, supervisa obra pública y asesora a los consejos comunales creados por
el gobierno de Chávez. Esta presencia en esa y otras localidades fronterizas se
remonta al año 2000, demostrando que a pesar de sus reveses recientes, las
FARC retienen una cuota significativa de poder y gozan del apoyo de algunos
gobiernos extranjeros.
Según la crónica de Casto Ocando para El Heraldo, en El Nula las guerrillas
resuelven disputas familiares; deciden la separación de bienes en casos de divor-
cio; dan la palabra final en casos de querellas por robo de ganado o por el
establecimiento de límites entre fincas; organizan reuniones con directores
y maestros de escuelas públicas; y obligan a las empresas contratadas por
el Estado para construir obra pública, a emplear guerrilleros como obreros
y a tributar entre el 15 y el 30 por ciento de su recaudación. La justicia guerri-
llera opera en 24 horas, mientras que la Defensoría del Pueblo demora meses.
Es una justicia salomónica que la gente acepta, frente a la virtual ausencia del
Estado venezolano. Además, la guerrilla combate el crimen. Ladrones y viola-
dores aparecen muertos. Según Ocando, el párroco del pueblo declara que:
“Hay mucha seguridad. Es como el pago de ellos. Y la gente lo reconoce”.
A pesar de estas pruebas de complicidad o connivencia entre Chávez y las
FARC, en agosto de 2007 el presidente colombiano Álvaro Uribe aceptó que
el venezolano intermediara entre Bogotá y los rebeldes por la liberación huma-
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nitaria de rehenes. Quizá quiso neutralizar la mala impresión causada en la
opinión pública internacional porque, en junio de 2007, negociaciones ante-
riores entre su gobierno y los insurgentes habían culminado en la muerte, por
fuego cruzado, de once congresistas secuestrados que las FARC habían ofreci-
do liberar. Con el apoyo locuaz del presidente de Francia, Nicolas Sarkozy, la
intermediación se puso en marcha, pero a fines de noviembre Uribe retiró su
apoyo a la mediación de Chávez, en parte porque éste daba a los negociadores
de la guerrilla el tratamiento propio de diplomáticos de Estados soberanos, a la
vez que sostenía conversaciones personales con generales colombianos, como
si respondieran a su mando.
El caudillo venezolano reaccionó airadamente y las FARC decidieron
“desagraviarlo”, entregando rehenes a Caracas para su liberación desde Vene-
zuela. Esta operación, en la que los gobiernos de Argentina y Francia tuvieron
participación, se concretó exitosamente el 10 de enero de 2008 con la liberación
de Consuelo González (una congresista colombiana secuestrada en 2001)
y Clara Rojas (asesora de la candidata presidencial Íngrid Betancourt, secues-
trada junto a ésta en 2002). Posteriormente, el 27 de febrero, otros cuatro
rehenes de alto perfil fueron entregados para su liberación por las FARC
a Chávez. Entre ellos, uno era senador cuando fue secuestrado y otro era
esposa de un senador.
Pero antes de esta postrera liberación de rehenes, con todos los ánimos
crispados por la crisis diplomática, el 20 de enero Chávez escaló su confrontación
con Uribe, amenazando militarizar la frontera entre su país y Colombia. Seis
días más tarde acusó a su vecino de “fraguar una provocación bélica contra
Venezuela”. Y el 3 de febrero volvió a proferir advertencias. No obstante estas
actitudes, el 28 de febrero Sarkozy recurrió otra vez a Chávez para que
intermediara por la liberación de Betancourt, que tiene doble nacionalidad
colombiana-francesa. El interlocutor del presidente francés era Raúl Reyes,
segundo en comando de las FARC y a veces considerado su “canciller” (minis-
tro de relaciones exteriores).
Cuando el 1ş de marzo, quizá con la intención de interrumpir negociacio-
nes que daban a las FARC un excesivo estatus internacional, fuerzas colombia-
nas mataron a Reyes y a otros dieciséis combatientes en territorio ecuatoriano,
muchos pensaron que comenzaría la guerra. Venezuela, Nicaragua y el propio
Ecuador acusaron a Colombia de violar la soberanía ecuatoriana. Chávez escaló
nuevamente la disputa anunciando el envío de tropas a la frontera Lo mismo
hizo Ecuador. Y el 6 de marzo, Nicaragua rompió relaciones diplomáticas con
Colombia.
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No obstante, en la ocasión se puso de manifiesto una vez más que América
latina tiene escasa vocación guerrera. El 7 de marzo, los presidentes de la
región se reunieron en Santo Domingo para una cumbre previamente agendada
del Grupo de Río. La sospecha persistentemente enunciada por diplomáticos
y analistas de varios países es que a quien verdaderamente le convenía una guerra
era al gobierno de los Estados Unidos, ya que su resultado probable hubiera sido
el derrocamiento de Chávez, el cese del subsidio venezolano a Cuba y Bolivia,
y quizás incluso una eventual crisis del régimen de La Habana.
En Santo Domingo, luego de feroces acusaciones e insultos entre las partes
en conflicto, los mandatarios de Brasil, Chile y Argentina pusieron paños fríos
y consiguieron un pedido de disculpas formal por parte de Colombia por haber
violado la soberanía ecuatoriana. Estas disculpas fueron premiadas, ya que
Cristina Kirchner habló del “terrorismo de las FARC”, alejándose levemente de
la posición histórica del gobierno argentino, que supone que éstas son sola-
mente un grupo insurgente. Antes del feliz desenlace, el mandatario colombia-
no Álvaro Uribe había denunciado a su par ecuatoriano Rafael Correa de ha-
ber recibido contribuciones importantes de los guerrilleros para su campaña
presidencial. También circularon informaciones de que en territorio ecuatoria-
no hay establecidas once bases de los insurgentes. No obstante, al rato hubo
fotos y apretones de mano, declarándose superada a la crisis. Inmediatamente,
Nicaragua reestableció relaciones diplomáticas con Colombia, y Venezuela
desmilitarizó su frontera.
Algunos días más tarde, durante la reunión de cancilleres de la Organización
de los Estados Americanos (OEA) del 18 de marzo, se puso más claramente de
manifiesto que el país del hemisferio menos interesado en la paz era Estados
Unidos. En esa reunión, el bloque latinoamericano se enfrentó a ese país
y a Colombia, quienes argüían que el ataque colombiano en territorio ecuato-
riano era “justificable”. Después de largas discusiones, Colombia cedió, dejando
a Estados Unidos aislado. Finalmente, el país del norte también cedió, y la OEA
aprobó un documento donde se rechaza “la incursión de fuerzas militares
y policiales de Colombia en territorio de Ecuador”. Además, se acordó “combatir
las amenazas de seguridad provenientes de la acción de grupos irregulares o de
organizaciones criminales, en particular de aquellas vinculadas a actividades del
narcotráfico”. Pero no se declaró a las FARC una organización terrorista.
Pero el juego geopolítico tiene sus riesgos. Chávez acusa airadamente
a Estados Unidos de estar detrás de la llama separatista que se ha avivado en la
provincia venezolana de Zulia y en la ecuatoriana de Guayas. Ambas son pe-
troleras y pertenecen a Estados cuyos gobiernos, aliados entre sí, que son
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antagónicos al norteamericano. Además, suscitando la ira de Caracas, Was-
hington negocia con Bogotá el establecimiento de una base militar en la Gua-
jira, justo en el límite entre Colombia y la rica provincia de Zulia.
El armamentismo del populismo venezolano
El casino geopolítico exige armas, y era esperable que Chávez las comprara
masivamente. Es en ese contexto que se inscribe la retórica militarista que el
mandatario venezolano desplegó antes de la resolución de la crisis entre su país
y Colombia. Chávez ya dispone de unos cien mil milicianos armados con fusiles
automáticos de última generación, de origen ruso. Están divididos en dos orga-
nizaciones, el Frente Francisco Miranda (FFM), fundado en 2003, y la Guar-
dia Territorial (GT), establecido en 2005.
Estas tropas irregulares están reclutadas entre los pobres y dependen de los
subsidios con que el caudillo doma sus voluntades. Cuando el 20 de enero,
Chávez amenazó con “armar al pueblo y a los batallones de reservistas”, se
refería a esta nueva fuerza, cuya función es alterar dos equilibrios de poder: el
sudamericano y el que ordena sus relaciones con la oposición interna a su
gobierno. En el fondo, como ha sucedido casi siempre con el armamentismo
latinoamericano, esta amenaza hacia afuera es una proyección de la política
interna.
Con estas erogaciones, Venezuela malgasta la mejor oportunidad que ha
tenido en su historia para desarrollarse. Pero lo más interesante es que, por lo
menos hasta la derrota de Chávez en el referéndum realizado en diciembre de
2007 para habilitarlo para reelecciones ilimitadas, la gran masa de venezola-
nos pareció aprobar este uso de recursos. Es un gasto que les deparó el bene-
ficio emocional de ver a su caudillo disputando protagonismo internacional con
el presidente de los Estados Unidos en las noticias de la tarde, como si fueran
verdaderos pares. Cuando un país está sumido en la pobreza y el analfabetismo
funcional, los beneficios electorales de este tipo de actitud suelen ser mayores
que sus costos internos. Los altos costos para el país en términos de desarrollo
frustrado son de largo plazo y por ahora no perjudican al caudillo: après lui le
déluge.
Por otra parte, en el plano doméstico Chávez va por más, y eso tiene conse-
cuencias geopolíticas. Seguirá intentando reformar la Constitución para perpe-
tuarse en el poder. Y a la vez, desde 2005 viene anunciando su aspiración de
expandir la fuerza de milicianos a 2,3 millones de hombres armados. De concre-
tarlo, las consecuencias serían graves tanto hacia adentro como hacia fuera.
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Armar un ejército popular de ese tamaño parece un proyecto faraónico,
pero con los petrodólares de Venezuela no lo es. A 500 dólares por fusil
automático ruso, representaría un gasto de 1.150 millones. Esta cifra es muy
inferior a los 5.000 millones que cuestan los cazas y helicópteros que Chávez
le compró a Rusia. Además, en lo que hace al equipamiento de milicianos
propios y ajenos, Venezuela pronto podrá autoabastecerse, ya que también
compró en Moscú el equipamiento y tecnología necesarios para una fábrica de
fusiles automáticos que, a partir de 2010, será capaz de producir 30.000 por
año. Téngase en cuenta que, por ahora, las fuerzas armadas brasileñas son las
más poderosas de la región, con una fuerza total de 189.000 hombres. Si
a los 2,3 millones de milicianos adicionales, Chávez sumara una flota de cazas
rusos más modernos que los mejores de Brasil, el equilibrio militar sudamerica-
no quedaría alterado a favor de una Venezuela aventurera.
Y por cierto, las primeras dos docenas de cazas Sukhoi 30-MK llegaron
a destino en septiembre de 2008, revitalizando la alicaída fuerza aérea de
Chávez, que había sufrido gravemente desde que, en 2001, los norteamerica-
nos interrumpieron la provisión de repuestos para sus cazas F-16. Los nuevos
cazas rusos son los más avanzados que están disponibles en el mercado mun-
dial y representarán un salto cuántico para el poder militar venezolano. Tienen
la autonomía necesaria para llegar al Canal de Panamá y a las bases norteame-
ricanas sitas en Guantánamo y en Puerto Rico. Aunque los nuevos cazas no se
usarán para atacar tales blancos, obligarán a una modificación en el despliegue
de los recursos aéreos estadounidenses en el Caribe.
Y aunque Chávez jamás atacaría a Brasil, el cambio en el equilibrio militar
regional le permitiría moverse con soltura frente a Colombia y las FARC.
Considérese que el caudillo venezolano da santuario y en ocasiones ha contri-
buido a armar a éstas. Si los milicianos chavistas crecen y se multiplican, podrán
entrar y salir de Colombia a voluntad, potenciando el poder de los hoy alicaídos
guerrilleros colombianos.
El caudillo juega a la geopolítica, invirtiendo en ese deporte los recursos del
pueblo venezolano. Pero es muy improbable que estalle la guerra con Colom-
bia: su propio pueblo no toleraría un conflicto bélico de alta intensidad. El
mandatario sería derrocado con el primer bombardeo de Caracas. Además,
Venezuela compra a Colombia el treinta por ciento de sus alimentos y también
gas natural. En 2007, el intercambio comercial entre ambos alcanzó los 5500
millones de dólares. En el caso del complejo Estado/sociedad civil de Venezue-
la, la interdependencia económica es casi un seguro de paz. La brillante trayec-
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toria de benignidad de la región, que seguirá pasando desapercibida, probable-
mente no será mancillada.
El desarme del populismo argentino
En algunos sentidos, el populismo de centroizquierda argentino se encuentra
en las antípodas del venezolano, y es sumamente interesante puntualizar el
contraste. La fase actual de la democracia argentina nació con el triple fracaso
de una dictadura militar de triste memoria. Las fuerzas armadas argentinas
masacraron a unos treinta mil ciudadanos sospechosos de connivencia o de
participación en la guerrilla de la década de 1970, sufriendo por ello una
derrota política que las desmanteló. Esta derrota fue agravada por el fracaso
económico del gobierno militar, que comenzó con un proceso de endeudamiento
externo que antes el país no padecía, y culminó con la catastrófica guerra de
Malvinas, que fue vivida como una humillación nacional sin precedentes.
Por todo ello, muy lejos está el populismo argentino de imitar la política
armamentista de Venezuela. Por el contrario, sucesivos gobiernos han conse-
guido desposeer a los militares. Hacia fines de 2008, sus obsoletos equipos
están en mal estado y sus municiones no alcanzarían para una guerra de vein-
ticuatro horas con un país vecino.
Por cierto, durante la década de 1990 se redujo a un mínimo el presupues-
to de las fuerzas armadas, se abolió el servicio militar obligatorio y se desmanteló
la industria de armas. En este último rubro, se liquidó:
· La fábrica Tanque Argentino Mediano S.E., dedicada a la producción de la
familia TAM de vehículos blindados – TAM, VCTP, VCTM, VCA, VCPC;
· El complejo Área Material Córdoba, dedicado al mantenimiento de aviones
y a la producción de material aeronáutico;
· La Fábrica Militar de Aviones, dedicada a la producción del avión de entre-
namiento IA-63 Pampa, de diseño argentino;
· Los Astilleros Río Santiago, dedicados a la producción de destructores
y fragatas misilísticas de la familia MEKO, con licencia de la empresa alema-
na Blohm & Voss;
· Los Astilleros Domeq García, dedicados a la producción de submarinos
clase 1700, bajo licencia de la firma alemana Thyssen Nordseewerke GMBH;
· La Fábrica Militar Domingo Matheu, dedicada a la producción de pistolas
y fusiles automáticos;
· La Fábrica Militar Río Tercero, dedicada a la producción de cañones, mor-
teros y municiones;
480 ON THE STATE OF LATIN AMERICAN STATES. APPROACHING THE  BICENTENARY
· La Fábrica Militar Fray Luis Beltrán, dedicada a la producción de municio-
nes para artillería;
· La Fábrica Militar San Francisco, dedicada a la producción de municiones
para armas personales, material electrónico y partes para la familia TAM de
vehículos blindados, y
· Una multitud de industrias militares menores.
Además, como ya se dijo, durante la década del ’90 se adhirió al Tratado de
Tlatelolco para la Proscripción de Armas Nucleares en América Latina, al Tra-
tado de No Proliferación Nuclear (NPT) y al Régimen de Control de Tecnologías
Misilísticas (MTCR). En el camino, se desmanteló el misil Cóndor II, un vehícu-
lo balístico de alcance intermedio comparable al Pershing II norteamericano,
con mil kilómetros de alcance y capaz de portar una carga útil de mil libras
(el peso promedio de una ojiva nuclear).
Ninguna de estas políticas fue revertida por los gobiernos posteriores. Por
el contrario, durante los gobiernos de ambos Kirchner se ha continuado con la
política, comenzada en 1984 por el presidente Raúl Alfonsín (1983–1989),
de perseguir penalmente a los militares por sus violaciones de derechos huma-
nos. En 2008, esta persecución se extendió a crímenes anteriores a los de la
última dictadura militar. Se ha procesado a los responsables de fusilamientos
acaecidos en el penal militar de Trelew en el año 1972, y se habla de llegar
hasta 1955, año en que Perón fue derrocado.
Paradójicamente, seguramente debido a path dependences divergentes, es-
tas políticas anti-militares generan tanto apoyo popular en la Argentina, como
parecen suscitar en Venezuela el armamentismo y los alardes belicistas de Chávez.
Ambas políticas son populistas y se prestan a la especulación demagógica,
aunque están encuadradas en contextos históricos y políticos divergentes.
Argentina: la crisis de gobernabilidad 2001
y la muerte de la política exterior
Este sorprendente contraste entre dos populismos latinoamericanos se explica
en parte por la singularidad de caso argentino y su colapso de diciembre de
2001. Por cierto, en poco más que un cuarto de siglo este país sufrió una
involución con pocos paralelos en el mundo: el porcentaje de su población bajo
la línea de pobreza aumentó permanentemente desde menos del 10% en 1975,
al 50% o más en 2002. Este milagro al revés es el dato central del que debe
partir cualquier diagnóstico de la crisis argentina, porque es el producto de un
proceso que ha tenido lugar bajo regímenes tanto democráticos como autorita-
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rios, e independientemente de qué partido gobernara cuando el gobierno era
constitucional.
Por cierto, aunque muchos países del Tercer Mundo siempre han albergado
una marginalidad de proporciones masivas, únicamente la Argentina ha sufrido
tamaña regresión. Se trata de un país que a principios del siglo XX fue tierra de
promisión para millones de europeos pobres, pero que en el siglo XXI se convirtió
en expulsor de su población de clase media. Su superficie es casi del tamaño de
la India pero alberga 28 veces menos población. No obstante, hacia el momen-
to de su colapso de fines de 2001 había acumulado más del doble de deuda
externa pública que ese país, y 64 veces más deuda por habitante. A pesar de
ello, si sumáramos los activos en el exterior de particulares nativos, la Argenti-
na como sociedad resultaría una acreedora neta. Sin embargo, su Estado apa-
rentemente no podía pagar sus deudas públicas y protagonizó la mayor cesaci-
ón de pagos de la historia económica mundial hasta entonces.
Cómo era de esperar, el deterioro de su estructura social y del nivel de vida
de sus mayorías no vino solo, sino que fue acompañado por una severa erosión
de sus instituciones, siendo el colapso político y financiero de diciembre de
2001 la ilustración más dramática del fenómeno. El crecimiento de la pobreza,
producido por la voracidad de una burguesía que capturó al Estado y concentró
riqueza, engendró poderosas organizaciones de protesta que hacia fines de
2001 adquirieron un visible poder de veto extra-constitucional sobre las ac-
ciones de los gobiernos.
Al quintuplicarse el porcentaje de la población por debajo de la línea de
pobreza, se redujo el margen de maniobra interno y externo de los gobiernos,
en una medida inimaginable en países como Chile, México o Brasil. En diciem-
bre de 2001, las organizaciones populares de la nueva pobreza fueron el
principal factor en el derrocamiento civil de dos presidentes constitucionales,
Fernando de la Rúa (1999–2001) y Adolfo Rodríguez Saá.
Éste último se alejó de la presidencia a los siete días de haber asumido el
cargo, cuando a fines de diciembre, durante una reunión de gobernadores en el
sur de la provincia de Buenos Aires, fue rodeado de protestas amenazantes a la
vez que privado de su escolta, gas y electricidad. Escondido en un automóvil,
huyó del lugar y luego voló a su provincia de San Luis, donde sus aliados contro-
laban la policía local. Sólo desde allí se atrevió a dar una conferencia de prensa,
renunciando a su cargo. El vicepresidente Ramón Puerta, que le seguía en el
orden de sucesión, hizo lo mismo desde su provincia, Misiones (Escudé 2006).
Durante 2002, las instituciones virtualmente habían desaparecido. El po-
der se segmentó territorialmente. El 27 de agosto de 2002 el New York Times
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anunciaba en su portada: “Some in Argentina See Secession As the Answer to
Economic Peril”. El país conservó su integridad territorial gracias a frecuentes
reuniones de gobernadores, que en la práctica reemplazaron a las instituciones
nacionales establecidas por la Constitución.
Estas fueron sólo algunas de las consecuencias de la involución en la distr-
ibución del ingreso, que destruyó el tejido social, generando a la vez instituciones
subterráneas, como el nuevo poder de veto de las organizaciones populares.
A partir de entonces, los gobiernos optaron por complacer a estas agrupacio-
nes, independientemente de los costos para el país en el largo plazo. Se privilegió
el beneficio de corto plazo de preservar el orden.
Para poner coto a las protestas sociales que amenazaban con sumir al país
en la anarquía y que hubieran podido producir la caída del gobierno recién
instalado de Eduardo Duhalde, en 2002 se optó por reducir al máximo el
inevitable aumento del costo de vida. Significativamente, como veremos, esta
política engendró nuevas dependencias frente a otros Estados de la región.
Decidida la mega-devaluación con que se sacó al país del modelo de paridad
monetaria con el dólar, el gobierno convirtió las tarifas de gas natural al peso
argentino y las congeló. En términos de divisas, el precio del gas natural (que
representa la mitad de la mezcla energética argentina) cayó un 67%.
Esta intervención en la estructura de precios del sector energético poseyó
la virtud de eliminar una fuente posible de disturbios sociales, contribuyendo
a la gobernabilidad de un país acosado por una regresión social sin paralelos.
Pero a la vez, el precio fijo no competitivo del gas representó un disuasivo a las
inversiones en el sector y un incentivo para un mayor consumo. Como el gas
fue el más subsidiado de los combustibles, gran cantidad de automóviles que
usaban nafta fueron reconvertidos para funcionar con gas natural comprimido.
Siempre que la tecnología lo permitió, consumidores e industriales optaron por
el combustible de menor precio.
Cuando la economía se recuperó del colapso de 2002, la demanda de gas
creció rápidamente mientras la oferta permaneció estancada. Peor aún, hacia
2004 las reservas probadas del país habían disminuido en un 35% frente a su
nivel de 2000. Por momentos, la red eléctrica estuvo a punto de colapsar.
Como consecuencia, para asegurar el suministro interno, el gobierno recortó
entre el 20 y el 50% las exportaciones de gas a Chile, violando acuerdos
y generando una crisis en las relaciones bilaterales. Al mismo tiempo, se estab-
lecía una dependencia que antes no existía frente al gas natural boliviano y el
fuel oil venezolano.
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Como se ve, la inserción externa de Argentina dejó de estar bajo el control del
gobierno, cuyo margen de maniobra disminuyó debido a la involución interna.
Un fenómeno análogo, de pérdida de capacidad de maniobra del Estado, se
observa en las relaciones post-crisis entre Argentina y Uruguay. En este caso
no estuvo de por medio una problemática económica sino ecológica. El ex
presidente Kirchner debió aceptar, casi con una sonrisa, que organizaciones de
ambientalistas de la provincia de Entre Ríos prácticamente destruyeran las rela-
ciones bilaterales entre ambos Estados. El conflicto se produjo por la oposición
de los habitantes de la localidad argentina de Gualeguaychú a que se instale, en
territorio uruguayo, una fábrica de pasta de papel presuntamente contaminan-
te. La planta se encuentra a la vera del río Uruguay, que comparten los dos
países.
Desde marzo de 2003, y con mayor intensidad desde febrero de 2006, los
ambientalistas se abocaron a violar las leyes argentinas, la Constitución y el
Tratado del MERCOSUR, cortando por la fuerza el tránsito del puente que une
a Argentina y Uruguay. A los camiones chilenos con insumos para la insta-
lación de la fábrica se los detenían a veces por una semana, alimentando a sus
chóferes, para luego ordenarles que regresen a su país. De esta manera, por
decisión de los ambientalistas argentinos, parte del comercio terrestre entre
Chile y Uruguay debió convertirse en marítimo.
A pesar de que las fábricas de papel argentinas, que existen desde hace
décadas, son mucho más contaminantes y también ensucian aguas comparti-
das, y a pesar de que ni a la Argentina ni al Uruguay les conviene tener esta
disputa que le ha causado un daño grave al MERCOSUR, el gobierno optó por
no aplicar la ley para impedir que los ambientalistas violen las leyes. Si lo hubie-
ra hecho, es muy probable que al día siguiente las calles de las ciudades argen-
tinas hubieran quedado sumidas en el caos, inundadas por miembros de otras
organizaciones de protesta más poderosas. Como ese fue el camino que con-
dujo en 2001 al derrocamiento civil de Fernando de la Rúa, el gobierno optó
por evitarlo, a la vez que la oposición política le conminaba a reprimir, quizás
ansiosa de producir precisamente ese desenlace.
Por cierto, la crisis de gobernabilidad argentina de 2001–2002 ilustra los
límites de la política exterior. Antes de ese punto de inflexión, los presidentes
estaban dispuestos a sacrificar apoyo político interno en aras de objetivos na-
cionales de largo plazo. Alfonsín aceptó enormes costos políticos para solucio-
nar el litigio territorial con Chile en el Beagle, porque entendió que hay pocas
cosas tan importantes para Argentina como tener relaciones de cooperación
con ese vecino. Lo mismo ocurrió con Menem, que solucionó el litigio de
484 ON THE STATE OF LATIN AMERICAN STATES. APPROACHING THE  BICENTENARY
Hielos Continentales con ese país. Pero – con permiso del razonamiento contr-
afáctico – si Menem o Alfonsín hubieran sido presidentes a partir de 2002, es
difícil imaginarlos sacrificando capital político en aras de un objetivo de política
exterior, beneficioso para el país en el largo plazo pero perjudicial para sus
gobiernos en lo inmediato.
Por todo lo dicho, se puede afirmar que hay razones estructurales por las
cuales el pragmatismo alcanzado por un país como Chile en su política exte-
rior, no está al alcance de un gobierno argentino. En circunstancias involutivas
como las de Argentina, el populismo no es simplemente una opción equivo-
cada, sino un producto de la decadencia del que es difícil escapar. Más que
fruto de la voluntad del gobernante, es un desenlace condicionado por fuer-
zas estructurales.
En verdad, cuando la supervivencia del gobierno está en juego, el largo plazo
tiende a sacrificarse, confirmando una vez más que el verdadero actor en las
relaciones interestatales no es el Estado sino el complejo Estado/sociedad civil.
Bolivia y el peligro del Estado fallido
por segmentación étnica
Los límites impuestos a la política exterior argentina por su crisis de gobernabilidad
de 2001–2002 permiten vislumbrar las consecuencias de la captura del Esta-
do, durante un cuarto de siglo, por un segmento de una clase social: la burguesía
prebendaria. El fenómeno pudo haber conducido al fracaso radical del Estado.
A su vez, el actual peligro de implosión de Bolivia ilustra un fenómeno afín
pero diferente: las consecuencias de la captura del Estado, durante casi toda su
historia, por una minoría étnica opulenta. Este caso nos aproxima mucho más
al peligro del Estado fallido. No sólo nos encontramos allí con pobreza masiva
extrema y con una polarización abismal en la distribución del ingreso. Debido
a la profundización de la democracia, la situación se agrava porque la minoría
que domina la economía se diferencia étnicamente, de una manera visible, de la
mayoría que domina el sistema político.
Como lo diagnosticara Amy Chua, en tales circunstancias tiende a generarse
un etno-nacionalismo potencialmente catastrófico, que enfrenta a una minoría
étnica opulenta y odiada con una mayoría autóctona iracunda, fácilmente
movilizable por políticos que buscan votos (Chua 2003: 6).
En estos casos, la democracia se convierte en el motor de la conflagración
étnica. Más allá de América latina, dos casos extremos mencionados por Chua
en los que esta combinación condujo al genocidio son la ex Yugoslavia y Ruanda.
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En Yugoslavia los croatas eran la minoría dominadora de la economía. Bajo el
comunismo de Tito hubo estabilidad, pero con la democratización, la historia
se encaminó hacia la tragedia. La mayoría serbia pasó a controlar el sistema
político, los croatas optaron por la secesión y los serbios se lanzaron a recupe-
rar la integridad territorial, desencadenando venganzas genocidas contra los
croatas, a quienes odiaban, y contra los bosnios, a quienes despreciaban. Even-
tualmente, todas las partes se volvieron genocidas. Un caso análogo fue el de
Ruanda, donde los tutsis representaban el 14 por ciento de la población pero
dominaban la economía. En cuanto se estableció la democracia, la mayoría
hutu dominó el sistema político. En 1994, civiles hutus masacraron a 800.000
tutsis. En otras ocasiones, la minoría económicamente dominante fue expulsa-
da, como ocurriera con los blancos en Rodesia. A su vez, en la ex Unión
Soviética, una minoría judía económicamente privilegiada se sintió obligada
a emigrar. En casos más venturosos, como el de Sudáfrica, se pudo evitar el
genocidio pero no sin peligrosas turbulencias que pudieron terminar mal (Chua
2003: 11–13).
Cuando se produce este divorcio entre una mayoría que domina el proceso
electoral y una minoría que domina la economía, que es étnicamente diferente
a simple vista, típicamente se genera un proceso que sobreviene en tres fases.
La primera es un impulso hacia la confiscación de la riqueza de la minoría
dominante. La segunda es una reacción defensiva de la minoría opulenta con-
tra la democracia electoral. Agotada esa instancia (que suele ser la de las dicta-
duras militares), la tercera fase se caracteriza por una violencia, a veces genocida,
contra la aborrecida minoría (Chua 2003: 10).
El parecido entre los casos mencionados y el incierto drama que se desen-
cadena actualmente en Bolivia es evidente. La mayoría de la población es
indígena, pero Evo Morales es el primer presidente en su historia cuya identi-
dad es explícitamente indígena. La mayor parte de los recursos naturales se
encuentran en cuatro departamentos cuya población es percibida como criolla
y rechaza el indigenismo. En forma permanente, crece la tensión entre los
empobrecidos indígenas de las tierras altas y los terratenientes de tez clara de
las tierras bajas. Santa Cruz, Tarija, Chuquisaca, Beni y Pando albergan ambi-
ciones autonómicas, si no secesionistas. Se oponen a la nacionalización de los
hidrocarburos y a las confiscaciones de tierras del gobierno, exigidas por la
mayoría indígena de las sierras. La situación no es demasiado diferente de la de
la ex Yugoslavia antes de su guerra civil. Y en menor medida, se viven situacio-
nes similares en Ecuador (un país que en los últimos doce años tuvo nueve
presidentes), Perú, Guatemala y algunas regiones mexicanas.
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En verdad, a mediados de 2009 Bolivia enfrenta graves desafíos. Cinco de
las principales problemáticas, todas vinculadas en mayor o menor grado a esta
fragmentación étnica, son:
1. La nacionalización de los hidrocarburos – Cumpliendo con promesas elec-
torales de Morales, un decreto de mayo de 2006 nacionalizó el petróleo
y el gas boliviano. La medida genera conflictos con los inversores extranje-
ros, especialmente brasileños (PETROBRAS), españoles (Repsol YPF) y fran-
ceses (Total). También genera conflictos internos con los departamentos
(provincias) productores de gas y petróleo. Por otra parte, acercó más
a Chávez y Morales. Al anunciar las medidas, el presidente proclamó: “ne-
cesitamos trabajadores revolucionarios, ningún reformista ni conservador”.
Sin embargo, la capacidad de gestión del Estado boliviano es muy baja, y en
la práctica es difícil que pueda instrumentar la nacionalización sin padecer
una parálisis. No obstante, la cuestión de quién controla los ingresos pro-
venientes del petróleo y el gas natural llegó a un punto culminante en sep-
tiembre de 2008, cuando se produjeron violentas manifestaciones en Santa
Cruz de la Sierra, Pando y Tarija, que clamaban por la devolución, a los
nueve departamentos bolivianos, de un fuerte impuesto recaudado por el
gobierno central. Por momentos, grupos autonómicos de Santa Cruz sabo-
tearon los envíos de gas a Brasil, que obtiene de Bolivia el 45% de su
consumo. Los disturbios condujeron a la mencionada expulsión del embaja-
dor norteamericano, acusado de promover la secesión.
2. La reforma constitucional – En septiembre de 2008, protestas violentas
contra la nueva constitución aprobada por la Asamblea Constituyente en
diciembre del año anterior habían convergido, en las provincias autonomis-
tas, con las manifestaciones contra los impuestos a los hidrocarburos. Los
autonomistas intentaron entonces bloquear carreteras para desabastecer la
capital. A pesar de esta fuerte oposición de los departamentos ricos de las
tierras bajas, en enero de 2009 un referendo nacional aprobó por amplio
margen la nueva Carta Magna, que fue entonces promulgada. Su artículo
1° define a Bolivia como “Estado unitario social de derecho plurinacional
comunitario” y su artículo 5° establece que los idiomas oficiales son el
castellano más otras 36 lenguas indígenas. Asimismo, sanciona un princi-
pio de “pluralismo jurídico” que pone el derecho positivo del Estado boli-
viano en un pie de igualdad con los derechos consuetudinarios de los pue-
blos indígenas, que son numerosos. En materia económica apunta contra
los latifundios, estableciendo que toda persona tiene derecho a la propie-
dad privada, individual o colectiva, siempre que ella tenga una función
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social. La expropiación podrá hacerse por causas de necesidad o utilidad
pública, o cuando la propiedad no cumpla ninguna función social.
3. El peligro de secesión – Como respuesta a la aprobación del proyecto de
reforma constitucional, el 15 de diciembre de 2007 los departamentos de
Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Beni, Pando y Tarija concretaron su amenaza de
declarar su autonomía. Los primeras tres lindan con Brasil, mientras Tarija
(que como se mencionó en la Parte I, posee el 85 por ciento de las reservas
de gas natural del país) linda con Argentina. Meses más tarde, en referendos
que fueron considerados inconstitucionales por el gobierno central, el 81,
82, 85 y 80 por ciento, respectivamente, de los sufragantes de Beni, Pando,
Santa Cruz y Tarija, votaron a favor de una autonomía que les permitiría
firmar tratados con Estados extranjeros, constituir un parlamento, crear
una fuerza policial propia y decidir sobre todo lo concerniente a la distribución
de la tierra. Sobre la base de ese mandato, el 15 de mayo de 2008 se
instaló en Santa Cruz una “Asamblea Provisional”, que deberá convalidar
sus legisladores en elecciones populares. Dicho departamento, que produ-
ce el 50 por ciento del PBI boliviano, tiene el 26 por ciento de la población
del país, el 10 por ciento de sus recursos de hidrocarburos y el 90 por
ciento de su capacidad industrial. En el evento de que se avanzara hacia la
secesión, el ejército ha declarado que se opondrá activamente. No obstan-
te, los aeropuertos de las cuatro provincias autonomistas están controlados
por fuerzas que responden a la oposición contra el gobierno central.
4. La posibilidad de intervención de países vecinos frente a un intento
secesionista – En octubre de 2006, para proteger al gobierno de Morales
de los secesionistas, Venezuela ofreció construir bases militares en las tie-
rras bajas cercanas a la frontera boliviana con Brasil y Paraguay. Luego, en
mayo de 2008, poco después del referendo santacruceño y de la embestida
del Senado boliviano para plebiscitar la continuación de la presidencia de
Morales, Chávez declaró que Caracas “no se quedará de brazos cruzados”
si se le hace daño a Bolivia. Sus palabras fueron interpretadas con alarma,
como una amenaza de intervención. Sin embargo, el presidente brasileño
aportó inmediata tranquilidad, declarando que “Chávez es el mejor presi-
dente venezolano de los últimos cien años”. Con esas palabras, sugirió que
ambos estaban del mismo lado y que su país no contribuiría a la desesta-
bilización de Morales. Además, lo sugerido por Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva
confirma el conservadorismo de la región a la hora de legitimar cambios en
el territorio que se le reconoce a sus Estados.
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5. La posibilidad de intervención de Estados Unidos para promover la secesi-
ón – En agudo contraste con los países de la región, que se oponen
a cambios en el mapa político de la región, los norteamericanos han dado
señales de estar más dispuestos a aceptar la secesión de algún departamen-
to, ya sea para facilitar el flujo de hidrocarburos bolivianos o para desesta-
bilizar a un gobierno que colabora poco en el control del narcotráfico. Eso
por lo menos es lo que sugiere el nombramiento del ya expulsado embaja-
dor Philip Goldberg.
En efecto, la carrera de éste es elocuente. Entre 1994 y 1996 fue el encar-
gado de la oficina para Bosnia del departamento de Estado. Simultáneamente,
fue asistente especial del avezado embajador Richard Holbrooke, jefe de la
delegación norteamericana que negoció los Acuerdos de Dayton de 1995, en
los que su país se comprometió a respetar la integridad territorial de las repúblicas
constituyentes de la ex Yugoslavia, promesa que luego fue violada. Entre 2004
y 2006 fue jefe de misión en Kosovo, la provincia separatista de Serbia cuya
independencia aún no había sido reconocida por nadie.
Aunque los detalles de su gestión en Pristina serán secretos por muchos
años, es fácil seguir su rastro en la prensa internacional. El 1ş de diciembre de
2004 Goldberg fue citado por el Globe and Mail de Toronto, expresando su
apoyo al gobierno autonomista de la provincia rebelde. También manifestó
entusiasmo por resolver el status de Kosovo, en una entrevista transmitida por
Radio Free Europe el 1ş de febrero de 2006. Y meses antes, el 20 de abril de
2005, su otrora jefe, el embajador Holbrooke, lo mencionó aprobatoriamente
en una nota de opinión del Washington Post, informando que Goldberg acon-
sejaba a su gobierno apurar los tiempos respecto de Kosovo. En ese artículo,
Holbrooke asentaba su propia opinión sin tapujos: “Aunque nadie se expresa
oficialmente en Washington ni en Europa, me parece difícil encontrar un des-
enlace para Kosovo que no sea la independencia”.
Como sabemos, esa independencia ilegal llegó en febrero de 2008, a pesar
del rechazo de Rusia y China, que impedirá su reconocimiento por la ONU.
Mientras tanto, Goldberg era enviado como embajador frente a Bolivia, incu-
rriendo repetidamente en la ira de Morales por sus sospechosas actividades en
Santa Cruz. Finalmente, en septiembre de 2008 fue declarado persona non
grata.
El nombramiento de un diplomático como Goldberg en La Paz no sorpren-
de. Aunque no puede demostrarse, desestabilizar a Morales puede ser un ob-
jetivo de Estados Unidos. Considérese que el presidente boliviano es el princi-
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pal dirigente de los cocaleros (los campesinos indígenas dedicados al cultivo de
la coca). Como es sabido, el consumo de esa planta forma parte de las más
antiguas tradiciones andinas, a la vez que es la materia prima para la producción
de cocaína. Con la elección de Morales a la presidencia, disminuyeron las
restricciones a su cultivo, impuestas por presión de los Estados Unidos. Esto
condujo a un importante aumento de la oferta de cocaína de origen boliviano.
Por otra parte, la debilidad de los Estados latinoamericanos, uno los leitmotifs
de este trabajo, se vislumbra elocuentemente en muchos de los fenómenos
descriptos en esta sección. Lo vimos en el caso de la rica Venezuela, que no
puede controlar regiones fronterizas con Colombia. Lo vimos también en el
caso argentino, cuyo gobierno perdió control de parcelas de su política exte-
rior. Lo vimos elocuentemente en el caso de la colapsada Bolivia. Y está presen-
te, finalmente, en el descontrol del narcotráfico.
Considérese que el 23 de febrero de 2008, el New York Times informaba
que sólo 200 policías federales brasileños vigilaban la frontera de 3380
kilómetros que ese país comparte con Bolivia – aunque las autoridades asegu-
raban que pronto llegarían refuerzos. Y en cuanto a Argentina, apenas el 10%
del territorio está vigilado por radares, dejando abiertas las fronteras a tráficos
ilegales de todo tipo. Mientras tanto, Brasil ya es el segundo consumidor mun-
dial de cocaína, sólo superado por Estados Unidos.
Parte IV – El crimen organizado
y la guerrilla insurgente frente
al complejo Estado/sociedad civil
Paraguay: presentación en sociedad
Como Bolivia, pero por causas muy diferentes, Paraguay está cerca del síndro-
me del Estado fallido. Durante 61 años fue gobernado por el Partido Colora-
do, comparable al PRI mexicano, que preservó su hegemonía durante 71 años
y se convirtió en sinónimo del Estado mismo. Alfredo Stroessner, el más famoso
de sus dictadores recientes, retuvo el poder durante tres décadas y media. Su
derrocamiento fue cuestión de familia: lo perpetró su consuegro, el general
Andrés Rodríguez, en 1989. Aquel golpe contó con los auspicios de quien
pronto se convertiría en activo protagonista de la política paraguaya, el general
Lino Oviedo.
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Desde entonces hasta 2008, Paraguay se debatió entre una serie de inten-
tos golpistas protagonizados por éste y elecciones que repetidamente le dieron
el triunfo al partido hegemónico. En el ínterin, en 1999, un vicepresidente,
Luís María Argaña, rival de Oviedo y del entonces presidente Raúl Cubas, fue
asesinado por un comando paramilitar. Cubas renunció, y él y Oviedo huyeron
del país.
En 2007 la Corte Suprema dictaminó que el golpista era inocente y éste se
postuló entonces a las elecciones presidenciales de abril de 2008. Pero ya
estaba desgastado y fue derrotado por un obispo retirado, Fernando Lugo,
que asumió la presidencia en agosto. Al frente de una coalición de centroizquierda,
el rotundo triunfo electoral del ex religioso puso fin a la longeva hegemonía del
Partido Colorado.
El fenómeno de un sacerdote que llega a la presidencia es nuevo en la
región, pero vino precedido por el ejemplo del obispo emérito Joaquín Piña, de
la contigua provincia argentina de Misiones, cuya enérgica campaña política de
2006 impidió la reelección indefinida del gobernador, un aliado de Néstor
Kirchner. En verdad, el impacto de influencias políticas transnacionales en el
otrora aislado Paraguay es cada vez más fuerte.
Lugo llegó a la presidencia con un amplio apoyo a su persona, pero sin
aparato político. Las organizaciones populares que lo respaldaron presentaron
sus propias listas para la legislatura, de manera que no posee un bloque sólido
en el Congreso. Su coalición alberga a casi dos docenas de partidos y orga-
nizaciones que nada tienen que ver entre sí excepto su oposición al Partido
Colorado. Sin apoyo legislativo, le resultará difícil desplazar a los funcionarios
colorados de la burocracia del Estado, y éstos tendrán la ocasión de boicotear-
lo. Según expresiones de un prestigioso periodista paraguayo, reproducidas
por La Nación de Buenos Aires, “Sólo con una política muy agresiva va
a poder mantenerse en el poder. Si no, lo van a tirar abajo”.
Para comprender el pesimista pronóstico hay que ubicarse en el complejo
escenario paraguayo. Entre 1996 y 2000 padeció unos cuarenta conatos de
golpe. La pobreza ronda el 40 por ciento de la población, y el desempleo
y subempleo, el 30 por ciento. Sus adversarios no sólo han acusado a Lugo de
recibir el respaldo del venezolano Hugo Chávez, sino también de la comisión
de delitos varios, como propiciar el tráfico ilegal de armas entre Brasil y los
países andinos, y permitir que, en 2004, las FARC secuestraran y luego ase-
sinaran a la hija del ex presidente Cubas.
Para colmo, su programa de gobierno sólo puede granjearle más enemigos.
Incluye una amplia reforma agraria y la renegociación de los tratados binacionales
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de las represas hidroeléctricas de Itaipú y Yacyretá. Lo segundo inquieta a los
gobiernos de Argentina y Brasil, ya que, de concretarse, aumentarían los pre-
cios de la electricidad que Paraguay vende a ambos vecinos.
Fronteras sin ley
Los ribetes transnacionales de estos acontecimientos ilustran una vez más que
las relaciones internacionales no se agotan con los vínculos interestatales. Como
sugieren las acusaciones, seguramente infundadas, contra el ex monseñor Lugo,
Paraguay está muy involucrado en el tráfico ilegal de armas en Sudamérica.
Gran cantidad de armas exportadas desde Brasil diariamente regresan ilegal-
mente a ese país a través de la frontera paraguaya, donde prácticamente no
existen controles. Las armas se pagan con cocaína y ésta con armas. Además,
armamento pesado fabricado en otros países ingresa por la misma vía.
Confirmando una vez más la debilidad de los Estados latinoamericanos,
incluido el brasileño, reporteros de O Estado de São Paulo recorrieron 750
kilómetros de caminos en el sur de Mato Grosso do Sul sin encontrar policías,
a pesar de que la región es la ruta principal de traficantes de drogas y armas
hacia Brasil. Algunas armas se quedan allí y otras fluyen hacia otros destinos:
por ejemplo, Colombia. Hacia el año 2000 había apenas un centenar de policías
brasileños cuidando el límite fronterizo entre su país y Paraguay, distribuidos
en tres estaciones.
Más allá del Brasil, en 1993 una comisión parlamentaria paraguaya informó
que una isla del Caribe perteneciente a Colombia era utilizada como base para
militares paraguayos involucrados en el tráfico de armas desde Sudáfrica. Ar-
mas norteamericanas y alemanas eran embarcadas desde la isla de San Andrés
hacia Colombia y Nicaragua. El ejército paraguayo también fue sospechado de
vender armas a Irán hacia finales de los ‘80, durante el conflicto con Irak.
Hechos como estos abrieron una investigación de la Comisión Bicameral de
Investigación del Paraguay, que demostró la participación de militares de alto
rango en la habilitación de empresas dedicadas al tráfico ilegal de armas. Éstas
operan desde Asunción y también desde la localidad de Pedro Juan Caballero,
famosa por las organizaciones delictivas que hospeda.
Por cierto, informes de 2008 indican que allí se encuentran los cuarteles
generales de las poderosas bandas mafiosas brasileñas Primeiro Comando da
Capital (PCC) y Comando Vermelho. Ésta última es la organización narcotraficante
que el notorio mafioso brasileño Fernandinho Beira-Mar maneja desde su cel-
da en la cárcel de alta seguridad de Campo Grande. Desde Pedro Juan Caballe-
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ro se articula el intercambio de cocaína por armas para las FARC, que luego se
materializa en pequeños aeródromos del Mato Grosso brasileño. Y según las
autoridades paraguayas, también son numerosos los guerrilleros colombianos
que circulan entre aquella ciudad y Ponta Porá, en la franja fronteriza paragua-
yo-brasileña. A la vez, el vacío de poder estatal entre las localidades paraguayas
de Pedro Juan Caballero, Capitán Bado y Salto del Guairá, pone en mano de
los cárteles el verdadero dominio del territorio.
En verdad, de manera aún más acentuada que en países como Argentina,
Brasil y México, la debilidad del Estado paraguayo se conjuga con la demanda
transnacional de armas y sustancias ilícitas, engendrando un paraíso delictivo.
Con la elección de un presidente idealista que carece de aparato político, esta
ingobernabilidad paraguaya probablemente se acentúe.
Porque Paraguay es un nodo de fronteras porosas y en gran medida ficti-
cias, su condición de Estado contrabandista y casi fallido engendra complicida-
des que corren por todos los niveles del poder en los Estados vecinos. Su
presencia genera mayores grados de libertad para las organizaciones delictivas
de la región, y esa es su principal función en el sistema latinoamericano.
Por cierto, según estimaciones del gobierno de los Estados Unidos, en la
Triple Frontera entre Argentina, Brasil y Paraguay, el Hezbolá, la poderosa
organización terrorista libanesa, gana decenas de millones de dólares anuales
a través del contrabando de productos electrónicos, discos de música y de
video pirateados, y falsificaciones de diversos productos de marca. Sus opera-
ciones están facilitadas por comunidades árabes de largo arraigo en la zona.
Según investigaciones realizadas por servicios de inteligencia argentinos,
estadounidenses e israelíes, esta Triple Frontera sin ley fue la base logística
desde donde se organizaron los ataques terroristas contra la Embajada de Is-
rael en Buenos Aires y la Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA), per-
petrados en 1992 y 1994 por el Hezbolá (con el concurso de la Embajada de
Irán en Buenos Aires).
Más aún, también de la Triple Frontera procede la incipiente penetración
islamista de la subregión, engendrada por clérigos chiítas que, auxiliados por
petrodólares venezolanos, hacen proselitismo en las organizaciones populares
de diversos países, incluidos los piqueteros argentinos, que a veces han mar-
chado en la Provincia de Buenos Aires acompañados por la bandera del Hezbolá.
Si a partir de la asunción de Lugo como presidente, la impotencia del ejecu-
tivo fuera a agravar el síndrome de Estado fallido que incipientemente sufre
Paraguay, este país podría equiparar a Bolivia, Colombia y Venezuela como
fuente de algunos de los principales riesgos de seguridad de la región.
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Las FARC como desafío a la integridad territorial
de Colombia
Otro de los elocuentes ejemplos de la debilidad del Estado latinoamericano es el
de las FARC colombianas, ya mencionadas. Aunque su descabezamiento en
marzo de 2008, debido a la caída de Raúl Reyes y la muerte natural de su jefe
supremo, el legendario Tirofijo, abre incógnitas sobre la estrategia futura de la
organización (que según algunos analistas atraviesa el peor momento de su
historia), éstas tienen una presencia activa en un 40% del territorio que teóric-
amente corresponde a la soberanía del Estado gobernado desde Bogotá. En los
hechos Colombia se divide en dos. La que es gobernada desde Bogotá, densa-
mente poblada, es aproximadamente del tamaño de California. La que dominan
las FARC, escasamente poblada, se acerca al tamaño de Texas. Complicando las
cosas, la insurgencia se financia con el narcotráfico y el secuestro extorsivo.
Como ya se ha visto, y al igual que otras organizaciones importantes de su
tipo, las FARC poseen una rudimentaria para-diplomacia que negocia oficial-
mente con otros países. No sólo desafían el orden colombiano sino que proyec-
tan su actividad más allá de sus fronteras, poseyendo cierta presencia en el
sistema interestatal. Aunque algunos Estados las incluyen en su lista de organi-
zaciones terroristas, otros se niegan a hacerlo. París y Brasilia están dispuestos
a negociar la liberación de rehenes bajo la coordinación de Caracas, aun
a espaldas de Bogotá. Y en la Argentina se ha tolerado la presencia de la
diplomacia de las FARC desde el regreso de la democracia, en diciembre de
1983. Durante los gobiernos de Carlos Menem y Fernando de la Rúa, el
entonces “embajador” de las FARC, Javier Calderón, se paseó libremente por
todo el país, dando conferencias en universidades y entrevistándose con fun-
cionarios del gobierno, legisladores e incluso con el ex presidente Raúl Alfonsín.
Según una investigación reciente del reputado Grupo de Diarios América
(GDA), publicada por La Nación de Buenos Aires, la guerrilla colombiana
tiene una red de contactos con unos cuatrocientos grupos muy diversos, en
por lo menos siete países de del hemisferio occidental. Incluso en Estados Uni-
dos hay académicos radicalizados que sirven como nexo (hasta ahora infruc-
tuoso) con congresistas.
Entre los grupos de simpatizantes esparcidos por América latina, hay orga-
nizaciones legales, clandestinas y semiclandestinas, incluyéndose partidos
políticos, movimientos de insurgentes y ONG defensoras de los derechos hu-
manos. El vértice de esta red es la Coordinadora Continental Bolivariana (CCB),
cuyo último congreso se realizó en Quito en febrero de 2008.
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Uno de los métodos de penetración de las FARC consiste en apoyarse en
estas “redes bolivarianas” para obtener el estatus oficial de refugiados políticos
para sus cuadros. Estos enlaces crean vínculos de diverso tipo con la sociedad
civil. En los últimos cinco años, por ejemplo, ochenta tales refugiados habrían
ingresado a la Argentina. Frecuentemente, las organizaciones que participan
de la red solidaria están vinculadas a empresas funcionales para el lavado de
dinero. A veces también, el apoyo ideológico se vincula al logístico, anclado en
el tráfico de armas y drogas.
En Ecuador, pequeñas empresas colaboran obteniendo propiedades y per-
misos de residencia para miembros de las FARC. En Perú, éstas cuentan con la
complicidad del Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA), al que brin-
dan entrenamiento militar. En este entramado, la ciudad amazónica de Iquitos
sirve como importante centro para el reclutamiento de milicianos, la atención
médica de heridos y el intercambio de drogas por armas.
En Chile, las organizaciones solidarias incluyen a sectores del Partido Co-
munista. En México, por lo menos dos agrupaciones participan de la red: el
Núcleo de Apoyo a las FARC, vinculado a la Universidad Nacional Autónoma
de México (UNAM), y el Frente Popular Francisco Villa, afín al Partido de la
Revolución Democrática (PRD), la segunda fuerza política del país,
ideológicamente cercana a los insurgentes colombianos. Sus talleres políticos
son frecuentados por enviados de las FARC.
La ambigüedad de Brasil frente a las FARC
A pesar de la fortaleza relativa del Estado brasileño, éste exhibe una tolerancia
hacia las FARC que es comparable con la que rige en Argentina. Ejemplo de
ello es la historia del comandante Francisco Antonio Cadena Collazos, alias
Padre Olivério Medina, un guerrillero que residió en Brasil cinco años antes de
ser detenido en septiembre de 2000. Durante ese tiempo, se había desempeñado
como representante diplomático de las FARC, encontrándose con docenas de
legisladores en Brasilia, visitando universidades y cultivando una amistad con el
célebre arquitecto Oscar Niemayer, como también con el movimiento brasileño
“Sin Tierra”.
Como informamos en Escudé y Souto Zabaleta (2001), en el mes y año
mencionados el Padre Olivério Medina fue apresado en Foz de Iguazú como
un “peligro para la seguridad nacional”. Por ese entonces, el gobierno brasileño
se había alarmado ante las posibles repercusiones demográficas del Plan Co-
lombia, una ofensiva contra el narcotráfico financiada por Estados Unidos.
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Con anterioridad a su arresto el propio Medina había dado “garantías”, en su
carácter de representante oficial de las FARC, de que a pesar del embate pre-
visto por parte de las fuerzas gubernamentales, su organización no escaparía
hacia territorio brasileño. La alarma brasileña era justificada porque, de hecho,
ya había habido incursiones guerrilleras en el propio Brasil y también en Vene-
zuela. Además, frente a ofensivas de las FARC, las mismas tropas regulares
colombianas se habían visto forzadas a refugiarse del lado brasileño. Por otra
parte, subsistía la cuestión de si, en caso de que el ejército colombiano atacara
frontalmente a las FARC en la región fronteriza, no se produciría un flujo hacia
Brasil de población civil.
Por cierto, esa amplia franja de territorio no está firmemente bajo el control
de ningún Estado (como tampoco lo está la llamada Triple Frontera entre Ar-
gentina, Brasil y Paraguay). En los hechos, la guerrilla ingresa pacífica pero
ilegalmente al Brasil para abastecerse de productos de todo tipo, desde víveres
hasta productos químicos para la elaboración de cocaína. Muchas veces ha
ocurrido que cuando se captura un laboratorio de las FARC, se encuentran
etiquetas en portugués de productos químicos provenientes de Manaos. Y a la
vez que mucha droga colombiana sale por Brasil, de allí entran también armas
para las FARC. Brasil es, en más de un sentido, parte de la economía y la
logística del narcotráfico, y de la guerra civil misma.
No obstante, la captura del cura-guerrillero en el año 2000 fue todo un
escándalo para algunas organizaciones de derechos humanos, que argüían que
éste no había cometido delitos en Brasil. Estas presiones condujeron a su
liberación tres semanas más tarde, por decisión de un juez federal de Foz de
Iguazú que restableció su derecho legal de residir en ese país. En su declaración
judicial, el guerrillero-embajador manifestó que “su principal función es buscar
el reconocimiento de Brasil a las FARC, porque son un Estado paralelo que
gobierna Colombia”. Lo mismo dijo por entonces Calderón, el “embajador” en
la Argentina: “Las FARC son un partido en armas en lucha por el poder. Somos
un Estado dentro del Estado. Tenemos, de hecho, el reconocimiento como
fuerza beligerante y pretendemos que lo sea de derecho.”
La historia no terminó allí, ya que Olivério Medina volvió a estar en el
escenario en agosto de 2005. Su reaparición ilustra con elocuencia las proyec-
ciones internas y externas de la debilidad de los Estados latinoamericanos. El
“embajador” fue encarcelado una vez más, en esta ocasión porque en marzo
de ese año la influyente revista brasileña Veja denunció que, por su intermedio,
las FARC habían donado en 2002 cinco millones de dólares al Partido de los
Trabajadores (PT), que es el del propio presidente Lula.
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Pero en cuanto el guerrillero fue detenido, el mismo partido acusado puso
el grito en el cielo, demandando su liberación. Lo hizo junto a otros partidos
y numerosas organizaciones de izquierda, incluyendo diecinueve diputados
federales. Por su parte, la Agencia Brasileña de Inteligencia (ABIN), que fue la
fuente citada por Veja, negó la veracidad de la acusación. Finalmente, después
de un intenso tira y afloja, en julio de 2006 Brasil concedió al guerrillero-
diplomático el estatus de refugiado político.
El PCC: otra manifestación de la debilidad
del Estado brasileño
Esta muestra de debilidad – que equivale a que Estados Unidos reconociera
como refugiado a un narcotraficante mexicano en apuros – no sorprende, pese
a que no caben dudas de que Brasil es un país muy importante.
Por cierto, en 2006 ostentó el décimo producto bruto interno del mundo,
ubicándose – según datos del Banco Mundial y el FMI – ligeramente por
encima de Rusia. Hallazgos recientes de reservas de hidrocarburos, realizados
desde fines de 2007, permiten suponer que pronto se ubicará entre Nigeria
y Venezuela en materia petrolera. Está cerca de la vanguardia mundial en el
desarrollo de combustibles alternativos, siendo renovable el 45% de la energía
que consume. Su etanol, producido con los deshechos de la caña de azúcar,
sirve de combustible barato para más de cuatro millones de automóviles.
Más allá de América latina, en materia de diplomacia económica Brasil es
parte de BRIC, un proyecto de bloque que incluye también a Rusia, India
y China. Son las cuatro economías emergentes más importantes del globo, aun-
que nada tienen en común excepto esa circunstancia. Y también participa del foro
trilateral IBSA, que incluye a la India y Sud África. Aunque por ahora no tienen
solidez institucional ni tampoco protagonismo, estos proyectos alimentan gran-
des expectativas entre algunos analistas. Por lo menos, documentan cierto reco-
nocimiento internacional del papel de Brasil como potencia regional.
No obstante, cuando se toman en consideración parámetros como la
distribución del ingreso, Brasil no deja de ser un país del Tercer Mundo. Según
el Banco Mundial, en 2006 su ingreso por habitante se encontraba entre
4730 y 8800 dólares (según se mida por el método Atlas o el de poder de
compra), ubicándose en el 91ş o 92ş lugar en el mundo. Como en otros países
latinoamericanos, una de las manifestaciones del subdesarrollo brasileño es el
déficit de poder de su Estado. Y ese déficit se refleja de manera dramática en el
escaso control del Estado sobre sus propias ciudades.
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Por cierto, en años recientes se han producido reiteradas batallas campales
entre el Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) y las fuerzas del orden, en pleno
centro de la ciudad de São Paulo, la mayor y más rica urbe del país. El PCC fue
fundado el 31 de agosto de 1993 en el Anexo de la Casa de Custodia de
Taubate, la prisión de máxima seguridad del Estado de São Paulo. En su inicio
fue llamado el Partido del Crimen y se estableció sobre la base de un pacto de
confianza y protección. La organización se financia principalmente a través de
puntos de venta de narcóticos en las ciudades. Está regida por un Estatuto que
obliga a sus miembros a contribuir financieramente, so pena de ser ejecutados.
Esta suerte de constitución aboga también por la “libertad, justicia y paz”
y convoca a la lucha por mejores condiciones en el sistema penitenciario
brasileño. En la actualidad la organización se ha internacionalizado. Se sospe-
cha que está siendo manejada desde Paraguay, con ramificaciones en Argenti-
na, Uruguay y Colombia.
En 2001 el PCC coordinó, por teléfono celular, rebeliones simultáneas en
veintinueve presidios paulistas. Ese año, después de una crisis de liderazgo,
estructuraron una alianza con la banda criminal carioca Comando Vermelho
(CV), ya mencionada. A partir de entonces, desde el Complejo Penitenciario de
Bangu, coordinaron atentados contra edificios públicos y asesinatos de jueces.
En 2006 la ciudad y el Estado de São Paulo sufrieron la peor ola de violen-
cia de su historia, cuando el PCC tomó varias unidades penitenciarias, entre
ellas los centros de detención provisional (CDP) de Mauá, Mogi das Cruzes,
Franco da Rocha, Caiuá e Iperó. Las rebeliones se extendieron a la Cadena
Pública de Jundiaí y a los CDPs de Diadema, Taubaté, Pinos y Osasco. A prin-
cipios de 2007 volvieron a producirse tumultos, aunque de menor gravedad.
Aunque el caso brasileño es incomparablemente menos grave que el colom-
biano, confirma la regla de la debilidad relativa de los Estados de la región. Por
otra parte, este contraste entre Brasil y Colombia es instructivo, ya que nada
similar a lo que sucede en São Paulo ocurre en Bogotá, donde el Estado señorea
sobre la ciudad.
¿Será que, en América latina, el precio de imponer un orden local sin fisuras
es perder el control sobre vastos territorios nacionales?
Recuerdos del futuro: el origen liberal de las FARC
Tal es la sospecha que inevitablemente emerge al contemplar las escasas recom-
pensas de la admirable seriedad y ausencia de populismo que caracterizan en el
presente al Estado colombiano. Colombia es poco más de la mitad del país que
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pretende ser. En la práctica (y por ahora) ha cedido el resto a una guerrilla
narcotraficante mucho más poderosa y “respetable” que el PCC brasileño.
¿De donde proviene esta fuerza insurgente que conmueve a una parcela
significativa del mundo, movilizando diplomacias y para-diplomacias? Para com-
prender su origen es preciso recorrer rápidamente los últimos sesenta años de
vida política colombiana. La protohistoria de las FARC comienza en 1948,
cuando se inauguró el período conocido como “la Violencia”, a raíz del asesi-
nato de Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, un dirigente de la izquierda liberal. Se desató
entonces una sangrienta sucesión de revueltas y saqueos bautizado como “el
Bogotazo”. Tras batallas campales, los liberales vencidos se retiraron al campo
y se aliaron al Partido Comunista, con el que organizaron la resistencia.
Se desencadenó entonces una enconada lucha entre los propietarios rurales
y los liberales. Los elementos conservadores más extremos conformaron mili-
cias armadas que confrontaron con las de los campesinos liberales e izquierdis-
tas. Al mismo tiempo, bandidos oportunistas se confundían con unos y otros.
Todos cometieron desmanes.
Cuando en 1953 el general Gustavo Rojas Pinilla tomó el poder e impuso
cierta paz, algunas guerrillas liberales firmaron un armisticio. Cinco mil guerri-
lleros de ese signo, vinculados a la línea oficial del partido, renunciaron a la
lucha armada. Pero varias organizaciones liberales habían roto con la línea
partidaria y siguieron en armas en los territorios donde operaban. Lentamente,
esas agrupaciones locales se volvieron autónomas, abandonaron el liberalismo
de origen y se acercaron al comunismo agrario. Desde la izquierda, algunos
llamaron “territorios liberados” a las zonas dominadas por estas milicias. A su
vez, para enfatizar el peligro separatista, desde el gobierno se las llamó
“repúblicas independientes”.
Estas organizaciones de anclaje territorial no reconocieron la legitimidad de
la dictadura militar de Rojas Pinilla. Entre ellas, la más conocida fue la República
de Marquetalia, ubicada en una zona montañosa de difícil acceso, en el sur del
departamento del Tolima. En 1964, el gobierno colombiano decidió terminar
militarmente con estos reductos autónomos. El ejército cercó a Marquetalia con
miles de soldados, mientras la fuerza aérea bombardeaba con napalm. Como
consecuencia, familias enteras de campesinos huyeron por la cordillera junto
con los guerrilleros.
Estas gentes, sumadas a gran cantidad de pobladores aterrorizados por la
violencia, se reagruparon al pie de la cordillera oriental colombiana, al sur de
los departamentos del Meta y Caquetá. Entre los resistentes estaba uno de los
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líderes campesinos de aquellas milicias originalmente liberales: el recientemente
difunto Tirofijo, también conocido como Manuel Marulanda Vélez, cuyo nom-
bre de nacimiento fuera Pedro Antonio Marín. Junto con algunos miembros
del Partido Comunista, Tirofijo organizó las FARC a partir de aquellos hechos
de 1964. Llegaron a tener entre 15.000 y 17.000 efectivos, aunque después
de las deserciones y reveses de 2008 se calcula que retienen sólo unos 8000.
Dichos reveses incluyen la liberación de Íngrid Betancourt en el mes de julio,
conseguida por el ejército colombiano gracias a la traición de dos oficiales de
las FARC.
El fallecimiento de Tirofijo se produjo en marzo de 2008 pero fue dado
a conocer recién a fines de mayo. Las FARC lo reconocieron sólo después de
que la noticia fue divulgada por el gobierno de Bogotá, lo que indica la vulne-
rabilidad actual de la organización.
No obstante, cuando eso ocurrió, el presidente de Nicaragua, Daniel Orte-
ga, expresó sus “condolencias” y “solidaridad” por la muerte del dirigente
miliciano. En el discurso de clausura del Foro de San Pablo, una organización
regional de partidos de izquierda reunida en esa ocasión en Montevideo, Orte-
ga calificó a Tirofijo como “un gran hombre, honesto, sencillo y valiente” que
bregaba por la paz. Agregó:
Nuestro hermano fue un luchador extraordinario, que batalló largos años
y fue el guerrillero de más larga lucha en la historia de América latina y el
Caribe.
Sin llegar a tanto, días más tarde el venezolano Chávez fustigó a quienes se
alegraron de su muerte, lamentando no haberse reunido con Tirofijo para ha-
blar sobre la paz y un acuerdo humanitarios para la liberación de “prisioneros
de guerra, o secuestrados o rehenes”.
Estas palabras, pronunciadas por dos presidentes en ejercicio, ilustran hasta
qué punto las FARC siguen constituyendo un grave desafío para el Estado
gobernado desde Bogotá. Por cierto, desde un punto de vista principista, libe-
ral y contractualista, la organización insurgente no tiene menos legitimidad de
origen que la dictadura de Rojas Pinilla, que fue el punto de partida de la
legitimidad colombiana posterior al asesinato de Gaitán y al colapso del Estado
acaecido entonces. Su accionar está hoy enmarañado en una compleja trama
en la que son componentes esenciales la oferta colombiana de narcóticos, la
demanda norteamericana y europea de sustancias ilícitas, y la represión de su
tráfico por parte de la mayoría de los Estados.
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La irrupción de la coca y su derivado en las relaciones
interestatales
Pocos fenómenos importantes para la vida de los países latinoamericanos son
tan auténticamente “internacionales” – en el sentido etimológico del vocablo –
como las causas y consecuencias de la producción y tráfico de cocaína. Como
se sabe, ésta es un alcaloide cristalino que se obtiene de las hojas de la planta de
coca, nativa de los Andes sudamericanos. El alcaloide fue aislado recién en
1855 por el químico alemán Friedriech Gaedcke.
La hoja de coca, a su vez, posee efectos medicinales comprobados. En las
culturas indígenas antiguas se le atribuían propiedades mágicas. Como ya se
dijo, desde tiempos inmemoriales su uso ha sido tradicional entre los indígenas
andinos, desde Colombia hasta el noroeste de Argentina. Después de la Con-
quista, su uso se generalizó a las poblaciones mestizas de esa amplia zona.
Estas gentes mascan la hoja tostada, a veces mezclándola con cal de piedra
o de conchas marinas. Además, la coca es consumida por los pueblos de las
selvas amazónicas, quienes producen un polvo verde que se llama “mambe”: la
hoja se tuesta, se pulveriza y luego se mezcla con cenizas de otras plantas de la
zona.
Ya en tiempos más recientes, cundió el hábito de producir infusiones con la
hoja. En algunos países, el té de coca se vende fraccionado en saquitos. Más
allá de hábitos locales, la receta tradicional de Coca Cola originalmente contenía
coca como aditivo de sabor. Y en 2005, los indígenas de la etnia nasa, nativos
de la cuenca del Cauca, lanzaron al mercado su propio refresco, la Coca Sek,
para competir con la Coca Cola. También producen otros derivados, como las
galletas de coca.
La comercialización de la hoja de coca fue prohibida en Colombia en enero
de 2007, como parte de la campaña del presidente Álvaro Uribe contra el
narcotráfico, inducida a su vez por Estados Unidos. Esta medida, muy criticada
por sectores progresistas e indigenistas, es una de las escaladas más recientes
vinculadas al Plan Colombia, lanzado en septiembre de 2000 por el entonces
presidente colombiano Andrés Pastrana y el norteamericano Bill Clinton.
Colombia y Estados Unidos frente al narcotráfico
Estos esfuerzos fueron el producto previsible del crecimiento, en la década de
1970, del tráfico ilegal de narcóticos colombianos. Tanto el Cártel de Cali
como el de Medellín comenzaron sus operaciones modestamente por aquellos
años, cuando grupos de traficantes pequeños, que traían base de coca de Perú,
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comenzaron a asociarse en estas dos ciudades. Pronto conformaron estas dos
organizaciones, que crecerían y se enriquecerían muy rápidamente.
Esos años fueron muy ricos en acontecimientos, entre ellos la formación de
la primera agrupación de paramilitares, creada por los mismos cárteles. Por
cierto, cuando el ahora disuelto grupo guerrillero M-19 comenzó a secuestrar
capos de la mafia, ambos cárteles cooperaron creando el MAS, acrónimo que
significaba “Muerte a Secuestradores”. Para ello, se contrataron mercenarios
extranjeros, el más famoso de los cuales fue el israelí Yair Klein, quien entrenó
al legendario Carlos Castaño, fundador quince años más tarde de las
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). Los narcotraficantes, los militares
regulares y los segmentos más derechistas de la “clase dirigente no mafiosa”,
tuvieron estrechos contactos a través de estas organizaciones, que protegieron
de los secuestros a los poderosos a la vez que lucraron con la droga en forma
independiente. Cuando hacia 1981 fue creado el MAS, las drogas ilegales ya
se había convertido en una de las principales fuentes de ingresos colombianos,
superando por momentos el valor de las exportaciones legales.
Este desenlace era esperable, por lo menos en lo que concierne a la cocaína,
ya que no sólo es su materia prima parte central de la cultura nativa, sino que
la producción del alcaloide requiere una tecnología que está al alcance de
muchos y representa un gigantesco valor agregado. Para la economía colom-
biana, la producción de cocaína es “natural”.
Mientras tanto, el complejo Estado/sociedad civil norteamericano envía
pulsiones completamente contradictorias a Colombia. Por un lado, a través del
mecanismo de mercado, la sociedad estadounidense (y las europeas) le piden
cocaína a Colombia. Esta pulsión transnacional necesariamente incrementa el
precio y la oferta. Por otro lado, el Estado norteamericano (y los europeos)
prohíben el producto demandado por su propio mercado. Esta contradicción
engendra violencia.
En el caso particular de Estados Unidos, estas “órdenes” contradictorias
vienen junto con la exigencia, de parte del Estado, de que la oferta se interrum-
pa en su mismo origen extranjero. En verdad, aunque ese país invierte enormes
sumas en la prevención del uso de narcóticos en su propio territorio, la represión
violenta se concentra principalmente en el punto de origen de la oferta.
Comprensiblemente quizá, las autoridades norteamericanas no quieren con-
vertir sus propias ciudades en el escenario de una guerra sin cuartel entre las
fuerzas del orden y las mafias que operan al interior de su país.
Esto significa exportar la violencia hacia las fuentes de la oferta, que se
reprimen más duramente que las fuentes de la demanda y las cadenas de
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distribución al interior del territorio de Estados Unidos. Este procedimiento,
accesible a una superpotencia, intenta curar a la sociedad estadounidense de
sus adicciones sin someterla a los costos de una guerra interna.
Este es el origen de la intromisión norteamericana en las actividades
narcotraficantes de muchos países latinoamericanos, especialmente después del
fin de la Guerra Fría. Antes, cuando el adversario estratégico era la Unión
Soviética, el grueso del esfuerzo estadounidense en América latina se había
concentrado en la lucha contra la insurgencia comunista en América Central,
que durante la década de 1980 insumió miles de millones de dólares. Pero
a partir de la década de 1990, la atención se desplazó hacia la lucha contra el
narcotráfico. En parte, fue una manera de encontrar ocupación para soldados
y agentes de inteligencia que se habían quedado sin un adversario.
Así nació la “Estrategia Andina” del presidente George H. W. Bush (1989–
1993), un plan quinquenal presupuestado en 2200 millones de dólares que
debía abarcar a varios países de la región. Estados Unidos continuó impartien-
do entrenamiento militar, como durante la Guerra Fría, pero el objetivo era
ahora el narcotráfico. Como el problema estratégico ya no era la insurgencia,
en Colombia los norteamericanos intentaron limitar su participación en la lucha
contra las FARC y el ELN, a aquellas situaciones en que resultara claro que
éstos eran cómplices del narcotráfico.
Pero la línea divisoria era débil. Las guerrillas habían ingresado a una etapa
defensiva, asediadas no sólo por las fuerzas colombianas regulares sino también
por los paramilitares de las AUC, que contaron con el apoyo de una extrema
derecha vinculada al aparato del Estado. Respondieron robusteciendo sus fi-
nanzas a través de la venta de servicios de protección de campos de coca,
laboratorios de cocaína y pistas clandestinas de aterrizaje. También aumentó el
número de sus secuestros extorsivos.
En ese primer capítulo de su involucramiento latinoamericano posterior a la
Guerra Fría, sin embargo, Washington intentó ser discreta. No transfirió bata-
llones enteros de militares colombianos para entrenarlos en bases estadouni-
denses (como había hecho durante las primeras etapas de la guerra civil
salvadoreña, a principios de los ‘80), sino que envió pequeños equipos de
fuerzas especiales para entrenar a los colombianos dentro de su propio país.
No obstante, pronto surgieron acusaciones de violaciones graves de dere-
chos humanos y complicidad con los paramilitares, contra brigadas y batallo-
nes colombianos entrenadas por los norteamericanos. Casi de inmediato, el
Congreso de los Estados Unidos impuso la interrupción de la ayuda a las uni-
dades militares culpables de tales abusos. Esta intervención, por lo tanto, se
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caracterizó por una dinámica dialéctica y compleja, típica de los procesos
decisorios de ese país.
La Estrategia Andina pronto fracasó, sin embargo. Alejándose de la vieja
y estéril táctica de intentar decapitar las organizaciones latinoamericanas, apuntó
contra figuras de nivel intermedio, como los corredores, pilotos e intermedia-
rios de dinero. Bush (padre) dejó momentáneamente de lado el proceso por el
que se sancionaba a países que no cooperaban y lo reemplazó por uno de
incentivos financieros para aquellos cuya cooperación pareciera más sólida.
Como esta táctica tampoco fue exitosa, en la segunda mitad de la década de
los ’90 el presidente Bill Clinton (1993–2001) regresó a las sanciones. En
marzo de 1996 tomó una medida revolucionaria: descertificó a Colombia.
Este es un mecanismo por el cual Estados Unidos califica a los países producto-
res o traficantes de narcóticos según su grado de cooperación con la “guerra”
de Washington contra las drogas ilegales. La descertificación implica sacar a un
país de la lista de aquellos cuya política se considera aceptable, para ubicarlo en
la lista de los que se consideran sospechosos de ser cómplices del negocio.
Cuando se anunció la medida hubo críticas dentro de los mismos Estados
Unidos, porque varios congresistas consideraron que la cooperación de México
en la lucha contra el narcotráfico no era superior a la de Colombia. Se dijo
entonces que la diferencia en el tratamiento de uno y otro estaba relacionada
con el estatus especial de México como vecino contiguo de los Estados Unidos,
con su posición de socio igualitario en el Tratado de Libre Comercio de América
del Norte, y con los 12.500 millones de dólares en préstamos con que Was-
hington había contribuido para paliar la crisis mexicana de 1994.
Fue en parte por esa doble vara, que funciona siempre que el interés nacio-
nal de los Estados Unidos aconseja una política hacia un país y otra hacia otro,
que México salvó el honor y Colombia fue sancionada. Pero hubo una razón
adicional: las acusaciones que se habían lanzado, en la misma Colombia, con-
tra el entonces presidente Ernesto Samper (1994–1998). Supuestamente, éste
había recibido una contribución electoral de seis millones de dólares del Cártel
de Cali. También se decía que Samper había conspirado con congresistas co-
lombianos corruptos para impedir la sanción de importantes leyes antinarcóticos.
Aunque el Departamento de Estado reconocía algunos progresos colom-
bianos importantes (como el arresto de seis de los siete principales líderes del
Cártel de Cali, entre ellos el notorio Miguel Rodríguez Orejuela), el país fue
incluido en la lista de peor comportamiento, junto con Afganistán, Birmania,
Irán, Nigeria y Siria.
504 ON THE STATE OF LATIN AMERICAN STATES. APPROACHING THE  BICENTENARY
La descertificación significó para Colombia no sólo la interrupción de toda
ayuda que no estuviera anclada en la lucha contra el narcotráfico o en razones
humanitarias, sino también:
1. La descalificación de las inversiones norteamericanas para créditos del
Eximbank y la Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC);
2. El voto negativo de Estados Unidos en cualquier solicitud de crédito colom-
biano ante bancos multilaterales como el Fondo Monetario Internacional
(FMI), el Banco Mundial y el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID);
3. La posibilidad de que, por disposición presidencial, se aplicaran sanciones
comerciales adicionales que podían llegar a cerrar las importaciones de café,
flores y otros productos colombianos.
4. La imposición de trabas a las importaciones colombianas, cosa que de he-
cho ocurrió pocos días después de la descertificación para el caso de pro-
ductos químicos usados (entre otras cosas) para la refinación de cocaína.
A partir de ese momento, cualquier estadounidense que quisiera exportar
alguno de una extensa lista de solventes y otros compuestos, útiles para un
sinnúmero de procesos industriales, debía documentar fehacientemente que
su destino fuera inobjetable. También se negociaron similares precauciones
por parte de los países europeos.
Por ese entonces, se calculaba que el 80 por ciento de la cocaína consumi-
da en los Estados Unidos podía rastrearse a Colombia, como así también el 60
por ciento de la heroína. En el caso de la cocaína, gran parte de la materia
prima provenía de Perú y Bolivia. En la medida en que la erradicación de
cosechas en estos países andinos había sido exitosa, sin embargo, había au-
mentado la producción colombiana. No obstante, la puerta de entrada de la
mayor parte de esta producción a los Estados Unidos, viniera de donde viniera,
era México. En términos generales, este diagnóstico sigue siendo válido en
2008.
En junio de 1996, el Congreso colombiano sobreseyó a Samper de todas las
acusaciones lanzadas contra él. No obstante, en marzo de 1997 Colombia fue
descertificada por segundo año consecutivo. Entonces, el presidente colombiano
tomó una medida audaz que sorprendió a casi todos: suspendió de inmediato los
programas de fumigación de cosechas de plantas de coca y amapolas.
La fumigación, una riesgosa operación que requiere helicópteros blindados
para escoltar a los aviones que rocían las cosechas, estaba financiada totalmen-
te por Estados Unidos aún en vigencia de la descertificación. Los norteameri-
canos proveían aviones, helicópteros y entrenamiento de pilotos. Al suspenderse
las fumigaciones llovieron críticas, tanto contra Samper como contra Estados
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Unidos. A Samper se lo acusó de permitir que el narcotráfico se beneficie de
una rencilla entre gobiernos, y a Washington de ser desaprensiva frente a los
riesgos corridos sistemáticamente por todos los colombianos (especialmente
los pilotos), que contribuían honestamente a combatir el narcotráfico.
Quizás fue por eso que, en febrero de 1998, la superpotencia revisó su
política hacia Colombia. Volvió a descertificarla, pero invocando su propio
interés nacional, desistió de aplicar las sanciones. De esta manera, Colombia
subió de categoría, ubicándose esta vez en la compañía de Pakistán, Paraguay
y Camboya, a pesar de que dos meses antes había sancionado una legislación
que protegía a los narcotraficantes de la extradición a Estados Unidos.
Con esa revisión, los norteamericanos también se preparaban para el re-
cambio presidencial colombiano. En efecto, a mediados de ese año Samper fue
reemplazado por Andrés Pastrana (1998–2002). Y ya en febrero de 1999,
Colombia fue restituida a la respetabilidad de la certificación, a pesar de las
quejas de muchos en Estados Unidos que insistían que ni ese país ni México
merecían tal distinción.
Con Pastrana comenzó una nueva etapa en las relaciones colombiano-nor-
teamericanas. Poco después de su inauguración, él y Clinton lanzaron solem-
nemente el ya mencionado Plan Colombia, en Bogotá. Supuestamente se trata-
ba de un plan colombiano que habría de desarrollarse a lo largo de tres años
y a un costo de 7500 millones de dólares. Su objetivo era erradicar el tráfico
ilegal de narcóticos. Estados Unidos contribuiría con ayuda por 1300 millo-
nes, para financiar operaciones militares colombianas contra el narcotráfico en
áreas controladas por las FARC. Se esperaban también contribuciones de Eu-
ropa y de Japón.
Desde un primer momento hubo desconfianza de parte de los demás países
latinoamericanos. Se sospechó que podría tratarse de una estratagema norte-
americana para recuperar una presencia militar en la región, después de la
entrega del Canal de Panamá al gobierno de ese país y el consiguiente retiro de
los efectivos, acaecido el 31 de diciembre de 1999.
Para compensar, en ese año Estados Unidos había negociado con Ecuador
el uso por una década de la base aérea de Manta. El pacto, que vence en 2009
y podría no ser renovado, fue y es duramente objetado en una región cuyo
nacionalismo simbólico es muy fuerte, al punto de que dicha base (que según el
convenio puede albergar un máximo de 475 efectivos) es la única extranjera en
todo el continente sudamericano.
La dimensión militar del Plan Colombia exigía presencia militar, pero una
base estadounidense en suelo colombiano era entonces impensable, y con la
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ecuatoriana Manta no alcanzaba. Guantánamo (en Cuba), y Fort Buchanan
y Roosevelt Roads (en Puerto Rico) no estaban suficientemente cerca. Para
suplir este déficit, Washington negoció bases en América Central: Soto Cano
en Honduras y Comalapa en El Salvador. Y también acordó con Holanda el uso
de instalaciones en Aruba y Curaçao. Así venció las dificultades impuestas por
la resistencia latinoamericana a la presencia militar extranjera.
Sin duda, esta escasez de bases norteamericanas en América latina des-
miente más de un estereotipo y contrasta con su presencia en Europa desde la
Segunda Guerra Mundial, donde hasta la orgullosa Gran Bretaña acepta sin
chistar la presencia militar “yanqui”. En diversa medida, Argentina, Brasil, Chile,
Ecuador, Panamá y Venezuela se opusieron al componente militar del Plan
Colombia. Incluso la Unión Europea lo objetó, y en los hechos, la contribución
europea fue mucho menor de la esperada. Más aún, entre los países de la
región, sólo Argentina y Chile aprobaron explícitamente las dimensiones no
militares del Plan.
No obstante, la política de Estados Unidos se endureció a partir de los
ataques a las Torres Gemelas y el Pentágono del 11 de septiembre de 2001. El
Congreso de ese país dio luz verde para que el componente militar del Plan no
se limitara a la lucha contra los cocaleros en las zonas controladas por las
FARC, sino que incluyera también la lucha directa contra éstas y el ELN, con-
sideradas organizaciones terroristas. Hacia marzo de 2003, el general James
T. Hill, jefe del Comando Sur de los Estados Unidos (con asiento en Miami)
declaró que el Plan Colombia debía regionalizarse, expandiéndose por lo me-
nos hasta Ecuador. Todas estas iniciativas fueron duramente resistidas en América
latina.
A pesar de ello, en agosto de 2003 el presidente Álvaro Uribe (2002–
2010) anunció el lanzamiento de la segunda fase del Plan. Su cruzada, aunque
enérgica, no deja de estar mancillada por la complicidad que desde siempre ha
existido entre las más altas esferas políticas colombianas y los paramilitares,
también narcotraficantes. Consistente con esta pauta es el hecho de que en
mayo de 2008 hay treinta y tres legisladores y ex legisladores presos por sus
presuntos nexos con escuadrones paramilitares de ultraderecha, acusados de
narcotráfico y violaciones de los derechos humanos. La mayoría son aliados del
presidente y entre ellos se encuentra su primo, Mario Uribe. A esto se agrega
que el propio presidente está acusado de haber planeado, con jefes paramilitares,
el asesinato de quince campesinos en 1997, y de haber sobornado a legislado-
res en 2004 para posibilitar la reforma constitucional que le permitió acceder
a su reelección.
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Quizás para recuperar respetabilidad y aumentar sus posibilidades de re-
formar una vez más la Constitución (para competir por un tercer mandato
presidencial consecutivo), el 13 de mayo de 2008 Uribe extraditó a Estados
Unidos catorce de los más importantes jefes paramilitares, para que respondan
por delitos de narcotráfico. Lo actuado – que fue condenado por la oposición
y las organizaciones de derechos humanos – es consistente con su promesa de
2003, cuando dijo que el nuevo capítulo del Plan Colombia incluiría la lucha
contra todas las organizaciones insurgentes o terroristas del país, incluidos los
paramilitares.
Por otra parte, la relevancia presupuestaria del Plan queda reflejada en el
hecho de que en aquel momento, la contribución norteamericana total ascend-
ía a 2500 millones de dólares. Hacia agosto de 2006 esta cifra había escalado
a 4700 millones, y en febrero de 2008 se situaba en 5500 millones, la ayuda
militar norteamericana más importante fuera del Medio Oriente.
El esfuerzo principal para la erradicación del narcotráfico consistió en la
fumigación de las cosechas de coca, realizada por aviones y pilotos norteameri-
canos, con la ocasional participación de pilotos de otras nacionalidades extranje-
ras. De tiempo en tiempo, la administración de George W. Bush (2001–2009)
alegó grandes éxitos. Por ejemplo, adujo que entre 2001 y 2005 se triplicó la
cocaína confiscada, se extraditaron 350 traficantes a los Estados Unidos y se
multiplicó por seis el número de laboratorios clandestinos destruidos.
Sin embargo, los expertos son prontos a señalar que estos indicadores en sí
mismos no implican un éxito. Resulta que la cocaína producida excede tan
ampliamente a la demanda, que la disminución de la disponibilidad de la droga
no alcanza para hacerla más escasa en el mercado norteamericano, donde ni
siquiera se registró un aumento del precio.
Por otra parte, a medida que se destruían sus cosechas, se modificaron las
tácticas de los cocaleros, que comenzaron a plantar en extensiones más pequeñas,
segmentadas, ocultas bajo grandes plátanos o al borde de bosques donde es
difícil fumigar. Hacia 2008, para destruir la misma cantidad de coca que en
tiempos del lanzamiento del Plan Colombia es necesario fumigar tres veces
más.
Si bien es cierto que la guerra contra los grandes cárteles produjo algunos
resultados, como la muerte de Pablo Escobar Gaviria (mandamás del Cártel de
Medellín) y el eventual colapso de estas organizaciones, las rutas que éstas
manejaban pasaron a otras más pequeñas, e incluso a los paramilitares de AUC,
que siempre contaron con el apoyo encubierto de poderosos segmentos de la
dirigencia “no mafiosa” de Colombia.
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Por cierto, en el lugar de los otrora poderosos cárteles de Calí y de Medellín,
hoy operan 300 organizaciones de contrabando de droga en Colombia. A su
vez, los paramilitares, hoy aparentemente asediados por el gobierno, también
se segmentaron en pequeñas bandas de narcotraficantes. La menor envergadu-
ra de las nuevas agrupaciones las hace más flexibles y difíciles de combatir
como conjunto. Las unidades operativas en que descansa la producción de
cocaína se han segmentado y dispersado. El cultivo, procesamiento y embarque
ahora están a cargo de organizaciones separadas y especializadas. Esta nove-
dad generó oportunidades para que otros agentes, como las FARC, participen
del negocio, brindando servicios logísticos y de protección, para los cuales su
capacidad militar resulta útil.
Por otra parte, esta disminución de la importancia de las organizaciones
colombianas individuales ha producido un cambio en el equilibrio de poder
entre los cárteles mexicanos y los colombianos. Otrora mandaban los colom-
bianos. Ahora es al revés, porque al hecho de que son los mexicanos quienes
poseen la llave geográfica para el gran mercado allende el río Bravo, se suma
este trastrocamiento en la dimensión relativa de las organizaciones.
La pregunta contrafáctica que se hacen muchos especialistas de Estados
Unidos es si la situación de su país en lo que hace al narcotráfico sería peor si
la guerra contra la droga nunca se hubiera librado. La producción de cocaína
de Colombia, Perú y Bolivia sigue siendo ampliamente superior a la totalidad de
la demanda mundial. Cuando hay indicios favorables en Estados Unidos, es por
una caída circunstancial de la demanda, no por problemas con la oferta.
Sociedades como las de los países sudamericanos mencionados, a los que
debe agregarse México, reciben la permanente pulsión de esta demanda desde
las sociedades de los países más ricos, y siempre habrá un sector de sus pobla-
ciones dispuesto a correr el riesgo de producir y traficar para satisfacer la sed
de narcóticos. La prohibición de la droga por parte de los Estados y su
intervención más allá de sus fronteras para reprimir la oferta, encarece el pro-
ceso de satisfacer la demanda y lo torna mucho más violento, pero no lo sufi-
ciente como para eliminar la oferta o desalentar la demanda.
En el caso del narcotráfico, Estados y sociedades civiles (los dos términos de
la ecuación que, en el largo plazo, dialécticamente conforma al verdadero ac-
tor de las relaciones internacionales) se encuentran en conflicto entre sí. El
conflicto no es entre Estados Unidos y Colombia, sino entre el Estado norte-
americano y su propio mercado (un emergente de su sociedad). En los interva-
los en que el gobierno colombiano coopera con Washington, también se libra
un conflicto entre el Estado bogotano y un importante segmento de la sociedad
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colombiana. Sólo cuando no se registra tal cooperación hay, por añadidura, un
conflicto entre ambos Estados.
Lo dicho resulta obvio si se analiza la inmensa popularidad que han tenido,
por momentos, los cárteles colombianos en sus zonas de influencia. En el seno
de vastos sectores de su país, han sido un símbolo de soberanía nacional. Una
organización como “Los Extraditables”, creada por los dirigentes de los cárteles
a principios de los ’80 con el lema “preferimos una tumba en Colombia antes
que una celda en Estados Unidos”, pudo influir en estamentos jurídicos y par-
lamentarios para demorar la vigencia del tratado de extradición.
El legendario Pablo Escobar Gaviria, todo un Robin Hood narcotraficante
de Medellín, fue incluso retratado post mortem por artistas como “candidato
a presidente”. Cuando en 1991 se entregó a la justicia, durante el gobierno de
César Gaviria Trujillo (1990–1994), fue recluido junto con sus cómplices en
una cárcel de lujo conocida como “La Catedral”, de donde entraba y salía
a capricho. La misma “cárcel” fue construida según sus especificaciones. Cuando
en 1992 cundió la voz de que sería trasladado a otra institución, se esfumó
con toda naturalidad. Finalmente fue abatido en 1993 por una unidad de elite,
con apoyo de inteligencia norteamericano.
Su tumba, cercana a Medellín, es una de las más visitadas en Colombia.
México, Estados Unidos y los cárteles del narcotráfico
Como vimos a propósito de Brasil, las limitaciones en el dominio efectivo del
propio territorio es un mal que aqueja no sólo a Estados menores, como Bolivia
y Paraguay, y medianos, como Colombia, sino también a los más importantes
de la región. El caso mexicano, uno de los más interesantes por su relevancia
y complejidad, ratifica este diagnóstico.
Por cierto, México no es solamente el país de economía abierta orientado
hacia las exportaciones, cuyo resonante Tratado de Libre Comercio de América
del Norte (TLCAN, o NAFTA según sus siglas en inglés) ha sido tan difundido
por la prensa mundial. No es solamente el país que tiene acuerdos similares al
TLCAN con más de cuarenta países y bloques (entre ellos la Unión Europea, la
Asociación Europea de Libre Comercio, Japón, MERCOSUR y Chile) y cuyo
comercio con sus dos vecinos hacia el norte representó en 2006 tanto como el
90% de sus exportaciones y el 55% de sus importaciones. Y tampoco es sola-
mente el país que se beneficia con un flujo de remesas de sus emigrados
a Estados Unidos, que a fines de 2007 alcanzara unos 24.000 millones de
dólares, un ingreso que en 2003 fue aproximadamente equivalente al 80 por
510 ON THE STATE OF LATIN AMERICAN STATES. APPROACHING THE  BICENTENARY
ciento de sus exportaciones petroleras, el 73 por ciento del superávit de la
balanza comercial de sus maquiladoras y el 142 por ciento de sus ingresos por
turismo extranjero.
Es verdad que el famoso tratado de libre comercio con Estados Unidos
y Canadá ha tenido un impacto positivo sobre la economía mexicana. A pesar
de la grave crisis de 1994–1995, la pobreza ha disminuido y los salarios
reales han aumentado. No obstante, estas mejoras no han alcanzado para ge-
nerar siquiera una incipiente convergencia con los niveles de desarrollo de sus
socios norteamericanos. Los niveles de pobreza siguen siendo muy altos, a la
vez que la educación y la infraestructura son insuficientes. Estas falencias ayu-
dan a explicar porqué México no se ha liberado de esa lacra crónica de América
latina, la debilidad de sus Estados, ni siquiera en lo que hace a su capacidad
para hacerse obedecer en toda la extensión de su territorio.
Más aún, en México este fenómeno no se limita al conocido desafío plan-
teado por la presencia en Chiapas del Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacio-
nal, con sus ribetes de reivindicación nacional maya. Su principal indicio es la
incapacidad del Estado para imponer la ley en los territorios donde operan los
principales cárteles de la droga y el crimen organizado, a pesar de la firme
determinación del presidente Felipe Calderón (2006–2012), y no obstante la
fuerte presión norteamericana para que disminuya el flujo de narcóticos hacia
el norte. Como en el caso de Colombia y las FARC, se trata de una debilidad
del Estado con fuerte impacto sobre las relaciones internacionales mexicanas.
Por otra parte y como es obvio, el narcotráfico es en sí mismo un fenómeno
transnacional en el que todos los cárteles importantes tienen significativos vínculos
propios que trascienden las fronteras. Como ya se dijo, el negocio existe por-
que los consumidores, principalmente de países ricos, demandan sus produc-
tos, y los cárteles frecuentemente se fortalecen gracias a sus vínculos con orga-
nizaciones hermanas en otros países, con quienes configuran verdaderas cade-
nas de abastecimiento. A diferencia de los Estados, cuyas relaciones más que
internacionales son interestatales, el narcotráfico (como el deporte, aunque de
manera diferente) vincula entre sí a diversos segmentos de muchas naciones,
a la vez que se enfrenta (por lo menos en teoría) a la mayoría de los Estados.
En verdad, los vínculos panamericanos del narcotráfico son muy fuertes, en
especial los que existen entre las organizaciones mexicanas y las colombianas.
Los viajes a México de representantes de cárteles colombianos para organizar
las entregas de cocaína sudamericana son tan frecuentes e importantes como
los desplazamientos por negocios de los ejecutivos de grandes corporaciones.
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Por otra parte, otra dimensión panamericana de los cárteles mexicanos es la
mano de obra especializada emigrada de América Central, de la que ha podido
nutrirse. Hasta la fecha, la más notoria proviene de desertores de las fuerzas
especiales guatemaltecas, los feroces “kaibiles”, cuyos reclutas están obligados
a arrancar cabezas de pollos vivos de un mordisco. Por su experiencia en las
luchas civiles de su país, están bien entrenados en el uso de explosivos, lo que
no es común entre los narcotraficantes mexicanos, cuya tropa frecuentemente
proviene del ejército y la policía locales. Según las autoridades mexicanas, ya en
el siglo XXI, desertores kaibiles han entrenado a algunos de los cuadros más
aguerridos de los cárteles mexicanos.
En el presente, las organizaciones mafiosas más fuertes de México son la
Federación de Cárteles de Sinaloa, y los cárteles del Golfo y de Tijuana. El
menos poderoso entre éstos es el de Tijuana, también conocido como
Organización Arellano Félix, otrora legendaria. El del Golfo, el más importan-
te, sufre en la actualidad un intenso embate de parte de las fuerzas del gobier-
no. Y la Federación de Sinaloa, a su vez, es una coalición muy fuerte que nació
cuando, a partir de 1997, colapsó el cártel de Juárez al morir Amado Carrillo
Fuentes, su caudillo. Debilitada esa hasta entonces poderosa organización,
algunas de sus ramas – como las de Zambada García y Esparragoza – se
aliaron a cárteles más chicos. Juntos configuraron una poderosa fuerza nueva.
Una mirada a un mapa de México dividido en las zonas de influencia de los
cárteles, apabulla. En 2008 se libra una feroz guerra por el control mafioso de
territorios en Yucatán, Guerrero, Jalisco y Chihuahua, que incide incluso sobre
el control del tráfico en la ciudad estadounidense de El Paso y su zona de
influencia. Otras ciudades del Estado de Texas, como Del Río y Laredo, están
firmemente bajo la influencia del cártel del Golfo. Douglas, en el sur de Arizona,
se encuentra en la zona atendida por la Federación de Sinaloa.
Es quizás por este motivo que, azuzados por los estadounidenses, hacia
mayo de 2008 el gobierno mexicano montó un enorme operativo en su lado
de la frontera, donde congregó unos seis mil efectivos. Uno de sus objetivos
inmediatos era doblegar a Los Zetas, el temible brazo armado del cártel del
Golfo. Al momento de entregarse este trabajo al editor, algunos de sus dirigen-
tes podrían estar acorralados por las fuerzas del orden y a punto de caer.
A su vez, el origen de este grupo de mercenarios – algunos de los cuales
fueron entrenados por kaibiles guatemaltecos – da la pauta de la dificultad que
enfrenta cualquier gobierno mexicano que se proponga derrotar al narcotráfico.
“Zeta” es un código de radio para oficiales de alto rango de la policía federal
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mexicana, y se sabe que la mayor parte de Los Zetas han pertenecido a fuerzas
de elite del Estado. Similar es el origen de Los Pelones, el brazo armado de la
Federación de Sinaloa. Estos escuadrones se especializan en intimidar y matar,
para posibilitar la plena vigencia de la ley mafiosa sin la cual el narcotráfico se
desmoronaría. Son, a los cárteles, lo que las fuerzas armadas y de seguridad
son al Estado.
Aunque el gobierno norteamericano quisiera acotar – si no eliminar – toda
la industria mexicana de narcóticos, sus esfuerzos son más intensos en el caso
del cártel del Golfo debido al control, por parte de éste, de gran parte del
tráfico fronterizo. Es por esa presión que, en enero de 2007, las autoridades
finalmente efectivizaron la extradición a Estados Unidos de Osiel Cárdenas
Guillén, jefe máximo del cártel, que había caído preso cuatro años antes. En
ese momento, el gobierno extraditó un total de quince mafiosos, incluyendo los
hermanos Ismael y Gilberto Higuera Guerrero, otrora encumbrados oficiales
del cártel de Tijuana. Y pocos meses antes, en septiembre de 2006, se había
extraditado al propio Francisco Rafael Arellano Félix, hermano menor del clan
de su nombre.
Pero es digno de notarse que, hasta esa fecha, el gobierno del ex presidente
Vicente Fox (2000–2006) sólo había entregado figuras menores a Estados
Unidos. Sin duda que esto no se debía a una complicidad de Fox con los mafiosos,
sino a su conocimiento de las vulnerabilidades de su Estado y al temor de las
represalias que los cárteles podrían desatar. Por cierto, la lucha contra el narcotráfico
mexicano ilustra con elocuencia la permanente dialéctica tejida entre la debili-
dad del Estado y la naturaleza de sus relaciones internacionales.
Por otra parte, la decadencia del cártel de Tijuana a partir de la eliminación,
por muerte o captura, de algunos de sus principales caudillos, corrobora una
enseñanza admonitoria. El fenómeno ya se había observado con el previo co-
lapso del cártel de Juárez. Como en Colombia, cuando una organización delictiva
sufre un revés, otras tienden a ocupar el vacío de poder. En 2008, la orga-
nización asediada por las fuerzas del orden es el cártel del Golfo, cuyo vasto
imperio se maneja desde las ciudades fronterizas de Nuevo Laredo, Reynosa,
Matamoros y Río Bravo. Si caen algunas de sus principales figuras, el casi
seguro resultado no será la eliminación de sus operaciones, sino el desencade-
namiento de una violencia furiosa para determinar qué organización ocupa los
territorios correspondientes a capitostes caídos y quién domina al interior del
cártel herido. Con el afianzamiento de una nueva distribución del poder terri-
torial, emerge un nuevo equilibrio y una nueva época de paz y prosperidad
delictiva.
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A principios de mayo de 2008, cuando los analistas se preparaban para un
zarpazo de la Federación de Sinaloa contra sus rivales del Cártel del Golfo, se
vieron sorprendidos porque en vez de aprovechar la coyuntural debilidad de su
asediado competidor, aquél asestó un duró golpe contra el gobierno central.
Asesinó en Ciudad de México a Edgar Millán Gómez, al más alto funcionario
policial del país, responsable directo de toda la lucha contra el narcotráfico. La
semana anterior había caído otro importante policía, Roberto Velasco Bravo,
también en el Distrito Federal, corazón del poder del Estado. Y hubo varios
más en fecha muy reciente. La consecuencia probable es que se relaje la situación
en la frontera con Estados Unidos, ya que el gobierno mexicano deberá trasla-
dar recursos de represión a la meseta central.
Comentando el caso, el analista estadounidense George Friedman publicó
el 13 de mayo un artículo con un significativo título: “Mexico: on the Road to
a Failed State?” Su reflexión es que puede estar próximo el momento en que,
frente a la opción de enriquecerse con el narcotráfico o morir asesinado por el
mismo, los más altos funcionarios nacionales optarán por lo primero. Y esa es
su definición de un Estado fallido.
Por cierto, el narcotráfico mexicano continuará floreciente, violento y vigo-
roso, debido a que el Estado es demasiado débil como para que segmentos de
sus estratos medios y altos no sucumban a la influencia de un negocio tan
lucrativo, capaz de movilizar a tanta gente que sin su aporte sería paupérrima.
Cuando poderosas fuerzas sociales se conjuran para llevar a cabo una activi-
dad catalogada como ilícita, los transitorios éxitos de la acción represiva no
suelen culminar con el aumento de la capacidad ordenadora del Estado, sino
con un reordenamiento de los conjurados. Los mismos Estados Unidos vivieron
procesos similares cuando, entre 1920 y 1933, intentaron prohibir las bebi-
das alcohólicas en su propio territorio.
Prueba de la vigencia de este fenómeno es lo acaecido en años recientes
con la Federación de Sinaloa. Gracias a la complicidad de decenas de guardias,
su jefe, Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, escapó en 2001 de una prisión de máxima
seguridad. Según análisis de inteligencia de fuente abierta, hacia marzo de
2008 se escondía en Pachuca, una ciudad que no sólo está lejos de los territo-
rios de su cártel, sino que se encuentra a apenas 98 kilómetros de la capital
mexicana. Desde su huída de la cárcel hasta fines de 2007, El Chapo cortejó
ostentosamente a una niña de 18 años, a cuyo pueblo se trasladaba en uno de
sus helicópteros. Sistemáticamente, cuando la visitaba, sus fuerzas cerraban
todos los accesos a la localidad con prolijidad y eficiencia.
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Finalmente, en noviembre de ese año, Guzmán y su joven novia contraje-
ron matrimonio en la localidad de Torreón, Estado de Coahuila, con bombos
y platillos. Según todos los informes, el territorio fue “liberado” por órdenes de
funcionarios comprados por el cártel. Estas hazañas son recurrentes: de vez en
cuando, el caudillo cena en público en el restaurante de algún pueblo cuyos
accesos han sido cortados transitoriamente por sus fuerzas, para que pueda
disfrutar tranquilo. Tales son los límites del poder del Estado mexicano.
Los límites del accionar estadounidense
No obstante, está claro que el mismo problema no afecta a los Estados Unidos.
Objetivamente, éstos poseen el poder requerido para frenar el tráfico de dro-
gas que atraviesa su frontera terrestre. Su Estado domina su propio territorio
tanto como puede esperarse de un país no totalitario. La pregunta que cabe es
entonces: ¿por qué no lo hace?
La respuesta se ancla en el ABC del comercio internacional. México es el
tercer socio más importante de Estados Unidos en el mundo entero. El monto
de sus exportaciones a ese país está superado sólo por Canadá, a la vez que
sólo los canadienses y los chinos importan más de Estados Unidos. En 2006,
las importaciones norteamericanas desde México llegaron a los 198.000 mi-
llones de dólares, a la vez que exportaron a ese destino por 134.000 millones.
Este comercio legal, que no es sacrificable para la economía de Estados
Unidos, depende del bajo costo del transporte y de una frontera eficiente. Para
posibilitar el flujo rápido y permanente de las mercancías, el contenido de los
vehículos raramente se verifica con esmero. Sólo así puede administrarse seme-
jante caudal de tráfico. Por consiguiente, es inevitable el ingreso de drogas
escondidas entre las importaciones legales – como también el de inmigrantes
ilegales. Encarecer el comercio con México con un control férreo, o reempla-
zarlo con importaciones de países más lejanos, pagando altos fletes, obraría en
detrimento de la economía estadounidense y afectaría el nivel de vida de su
gente. Para colmo, tampoco falta corrupción en el lado norte de la frontera.
Podrá objetarse que el comercio bilateral es mucho menos sacrificable aún
para los mexicanos. Por cierto, los países que le siguen a Estados Unidos en
importancia como socios comerciales, China y Japón, compraron en 2006 por
apenas 1.700 y 1.600 millones de dólares. En otras palabras, el primero de
éstos compró en México por un valor 116 veces inferior al de las compras
estadounidenses en ese país. La dependencia mexicana frente a la economía de
los Estados Unidos es abismal. Pero el dato resulta irrelevante, porque aunque
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estuviera en juego ese mercado gigantesco, el gobierno mexicano no podría
intentar la eliminación del narcotráfico sin destruir su propio Estado.
México podrá colaborar “enérgicamente”, poniendo coto a sus cárteles,
pero mientras haya una fuerte demanda de narcóticos del otro lado de la fron-
tera, no podrá eliminar a estas mafias colosalmente poderosas. Téngase en
cuenta que las pulsiones que motorizan las relaciones auténticamente “interna-
cionales” no se limitan a las exigencias de un Estado sobre otro: la demanda
estadounidense de narcóticos es una pulsión aún más poderosa. Lo que el
gobierno de Washington le pide a México está en total contradicción con lo
que le pide el mercado estadounidense. Las opciones del Estado mexicano son
limitadas, porque éste no quiere ni debe ni puede controlar totalitariamente
a su sociedad.
Sólo Estados Unidos tiene opciones radicales, y esto sólo en teoría. Es por
eso que, mucho antes de que entrara en vigencia el NAFTA, se llegó al modus
vivendi actual. El costo, para el país del norte, de fortalecer su economía con
importaciones legales de bajo costo provenientes de México, es tolerar no sólo
el tráfico ilegal de narcóticos e inmigrantes, sino también una medida de crimi-
nalidad y violencia en su frontera sur, que de manera limitada se derrama sobre
su propio territorio.
En enero de 2008, en una batalla campal en pleno centro de la ciudad
fronteriza de Tijuana entre mafiosos y una combinación de fuerzas policiales
y militares, se puso de manifiesto una vez más el poder de los cárteles. La
batalla duró más de tres horas y requirió el traslado de unos 500 efectivos de
refuerzo. Como si se tratara de insurgentes de las calles de Bagdad, los
narcotraficantes emplearon cohetes lanzagranadas. Casi no hay armamento
militar que no puedan adquirir. A la vez, la violencia no enajena a la gran masa
de la población, porque desde siempre, los cárteles mexicanos se han cuidado
de reducir a un mínimo el número de víctimas inocentes. Las bajas colaterales
son relativamente escasas.
La batalla de Tijuana y otros intensos tiroteos recientes entre organizacio-
nes que combaten entre sí por el dominio de zonas estratégicas en la frontera,
alertaron a los servicios de seguridad y de inteligencia estadounidenses, que
saben que este tipo de violencia fácilmente puede trasladarse a su país. En los
hechos, algunos mafiosos del cártel del Golfo, perseguidos por el gobierno
mexicano, ya han huido a refugios en Estados Unidos, donde incluso hay ins-
talados arsenales de los cárteles.
En un pasado ya lejano, cuando la expansión de las actividades ilegales
mexicanas sobre el territorio estadounidense superó cierto umbral, se produjo
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una intervención armada de ese país. Fue lo ocurrido en 1916, cuando Pan-
cho Villa comenzó a operar dentro de Estados Unidos. Menos lejos en el tiem-
po están las incursiones punitorias de 1985 de la Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA), cuyas fuerzas cruzaron la frontera varias veces para castigar a los res-
ponsables de la tortura y asesinato del agente especial Enrique “Kiki” Camarena.
Pero la complejidad de las relaciones bilaterales entre los dos países, en el contex-
to de la actual economía globalizada, torna poco viables esas alternativas.
No obstante, desatada la crisis de octubre de 2008 sobre las finanzas y la
economía norteamericanas, el futuro de México es imprevisible. La alta depen-
dencia engendrada por el NAFTA puede resultar en una catástrofe económica,
política y social que agudice la agonía de su Estado y potencie el poder de sus
cárteles. En ese caso, la reacción norteamericana también sería imprevisible.
Estados Unidos, muy cerca de México y muy lejos de Dios, inevitablemente
importa parte de las lacras engendradas por la debilidad crónica del Estado
azteca.
Conclusiones
Los casos abordados en este estudio sugieren la validez de lo que Robert Cox
postuló para el sistema interestatal en su conjunto: que desde la perspectiva de
un mediano o largo plazo, la inserción internacional y la política exterior son
más el producto de profundas fuerzas económicas, sociales y culturales, en
gran medida endógenas, que de la voluntad de los gobernantes y sus proyectos
estratégicos.
Asimismo, se ha verificado que las circunstancias singulares del nacimiento
de los Estados latinoamericanos engendraron mitos fundacionales que, dos-
cientos años más tarde, aún se proyectan sobre el presente de la interacción
internacional de cada uno de ellos. Esta generalización es más valida para la
América española, cuyos diversos Estados debieron engendrar diferencias
identitarias para consolidar su individualidad, que para el único Estado luso-
americano, que más fácilmente desarrolló una identidad específica.
Pero la vigorosa proyección del pasado sobre el presente no sólo se verifica
en las ficciones de origen. Los diversos casos analizados sugieren una fuerte
path dependence, diferente para cada uno de ellos, en varias esferas de la vida
política. Las crisis argentina y boliviana, los problemas de gobernabilidad
brasileños y mexicanos, el populismo venezolano, la porosidad paraguaya, el
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desafío a la integridad territorial colombiana y las imágenes de un Chile
“tricontinental” propaladas por su misma Presidencia, no pueden comprender-
se sin estudiar los caminos divergentes de cada una de estas sociedades desde
que se separaron de España y Portugal. A la vez, cada uno de estos síndromes
tiene una fuerte gravitación sobre las relaciones internacionales actuales de
estos países.
Todos los Estados latinoamericanos son débiles, en el sentido de que tienen
dificultades a la hora de hacerse obedecer por su propia gente, especialmente
si se trata de exacciones fiscales. Por eso, tienen menos autonomía, tanto inter-
na como externa, para defender los intereses de su colectivo nacional. Parecen
especialmente vulnerables a la captura y explotación por parte de burguesías
prebendarias, tanto autóctonas como extranjeras.
Porque los Estados latinoamericanos son fácilmente capturados por intere-
ses facciosos que los usan para provecho propio, tiende a concentrarse el
ingreso, engendrando pobreza. Y así emerge una tendencia al populismo, que
más que vicio político es una resultante estructural de la pobreza masiva y la
educación deficiente.
Por cierto, cuando se profundiza la democracia política en países sumidos
en la miseria y el analfabetismo funcional, los beneficios electorales de la dema-
gogia suelen ser mayores que sus costos internos. Aunque la demagogia gene-
ra altos costos colectivos, éstos son de largo plazo y normalmente no perjudi-
can a los políticos individuales. Por el contrario, una vez instalado el juego de
suma cero, el político que privilegie el interés colectivo sobre el de su facción
particular perderá frente a la demagogia de sus rivales. Y dada esta estructura
de juego, dichos rivales tenderán a acudir a la demagogia.
Hasta el presente, Chile es el país que mayor éxito ha tenido evitando este
círculo vicioso, pero corre peligro mientras no mejore la distribución de su
ingreso y disminuya la pobreza más allá de los parámetros de la región. Gracias
a que sus gobernantes han podido evitar el extremo pragmatismo interno de,
por caso, sus contrapartes argentinos, su política externa pudo conservar su
pragmatismo, contribuyendo al crecimiento.
Pero aunque su trayectoria señala cuál es el camino del ansiado círculo
virtuoso, su receta posiblemente no esté al alcance de los gobernantes de países
en los que el juego de suma cero ya está instalado. Universalmente, cuando
(bajo la vigencia del sufragio universal) está en juego la supervivencia del go-
bierno o de los políticos, el largo plazo tiende a sacrificarse, confirmando una
vez más que el verdadero actor en las relaciones interestatales no es el Estado
sino el complejo Estado/sociedad civil.
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De cualquier manera, no todo es estructural. Existen factores aleatorios
que pueden tener enormes consecuencias, positivas y negativas, sobre cada
uno de estos países y la región en su conjunto. Un ejemplo relevante es el
surgimiento de un líder carismático como Chávez, que ha engendrado una
gran inestabilidad continental.
Además, hay factores externos a la región que inciden profundamente so-
bre las fuerzas internas. Por ejemplo, los altos precios del petróleo, sin los
cuales Chávez no sería un peligro para otros países, o los altos precios de la
soja, sin los cuales los populistas Kirchner no hubieran podido alejar a la Ar-
gentina de su crisis.
A la vez, la crisis global desatada en octubre de 2008 puede transformar
estos guarismos en un santiamén, cambiando radicalmente las ecuaciones de la
política interna y externa de estos Estados. Por cierto, al momento de entregar-
se este trabajo al editor se abre una enorme incógnita respecto del futuro
iberoamericano, en el contexto de lo que parece el comienzo de una grave
crisis del capitalismo global.
Aunque no hubiera tal crisis de por medio, el factor extrarregional de ma-
yor relevancia para la región sería siempre Estados Unidos, por su peso tanto
político como económico. Dejando de lado a México, con quien ha establecido
una alianza estratégica, su proyección es principalmente destructiva. Su mer-
cado demanda narcóticos, a la vez que su Estado declara la “guerra a las
drogas” por el lado de la oferta, exportando violencia a América latina. Y si
contara con la complicidad de algunos gobernantes de la región, es probable
que Washington estuviera dispuesto a desencadenar una guerra local para sa-
carse de encima al peligroso Chávez, y de paso destruir las FARC colombianas
y eliminar los subsidios venezolanos a Cuba, Bolivia y Nicaragua.
Pero curiosamente, estos gobernantes latinoamericanos que con tanta faci-
lidad sacrifican el interés nacional, vendiéndose al voto, no se dejan seducir
fácilmente por el encanto americano. Su actitud de 2008, evitando la guerra y
frustrando a los Estados Unidos, demuestra una vez más que América latina es
más que un capricho clasificatorio.
Tiene identidad y puede llegar a tener entidad.
La civilización iberoamericana
Más allá de todo, nuestra conclusión más importante es la confirmación de la
vigencia del modelo enunciado a comienzos de este trabajo. Por razones es-
tructurales vinculadas al proceso de gestación de los Estados iberoamericanos,
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la región está caracterizada por dos singularidades sin paralelos en el mundo:
ausencia tanto de guerras totales como de violencia interna de magnitud
holocáustica (ilustrada por el hecho de que jamás se protagonizaron allí episo-
dios comparables a los genocidios judío, armenio, yugoslavo, camboyano
o ruandés), e injusticia social extrema (medida en términos de la concentración
del ingreso).
A partir de su nacimiento, los recorridos de los diversos países de la región
fueron muy divergentes. No obstante, compartieron una característica que
contribuye a explicar estructuralmente tanto la ausencia de violencia extrema
como la polarización en la distribución del ingreso: la debilidad de los inci-
pientes Estados latinoamericanos al momento de producirse la crisis de la
Independencia.
Esta deficiencia de origen (no compartida por las trece colonias angloame-
ricanas al momento de gestarse su Guerra Revolucionaria) se proyecta hasta el
presente. Y tanto la viciosa concentración del ingreso, como la virtuosa ausen-
cia relativa de guerra total y violencia holocáustica, parecen emanaciones de
esa persistente debilidad del Estado.
Por otra parte, estudios cuantitativos sobre la guerra y la violencia demues-
tran que a lo largo de los doscientos años de independencia de estos países, el
segundo rasgo se ha acentuado. Quizá por eso, esa singularidad de origen
estructural parece haberse convertido en parte de una conciencia colectiva que
forja imperativos categóricos. Por ejemplo, el mandamiento “no bombardearás
ciudades” mencionado en la primera sección. En verdad, las ciudades latinoa-
mericanas jamás fueron bombardeadas como lo han sido las europeas y asiáticas
por otros europeos y asiáticos. Este hallazgo converge con señalamientos pre-
vios, de autores ya mencionados, que sugieren que en América latina ha surgi-
do una envidiable y singularmente civilizada cultura diplomática, que facilita la
resolución de conflictos.
Por cierto, en Iberoamérica se firman más tratados que en ninguna otra
región del mundo, a la vez que éstos se acatan con mucha menor frecuencia.
Curiosamente, pocos esperan que se cumplan. Pero esto no significa que sean
irrelevantes. Por el contrario, muchos de esos acuerdos no respetados son el
trasfondo ritual de un concierto latinoamericano que una y otra vez evita la
guerra a través de mecanismos ad hoc.
MERCOSUR, por caso, es un bloque comercial cuyos protocolos muchas
veces no se cumplen. Cuenta un distinguido ex funcionario argentino que, en
el contexto de unas conversaciones con Estados Unidos en que los países del
bloque exigieron que éste fuera respetado, los norteamericanos preguntaron
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intrigados qué era exactamente lo que ellos debían respetar, dado que la mayor
parte de las regulaciones no eran respetadas por los mismos Estados miembros.
El funcionario sorprendió a sus interlocutores con esta sentencia: “el MER-
COSUR es la paz”.
En verdad, aunque éste se presenta jurídicamente como un bloque comer-
cial, en la práctica es otra cosa. Es un lubricante que afianza la cooperación
informal, vacunando contra las escaladas de conflictos. Es un ejemplo de un
estilo diplomático sui géneris pero sofisticado. Por cierto, como ya lo señalara
Kacowicz, la diplomacia latinoamericana descansa sobre una cultura casi in-
descifrable que el extranjero debe decodificar si aspira a vincularse con éxito.
Simultáneamente, el segundo rasgo de nuestro modelo también ha trascen-
dido su origen estructural para convertirse en parte de la cultura. Las grandes
desigualdades sociales, vigentes quizás desde tiempos precolombinos, parecen
haberse convertido en parte de una conciencia pervertida que las toma con
naturalidad. En tal sentido, como ya se dijo, la región se caracteriza por la
ausencia de un imperativo categórico, vigente de manera limitada e imperfecta
tanto en los países capitalistas desarrollados como en los pocos Estados comu-
nistas supérstites (Cuba incluida). Este mandato ordena: “no extremarás la
explotación de tu propio pueblo”.
Lejos de ese ideal, en la América latina profunda los pobres se han conver-
tido en parte de un color local que enriquece la extraña estética local, sin herir
la conciencia moral del buen burgués. Éste, a su vez, parece creer que el
acceso al servicio doméstico es un derecho natural de la clase media, lo que
exige la existencia de una clase masiva de sirvientes que sólo es compatible con
una alta concentración del ingreso.
Por lo tanto, debido a esta combinación de rasgos estructurales que se han
convertido en parte constitutiva de la cultura, postulamos que más que región
del mundo, América latina es una “civilización”, tan diferenciada de las demás
como pueden serlo la europea, la china, la india o la islámica.
Este estatus es poco visible, sin embargo, debido a su filiación europea.
Obsérvese que, a diferencia de otras regiones del mundo, los diversos nombres
por los que se la conoce refieren todos a su origen mestizo: América latina,
Iberoamérica, Hispanoamérica, Lusoamérica. Los términos “latino”, “hispa-
no”, “luso” e “íbero” refieren directamente a Europa. Incluso “América” (también
usado por Estados Unidos, pero sin adjetivo identitario) tiene su origen en
Amerigo Vespucci, un navegante italiano al servicio de las coronas de España
y Portugal.
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Esta filiación, por otra parte, condice con la condición de “madre patria”
y “mãe pátria” que los manuales escolares latinoamericanos adjudican a sus
antiguas metrópolis. A diferencia de la memoria de la Conquista, que produce
gran escozor en sectores indigenistas, en la mayoría de estos países este romántico
y filial punto de referencia genera pocos resentimientos. Sin jamás habérselo
propuesto, los Estados ibéricos prohijaron una nueva civilización allende el
Atlántico, de la que – Guerra Civil Española por testigo – no forman parte.
Con sus luces y sombras, esta novísima civilización es un actor relativamen-
te benigno de la comunidad global. Exporta drogas que estadounidenses
y europeos se desesperan por consumir. Sus burguesías explotan a sus clases
populares como en ninguna otra de las grandes regiones del mundo. Pero no
será desde ella que se desencadene la guerra holocáustica que termine con la
especie humana.
Oculta detrás de sus numerosas e indisimulables lacras hay una grandeza
paradójica.
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